Friday, June 15, 2007

Electronic Access to the Uniform Laws

The Biddle Law Library at the University of Pennsylvania Law School in partnership with the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recently announced access to electronic versions of draft and final acts of Uniform Laws and Final Acts. This is not a complete collection of all drafts and acts but it is certainly increased access for those who don't have a full set of the ULA from Thompson-West Publishing on their shelves! It is possible to download using several different software options for your midnight, last-minute perusal...enjoy.

Summary 2007 WY 96

Summary of Decision issued June 15, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: McMurry Construction Co. v. Community First Ins., Inc., BW Insurance Agency, Inc., and Ohio Casualty Ins. Co.

Citation: 2007 WY 96

Docket Number: 06-271

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): W.W. Reeves of Park Street Law Office, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee BW Ins. Agency, Inc.: Richard A. Mincer and Billie L.M. Addleman of Hirst & Applegate, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Mincer.

Representing Appellee Ohio Casualty Ins. Co.: Patrick J. Murphy and Ryan Schwartz of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, PC, Casper, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Murphy.

Issues: Whether the builder’s risk policy claims, including reformation, were barred by the construction company’s failure to read the insurance documents or by its failure to mitigate damages. Whether the district court erred in denying the construction company’s motion to amend its complaint.

Facts/Discussion: McMurry appealed from summary judgments granted to an insurance agency and an insurance company in a controversy primarily involving a builder’s risk insurance policy. McMurry appeals from the district court’s denial of its motion to amend its complaint.

Standard of Review: When the Court reviews a summary judgment, they have before them the same materials as the district court had and they follow the same standards which applied to the proceedings below. In the present case, BW Ins. and Ohio Casualty both admitted negligence and breach of contract which left a purely legal issue for the Court to review de novo.
The issue was whether McMurry’s claims were barred by its failure to read the builder’s risk policy documents or its failure to mitigate damages. The Court’s analysis focused on whether the equitable doctrine of reformation survived in the face of a clear violation of the failure-to-read rule and the failure to mitigate damages.
The Court espouses the principle that an insured has a duty to read his or her insurance policy. The federal courts have also interpreted Wyoming law as imposing upon an insured the duty to read his or her policy.
The Court conjectured that BW and Ohio admitted negligence and breach of contract for purposes of their summary judgment motions under the assumption that failure to read the policy and failure to mitigate damages protected them from liability. McMurry countered that in none of the cases cited did those defenses triumph in the face of a properly pled and proven cause of action for reformation of contract. Reformation is dependent upon an agreement having been reached and that the agreement had been correctly recited in the subsequently written instrument.
The Court stated the question it was being asked to consider was whether McMurry could seek reformation, given its failure to read the policy. Cordero Mining Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guarantee Insurance Co. was the only one of the cases cited in which the reformation of contract was actually raised as a claim in the complaint. The Court summarized that even after Cordero, they have only gone so far as to say that the defenses of failure to read and failure to mitigate barred a plaintiff’s legal contract and tort claims. The Court noted that the courts of the country are split over the separate question of the availability of the equitable doctrine of reformation where an insured has failed to read an insurance policy. The Court stated they were convinced the majority view was correct – where effectuation of an antecedent agreement is thwarted by mutual mistake in reducing that agreement to writing, justice is not served by judicial enforcement of the mistaken writing, rather than the intended agreement, just because one of the parties did not read the writing. The Court concluded that failure to read and failure to mitigate should not and do not bar the remedy of contract reformation.

Motion to Amend Complaint:
The district court separated the new allegations of the proposed amended complaint into three categories and denied amendment for a different reason as to each category. The district court presented a reasonable basis for each decision, based upon objective criteria. The complaint was filed in November, 2005 and the motion hearing was in August, 2006. It was not unreasonable for the district court to deny amendment of a complaint to add new issues to a ten-month-old case.

