Summary 2010 WY 58

Summary of Decision issued May 7, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Uptown Café, Inc. v. Town of Greybull

Citation: 2010 WY 58

Docket Number: S-09-0032

Appeal from the District Court of Big Horn County, the Honorable Steven J. Cranfill, Judge.

Representing Uptown Cafe: G. Mark Garrison of Garrison & Krisjansons, PC, Cody, Wyoming.

Representing Greybull: Larry B. Jones and William L. Simpson of Simpson, Kepler & Edwards, LLC, Cody, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: In May 2007, Uptown Café filed a complaint, pursuant to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA) seeking to recover damages allegedly caused by a leaking sewer line owned and operated by Greybull.
The disposition of the appeal was controlled by Beaulieu II. The failure of a complaint in a governmental claims action to allege compliance with both the constitutional signature and certification requirements and the statutory filing requirements can prevent the district court from acquiring subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.
Conclusion: Because Uptown Café’s complaint failed to allege the requisite constitutional compliance under Beaulieu II; the district court never acquired subject matter jurisdiction over the action. Accordingly, the district court’s summary judgment order was null and void. Since there was no order invoking the Court’s jurisdiction, the appeal was dismissed.

Dismissed.

J. Golden delivered the decision.

J. Kite dissenting, joined by J. Burke: The Justice dissented for the same reasons articulated in J. Burke’s dissenting opinion in McCann v. City of Cody. The allegations sufficiently allege the conditions precedent for filing a claim against Greybull to invoke the district court’s subject jurisdiction. If the complaint was insufficient, allow Uptown Café to amend it. If the rules created by the Court for pleading a governmental claim lead to the conclusion that the complaint is legally insufficient and Uptown Café is not permitted to amend, the rules should be abolished because they serve no useful purpose and create obstacles to the determination of governmental claims on their own merits.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2ckc92n .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance using the Universal Citation format, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2010 WY 57

Summary of Decision issued May 4, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Ohio Casualty ins. Co. v. W.N. McMurry Construction Co.; McMurry v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co.; McMurry v. BW Ins. Agency, Inc.

Citation: 2010 WY 57

Docket Number: S-08-0163; S-08-0164; S-08-0165

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge.

Representing Ohio Casualty Ins. Co.: Patrick J. Murphy and Scott P. Klosterman of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, PC, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing W.N. McMurry Construction Co.: W.W. Reeves and Anna Reeves Olson of Park Street Law Office, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing BW Insurance: Billie L.M. Addleman and Richard A. Mincer of Hirst Applegate PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: The three consolidated appeals arose out of McMurry Construction’s legal action to recover for two separate incidents involving two separate insurance policies. Both policies were issued to it by Ohio Casualty Ins. BW Insurance was the procuring agent for both policies.

S-08-0163: McMurry Construction sought through reformation to enforce a contract other than that into which it entered. The numbers ultimately reported to Ohio Casualty and supplied by McMurry Construction were unintentionally lower than they should have been. A review of the process showed there was no mistake reciprocal and common to both parties with each party being under the same misconception. It was a mistake in reaching the antecedent agreement which cannot be corrected by means of reformation.
S-08-0164: McMurry Construction challenged the interest calculations of the district court in its award of damages after reformation of the builder’s risk policy. Since the Court reversed the district court order requiring reformation, the appeal was moot and therefore dismissed.
S-08-0165: This appeal is based on the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of BW Insurance on contract and tort claims made against it by McMurry Construction as well as the district court’s denial of McMurry Construction’s attempt to reform its business auto insurance policy to gain coverage for a driver (Nelson) Ohio Casualty had expressly excluded from the policy. McMurry Construction recognized that failure to read an insurance policy will bar claims against an agent for breach of contract and negligence. It also admits it never read the business auto policy. It argued that the duty to read a policy is mitigated if the insured does not have a reasonable opportunity to read the policy. The Court found the argument specious since the policy was delivered in January and the accident in question occurred in September. McMurry Construction sought reformation of the business auto policy. Ashba of BW Insurance informed McMurry Construction that Nelson was covered under the policy. The Court’s question was whether Ashba and thus BW Insurance were acting as an agent for Ohio Casualty when he made that statement. Ohio Casualty made it clear in the auto policy that BW Insurance had no authority to alter the terms of the policy. BW Insurance did not have actual authority from Ohio Casualty to remove the exclusion-of-named-person endorsement.

