Tuesday, July 31, 2007

SUmmary 2007 WY 116

Summary of Decision issued July 27, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Pinther v. Ditzel

Citation: 2007 WY 116

Docket Number: 06-231

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Donald Eugene Miller of Graves, Miller & Kingston, Cheyenne, Wyoming

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Terry Wynn Connolly, of Patton & Davison, Cheyenne, Wyoming

Date of Decision: July 27, 2007

Issue: Whether the district court properly applied the tort of negligent misrepresentation to reduce the payoff amount on a mortgage.

Facts/Discussion: Ditzel wanted to pay off a loan and extinguish the mortgage on his property, but he and Pinther could not agree on the payoff amount. Ditzel filed a declaratory judgment action asking the district court to determine the payoff amount.
Standard of Review: Following a bench trial the Court reviews a district court decision using a clearly erroneous standard for factual findings and a de novo standard for conclusions of law.
A published foreclosure notice had stated that the payoff amount on the mortgage would be $37,609.73. Ditzel contended that Pinther was bound by that amount, even if it proved to be incorrect, and even though the foreclosure sale had been canceled. In contrast, Pinther relied on the mortgage agreement, which allowed him to include certain filing fees, insurance premiums, attorney’s fees, and taxes that he had mistakenly failed to include in the published payoff amount for a payoff amount of $57,675.93 as of the foreclosure sale date. Pinther asserted that, because the foreclosure sale on the senior mortgage had been canceled, he was not obligated to accept as the payoff amount the mistaken figure published in the foreclosure notice. The district court accepted Ditzel’s argument, and ruled that the payoff amount, as of the foreclosure sale date, was the lower figure of $37,609.73.

Negligent misrepresentation is a tort claim. Ditzel did not actually assert negligent misrepresentation as a separate tort claim. The ‘negligent misrepresentation’ issue was forwarded only as a method for the court to determine the amount necessary to pay the note and release the mortgage. Tort theories may not be used to change the terms of a written agreement. Where the parties have a contractual agreement, the contractual relationship controls, and parties are not permitted to assert actions in tort in an attempt to circumvent the bargain they agreed upon. Absent a completed foreclosure sale, Pinther owed no duty to Ditzel in representing the payoff amount on the senior mortgage. Accordingly, there was no foundation for the conclusion that the tort of negligent misrepresentation justifies a departure from the terms of the mortgage agreement.

Holdings: The district court erred when it used the tort of negligent misrepresentation to vary the terms of a written agreement. The payoff amount should have been calculated in accordance with the parties’ written agreement.

Reversed and remanded.

J. Burke delivered the opinion for the court.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/37h7kg .

Summary 2007 WY 119

Summary of Decision issued July 31, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Doles v. State

Citation: 2007 WY 119

Docket Number: S-07-0002

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, the Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Nicholas H. Carter of Carter Law Office, PC, Gillette, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; and David L. Delicath, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Issue: Whether the Appellant’s acquittal on related criminal charges acts collaterally to estop the State from pursuing forfeiture.

Facts/Discussion: This is an appeal from a district court’s order of forfeiture in which order the district court found certain items to be “drug paraphernalia” as defined by statute and ordered their forfeiture to the State of Wyoming.
The Court reviews de novo a district court’s application of or refusal to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel because it is a question of law. All three criminal charges against Appellant were based on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1056. Coffey v. United States is the seminal case in this area of law. While not relying directly upon the equitable doctrine of collateral estoppel, the United States Supreme Court declared that the acquittals in the criminal case barred the government from pursuing civil forfeiture. Appellant contended that the holding of Coffey endured citing the following cases: Lowther v. United States, United States v. One 1956 Ford Fairlane Tudor Sedan; Bramble v. Kleindienst; United States v. 86.9 Cases; and United States v. One De Soto Sedan. The Wyoming case in which collateral estoppel was applied to forfeiture proceedings after a criminal action is State v. Eleven Thousand Three Hundred Forty-Six Dollars & No Cents in United States Currency. The Court carefully limited its opinion as to the extent of the effect of collateral estoppel. The Court held the State was barred from relitigating the issue of whether the law enforcement officers had probable cause at the time of the seizure and arrest but that the State was not barred from attempting to prove, under another subsection of the forfeiture statute that the State Board of Pharmacy or the Attorney General otherwise had probable cause to believe that the money was traceable to violations of the controlled substances act. Thus the case did not involve the direct issue of the effect of an acquittal upon a forfeiture action.
Coffey has been overruled. The Supreme Court determined that Coffey did not apply to estop the government from pursuing a tax deficiency after an acquittal on related criminal charges because the recovery action required a different burden of proof. The Court stated they accepted and adopted the reasoning of 89 Firearms, One Lot Emerald and Helvering where a general verdict of not guilty in a criminal case does not answer the same question asked in a civil forfeiture action under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1049. Because the jury returned a general verdict of not guilty on the three charges in the instant case, the Court does not know what element of the crimes it found unproven beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore, they do not know whether the jury determined that the seized items were not drug paraphernalia.

