Thursday, February 09, 2012

Summary 2012 WY 17

Summary of Decision February 9, 2012

[SPECIAL NOTE:  This opinion uses the "Universal Citation."  It was given an "official" citation when it was issued.  You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation.  You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered.  When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number.  The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance] 

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name:  Peterson v. State of Wyoming

Citation:  2012 WY 17

Docket Number: S-10-0104


Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, The Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant):  Diane M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellant Counsel; David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. Westling.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff):  Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Stewart M. Young, Faculty Director, Joshua Beau Taylor, Student Director, and Anthony Barton, Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance Program.  Argument by Mr. Taylor.

Date of Decision: February 9, 2012

Facts:  Appellant was charged with second degree sexual abuse of a minor under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-315(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2011)3 (Count I), two counts of first degree sexual abuse of a minor under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-314(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2011)4 (Counts II and III), and soliciting a minor to engage in sexual relations under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-318 (LexisNexis 2011) (Count IV).  Appellant’s jury trial began after several continuances.  The jury found Appellant guilty on Counts I and IV but acquitted him on Counts II and III.  The district court sentenced Appellant to eighteen to twenty years on the sexual abuse count and to a consecutive term of four to five years on the soliciting count.  Appellant then initiated this appeal. 

Contemporaneously with the filing of the appellate brief, Appellant filed a motion seeking a partial remand to the district court to develop evidence concerning the effectiveness of his trial counsel.  This Court granted the remand motion and directed the district court to consider the following four issues:  (1) whether trial counsel failed to conduct a proper investigation and failed to interview the witness SP prior to trial; (2) whether trial counsel was ineffective with regard to the competency/taint hearing involving the minor victim and with regard to a Daubert hearing; (3) whether trial counsel was ineffective because he did not dedicate his full attention to the trial; and (4) whether trial counsel was ineffective with regard to his cross-examination of the victim.  The district court held an evidentiary hearing and determined that trial counsel was not ineffective in his representation of Appellant.  The case then returned to this Court for briefing and argument. 

Issues:  Did the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s general lack of preparation, failure to investigate, failure to propose jury instructions and general incompetence amount to ineffective assistance of counsel?

Holdings:  As to the issue of whether counsel failed to investigate and interview the witness SP, the Court found Appellant failed to demonstrate that counsel’s investigation and evaluation of SP’s likely testimony was flawed and outside the realm of professionally competent assistance.

As to the competency hearing, the Court observed that Appellant made no showing that presenting his slight evidence of taint at the competency hearing would have prevented the child from testifying, or that presenting the evidence only at trial lessened his chances of acquittal.  The Court found Appellant’s failure to make the required showing of deficient performance and resulting prejudice defeated his ineffectiveness claim.

The Court concluded that throughout the trial, defense counsel vigorously represented Appellant and challenged the State’s evidence.  Appellant failed to sustain his burden of proving that he was deprived of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. 

Affirmed.

J. Golden delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2012 WY 16

Summary of Decision February 9, 2012

[SPECIAL NOTE:  This opinion uses the "Universal Citation."  It was given an "official" citation when it was issued.  You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation.  You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered.  When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number.  The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance] 

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Wyatt L. Bear Cloud v. The State of Wyoming

Citation:  2012 WY 16

Docket Number: S-11-0102


Appeal from the District Court of Sheridan County, the Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge.

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Diane Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. Morgan.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jeffrey S. Pope, Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. Pope.

Date of Decision: February 9, 2012

Facts: On August 26, 2009, Appellant Wyatt Bear Cloud and two co-defendants were involved in the armed burglary of a residence in Sheridan, Wyoming.  During the course of the burglary, one of Bear Cloud’s co-defendants shot and killed one of the home’s residents.  Bear Cloud was charged with, and ultimately pleaded guilty to,  Murder in the First Degree (Felony-Murder), in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(a) (LexisNexis 2011); Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated Burglary, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-303(a) and 6-3-301(a) and (c)(i) (LexisNexis 2011); and Aggravated Burglary, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann.  § 6-3-301(a) and (c)(i) (LexisNexis 2011).  He was sixteen years of age at the time of these offenses.  In addition to his sentences on the burglary and conspiracy charges, Bear Cloud was sentenced to life imprisonment for his conviction for felony-murder.  He now appeals his convictions and sentences on numerous grounds. 