Conclusion: (S-08-0163) The remedy of reformation was not available for the purpose of making a new and different contract for the parties. Instead, it was confined to establishment of the actual agreement reached between the parties as to the material terms of the contract. McMurry Construction and Ohio Casualty never reached a mutual agreement on material terms of the insurance policy – specifically the coverage limits. The decision of the district court was reversed.
(S-08-0164 dismissed)
(S-08-0165) McMurry Construction had plenty of time to read the business auto policy. The grant of summary judgment to BW Insurance on contract and tort claims was appropriate. Although Ashba told Fairservis that Nelson was covered, Ashba did not have the actual authority to effect such a change. Ohio Casualty never agreed to cover Nelson and never removed the exclusion-of-named-person endorsement from the policy. There was no basis for the reformation of the policy the district court’s decision on both of those issues was affirmed.

Appeal S-08-0163 was reversed. Appeal S-08-0164 was dismissed. Appeal S-08-0165 was affirmed.

J. Golden delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/23fo39o .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance using the Universal Citation format, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2010 WY 56

Summary of Decision issued April 28, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: M&M Auto Outlet v. Hill Investment Corp.

Citation: 2010 WY 56

Docket Number: S-09-0160

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge.

Representing Appellant M&M: Stephen R. Winship of Winship & Winship, PC, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee Hill: Richard D. Bush, David Evans and John A. Coppede of Hickey & Evans, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: M&M and Hill, doing business as First Financial, Inc. (FFI) entered into a contract in which FFI agreed to purchase vehicle loans from M&M and perform collection activities on the loans at its expense. In the event an M&M customer became delinquent on a loan, the contract provided that M&M would pay FFI the “full recourse amount.” Alleging that M&M failed to pay the full recourse amount on delinquent loans in accordance with the contract, FFI filed a complaint for breach of contract.

Meaning of the contract: From the four corners of the agreement, it was clear the parties intended the agreement to be a full recourse agreement in which FFI would purchase from M&M the loans M&M made to its customers, M&M’s customers would then make payments on the loans directly to FFI and FFI, at its expense, was responsible for collection activities, except for repossession expenses. The disagreement concerns the lengths to which FFI was required to go in collecting payments, and that is something the agreement did not address. If M&M desired FFI’s collection efforts to include specific activities, it was free to incorporate the terms in the agreement.
Alleged Breach by FFI: M&M claimed it was excused from performing under the agreement because FFI breached the agreement when it failed to perform its collection activities in good faith. The agreement unambiguously provided that FFI was entitled to full recourse from M&M in cases where its collection activities proved unsuccessful. Because the parties’ business relationship spanned several years and both parties were experienced in the used car financing business, the Court was unwilling to infer that duties existed absent clear language in the contract or evidence indicating that was the parties’ intent at the time the agreement was executed.
Mitigation of damages: The contract clearly stated that in the event FFI was unsuccessful in collecting the amounts due, it was entitled to full recourse as expressly defined in the agreement. The agreement did not require FFI to repossess the vehicles as part of its collection activities. For the Court to conclude so would have imposed a duty on FFI that the contract did not require.
Sufficiency of the evidence to support summary judgment: W.R.C.P. 56(e) requires an affidavit be made on personal knowledge; set forth facts which are admissible in evidence; demonstrate the affiant’s competency to testify on the subject matter of the affidavit; and have attached to it the papers and documents to which it refers. Shaw, FFI’s general manager, attached a summary identifying the problem accounts, the date recourse was declared, buyback amount, accrued interest and the total due. The affidavit also included the full recourse program agreement and a list of the designated accounts he provided to M&M. W.R.E. 1006 provides that writings which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a summary as long as the party makes the documents available for exam and copying by the opposing party. There was no contention that FFI did not make the actual documents available to M&M.
Prematurity of summary judgment: M&M asserted the summary judgment was premature because discovery had not been completed. On the same day as the summary judgment hearing, M&M signed a withdrawal of its motion to compel discovery stating that FFI had satisfactorily amended its discovery responses. Given that M&M stated it was satisfied with the discovery responses, the Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of the motion for continuance.