Holding: The district court correctly determined that the acquittal of the Appellant in the criminal case that preceded the forfeiture proceeding did not collaterally estop the State from pursuing forfeiture.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2tgxz5 .

Summary 2007 WY 118

Summary of Decision issued July 31, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Meyers v. State

Citation: 2007 WY 118

Docket Number: 05-284

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, the Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Ken M. Koski, State Public Defender, PDP; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General.

Issue: Whether the District Court erred in denying Meyers’ post-sentence “Motion to Withdraw No Contest Plea” without a hearing and should his claim also be rejected as res judicata.

Facts/Discussion: Meyers sought to withdraw his nolo contendere plea after the district court sentenced him for attempted voluntary manslaughter. The district court denied Meyers’ motion without a hearing. The Court noted that most of the facts were stated in their decision on Meyers’ first appeal from 2005.
Withdrawal of Plea:
Rule 32(d), W.R.Cr.P., states that after a criminal defendant who pleads nolo contendere is sentenced, such plea may be set aside only to correct manifest injustice. The district court has discretion in deciding whether or not manifest injustice exists. It does not specify that a district court must hold a hearing and the Court has adopted a two-part test formerly used by the federal courts in determining whether or not to allow the withdrawal of a plea: if the defendant alleges facts which if true, would entitle him to relief and the trial court can deny a hearing if the defendant’s allegations are contradicted by the record, are inherently unreliable or are merely conclusions rather than statements of fact.
Meyers’ contention that he was denied a psychological evaluation was directly contradicted by the record. A hearing on his claims would not have presented any plausible basis for concluding that manifest injustice would result if withdrawal was not permitted.

Res Judicata:
It is a longstanding rule that issues which could have been raised in an earlier proceeding are foreclosed from subsequent consideration. Meyers appealed his case long before he moved to withdraw his plea. He could have claimed that his plea was involuntary but did not.

Holding: The district court properly decided Meyers’ motion to withdraw plea without a hearing. Meyers should have made his claim that his plea was involuntary in his original appeal. Res judicata prevents him from making that claim now. The action of the district court is affirmed on each of these bases.

Affirmed.

Kautz, District Judge delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/26nest .

Summary 2007 WY 117

Summary of Decision issued July 31, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Bradley v. Bradley

Citation: 2007 WY 117

Docket Number: 06-201

Appeal from the District Court of Teton County, the Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): Kenneth S. Cohen of Cohen Law Offices, PC, Jackson, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Jessica Rutzick, Jackson, Wyoming.

Issue: Whether the district court properly applied Minnesota law to a purported modification of a premarital agreement where the premarital agreement included a choice of law provision calling for Minnesota law to govern its “validity, execution, enforcement, and construction.”

