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Summary 2008 WY 50

Summary of Decision issued April 30, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: In re CW and CW

Citation: 2008 WY 50

Docket Number: S-07-0157; S-07-0158

Appeal from the District Court of Uinta County, the Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge.

Representing Appellants (Petitioners): John A. Thomas, Evanston, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Respondent): Farrah L. Spencer, Harris Law Firm, PC, Evanston, Wyoming.

Guardian Ad Litem: Geoffrey James Phillips, Phillips Law, PC, Evanston, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: Mother and Father are the biological parents of CW1 and CW2. Mother and Father never married. In 2002, Mother married Husband. In these two consolidated appeals, Mother and Husband challenge the district court’s denial of their petition to adopt the two children and Mother challenges the district court’s denial of her petition to terminate Father’s parental rights.
Father had never been ordered to make any child support payments. The district court stated that because of the absence of a defined child support obligation and the duty of the court to strictly construe the statutes against terminating a non-consenting parent’s rights, the adoption could not be granted. The court also found it was impossible for Father to bring the child support current because it was impossible to state the amount of the obligation. Mother and Husband relied on In re Adoption of GAR. The legislature amended the statutes after GAR was decided in 1991 adding that an adoption may be granted over the objection of a parent if that parent has failed to bring the support obligation current within 60 days. In the instant case, Father asked the court to establish child support payments in his petition to establish paternity. The Court reaffirmed that every parent has a duty to contribute to the support of their child with or without a court order. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the Court would not disturb the ruling that Father had not willfully failed to make child support payments or to bring them current.
The Court noted that the statute provides that the adoption of a child may be ordered without the written consent of the parent. Even if the district court had concluded that one or more of the statutory factors had been met, it was still not required to order the adoption if it found other valid grounds for denying it. The district court’s decision letter showed that it carefully weighed the conflicting evidence about the best interests of the children in making their decision.
The Court has previously held that the adoption statutes control over the more general provisions found in the paternity statutes. Because the district court denied the adoption, its further decision to deny Mother’s petition to terminate Father’s parental rights worked no prejudice against Mother.

Holding: The Court would not disturb the ruling that Father had not willfully failed to make child support payments or to bring them current. Because the district court denied the adoption, its further decision to deny Mother’s petition to terminate Father’s parental rights worked no prejudice against Mother.

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/648frk .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 49

Summary of Decision issued April 22, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Stone v. Devon Energy Production Co., LP

Citation: 2008 WY 49

Docket Number: S-07-0166

Appeal from the District Court of Johnson County, the Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge.

Representing Appellant (Plaintiffs): Steven R. Winship of Winship & Winship, PC, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Defendants): Scott P. Klosterman of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, PC, Casper, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: Stone and Loundagin owned operating rights under a state oil and gas lease which they assigned to Devon Energy Production Co. and Carpenter & Sons, Inc. After Devon and Carpenter failed to offer to reassign the operating rights to them six months before the lease expiration date, Stone and Loundagin filed a complaint asserting that Devon and Carpenter breached the assignment contract and should be ejected from the leasehold. In addition they pleaded trespass and conversion and sought an accounting and injunctive relief. The district court granted partial summary judgment for Devon and Carpenter on the breach of contract claim concluding that the lease had not expired and the reassignment obligation was never triggered.
Neither the parties nor the Court found cases involving a reassignment clause like the one at issue. The clauses are almost exclusively found in the oil and gas arena and many require a reassignment offer only in the event that the assignee intends to let the lease expire. Many also require the assignor to respond to an offer of reassignment within a specified time period or lose the right to reassignment. In the instant case, all parties agreed that the intent of the reassignment clause was to avoid the loss of the lease. The Court held that the reassignment clause required Devon and Carpenter to make an offer to reassign the operating rights to Stone and Loundagin before October 2, 2001. Considering the language of the clause in the context in which it was written and looking to the surrounding circumstances, the subject matter, and the purpose of the agreement, it was clear the parties intended the term “expiration” to mean the expiration date of the lease that was contained within the lease itself. The interpretation was consistent with the underlying purpose of reassignment clauses generally which is to protect assignors against the loss of their overriding royalty interest prior to the end of the primary term. The Court found it significant that the clause these parties drafted and agreed to, did not contain language to the effect that a reassignment offer was required if the assignee desired to surrender the lease. The omission of language that appeared to be standard in oil and gas reassignment clauses suggested that rather than being dependent on the assignee’s intent, the parties intended the reassignment offer to be made on a date certain – prior to six months before the expiration of the lease or October 2, 2001.
In the instant case, the lease never terminated and thus, Stone and Loundigan incurred no damages. They continued to receive the timely payment of all overriding royalties due under the lease.