Conclusion: M&M could have, but did not include specific collection activities in the contract with FFI. The Court declined to rewrite the agreement under the circumstances of the instant case. The agreement unambiguously provided that FFI was entitled to full recourse from M&M in cases where its collection activities proved unsuccessful. The agreement did not require FFI to repossess vehicles. The affidavit and documents provided for the motion for summary judgment were sufficient. M&M’s argument that discovery was not complete and so its motion for continuance should have been granted was not borne out by the record.

Affirmed.

J. Kite delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2ao9n7l .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance using the Universal Citation format, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2010 WY 55

Summary of Decision issued April 28, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Fuller v. State

Citation: 2010 WY 55

Docket Number: S-09-0169

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge.

Representing Appellant Fuller: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Justin A. Daraie, Student Intern.

Facts/Discussion: Fuller appealed his conviction on a charge of felony property destruction. Fuller and his wife leased a house and garage in Casper. After an argument, Fuller drove his pickup through the garage door striking his wife’s car inside. He backed up the pickup and struck the car again damaging both the car and the garage.
Fuller contended the statute was ambiguous when applied to property in which a defendant has an ownership interest. Because the lease entitled him to sole possession of the garage at the time it was damaged, Fuller asserted that the garage could be considered his property as well as “property of another.” The Court concluded the language had only one reasonable interpretation. The garage was “property”, the landlords were “another” and they had a property interest in the garage.
The Court also rejected Fuller’s suggestion that his conviction was improper because his insurance company reimbursed the landlord. Nothing in the language of the statute indicates that paying for the damages is a defense to the charged crime.

Conclusion: The Court concluded the statutory language was not ambiguous. The language of the statute did not indicate that paying for damage done was a defense to the charged crime.

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/297y3hp .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance using the Universal Citation format, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2010 WY 54

Summary of Decision issued April 27, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Neidlinger, Sr. v. State

Citation: 2010 WY 54

Docket Number: S-09-0096

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Thomas T.C. Campbell, Judge.

Representing Appellant Neidlinger, Sr.: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Neidlinger, Sr. appealed the district court’s “Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Withdraw No Contest Plea.” He contended that the district court abused its discretion in denying that motion.

The circumstances of the case are indistinguishable from those presented in Nixon and Brown. Neidlinger appealed his judgment and sentence on February 27, 2007. The court affirmed the conviction and sentence in all respects. His motion to withdraw the plea was filed nearly two years later which was untimely, therefore the district court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the motion. The district court only has jurisdiction to act if the case has been remanded or if a specific express exception conferring jurisdiction is created by a rule or statute.

Conclusion: The district court’s Order Denying Early Discharge from Probation and Order Revoking Probation and Imposing Sentence are affirmed in all respects. Neidlinger’s appeal of the district court’s Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw No Contest Pleas was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Dismissed.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/26orzro .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance using the Universal Citation format, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2010 WY 53

Summary of Decision issued April 27, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Kerbs v. Walck, Jr.

Citation: 2010 WY 53

Docket Number: S-09-0121

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, the Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge.

Representing Appellants Kerbs, and Kerbs Four Bar Ranch Partnership (and the partners in Kerbs Ranch): Daniel B. Frank, Frank Law Office, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee Eugene Walck, Jr.: William M. MacPherson and Brandon W. Snyder, MacPherson, Kelly & Thompson, LLC, Rawlins, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of Walck ruling that the Kerbs Ranch had wrongfully interfered with Walck’s water rights. The Kerbs Ranch is located in Carbon County, a few miles west of the town of Saratoga. Walck’s ranch is west of the Kerbs Ranch. Jack Creek, a tributary of the North Platte River, winds its way in a northeasterly direction through Walck’s ranch, then through the Kerbs Ranch. Both ranches use irrigation water from Jack Creek to produce hay. In the spring of 2002, Wyoming regulated the North Platte River in response to the Federal Bureau of Reclamation’s call to fulfill its water rights for Pathfinder Reservoir. This “Pathfinder Call” allowed pre-1904 water rights to be fulfilled while post-1904 water rights generally could not. Both Walck and the Kerbs Ranch had some pre-1904 water rights which were fulfilled.
A preliminary issue raised by Kerbs Ranch was that the district court failed to specify whether Walck’s claims sounded in negligence or an intentional tort such as conversion. The Court stated that the record left no doubt that the district court and the Kerbs Ranch fully understood the nature of Walck’s claims.