Facts/Discussion: Husband appealed from the district court’s order granting a partial summary judgment in favor of Wife. The court ruled, as a matter of law, that Minnesota law applied to the modification provision of the parties’ premarital agreement and their post-nuptial amendment to the agreement was unenforceable because it did not comply with Minnesota statutes.
The Court reviews all aspects of the district court’s decision to grant a summary judgment de novo. They employ the same standards and examine the same materials as the district court.
The Court reviewed the applicable Minnesota statutes and stated that it was undisputed the parties did not comply with the statute in numerous ways when they executed the amendment. Husband conceded the amendment was not enforceable under Minnesota law but argued that the choice of law did not apply to the provision pertaining to modification of the premarital agreement. Courts in Minnesota and Wyoming seek to interpret contracts in accordance with the parties’ intentions.
Husband argued that under the plain language of the premarital agreement, the choice of Minnesota law in Article 15 did not extend to the method of amending or modifying the contract under Article 14. The Court disagreed. The Court noted that Wyoming and Minnesota rules for interpreting contracts are very similar. The clear language in Article 15 broadly defined the scope of the choice of law provision. Under the terms of Articles 14 and 15, execution of an amendment to a premarital agreement must be accomplished in accordance with Minnesota law.
The general language of Article 15 makes it clear the parties intended the choice of law provision to apply broadly to the contract. Under the clear and unambiguous language of the premarital agreement, Minnesota law applies to amendment of the agreement. The Court’s analysis continued with a discussion of Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws which generally respects the parties’ contractual choice of law. Minnesota law is not contrary to Wyoming law or public policy, the parties had sufficient contacts with Minnesota (property and time spent) so under the Restatements, the parties’ choice of Minnesota law was valid.

Holding: The district court correctly held the plain language of the premarital agreement directed that Minnesota law applied to the procedure for amending the agreement and the 2003 amendment did not comply with the applicable Minnesota statute. Consequently, the district court correctly granted a partial summary judgment in favor of Wife, declaring the amendment unenforceable.

Affirmed.

J. Kite delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/257lt6 .

Friday, July 27, 2007

West eLearning Center

There is a new resource available for users of Westlaw that is free, online and interactive. The West eLearning Center now provides short (8 minutes or less) lessons to help you get the most from your Westlaw subscription.

They do, of course, require a registration--but it's fairly painless as these things go. Just give them a name, email and password, and you can take a course at your convenience, track your progress, and even email lessons to colleagues or employees.

Below are some topics you will find in these courses. See if you can learn some new tricks and maybe even cut down some of that Westlaw bill. It's time for some training!

[Update: Don't forget -- you can use free public access Westlaw in the law library!]

Getting Started on Westlaw

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  • WestMate®
Resources for Litigation
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Westlaw for Paralegals
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Tuesday, July 24, 2007

Summary 2007 WY 115

Summary of Decision issued July 24, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Nickle v. Board of County Commissioners, Platte County, Wyoming

Citation: 2007 WY 115

Docket Number: 06-128

Appeal from the District Court of Platte County, the Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Frank J. Jones, Wheatland, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Eric Alden, Wheatland, Wyoming.

Issues: Whether the County has the right to recover the costs expended for abatement of a nuisance. Whether the County is entitled to recover against the supersedeas bond in the instant case for its damages incurred by the delay caused by filing of that appeal.

Facts/Discussion: Nickle challenged the district court’s order that had the effect of applying a portion of a supersedeas bond that Nickle posted in an earlier appeal, which arose out of the same circumstances as the instant appeal, so as to recompense Platte county Board of County Commissioners (the County) for damages it suffered as a result of that appeal which was dismissed for want of prosecution.
To the extent the case involves the district court’s construction of W.R.A.P. 4.02, the question of law is reviewed de novo. However, in its totality the question presented is a mixed question of law and fact. Whether the rule in question contemplates an award for the sorts of damages at issue is a question of law but the district court must also take evidence on which to base any award of damages that may be allowed by the rule. The findings are considered presumptively correct and the appellate court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record. Findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. It is appellant’s burden to bring the Court a complete record. In the absence of anything to refute them, the Court will sustain the trial court’s findings and assume the evidence presented was sufficient to support those findings.