Holding: The Court held that the reassignment clause required Devon and Carpenter to make an offer to reassign the operating rights to Stone and Loundagin on or before October 2, 2001. The Court affirmed the partial summary judgment order because under the particular circumstances, no contract damages could be proven.

The partial summary judgment on breach of contract was affirmed and the matter was remanded for consideration of the remaining claims.

J. Kite delivered the decision.

J. Golden dissented stating that the supplemental agreement at issue required Devon and Carpenter to offer reassignment of all pertinent acquired rights under the lease to SEI not later than 6 months prior to the expiration of each such lease. J. Golden agreed that the intent of the parties in including the reassignment clause was to prevent the lease from expiring without giving SEI the opportunity to save it. Devon and Carpenter must allow SEI an opportunity to save the lease when they know their actions will not be enough to do so. By focusing on the practical, as versus the theoretical “expiration” of the lease, J. Golden believed the reassignment provision imposed such a requirement. He would have upheld the grant of summary judgment to Devon and Carpenter.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/6cj2jm .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 48

Summary of Decision issued April 22, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Drake v. State

Citation: 2008 WY 48

Docket Number: S-07-0092

Appeal from the District Court of Converse County, the Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge.

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Diane Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and Sylvia Lee Hackl, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Dana J. Lent, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Convicted of larceny by bailee, Drake challenged the imposition of a restitution order. The restitution was imposed after Drake filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition and was granted a debt discharge.
Drake argued that the restitution award was precluded by the bankruptcy discharge.
The Court has addressed questions about restitution before. They noted that in Abeyta, they reasoned that uniformly, courts hold that a civil settlement or release does not absolve the defendant of criminal restitution. Drake asked the Court to apply the “principal motivation test” to determine whether or not the purpose of the prosecution was simply to collect a debt. The Court stated they were unable to apply it in the instant case for two reasons: the first exception is for criminal proceedings against the debtor. Secondly, Drake did not satisfy the first prong of the plain error rule which required the record to be clear as to the alleged error.

Holding: After reviewing the record, the Court found no clear error. Restitution was ordered under the court’s discretion. The Court concluded that Drake’s previous Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge did not discharge the district court’s restitution order and the Court affirmed the order.

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/68pun4 .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 47

Summary of Decision issued April 22, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Schuler v. State

Citation: 2008 WY 47

Docket Number: S-07-0207

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge, Retired.

Representing Appellant (Defendant): R. Michael Vang and E. Kurt Britzius of Brown & Hiser LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Schuler was charged with five counts of credit card fraud. He was convicted of one count and acquitted on the other four counts by a jury. The Court stated the issue to be improper duplicitous charging. The Court affirmed the conviction because Schuler waived the duplicity defects by failing to object.
Sufficiency of the Evidence: The Court reviewed the evidence included in the record and determined that a quorum of reasonable and rational jurors could have found Schuler guilty. However, sufficiency of the evidence was not the issue. The Court concluded that the real issue concerned the State’s violation of the rule against charging duplicity. The violation was not grounds for dismissal because Schuler waived the issue by failing to raise it before trial. Pursuant to Rule 12, any objection to the information was waived when it was not raised prior to trial.
The Court noted their decision in McInturff v. State where they said that each distinct transaction should be separately charged and may not be combined with other independent offenses in the state’s proof.
Restitution Order: Schuler claimed the district court imposed an illegal sentence when it ordered him to pay restitution for a transaction which the State alleged took place on a date encompassed in Count Four on which he was acquitted. The Court stated that neither Van Riper (as asserted by Schuler) nor Layton (as asserted by the State) applied to the instant case because neither involved duplicitous charging. The Court reiterated that there was no way of knowing whether the jury found Schuler guilty based on evidence that the transaction occurred or acquitted him because the State failed to prove the date of the transaction.
The State asserted that the restitution order was proper because Schuler admitted in the pre-sentence investigation report that he abused his authority to use the credit card however, the PSI was not part of the record. The Court stated that they will not consider matters not contained in the appellate record.