Holding: The district court appropriately granted summary judgment to BW Insurance and Ohio Casualty on the tort and contract causes of action contained in McMurry’s complaint because those causes of action were barred by McMurry’s failure to read the insurance policy documents sent to it. Summary judgment was not appropriate on the equitable doctrine of reformation, which remained viable under the majority rule, which the Court adopted. The summary judgments were reversed to that extent and the matter was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying McMurry’s motion to amend its complaint and that denial is affirmed.

Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link
: http://tinyurl.com/yu4v2e .

Monday, June 11, 2007

Summary 2007 WY 95

Summary of Decision issued June 11, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Board of Professional Responsibility, Wyoming State Bar v. Judson

Citation: 2007 WY 95

Docket Number: D-07-0002

Order Suspending Attorney From the Practice of Law

The matter came before the Court upon a “Report and Recommendation for Reciprocal Discipline” filed May 16, 2007, by the Board of Professional Responsibility for the Wyoming State Bar and pursuant to Rule 20 of the Disciplinary Code of Wyoming State Bar. The Court, after a careful review of the Board’s report and recommendation; the Colorado Supreme Court’s “Order Approving Conditional Admission of Misconduct and Imposing Sanctions Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 251.22; the “Stipulation”; the Affidavit of Costs and Expenses; the Motion for Reciprocal Discipline and to File a Report and Recommendation for Discipline; and the file, found that the Report and Recommendation for Reciprocal Discipline should be approved, confirmed and adopted by the Court.

Consistent with the discipline imposed by the Colorado Supreme Court, Respondent Judson shall be suspended from the practice of law in Wyoming for a period of one year and one day with six months already served. The remaining six months shall be stayed upon the successful completion of the three-year period of probation referenced in the Colorado Supreme Court Order. Respondent Judson shall reimburse the Wyoming State Bar $87.87 and a $500.00 administrative fee.

The Order can be found at the link below.

C.J. Voigt delivered the order for the court.

Justice Hill and Justice Burke would have denied the recommendation.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2e6z55 . (pdf documents will be added later this week.)

Summary 2007 WY 94

Summary of Decision issued June 8, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Bentley v. Director of the Office of State Lands and Investments

Citation: 2007 WY 94

Docket Number: 06-131

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, Honorable Wad E. Waldrip, Judge

Representing Appellants (Plaintiffs): Karen Budd-Falen and Brandon L. Jensen, Budd-Falen Law Offices,Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Jensen.

Representing Appellees (Defendants): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Bridget Hill, Assistant Attorney General; C. Levi Martin, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Susan K. Stipe, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Issues: Whether the district court erred when it dismissed appellants' causes of action relating to the Board of Land Commissioners' easement to the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission. Whether the district court erred when it found that the water rights which were historically attached to Section 16 were severed by the easement and, therefore, conveyed to the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission.

Facts: In 1992, the State Board of Land Commissioners ("Board") began contemplating a sale of school lands in Carbon County where the Dome Rock Reservoir is located. In response to public concern that sale of the land would prevent public use of the reservoir for fishing purposes, the Board approved an easement in favor of the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission in 1993. The land was subsequently advertised for public auction subject to the easement. It was purchased by John Anselmi, who entered into an installment sales contract with the Board.

In 2000, Mr. Anselmi assigned the sales contract to Appellants. A short time later, the Game and Fish easement was recorded with the county clerk. In 2002, when the Bentleys made full payment under the sales contract, the State of Wyoming issued a patent conveying the land to them. The Bentleys initiated this action in 2004, seeking a declaration that the easement was void, injunctive relief, and damages. The district court upheld the validity of the easement and determined that the water rights appurtenant to the publicly auctioned land had also been transferred to Game and Fish.

On appeal, the Bentleys claim that their ownership of Section 16 is not subject to the easement because: 1) the easement was not created and validly established prior to their purchase of the property; and 2) they had no notice of the easement at the time they purchased the property. Invoking bona fide purchaser status, they assert the easement cannot be enforced against them, relying upon the operation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-120. The Bentleys' argument is premised on the nature of the State's ownership after the Sales Contract was executed. As stated in their brief, "as of June 3, 1993, the State of Wyoming no longer owned Section 16; and therefore, no longer owned any interest in which to convey an easement." The Bentleys contend that any interest granted by the State after June 3, 1993, cannot be enforced against them.