Holding: The record in the case was woefully incomplete. From the materials forwarded, the Court could only conclude that the district court did not err as a matter of law to the extent that it applied W.R.A.P. 4.02. So far as the facts are concerned, applying the rule above, the Court presumed that a complete record would sustain the district court’s fact findings.
Nickel purports to appeal from two orders issued in 2005, as well as the order entered on April 19, 2006. He did appeal one of the earlier orders, but that appeal was dismissed. The Court did not dispositively discuss whether the earlier orders were subsumed into the 2006 order because the Court did not have a complete enough record to perform any sort of meaningful appellate review.

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2vbzq2 .

Monday, July 23, 2007

Summary 2007 WY 114

Summary of Decision issued July 23, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Dowlin v. Dowlin

Citation: 2007 WY 114

Docket Number: 06-245

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, the Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): Steve C. M. Aron and Galen Bruce Woelk, of Aron and Hennig, LLP, Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): William L. Hiser, of Brown & Hiser, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

Issue: Whether the district court erred in concluding that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-402 and W.R.C.P. 60(b) do not create a tort duty that, if breached, gives rise to an independent cause of action for damages.

Facts/Discussion: Lori Ann Walker (Walker, f/k/a Lori Ann Dowlin) filed a civil suit against her former husband, Charles Dowlin (Dowlin), requesting damages for “Fraud on the Court” allegedly committed during divorce proceedings. Her challenge was rooted in her contention that W.R.C.P. 60(b) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-401 establish a tort duty that was breached by Dowlin. Walker cited McCulloh v. Drake. The Court stated that in McCulloh, their holding was that the tort claim should be heard separately from the divorce. It did not suggest that the Court should recognize the new tort cause of action urged by Walker.
The Court then turned their attention to cases from other jurisdictions that Walker suggested supported her claim. They stated there was a wealth of authority from other jurisdictions that contradicted her claim. In addition, all of the cases she cited demonstrated that the appropriate remedy for alleged fraudulent conduct is to set aside the judgment, whether in the same or a different proceeding. The Court specifically noted MacArthur v. Miltich in which the Court held that once the time to file a motion had expired, the plaintiff was required to proceed in an independent action to set aside the judgment. The common thread through the cases was that the remedy provided was setting aside the judgment, not an award of damages.

Walker also argued the Court should follow the decision in Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, where the plaintiffs in an independent fraud suit alleged that the defendant failed to produce all documents requested during a prior suit’s discovery process. This failure to disclose allegedly induced the plaintiffs to settle for less than they otherwise could have negotiated. Apparently, Walker overlooked the subsequent history which held that plaintiff’s action was not one at law but was instead equitable in nature. Cresswell supports the Court’s conclusion that Walker’s only appropriate remedy was relief from the original divorce court judgment.
The Court stated they were troubled by Walker’s position that she was entitled to bring a tort claim to recover compensatory damages based on a property division in a divorce. Walker wished to have a jury in her tort proceeding decide the fundamentally equitable issue of dividing property in a divorce which would improperly remove the question from the judge’s hands where it belongs. To allow such a tort claim would allow a jury to become a de facto appellate court reviewing the divorce court’s decision. The Court stated they were aware of no legal principle that would allow or justify such an approach. The Court stated their decision was also supported by their policy of the finality of judgments.

Walker knew of some of the alleged fraudulent behaviors at the time of the divorce hearing because she filed her first complaint before the divorce trial. She filed her amended complaint between the time the divorce court issued its decision letter and the final divorce decree. The Court does not allow litigants to “sit on” useful information in one proceeding in order to collaterally attack the result in a subsequent action.

Holding: Both W.R.C.P. 60(b) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-401 provide a remedy to a litigant alleging that a judgment has been obtained fraudulently. The litigant may seek relief from the judgment in the form of modification or revocation of that judgment. For reasons that are not clear from the record, Walker chose not to seek that relief. Instead she sought an award of damages from a jury. There is no language in the rule or the statute that establishes a duty giving rise to a tort cause of action for damages, nor do any cases from Wyoming or other jurisdictions support the result she desires.

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2mtoxd .