North of Jack Creek: On the north side of Jack Creek there are two irrigation ditches at issue in this appeal. The headgate of the Forney No. 2 Ditch is upstream and the headgate of the D. McPhail Ditch is downstream. Water in the McPhail Ditch is split between Walck and Kerbs. The Forney No. 2 supplies water only to the Kerbs. Kerbs had not been using the McPhail Ditch for fifty years. It sent its water from the McPhail and the Forney through the Forney No. 2 Ditch. Kerbs never applied for permission to change its point of diversion as required by statute. Jack Creek was subject to the Pathfinder Call but Mr. Kerbs did not adjust the headgates to the pre-1904 levels. Later he noticed the water level was down as a result of action taken by the water commissioner. Kerbs installed a culvert and dam near where Forney No. 2 crosses over the McPhail Ditch. By taking water out of the McPhail Ditch, Kerbs effectively prevented Walck from irrigating 23 acres of his land. The district court found that Walck did not get the water he was entitled to receive.
South of Jack Creek: The water commissioner also adjusted the headgates of the Forney No. 2 Ditch Co. Ditch which is located on the south side of Jack Creek with a headgate downstream from the Forney No. 2 Ditch and upstream of the McPhail Ditch. Notices were placed along with chains and locks. Later, the headgates on the Forney Ditch Co. Ditch and the McPhail Ditch had been shut off letting no water into the two ditches shared by Walck and Kerbs Ranch, but allowing water to flow downstream to another irrigation ditch that served only the Kerbs Ranch. The district court found that both parties’ rights were of equal priority. It was unlawful for Kerbs Ranch to get ample water while Walck was getting a minimal amount. The shortfall must be shared equally.
Damages: Kerbs Ranch’s only objection to the damages calculations was that the district court used the county-wide average while Walck testified that actual production on his ranch was consistently below the county-wide average. The district court did not use the county-wide average hay production figure of 1.4 tons per acre. Part of Walck’s damages related to reduced pasturage, not reduced hay production. Mr. Walck did not appeal the district court’s damages calculations. The amount of damages is within the sound discretion of the jury or trial judge. The damages were not excessive or unreasonable as to indicate passion or prejudice.

Conclusion: Kerbs was legally required to leave the entire flow of the McPhail Ditch in that ditch. Kerbs violated that regardless of how little or how much was left to trickle down to Walck. The district court’s finding that Kerbs was not entitled to divert did not elevate Walck’s water rights over those of the Kerbs Ranch. The shortfall on the irrigation located south of Jack Creek must be shared equally by Walck and Kerbs Ranch since each party’s rights were of equal priority. The Kerbs Ranch failed to show that the district court’s damages calculations were clearly erroneous.

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/26td95x .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance using the Universal Citation format, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2010 WY 52

Summary of Decision issued April 26, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Cosco v. Lampert

Citation: 2010 WY 52

Docket Number: S-09-0106

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, Honorable Michael K. Davis, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): Louis D. Cosco, Pro se.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; and John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General.

Facts: Appellant’s claims allege that, while he was an inmate under the supervision and control of the DOC, at the Wyoming State Penitentiary (WSP), he was wrongfully deprived of property. The district court dismissed both of Appellant’s claims with prejudice. The district court reasoned that there was no waiver of governmental immunity that would make relief available. Moreover, even if such a waiver existed, Appellant had failed to timely file a governmental claim with the proper State entity, as prescribed by the governing statutes.

Issues: Whether Appellant properly filed a governmental claim as required by the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA). Whether the WGCA includes a waiver of immunity that makes Appellant’s claim(s) actionable. Whether the lack of a remedy under Wyoming law for Appellant’s claims violate either the Wyoming or United States constitutions.