Holdings: In an installment land contract, the seller agrees to accept payments from the buyer, usually over a period of time, until the price set by the contract has been paid. When all payments have been made, the seller is bound to convey title to the buyer. The buyer must record an installment contract for the purchase of state lands in the county where the property is located. However, a buyer does not acquire a complete equitable title until paying the purchase-money and complying with the other conditions precedent. A buyer's interest under an installment land contract is equitable in nature, and legal title remains with the seller. The State possesses the same rights as any other seller under an installment land contract and continues to retain legal title to the property. Until the full purchase price is paid, the State is not bound to convey; there are many uncertain events to happen before it will be known whether it will ever have to convey, and it retains for certain purposes, its old dominion over the estate. In the present action, the Appellants took assignment of the contract when it was still executory and assumed the risks inherent in purchasing an equitable interest, which is subject to outstanding equities and possible imperfections. They could not acquire full "equitable title" until they were entitled to a patent, i.e., when full payment under the Sales Contract had been made. Thus, under the executory Sales Contract, the State retained legal title to Section 16 and transferred only a limited equitable interest. After Appellants made full payment under the Sales Contract, they received a patent in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 36-9-112(a). Patent number 2992 issued on May 16, 2002, and was recorded on May 24, 2002. The patent specifies that the Appellants' title to Section 16 is subject to the easement. Although Appellants have framed their causes of action and arguments on appeal as if there are inconsistent claims to Section 16, the patent is consistent with the existence of the easement. The Appellants' real complaint is that they do not believe their patent conveyed all they were entitled to receive under the Sales Contract. However, once a contract for the sale of realty has been executed, its provisions merge with the conveyance and are no longer separately enforceable. The Appellants' rights are therefore controlled by the patent. Because the patent specifies that title is subject to the easement, the Appellants' title is indeed subject to the easement.
The Appellants acknowledge that they did not obtain legal title until the patent issued in 2002, but they assert that two principles - relation back and equitable conversion - apply under the circumstances. According to the Appellants, equity transforms the nature of the interests discussed above to recognize in them full ownership of Section 16 prior to the patent. They reason that their full ownership in Section 16 thereafter divested the State of the ability to convey an easement to Game and Fish. However, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the Appellants, it is clear they seek relation back of a legal title they have not acquired. They claim entitlement to an unencumbered fee interest, free from the easement, under the Sales Contract. However, the doctrine of relation has never been applied to rectify a perceived deficiency in a patent, i.e., the owner's claim that his earlier, equitable interest was not fully realized by the conveyance. The Section 16 patent, by its terms, conveyed title subject to the easement. Even if it were concluded that the patent related back, that legal fiction would not provide the Appellants the relief they desire. Under these circumstances, the district court properly concluded that the Appellants did not present any reason and justice did not require the application of the doctrine of relation.
The Appellants also assert that equity made them full owners of Section 16 and divested the State of ownership before the patent issued. The equitable conversion theory treats the interest of the purchaser to be tangible real estate from the time the installment land contract or contract for deed is executed and considers the purpose of the retention of title by the vendor to be a security interest, with the contractual right to the balance of the purchase price treated as personalty. The application of equitable conversion to installment land contracts has been rejected in Wyoming.
Although no official grant of easement was recorded until 2000 and the Board's approval lacked material terms and formalities required in a formal conveyance of an interest in state land, it is also true that the intent to create an easement was demonstrated by the Board's actions. Evidence showed that there was application, approval, and recited consideration, which reflected a clear intent to convey the easement in the future. This documented intent may not have the formal, legal significance of creating an easement, but it is highly relevant to a determination of competing equitable interests in land. Additionally, the board of land commissioners may, at their discretion, grant permanent rights-of-way or easements across or upon any portion of state or school lands, upon such terms as the board may determine, for any ditch, reservoir, railroad, public highway, telegraph and telephone lines, or other public conveyances. Having already determined that the State held legal title to Section 16 on the date it granted the easement, the Appellants' repeated assertions that the November 28, 2000 grant was void on that basis is rejected.