Summary 2007 WY 113

Summary of Decision issued July 18, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Hauck v. State

Citation: 2007 WY 113

Docket Number: 06-216

Upon Petition for Writ of Review/Certiorari

Representing Appellant (Petitioner): Diane Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Post-Conviction Counsel, State Public Defender Program.

Representing Appellee (Respondent): Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: July 18, 2007

Issues: Whether the district court erred in summarily dismissing Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief from a conviction for felony property destruction.

Holdings: The tenets of post-conviction relief are well established by Wyo. Stat. 7-14-101 through 7-14-108 (2005). Post-conviction relief is available in limited circumstances to redress constitutional errors occurring in the proceedings resulting in the defendant’s conviction. Accordingly, constitutional errors relating to the finding of guilt are open for consideration in a post-conviction relief action, whereas claims of error pertaining to sentencing are not.
One of the issues raised by Petitioner in his petition below was whether he had received appropriate credit on his sentence for time served. The district court dismissed this issue as being not cognizable in a post-conviction relief action. This determination by the district court is correct and that decision is affirmed.
However, Petitioner’s other claims do not fall outside the scope of § 7-14-101(b). Petitioner’s challenges to his competency, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the use of restraints at trial, and prosecutorial misconduct all implicate constitutional protections and relate to the finding of guilt. Therefore the district court’s determination on those challenges are reversed and the matter is remanded for further consideration.
The district court also ruled that Petitioner’s claims were barred from consideration in the post-conviction relief action because they could have been raised in a direct appeal from conviction. The district court’s ruling generally would be correct in light of Petitioner’s failure to timely appeal his conviction. In this case, however, we find that Petitioner was effectively denied his direct appeal. The right to appeal, if that right is granted by a state, as Wyoming has, is a due process right. Because of its constitutional magnitude, the right must be zealously protected. The record shows that the district court, after imposing sentence, abrogated its duty to protect this right by failing to advise Petitioner of his right to appeal his conviction as mandated by W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(3). The record does not otherwise reflect that Petitioner knew of his right to appeal and the process involved to effectuate that right. Under these extenuating circumstances, where the district court undermined Petitioner’s ability to take a timely direct appeal, district court’s mistake cannot be allowed to prejudice the Petitioner. Given these specific facts, Petitioner’s failure to appeal cannot be relied upon as grounds for summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. The district court’s ruling that Petitioner’s claims were procedurally barred is hereby reversed.
Petitioner’s claim that he should have received credit on his sentence for time served is not cognizable in a post-conviction relief action and, consequently, the district court’s dismissal of this claim is affirmed. The district court improperly dismissed Petitioner’s other claims. Its rulings concerning those claims are reversed. This case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

J. Golden delivered the opinion for the court.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2hbr4t .

Summary 2007 WY 112

Summary of Decision issued July 18, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Wyoming Department of Revenue v. Exxon Mobil Corp.

Board of County Commissioners, County of Sublette v. Exxon Mobil Corp.

Citation: 2007 WY 112

Docket Number: 06-41 & 06-42

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge, Retired

Representing Appellant Wyoming Department of Revenue: Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Martin L. Hardsocg, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and William F. Russell, Assistant Attorney General.

Representing Appellant Board of County Commissioners of the County of Sublette: John C. McKinley of Davis & Cannon, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee Exxon Mobil Corporation: Lawrence J. Wolfe, Patrick R. Day, and Walter F. Eggers, III of Holland & Hart LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming; and Brent R. Kunz of Hathaway & Kunz, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Date of Decision: July 16, 2007

Issues: Whether the district court correctly concluded that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not bar Appellee from challenging the imposition of ad valorem or severance tax on helium produced from Appellee’s federal leases. Whether the district court properly concluded that Appellee does not owe ad valorem taxes to Sublette County for helium produced from Appellee’s federal leases. Whether the district court properly concluded that Appellee does not owe severance taxes on helium produced from Appellee’s federal leases