Issues:  Bear Cloud presents the following issues for review: 1) Was Appellant’s trial counsel ineffective, specifically by: (A) inviting intrusion into the attorney-client relationship, (B) waiving his meritorious appellate issues and (C) incorrectly advising him of the consequences of his pleas, thus rendering his pleas involuntary? 2) Is a motion to transfer a case to juvenile court a dispositive motion, so it may be the subject of conditional guilty pleas? 3) Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it refused to transfer Appellant to juvenile court? 4) Does the sentence of life in prison for a juvenile who did not commit or intend to commit a homicide violate the [Eighth] Amendment of the United States Constitution? 5) Does the sentence of life in prison for a juvenile who did not commit or intend to commit a homicide violate Art. 1, § 14 of the Wyoming Constitution? 6) Does the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment provided in the [Eighth] Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 14 of the Wyoming Constitution, prohibit the imposition of mandatory life imprisonment on a juvenile when the sentencing court cannot take into consideration the child’s age, culpability or other mitigating factors? 7) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas?  Appellee, the State of Wyoming, generally relies upon the same issues. 

Holdings: The Court concluded that the district court did not err in denying  Bear Cloud’s motion to transfer the proceedings to juvenile court nor did it abuse its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.  To the extent his appellate claims survive the entry of a guilty plea, trial counsel was not ineffective in her representation of Bear Cloud.  Further, Bear Cloud’s assertion that his life sentence for felony-murder was unconstitutional, under either the United States Constitution or the Wyoming Constitution, failed.  A sentence of life imprisonment, with the possibility of parole, for a juvenile offender convicted of felony-murder satisfies the constitutional mandates of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 14 of the Wyoming Constitution.  Finally, Wyo. Stat. Ann.  § 6-2-101(b) was not rendered unconstitutional by its mandatory sentencing structure, even as applied to a juvenile offender, and particularly in light of the district court’s ability to consider mitigating circumstances when considering whether to transfer proceedings to juvenile court.  Bear Cloud’s convictions and sentences were affirmed in all respects.

Judge Donnell delivered the opinion for the court.



Tuesday, February 07, 2012

Summary 2012 WY 15

Summary of Decision February 7, 2012

[SPECIAL NOTE:  This opinion uses the "Universal Citation."  It was given an "official" citation when it is issued.  You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation.  You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered.  When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number.  The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance] 

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name:  Schreibvogel v. State of Wyoming

Citation:  2012 WY 15

Docket Number: S-11-0172


Original Proceeding, Petition for Writ of Review, District Court of Carbon County, The Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

Representing Appellant (Petitioner):  W. Keith Goody, Cougar, Washington.

Representing Appellee (Respondent):  Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; Meri V. Geringer, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. Geringer.

Date of Decision: February 7, 2012

Facts:  The appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree sexual assault and one count of robbery.  The Court’s opinion affirming those convictions upon direct appeal is found at Schreibvogel v. State, 2010 WY 45, 228 P.3d 874 (Wyo. 2010).  In that proceeding, the appellant alleged, inter alia, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to inadmissible evidence, and for failing adequately to cross-examine the victim in regard to the defense of consent. The appellant did not prevail on either allegation.

Just less than a year after losing his appeal, the appellant filed in the district court a Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.  In his petition, the appellant alleged that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising in the direct appeal two additional allegations of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness: (1) failure to pursue as a defense the synergistic effect of the victim’s simultaneous use of the prescription drug Paxil and alcohol; and (2) failure to investigate and pursue expert medical testimony as to the cause of an injury to the victim’s face.  In addition, the appellant also alleged that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to seek an evidentiary hearing under W.R.A.P. 21.

The State filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(a)(iii) for the proposition that the appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was procedurally barred because it had been determined on the merits in the direct appeal.  The district court heard the motion to dismiss and subsequently issued a lengthy decision letter and order dismissing the petition. 

In response, Appellant filed this Petition for Writ of Review.  The Court granted the petition, the matter was briefed, and oral argument was heard.

Issues:  Where the appellant has raised the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his direct appeal, may he raise the claim again, on different factual grounds, in a petition for post-conviction relief by arguing that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising those different factual grounds? 

Holdings:  This was a question of first impression before the Court.  The Court answered the question in the negative.  The Court held that where a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has been raised and decided against the appellant in his direct appeal, he may not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, based upon different allegations, in a petition for post-conviction relief because the claim is procedurally barred by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(a)(iii).  A stand-alone claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is not cognizable under the post-conviction relief statutes because post-conviction relief is limited to the alleged denial of constitutional rights during the proceedings which resulted in conviction.  The jurisdictional exception for the consideration of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel provided in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(b)(ii) is limited to situations where a claim “[c]ould have been raised but was not raised” in the direct appeal, as addressed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(a)(i).