To prevail in a contest under Wyo. Stat. 34-1-120, the Appellants must show that they have the status of a "bona fide purchaser," which is: (1) a purchaser in good faith; (2) for a valuable consideration, not by gift; (3) with no actual, constructive or inquiry notice of any alleged or real infirmities in the title; and (4) who would be prejudiced by the cancellation or reformation. The term 'purchaser', shall be construed to embrace every person to whom any estate or interest in real estate shall be conveyed for a valuable consideration, and also every assignee of a mortgage or lease, or other conditional estate. The term "conveyance", shall be construed to embrace every instrument in writing by which any estate or interest in real estate is created, alienated, mortgaged or assigned, or by which the title to any real estate may be affected in law or in equity, except wills, leases for a term not exceeding three (3) years, executory contracts for the sale or purchase of lands, and certificates which show that the purchaser has paid the consideration and is entitled to a deed for the lands, and contain a promise or agreement to furnish said deed at some future time. Appellants, who were paying valuable consideration and expecting a conveyance of Section 16, were "purchasers" within the meaning of the recording act. However, they did not receive a conveyance to Section 16 until they received the patent. The Sales Contract was an executory contract, specifically excluded from the statutory definition of conveyance. Accordingly, the fact that the Sales Contract was recorded does not change the operation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-120. By its express terms, the statute provides no protection for a purchaser who was not the first to record a conveyance. For purposes of this appeal, the first conveyance to be recorded was Easement No. 5382. The Appellants' conveyance, the patent, was recorded two years later.
Moreover, the Appellants are likewise ineligible for protection under the recording act because they cannot demonstrate that they are bona fide purchasers. Under the third prong of that inquiry, the Appellants would have to prove that they lacked "actual, constructive or inquiry notice of any alleged or real infirmities in the title" to Section 16. This they cannot do. While they might not have discovered documentation of the easement before they received their assignment, the assignment itself reflects a defect in the title, i.e., it was retained by the State. Any effort to check the county clerk's records would have revealed that their predecessor in interest lacked the ability to convey legal title to Section 16. It is apparent that the Appellants did not make such efforts.
Additionally, the Appellants' claims that they lacked notice of the easement are solidly refuted by the very facts alleged in their complaint. Their complaint states that at the time of their purchase, Section 16 featured a roadway to the reservoir, a parking lot, and signs announcing that the reservoir was a public fishery. Also, members of the public used the fishery. According to the Appellants, that public use was known to them and was ongoing. The improvements visible upon physical inspection of the property, as well as the continual access and use by the public, provided inquiry notice of an easement. Perhaps conceding the import of these facts, counsel for the Appellants admitted actual knowledge of the easement at the hearing on the motion to dismiss.
As the foregoing demonstrates, the Appellants' reliance upon the recording act to void the easement is misplaced. The protections afforded by recording acts generally do not extend to equitable interests as such holders are not considered bona fide purchasers. It is apparent from their pleading that the Appellants are not entitled to relief under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-120.
A purchaser under an installment contract, although lacking a conveyance, may have a remedy in equity. However, resort to principles of equity is of no assistance to the Appellants. Their equitable interest was preceded in time by a public interest, documented in public records, of which they had knowledge. The inchoate, equitable interest purchased by Game and Fish arose prior to the Appellants' equitable interest under the Sales Contract. Where the purchase is only of an equitable title, it is ordinarily taken with all its imperfections and outstanding equities, notwithstanding the fact that a valuable consideration may have been given and that there may have been no notice of the equity or defense against the title. Accordingly, the Appellants' ownership of Section 16 could equitably be made subject to a prior equitable interest, even if they had no knowledge of it. However, the Appellants did have knowledge of public use. There is no indication that they possessed Section 16 in a manner that was inconsistent with the easement. The public continued to access Dome Rock Reservoir without interference. In this case, equity favors upholding the easement which was prior in time to the Appellants' interest, is consistent with the clearly expressed intent of the Board and Game and Fish, and ultimately benefits the public.
As a general rule, a water right beneficially used upon land becomes appurtenant to the land. And, when the land is conveyed, the water right passes with it. However, in this case, the water rights could be, and were, identified and separately transferred to the Game and Fish. Although the Board's reference to "any rights" language could have been more precise, there is no question which reservoir was involved because Dome Rock Reservoir is the only reservoir on Section 16 and was also the subject of the easement. It is obvious that water in the reservoir is essential to a public fishery, the interest served by the easement. Thus, the Board sufficiently demonstrated its intent to convey its water rights to Game and Fish, along with the easement. This intent was manifested in the patent, which excludes the reservoir water rights.
The Appellants also assert that the conveyance was invalid and could not have severed the water rights because the Board did not petition the State Engineer's Office for change in use, change in point of diversion, enlargement of use, or change in place of use of the water. The water rights at issue are for stored water, not for the direct use of the natural unstored flow of any stream. Appellants appear to overlook this distinction. The fact that the reservoir rights were permitted for irrigation does not impact the ownership of the rights conveyed by the Board when it granted the easement to the Game and Fish.
Additionally, the Appellants claim that the indications of an easement upon Section 16 would not have alerted them to the transfer of water rights in Dome Rock Reservoir. While that may be true, as discussed above, the Appellants' claims that they lacked notice are unavailing because they accepted an assignment of a mere equitable interest, subject to all imperfections and competing claims.
Appellants failed to state a claim for relief which would invalidate the easement, and the district court properly dismissed those causes of action. Their equitable interest in Section 16 did not prevent the Board from granting a valid easement to Game and Fish. The district court was also correct in holding that the water rights were severed and conveyed to the Game and Fish with the easement.