Facts/Discussion: The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel incorporate a universal legal principle of common-law jurisprudence to the effect that a right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies. The issue in the present action, as to the application of severance and ad valorem taxes to helium produced from Appellee’s federal lease, is not identical nor does it arise from the same transaction or series of transactions as were litigated in the previous action Amoco Prod. Co. v. State, 751 P.2d 379. In that action a declaratory judgment action was filed in which the parties sought a determination as to the severance tax rate to be applied to non-hydrocarbon gases under Wyo. Stat. 9-6-302 (1977). The district court correctly concluded that the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata do not apply to bar Appellee’s declaratory judgment action.
The imposition of an ad valorem property tax on mineral production is authorized pursuant to the Wyoming Constitution [Wyo. Const. art 15, sec. 3]. The Wyoming Legislature holds the exclusive authority to define a taxpayer under Wyoming law. For purposes of ad valorem taxes on natural gas the legislature has defined taxpayer as the lessor, lessee, or the lessee’s assignee. Under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, the United States Congress determined that it should reserve the ownership and right to extract helium from all gas produced from federal mineral leases. Consistent with this reservation, the federal leases at issue in this case reserved unto the federal government the ownership and right to extract helium from all gas produced under these federal leases. Due to these restrictions, which were imposed by the federal government without regard to Wyoming severance or ad valorem taxes, Appellee is actually required to purchase the helium from the federal government following its extraction from the natural gas stream. Moreover, the point at which this purchase occurs under the Helium Agreement is in Lincoln County because of engineering requirements and the physical properties of helium. Thus, due to the unique circumstances created by Congress’ reservation of helium in the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, and the federal leases issued pursuant thereto, Appellee does not fit within any of the definitions of taxpayer for purposes of ad valorem taxes on natural gas. Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that Appellee does not owe ad valorem taxes to Sublette County for helium produced from Appellee’s federal leases.
The language under the statutes, and the unique reservation under the federal leases, precludes assessment of severance taxes upon Appellee for the helium produced from these federal leases. Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-14-203(a)(i), a severance tax is imposed “on the value of the gross product extracted for the privilege of severing or extracting . . . natural gas in the state.” Under Appellee’s federal leases, at the time they were issued, the United States reserved “the ownership of and the right to extract helium from all gas produced from lands leased . . . .” 30 U.S.C.181 (2007). This language was also contained in the actual leases which are the subject of this litigation. Appellee does not possess the privilege of removing, extracting, severing or producing the helium. By virtue of Congress’ limitations under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, the privilege of severing or extracting helium has not and cannot be assigned or conveyed to Appellee. This legal limitation necessitated the 1985 Helium Agreement, under which the federal government sells the crude helium, following its extraction from the gas stream.
Moreover, there is no evidence that this unique factual and legal situation was manipulated by Appellee for purposes of tax avoidance. The unambiguous language under Wyo. Stat. 39-14-203(a) (2007) supports the district court’s determination that Appellee was not subject to severance taxes for helium purchased from the federal government. Accordingly, the decision of the district court is affirmed.

Holdings: The district court did not err in finding that the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata did not apply to bar Appellee’s declaratory judgment action. Furthermore, the district court did not err in determining that severance and ad valorem taxes do not apply to the helium produced from these federal leases and purchased by Appellee pursuant to the Helium Agreement.

Affirmed.

District Judge Skavdahl, delivered the opinion for the court.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/26webp .

Summary 2007 WY 111

Summary of Decision issued July 17, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Lemus v. State

Citation: 2007 WY 111

Docket Number: 06-68

Appeal from the District Court of Lincoln County, Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Daniel G. Blythe and Karen Ashcraft Byrne, Cheyenne, Wyoming

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: July 17, 2007

Issues: Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct, sufficient to warrant reversal of Appellant’s convictions, in his opening and closing arguments, in his alleged threatening and intimidation of witnesses, or in his alleged use of “fake pictures” and perjured testimony. Whether the district court hindered Appellant’s right to present his defense when it allegedly did not offer him experts to assist with his defense, allegedly refused to allow him to speak with his coconspirators, and allegedly refused to allow him to issue his own subpoenas. Whether the district court committed error in allowing Appellant’s videotaped confession – which Appellant insists contained W.R.E. 404(b) evidence – to be played in its entirety, or in allowing the admission of testimony from an expert concerning the nature of the victim’s wounds. Whether the district court interfered with Appellant’s right to a trial by an impartial jury when it denied his motion for change of venue, or in its method of jury selection. Whether sufficient evidence supported Appellant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery.