Holding: The Court affirmed the conviction and reversed the restitution order. The case was remanded for entry of a new judgment and sentence omitting the order requiring Schuler to pay restitution in the amount of $13,266.67.

Conviction affirmed; restitution reversed.

J. Kite delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/58vmq4 .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 46

Summary of Decision issued April 16, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Tilden

Citation: 2008 WY 46

Docket Number: S-07-0208

Appeal from the District Court of Park County, the Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Andrea L. Richard and Erika M. Nash of the Richard Law Firm, PC, Jackson, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Jessica Rutzick of Jessica Rutzick Attorney at Law, PC, Jackson, Wyoming and John R. Vincent of Vincent Law Office, Riverton, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: Stewart Title appealed the district court’s award of statutory attorney’s fees and interest to Tilden. This is the third trip to the Court for the instant case.
Whether the filing deadline of W.R.C.P. 54(d)(2) applied: The unambiguous language of W.R.C.P. 54(d)(2) does not place a 14-day filing deadline upon application for fees in a case where the cause of action is for attorney’s fees. There was no reason to require the filing of a motion for attorney’s fees because the only reason any additional filing was required was that a partial summary judgment had been granted resolving the fact that statutory attorney’s fees were due but not establishing the amount.
Whether doctrine of res judicata bars award: The district court found that the arbitrator denied the attorney’s fee claim on the grounds that he had no authority to decide it. The language and intent of the Interim Order was clear. The arbitrator did not address and decide Tilden’s claim for statutory attorneys’ fees therefore, the issue was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
Whether contingent fees can be included: In its brief, Stewart Title did not mention the existence or effect of contingent fees. The Court noted that attorney’s fees must be proven to be reasonable. Whether or not attorney’s fees are fixed or contingent is one factor a district court is to consider in determining the reasonableness under the federal “lodestar” test adopted by the Court. The district court listed and considered the required lodestar factors.
Whether amounts billed in violation of Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(g) can be included: Stewart Title contended that one of Tilden’s lawyers violated the rule by hiring and charging Tilden for the services of a certain paralegal. The Court summarily affirmed the district court’s rejection of Stewart Title’s objection to inclusion in the attorney’s fees award of amounts paid to the paralegal.
Whether prejudgment interest can be included: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-15-124(c) does not clearly indicate whether prejudgment interest is available only upon the underlying claim or loss that the insurer refused to pay or also upon the attorney’s fees incurred both in vindicating that claim and in pursuing the attorney’s fees claim under the statute. The Court noted again that the arbitrator declined to decide the attorney’s fees issue because he concluded that he lacked the jurisdiction to make such a determination under applicable arbitration rules and that there was no prevailing party statute for him to apply. Attorney’s fees owed at any given time could have been readily computed and if Stewart Title had asked for the amount, they could have cut off the accrual of fees and interest. An insured, wronged by the dilatory tactics of an insurer cannot be made whole if he or she loses more in attorney’s fees and interest that he or she obtains in an underlying damage award.

Holding: The filing deadline of W.R.C.P. 54(d)(2) did not apply to an application for fees under Wyoming Statutes. The present action was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata because it was not raised, and could not be raised, in the arbitration. The district court did not err by including in the final judgment attorney’s fees that might have been contingent or attorney’s fees paid to a certain paralegal or prejudgment interest on the fees awarded in the judgment.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/6mzkeg .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 45

Summary of Decision issued April 14, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Jenkins v. Miller

Citation: 2008 WY 45

Docket Number: S-07-0216

Appeal from the District Court of Johnson County, the Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge

Representing Appellants (Defendants): Kim D. Cannon and J. Mark Stewart of Davis & Cannon, Sheridan, Wyoming.