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the opinion for the court.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2ujnlj

Friday, June 08, 2007

Authenticated Public and Private Laws for the 110th Congress

Announcement from GPO (5/29/2007):

Authenticated Public and Private Laws for the 110th Congress are now available on GPO Access as a searchable and browseable application in beta form at http://fdlpdev.gpo.gov/plaws/index.html. The Government Printing Office has had an objective of assuring users that the information made available by GPO is official and authentic and that trust relationships exist between all participants in electronic transactions. GPO is working to afford users further assurance that files electronically disseminated through GPO Access are unchanged since GPO authenticated them and provide security for and safeguard Federal Government publications that fall within scope of the Federal Depository Library Program.

The Public and Private Laws beta application provides authenticated Adobe Portable Document Format (PDF) files for the 110th Congress only. Public and private laws within this application contain digitally signed and certified PDF files that contain GPO's Seal of Authenticity. These files have been digitally signed and certified using Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) technology. GPO is using PKI and Digital Signature technologies to verify the authenticity of the electronic U.S.
Government documents that it disseminates through the FDLP. GPO's Seal of Authenticity notifies users that a document has not been altered since it was authenticated and disseminated by GPO.

Public and private laws are prepared and published by the Office of the Federal Register (OFR), National Archives and Records Administration. The database is updated when the publication of a slip law is authorized by OFR. Documents are available in ASCII text and as authenticated PDF files.

Thursday, June 07, 2007

Summary 2007 WY 93

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Three Sons, LLC v. Wyoming Occupational health and Safety Commission (OSHA)

Citation: 2007 WY 93

Docket Number: 06-228

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, Honorable Wade E. Waldip, Judge

Representing Appellant (Petitioner): John R. Hursh of Central Wyoming Law Associates, Riverton, Wyoming

Representing Appellee (Respondent): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Steven R. Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kristi M. Radosevich, Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: June 7, 2007

Issues: Whether the District Court erred in finding that the misallocation of the burden of proof by the Appellee and the Hearing Officer was harmless error. Whether the District Court erred in finding that the Appellee, even under an improper allocation of the burden of proof, met its burden without any evidence of foreseeability or preventability of the willful violation of OSHA regulation 1926.652(a)(1) requiring excavation cave-in protection, is supported by substantial evidence. Whether the District Court erred in upholding the rejection of the employee misconduct defense and holding the employer to a strict liability standard.