Facts/Discussion: Trial proceedings are transferred to another county as provided in W.R.Cr.P. 21(a). A two-part test has been adopted for determining whether a change of venue should be granted after voir dire because of pre-trial publicity: First, the nature and extent of the publicity; second, the difficulty or ease in selecting a jury along with the amount of prejudice which actually appears during voir dire examination. In the present action, Appellant made no attempt to demonstrate the level of pretrial publicity. Sixty-five jurors were summoned for Appellant’s trial. Of those, 12 had heard about the case in the media or from other sources, such as friends and co-workers. Each of those jurors was closely examined. At the close of voir dire, Appellant passed the jury for cause and had no objections to the jury selection process. At trial, Appellant had no objections to the jury selection process, and he passed the jury that was selected for cause. He exercised all of his peremptory challenges. The record of the voir dire shows no irregularities of any sort.
As a part of the lengthy and very complete warnings the district court gave Appellant with respect to disadvantages of representing himself at trial (with standby counsel), the district court specifically called Appellant’s attention to the circumstance that the district court could not aid Appellant in subpoenaing witnesses, and that he would be required to demonstrate the relevance of the testimony of all proposed witnesses. Moreover, the trial court emphasized that it could not aid Appellant in arranging interviews with witnesses from his jail cell, or with witnesses who were incarcerated elsewhere. However, the record supports only a conclusion that witnesses Appellant wanted to call either appeared voluntarily or were summoned by means of subpoena. It is unquestioned that a defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to a fair trial, and that includes the right to summon witnesses in his defense. It is, however, the defendant’s burden to ensure that the witnesses he wants are summoned. It is transparent in the record that Appellant’s concept of a “material witness” was very broad. However, the district court did allow Appellant to subpoena an employee of the State Crime Lab whose testimony appeared to be relevant. In addition, the clerk of the district court in Lincoln County met with Appellant in his cell in an effort to further identify, locate, and serve Appellant’s witnesses.
Neither in the trial court below, nor in this appeal, has Appellant articulated a desire to have his codefendants called as witnesses, nor has he provided any cogent argument to suggest that the district court abused its discretion with respect to a request made by Appellant to communicate with his codefendants or to call them as witnesses on his behalf. In addition, contrary to an allegation stated in his brief, Appellant received copies of the transcripts of his codefendants’ trials.
As a general statement of the applicable rule, a defendant in a criminal case may be entitled to access to expert witnesses if there is a reasonable probability that an expert would aid in his defense and that the denial of an expert would result in an unfair trial.
Such decisions rest in the sound discretion of the trial court. At trial, Appellant asked for expert witnesses. He had a theory of the case that he attempted to present to the jury, even though it was not supported by any testimony or other evidence. Appellant wanted experts to testify on his behalf in order to bolster his contentions.
Before error in the nature of prosecutorial misconduct will be found to have affected an accused's substantial rights and require a reversal of a conviction, a review of the entire record must show a reasonable possibility exists that in the absence of the error, the verdict might have been more favorable to the accused. In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument, the entire record will be examined to determine whether or not the defendant's case was so prejudiced by the improper comments as to result in the denial of a fair trial. The challenged comments are judged in the context of the prosecutor's entire argument, considering the context of the statements and comparing them with the evidence produced at the trial.
The burden of establishing prosecutorial misconduct rests upon the appellant who raises the issue. Appellant in the present action contends that a combination of errors/misconduct by the prosecutor in both opening argument and closing argument combined to deprive him of a fair trial and necessitates the reversal of his convictions. Appellant did not object to the arguments in either opening or closing. However, Appellant would have had no cause to object to the opening statement because it was merely the prosecutor summarizing the evidence that he intended to present. The “error” asserted here did not take on substance until the prosecutor “explained” in closing argument his reasons for not calling certain witnesses. The record clearly reflects the statement made by the prosecutor, but the error of it, if any, is not so patent. A prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of the State’s witnesses, even in responding to defense arguments. However, that the rule was violated in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way is not so clear in the present action. The prosecutor did not directly vouch for the credibility of his witnesses, only that the evidence he did present sufficed to meet the burden that the State carries to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Of course, the State’s principal witness was Appellant himself. All the other witnesses merely tied up loose ends. Misconduct by a prosecutor invokes a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial and can be an error of constitutional magnitude. However, under the somewhat unique circumstances of this case the argument challenged did not violate the relevant rule in a clear and obvious way. Moreover, to the extent the argument could be said to have been ill advised, it did not serve to prejudice Appellant.
Appellant’s contention that the state used fake pictures and perjured testimony also has no support in the record. Appellant looked at the pictures offered by the State and contended that they had to be fakes because he was there and they did not correspond with his memory of the events he related in his confession. Because there is nothing in the record to support his contention that the pictures were “fakes,” it will not be considered. Likewise, Appellant says that witnesses perjured themselves because they said things that he did not agree with. This contention is unsupported by anything in the record.
It is unclear exactly what Appellant’s objections are to the state’s use of a substitute pathologist when the physician who performed the autopsy was not available at the time of the trial, but he voiced no objections at trial. Indeed, Appellant sought to use the substitute’s testimony to his advantage.
Appellant contends that the video tape of his confession should have been edited because it contained so much W.R.E. 404(b) evidence. The State contends that it is relevant because it tells the whole story that unfolded over the few days which bracket the crime. Although Appellant attempted to suppress his confession, once the district court determined it was admissible, he wanted the entirety of it to be presented to the jury. The district court allowed the entire tape to be played for the jury.
In addressing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, it must be determined whether or not any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. When considering a claim of the sufficiency of the evidence, that evidence is reviewed with the assumption that the evidence of the prevailing party is true, disregard the evidence favoring the unsuccessful party, and give the prevailing party the benefit of every favorable inference that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. The evidence will not be reweighed nor will the credibility of the witnesses be reexamined.
A person who believes he is conspiring with another to commit a crime is a danger to the public regardless of whether the other person in fact has agreed to commit the crime. Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction. However, when the evidence adduced at his trial is considered in light of the instructions, it is clear that the evidence does suffice. In addition to the fact that there is no testimony to that effect in the record, the jury could, of course, believe Appellant’s first story and disbelieve his proposed defense. However, the district court, in an abundance of caution, gave the jury self-defense instructions, and the jury was permitted to consider Appellant’s theory of the case. The evidence was sufficient to sustain the conspiracy conviction, as well as the conviction for felony murder.