J Voigt delivered the opinion for the court.

In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Kite wrote separately because, while she agreed that Petitioner was not entitled to the relief he sought, she disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the district court and this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide his post-conviction claim.  The concurrence would hold that Petitioner’s assertion that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of appellate counsel falls within the scope of § 7-14-101(b) and is not barred under § 7-14-103 and would have addressed the merits of the claim. 

Monday, February 06, 2012

Summary 2012 WY 14

Summary of Decision February 6, 2012


[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Joseph Randall Owens v. The State of Wyoming

Citation: 2012 WY 14

Docket Number: S-11-0184

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=465073

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, the Honorable John R. Perry, Judge.

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Gregory A. Phillips, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Stewart M. Young, Director, and Joshua B. Taylor, Student Director, Prosecution Assistance Program, University of Wyoming, College of Law.

Date of Decision: February 6, 2012

Facts: Appellant, Joseph Randall Owens, entered a conditional guilty plea to felony possession of methamphetamine in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(ii). He reserved the right to appeal the constitutionality of the search that resulted in discovery of the methamphetamine.

Issues: Appellant presents the following issue: Should the motion to suppress evidence seized in a warrantless search of Appellant’s containers have been granted?

Holdings: Appellant contends that evidence of methamphetamine seized from his backpack should have been suppressed because it was discovered during an unlawful search. He claims that the search of his backpack was unreasonable because there was no connection between his medical emergency and the search. Under the circumstances presented, however, the Court found that the search was reasonable.

The responding officer was presented with an emergency situation when, upon entering Appellant’s motel room, he found Appellant convulsing on the floor. Appellant was unable to communicate with the officer and did not respond to the officer’s attempts to gain his attention. During the encounter, Appellant’s eyes were extremely wide and periodically rolled to the back of his head. The officer was unable to gather any pertinent information about Appellant’s condition from Appellant’s acquaintance. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for the officer to search Appellant’s backpack, as well as the containers found therein, in an attempt to aid Appellant. Despite the subsequent arrival of emergency medical personnel, it was reasonable for the officer, who had also received training as an emergency medical technician, to seek identification indicating a specific medical condition, emergency medication to alleviate Appellant’s seizure, or substances that may have contributed to Appellant’s condition. The officer’s discovery of methamphetamine prompted the medical technicians to treat Appellant for a suspected drug overdose. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Court found that the State satisfied its burden of establishing specific and articulable facts showing that the search was justified pursuant to the officer’s community caretaker function.

Appellant asserted that the officer’s seizure of a cardboard box from his friend’s motel room showed that the officer engaged in a “general exploratory search” that was “related to the emergency only as a matter of fortuitous opportunity.” The Court agreed that the officer’s search of the adjoining motel room was unrelated to the exigencies created by Appellant’s emergency. However, the fact that the officer retrieved a cardboard box from the neighboring motel room did not undermine the conclusion that the officer’s search of Appellant’s backpack was objectively reasonable. The search of the trash can in the neighboring room, conducted after Appellant had been transported to the hospital, had no bearing on the reasonableness of the officer’s search at the time of Appellant’s emergency. Further, the issuance of the search warrant for Appellant’s room was not in any measure based on evidence discovered during the officer’s search of the neighboring room. The officer’s affidavit in support of the warrant to search Appellant’s motel room made no reference to his search or observations in the adjoining room. While the facts may present a question as to whether the search in the adjoining room was lawful with respect to Appellant’s friend’s Fourth Amendment rights, Appellant did not demonstrate that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his friend’s room and, as a result, he did not have standing to challenge that search. Affirmed.

Justice Burke delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2012 WY 13

Summary of Decision February 6, 2012

[SPECIAL NOTE:  This opinion uses the "Universal Citation."  It was given an "official" citation when it is issued.  You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation.  You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered.  When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number.  The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance] 

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name:  Brock v. State of Wyoming

Citation:  2012 WY 13

Docket Number: S-11-0108


Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, The Honorable David B. Park, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant):  Tamara K. Schroeder, Chapman Valdez, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Gregory A. Phillips, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Justin A. Daraie, Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. Daraie.

Date of Decision: February 6, 2012

Facts:  Appellant was employed as an assistant manager at a restaurant. He failed to deposit two days earning at the bank.  Appellant was charged with one count of larceny, which was later amended to larceny by bailee.  Appellant pled not guilty and his case proceeded to trial.