Holdings: In determining which party bears the burden of proof, the applicable substantive statutes are considered. When the statutes do not assign the burden of proof, the proponent of the order has both the initial burden of production and the ultimate burden of persuasion in a contested case hearing. The purpose of Wyoming's OSHA statutes is to prevent accidents and promote safety in the workplace. The statutes do not assign the burden of proof. Therefore, WOSHA, as the proponent of orders upholding citations and penalties, has both the initial burden of production and the ultimate burden of persuasion in a contested case hearing to prove an employer committed the violations. However, when unpreventable employee misconduct is provided as an affirmative defense, the employer bears the burden of pleading and proving it.

Congress has specifically imposed on the employer the responsibility to assure compliance by his own employees. The duty to assure compliance includes the obligation to prevent hazardous non-complying conduct by employees. Since the employer has the responsibility of taking all reasonable steps to eradicate preventable hazards, including imposing work rules, communicating the rules to employees, and providing training, supervision and disciplinary action designated to enforce the rules, a prima facie case is established when there is evidence of the employer's awareness of a potentially preventable hazard and introduction of proof of the employer's failure to provide adequate safety equipment or to properly instruct its employees on necessary safety precautions. Thereafter, an employer may defend the citation on the ground that, due to the existence of a thorough and adequate safety program which is communicated and enforced as written, the conduct of its employee(s) in violating that policy was idiosyncratic and unforeseeable. By its nature, information with respect to the implementation of its written safety program will be in the hands of the employer, and it is not unduly burdensome to require it to come forward with such evidence. If the employer's evidence preponderates, it has successfully established the defense of unforeseeable employee misconduct.

Although the agency has the initial burden of production and the ultimate burden of persuasion to prove that a violation occurred, it is reasonable and in accord with the usual evidentiary rules for the burden to shift upon presentation by WOSHA of a prima facie case to the employer to prove the affirmative defense of employee misconduct. Therefore, the hearing examiner properly placed upon Appellant the burden of proving the affirmative defense of unpreventable employee misconduct.

It is not enough for the government to prove the violation. In order to make the prima facie showing necessary to satisfy its burden of proof, the government must also prove the violation occurred and the employer knew or with reasonable diligence could have known the violation was likely. Proof of the employer's actual or constructive knowledge of the violation is essential to the government's prima facie case. Constructive knowledge may be shown by evidence that the employer failed to establish an adequate safety program promoting compliance with safety standards. In the case at hand, the testimony was enough to establish a prima facie case that the violation was foreseeable because of inadequacies in safety precautions, employee training and supervision. The evidence was undisputed that two of the three employees observed in the trench in violation of OSHA regulation 1926.652(a)(1) requiring excavation cave-in protection had not received excavation safety training and that only one of the employees had received any safety training at all. Given that the evidence supports the conclusion that Appellant knew, or with the exercise of reasonable care could have known, that a violation was likely, the hearing examiner's failure to specify that element of the state's burden in her written order does not give rise to reversible error.

Although an employer cannot foresee that an employee would violate a direct order and that intentional employee misconduct cannot form the basis of a citation. Appellant's principal supervisor on the job site, knew the employees had never seen a trench box or a ladder in their life. Yet despite its knowledge that the employees knew nothing about trench safety, working around trenches or safety in general, Appellant took no precautions to ensure that these employees were aware of and understood the requirements of the OSHA excavation safety standards or that they conducted themselves in accordance with them. Appellant did not do everything in its power to ensure compliance with the law. Rather, without providing any training in excavation safety to ensure these newly hired employees were aware of and understood the OSHA requirements and conducted themselves accordingly, Appellant allowed them to begin work above a trench that was over seven feet deep without supervision with the ultimate intent of having them work in the trench. Other than the testimony that one individual instructed to them not to enter the trench, the significance of which was brought into question by the evidence that another supervisor allowed the three members of his crew to enter the trench, there was no evidence Appellant did anything to ensure compliance with the law.