Holdings: Applying the standard set by W.R.Cr.P. 21(a), the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a change of venue. The record of the voir dire shows no irregularities of any sort. Appellant’s brief fails to present cogent argument or pertinent authority. For these reasons, the jury selection process is deemed not to be erroneous in any way. At no point in the record does Appellant complain that there was a witness, whose testimony was material to his trial, who he was unable to call to the witness stand. The district court did not abuse its discretion in any way with respect to requiring the issuance of subpoenas on Appellant’s behalf. The district court did not err in not ordering Appellant to have access to expert witnesses because of Appellant’s failure to establish any foundational facts that would have justified expert testimony. Appellant’s contention that the prosecutor threatened/intimidated witnesses has never been supported by any evidence admitted during the trial or in any pretrial proceeding. Because there is no material in the record to support it, it was not considered. Appellant’s contention that the state used fake pictures and perjured testimony also had no support in the record so the argument was not considered. Appellant’s contentions with respect to the substitute witness's testimony are not supported by cogent argument or pertinent authority. The district court fully considered all of Appellant’s objections to the confession and its content and determined that it was admissible even in light of Rule 404(b). There was no error in that ruling. However, under the circumstances presented here, the disputed evidence was not even Rule 404(b) evidence. The evidence was sufficient to sustain the conspiracy conviction, as well as the conviction for felony murder.

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the opinion for the court.

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