Representing Appellees (Plaintiffs): Dennis M. Kirven and Benjamin S. Kirven of Kirven & Kirven, PC, Buffalo, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: The Jenkins’ challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Millers and sua sponte dismissal of Jenkins’ counterclaim with respect to a private road easement. Millers had requested declaratory relief regarding an Easement Deed unilaterally recorded by Jenkins, the terms of which Millers disputed. Jenkins counterclaimed for a declaration that the same Easement Deed was valid and further that the parties were bound by an historical oral agreement for easement. The district court granted judgment in favor of Millers, concluding that Millers never accepted the Easement Deed and that there was no legally enforceable access to Millers’ lands. The court further dismissed Jenkins’ counterclaim on the grounds that Jenkins were precluded from seeking such declaratory relief as the decision to pursue an easement rested only with Millers, as potential grantees/dominant estate owners.
Grant of Millers’ Motion for Summary Judgment: Wyoming law holds that the grantees must “accept” the offered easement for the easement to be valid and binding. Millers argued that a letter and their Notice of Non-acceptance of Easement Deed were sufficient to demonstrate rejection of the Easement Deed. However, the Millers continued to use the route which had been used consistently for over twenty years. The Court stated the record could have supported a conclusion in favor of either party at that point.
The district court was also asked to determine whether Millers had any legally enforceable access, which request would encompass possibilities such as irrevocable license or an oral easement falling outside the statute of frauds. The Court noted it was one thing to say that Millers timely and appropriately rejected the Easement Deed but quite another to say that they had no legally enforceable license that they historically had accepted. The record showed that the parties had negotiated the gravel road in its current location in exchange for a grant of “permanent easement.”
Dismissal of Jenkins’ Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment: The district court dismissed sua sponte Jenkins’ counterclaim for declaratory relief. Sua sponte dismissals require adherence to a specific procedure. The district court failed to follow it. Therefore, the matter was remanded to the district court with directions to follow the procedural steps outlined in Osborn.
The Court addressed the district court’s conclusion that the right to pursue an easement rests exclusively with the petitioners, and that the Defendants were precluded from bringing a declaratory judgment action. “Landlocked” property owners cannot be forced to pursue legal remedies such as common law way of necessity or an implied easement, prior to seeking a private road pursuant to Wyoming’s private road statutes. Wyoming also recognizes the rights of property owners whose lands will be subjected to the imposition of private roads. Such property owners should have the right to determine the status of alleged or potential existing legally enforceable access through their lands even where those rights have not yet been adjudicated.

Holding: The district court erred in granting summary judgment to Millers, both in its determination that there were no issues of fact regarding Millers’ acceptance of the Easement Deed and in its conclusion that there were no issues of fact regarding Millers’ lack of legally enforceable access to their lands. The district court further erred in dismissing Jenkins’ counterclaim on the grounds that Jenkins as alleged grantors of an easement were without authority to seek a declaratory judgment as to the validity of that easement or their rights thereunder.

Reversed.

D.J. Donnell delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/65sdue .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 44

Summary of Decision issued April 11, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Retz v. Siebrant

Citation: 2008 WY 44

Docket Number: S-07-0023

Appeal from the District Court of Albany County, the Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

Representing Appellants (Plaintiffs): C.M. Aron, Aron and Henning, LLP; and Mattaniah Eytan, Law Office of Mattaniah Eytan.

Representing Appellees (Defendants): Jason M. Tangeman, Jeff Anthony and Philip A. Nicholas of Anthony, Nicholas and Tangeman for Appellees Siebrant and Zarate. Paul J. Hickey, Roger C. Fransen and Brandi L. Monger of Hickey & Evans, LLP for Appellee Graves; Gregory C. Dyekman and Timothy Woznick of Dray, Thomson & Dyekman, PC, for Appellee UW Foundation.