Where an employee is directly participating in a job, the employer may well have a duty to instruct him on the safe procedure for handling the job. On the other hand, training may be unnecessary for an employee who is wholly disassociated with the operation in question and who would not be foreseeably exposed to danger. In the present case, the employees were at the excavation site specifically for the purpose of performing work in and around the trench. They were not, therefore, "wholly disassociated with the operation in question" and it was foreseeable that they would be exposed to the dangers associated with excavation work. It was undisputed that they had no experience or training in excavation work and no one communicated any safety rules to them before leaving them to begin work around the trench. Given these facts, substantial evidence supported the district court's order affirming the hearing examiner and the order was not arbitrary.

Affirmed.

Link to case: http://tinyurl.com/yqfn89.

Summary 2007 WY 92

Summary of Decision issued June 5, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: In the Interest of L.L., A.L., M.L. and N.C.:M.L. v. Laramie County Dep’t of Family Services

Citation: 2007 WY 92

Docket Number: C-06-8

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): John M. Burman, Faculty Supervisor and Tina Popova, Student Director, UW Legal Services Program; and Scott A. Homar, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Ms. Popova. (Order granting Motion allowing Scott A. Homar to withdraw as counsel entered Nov. 16, 2006.)

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; Dan S. Wilde, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Jill E. Kucera, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Kucera.

Issue: Whether the district court erred when it permitted the GAL from previous neglect cases involving Mother and her children to testify at the termination of parental rights hearing, wherein the witness was not appointed as a GAL. Whether clear and convincing evidence existed to justify terminating Mother’s parental rights.

Facts/Discussion: The district court terminated Mother’s parental rights to four of her children after a two-day hearing. Mother now appeals the district court’s ruling.
Standard of Review: Decisions concerning the admissibility of evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Due to the tension between the fundamental liberty of familial association and the compelling state interest in protecting the welfare of children, application of statutes for termination of parental rights is a matter for strict scrutiny.
Whether the district court erred when it allowed Mr. Frentheway to testify: Mother argued that Mr. Frentheway acted as a GAL in the case because of his status as GAL in previous proceedings, even though the district court did not appoint him. He was not appointed as a GAL in the termination proceeding and his role was that of a witness therefore he had no responsibility to the court, the children, or Mother greater than that of any other factual witness at a trial. The Court found there was no per se error in allowing Mr. Frentheway to testify.
The Court then considered whether the district court erroneously allowed Mr. Frentheway to testify regarding inadmissible opinion evidence. The Court reiterated that lay witnesses may give opinion evidence regarding matters that are rationally based on their perceptions and helpful to the trier of fact. The Court reviewed the record and was satisfied that the testimony conveyed his opinion that visits with Mother were causing problems for the children in adjusting their lives when she was not around.
Mother’s argument of unfair prejudice as a result from such testimony did not stand because the Court found no error in allowing Mr. Frentheway to testify as a lay witness.
Whether clear and convincing evidence supported the district court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights: Two elements must be proven by clear and convincing evidence under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(v) in order to divest parents of their rights to their children. First it must be shown that the children had been under the responsibility of the state for 15 out of the most recent 22 months. It was undisputed that all the children had been in foster care for 15 out of the most recent 22 months. The Court reviewed the record and determined that the evidence proving whether Mother was unfit was clear and convincing.

Holding: The district court did not err in allowing Mr. Frentheway to testify in the instant case and clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of Mother’s parental rights to LL, ML, AL, and NC.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2s5f3t .

Check out our tags in a cloud (from Wordle)!