Holdings: In Wyoming, no suit may be maintained against the State unless the legislature has authorized such a suit. Wyo. Stat. 1-39-101 through 121 (2009). The WGCA does not provide an exception to the rule of immunity for the claims pressed by Appellant. Furthermore, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the claims he did file met the stringent requirements of the WGCA. Appellant has brought his claims against the State of Wyoming generally, the DOC, and two former and present employees of the DOC/WSP. However, he has failed to establish that the WGCA has waived immunity for any of those claims. Appellant’s claims, as articulated in his detailed pleadings, are not cognizable under any of the exceptions to the rule of immunity. Furthermore, the procedural requirements set out in the WGCA are construed very strictly and as jurisdictional requirements. None of Appellant’s claims were filed within the time periods prescribed in Wyo. Stat. 1-39-113(a). Thus, the district court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of the State as to all of his claims. Moreover, the WGCA does not provide a waiver of immunity for the DOC’s conduct at issue here, even if the filings had otherwise met the statutory requirements.
Appellant asserts that he has been denied “due process of law” and “equal protection of the law,” and that as a general matter his “rights” of every kind and description have been trampled upon. Appellant raised these issues through the grievance process available to him under the rules and regulations which govern Wyoming’s penal institutions. The grievances Appellant filed were addressed by the warden of the WSP and/or the DOC in a timely and courteous manner. These internal procedures are the sort of rules and regulations contemplated by § 25-1-105 and the final result of an inmate grievance is not a matter that may be appealed to the courts. Appellant has aired his contentions of wrong-doing by WSP and DOC personnel in both the state and federal courts. It is clear that Appellant has been provided due process of law. Many, if not most of his issues, have been answered substantively. Those few issues that were not substantively addressed are deemed by the law to have been resolved (even though dismissed or otherwise not addressed on their merits), because Appellant had a full and complete opportunity to bring them before the courts, but he failed to adhere to mandatory procedural rules in doing so.
Appellant contends he has been denied equal protection of the law because the legislature did not include the DOC and the WSP within the waiver of the rule of immunity. To satisfy the first element of an equal protection challenge, a claimant must identify a classification of persons explicitly contained within a given piece of legislation. The WGCA does not differentiate between inmates and non-inmates. The WGCA simply enumerates certain tortious conduct for which the State waives the generally applicable rule of immunity. There is no attempt to distinguish between classes of individuals; the WGCA identifies causes of action which are actionable and those not enumerated remain in the category where immunity prevails. There is also a legitimate legislative objective since the purpose of the WGCA is to conserve public funds and yet preserve a fair and viable system of compensating persons injured by governmental actions. Further, the legislative classification is reasonably related to the achievement of the appropriate legislative purpose. Appellant’s claims arise in a setting where the sort of property loss/destruction at issue here is unpredictable, and further it is often virtually impossible to ascertain a reasonable value. For instance, here Appellant seeks tens of millions of dollars in compensation for more than a thousand separate pieces of property. Excluding such losses from the beneficent purposes of the WGCA is rational and readily withstands the equal protection provisions of both the United States and the Wyoming constitutions.
Freedom of religion is a fundamental right. However, the religious practices of inmates may be limited. The Court declined to address Appellant’s assertions that his religious liberties have been violated by the DOC and the WSP. Those assertions were supported by the barest of allegations that articles he claimed to be of religious significance to him were intentionally destroyed, misplaced, or lost by the WSP and DOC. His pleadings contain no averments that he has, because of these circumstances, been deprived of the right to otherwise freely pursue his religious beliefs, or that the destruction, misplacement, or loss of the religious articles at issue was designed to frustrate his right to freely practice his religion, within the limitations rightfully imposed by the DOC and WSP for the safety and security of DOC staff and other inmates in the charge of the DOC.
Appellant contends that the governing statutes and policies of the State deprive him of any sort of meaningful remedy and that, therefore, this Court must create a remedy for his peculiar circumstances. To the extent that this Court may have the authority to fashion a legal or equitable remedy to aid in the resolution of the circumstances set out in Appellant’s pleadings, it declined to do so.

The district court’s order which is the subject of this appeal is affirmed in all respects. In order that the contentions advanced by Appellant in these proceedings, as well as in other proceedings cited herein, be brought to finality, Appellant shall be prohibited from filing any further litigation relating to the subject matter of this case in any court of the State of Wyoming without first having obtained leave of the Court to do so.

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the opinion for the court.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2e3u2ef .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance using the Universal Citation format, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]