Facts/Discussion: Appellants, Ron Retz, Anne Burwell Williams, Fred Crouter and Beverly Crouter request relief from the district court’s grant of two separate motions for summary judgment the last of which effectively disposed of Appellants’ claims against Appellees William Siebrandt, Salvador Zarate, Charles E. Graves and the University of Wyoming Foundation. Appellants also contested the district court’s denial of a motion to amend the complaint.
Colonel Rogers died in Carmel, California in 2003. He was 96, not married at the time and had no known children. Anne and Ernest Williams are children of two of the Colonel’s sisters. William Siebrandt was his closest companion. They cut off contact with each other several times over the years. The Colonel made a series of generous monetary gifts to Siebrandt over the course of the relationship. The Colonel was meticulous in his estate planning.
Motion to Amend: The Court could not find that the district court abused its discretion in denying Appellants leave to amend the Complaint. The district court found that Appellants Anne and Ernest Williams’ claim to remove Charles Graves as Trustee was a reiteration of an earlier request for injunctive relief. The district court refused to add claims for elder abuse and undue influence noting Appellants made no cogent argument as to why a Wyoming court should have jurisdiction over torts allegedly committed in California. Fred and Beverly Crouter attempted to bring several claims on behalf of their mother Ada Crouter, the Colonel’s long-time friend and companion during his years in Wyoming and Nebraska. They failed to allege any form of consideration for the alleged promise. The claim for conversion had exceeded the statute of limitations.
Summary Judgment: The district court granted summary judgment on all issues in two separate decision letters. Appellants contested the decision on two of the issues.
Contract to Make a Will: The Williams claimed that the Colonel entered into an agreement with their parents to leave all his money to his family when he died in exchange for their assistance in hiding his assets at the time of his divorce. There was no competent evidence to support the allegation. The Court stated it was against public policy to contract to hide assets in order to prevent a court from considering all assets when dividing a marital estate.
Undue Influence: The Court may affirm a summary judgment on any grounds supported by the record. The determinative issue was that Appellants had not raised an issue of material fact as to the validity of any part of the 2002 trust. The Court found that the district court was correct in finding that Appellees met their burden under the summary judgment standard. Appellants failed to make any showing that the Colonel was in a condition that permitted subversion of his will. They failed to show there was activity on the part of Siebrandt or Zarate with respect to the trust instrument. There was no evidence that either of them unduly profited as beneficiary under the trust.
Forgery: Appellants also attacked the 2002 trust on the basis that the Colonel’s signature was a forgery. The signature was notarized. The notary testified explaining her procedure for a jurat and her memory of the event. Appellants offered the report of a forensic document examiner. As the only evidence offered, it was not enough to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the authenticity of a notarized signature.

Holding: The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellants’ request to amend their complaint. The district court properly summarily disposed of Appellants’ claims when they failed to produce enough evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact on any claim.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/55fopm .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 43

Summary of Decision issued April 10, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Coffinberry v. Thermopolis

Citation: 2008 WY 43

Docket Number: S-07-0261

Appeal from the District Court of Hot Springs County, the Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): Richard A. Coffinberry, pro se.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Michael S. Messenger and Wade Redmon of Messenger & Jurovich, PC, Thermopolis, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: In the instant case, Coffinberry tested the authority of a municipality to adopt an ordinance holding the property owner liable for water, sewer and sanitation service fees unpaid by a tenant. He appealed the summary judgment order granted to Thermopolis.
Coffinberry owns property within Thermopolis. In the past, the town has required him to pay for water, sewer and sanitation service fees unpaid by his tenants. Municipalities can exercise only those express and implied powers that are granted to them by statute. The Court has long recognized that the statutory grants of authority to municipalities carry with them the powers necessarily implied from them. Coffinberry’s interpretation of the statutes would have an unreasonably inhibitory effect on the provision of municipal services and runs contrary to that long-recognized principle. The power to hold property owners responsible is necessary because it ensures the fiscal integrity of the utility system.

Holding: The statutes that authorize cities and towns to provide water, sewer and sanitation services also authorize those cities and towns to hold property owners ultimately liable for the cost of providing those services to the property.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/6q5pyy .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]