At that hearing, defense counsel objected in advance to the introduction of evidence concerning Appellant’s rumored gambling problems.  The subject of gambling was not mentioned during trial.

Defense counsel also opposed the introduction of recently discovered incriminating statements, and requested that the court grant a continuance or prevent the State from introducing those statements.  In response, the court ordered the State to make the witness available that morning for an interview.  The witness was interviewed by the defense that day, and was called as the State’s final witness on the second day of trial.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict. The court sentenced Appellant to a term of seven to ten years in prison.  Appellant timely filed this appeal.

Issues: 1) Whether it was ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to call the investigating police officers to testify with regard to their investigation; 2) Whether it was ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to investigate or interview or call key witnesses with possibly exculpatory information; and 3) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the prosecution’s objection to cross-examination of a witness regarding statements made to the police.

Holdings:  As to the first issue, the Court found that Appellant discounted the possibility that police testimony would have been more damaging than helpful to his case.  The Court also found that trial counsel’s effort to preclude evidence of Appellant’s rumored gambling problems did not constitute deficient performance when properly viewed as a strategic decision securely within the reasonable judgment of counsel. 

As to the second issue, the Court did not find that defense counsel’s investigation of witnesses to be presumptively prejudicial.  Appellant made no attempt to identify the favorable evidence that additional investigation by defense counsel would have revealed.  Accordingly, the Court rejected his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Lastly, the court found that Appellant failed to establish that he was prevented from asking any specific question during cross-examination of a witness, or that the district court abused its discretion in sustaining the prosecutor’s objection to a document never specifically identified in the record.

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2012 WY 12

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]


Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Shepherd of the Valley Care Center v. Rebecca K. Fulmer

Citation: 2012 WY 12

Docket Number: S-10-0236

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=465064

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, The Honorable David B. Park, Judge.

Representing Appellant: Scott P. Klosterman of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, Wyoming

Representing Appellee: Peter J. Timbers of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, Casper, Wyoming

Date of Decision: February 2, 2012

Facts: Rebecca K. Fulmer (Fulmer) suffered injuries on two separate dates while working as a Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA) at Shepherd of the Valley Care Center (Shepherd). She submitted worker’s compensation claims for both injuries. Shepherd objected to both claims, and the Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division (Division) denied benefits for the two injuries.

Fulmer requested a hearing, and following a combined contested case hearing, the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the denial of benefits. The OAH concluded Fulmer was not entitled to benefits for her first injury because it was the result of Fulmer’s own culpable negligence. It concluded Fulmer was not entitled to benefits for the second injury based on its finding that “Fulmer was performing activities of daily living not causally related to her work and the fracture could have become complete at any time or place.”

Fulmer appealed, and the district court reversed the OAH decision. The district court found the record did not support either the finding that Fulmer’s first injury was caused by her own culpable negligence or the finding that Fulmer’s second injury was caused not by her work but by normal activities of day-to-day living.
Issues: Whether the hearing examiner correctly determined that the injury sustained by Rebecca Fulmer on August 12, 2008, was caused by her culpable negligence and therefore [was] not a compensable injury as defined under Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-102(a)(xi). Whether the hearing examiner correctly determined that the injury sustained by Rebecca Fulmer on August 30, 2008, resulted primarily from normal activities of day-to-day living and therefore [was] not a compensable injury as defined under Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-102(a)(xi).

Holdings: The Court found that Shepherd did not meet its burden of proving Fulmer was culpably negligent when she injured her hip lifting a patient by herself; nor did it meet its burden of proving a normal activity of day-to-day living caused Fulmer’s hip fracture. The Court remanded to the district court with directions that it remand to the OAH for entry of an order awarding benefits to Fulmer for both her August 12, 2008, and August 30, 2008, hip injuries.

Justice Golden delivered the opinion for the court.

Thursday, February 02, 2012

Summary 2012 WY 11

Summary of Order February 1, 2012

[SPECIAL NOTE: This order uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the order, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the order that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future order using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Board of Professional Responsibility, Wyoming State Bar v. Don Franklin Shreve, Jr.,

Docket Number: D-12-0001

Date of Order: February 1, 2012

Pursuant to Section 17 of the Disciplinary Code for the Wyoming State Bar, Bar Counsel for the Wyoming State Bar filed a “Petition for Interim Suspension of Attorney.” The Court, after a careful review of the Petition for Interim Suspension, the affidavit of Bar Counsel, and the other materials attached to the petition, concludes that the petition for interim suspension should be granted and that Respondent should be suspended from the practice of law pending resolution of the formal charge that has been, or will be, filed against Respondent.

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