Summary 2007 WY 168
Summary of Decision issued October 24, 2007
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Case Name: Cureton v. State
Citation: 2007 WY 168
Docket Number: S-07-0001
Appeal from the
Representing Appellant (Defendant): Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel, State Public Defender Program.
Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General.
Date of Decision: October 24, 2007
Facts: Appellant was convicted on two counts of possession of a controlled substance and one count of possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver.
Issues: Whether plain error occurred when the district court permitted the arresting officer to give opinion testimony as to Appellant’s guilt. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s convictions.
Holdings: The rule is well established that a witness, lay or expert, may not express an opinion as to the guilt of the accused. This rule ensures that it is the jury that resolves the factual issues and determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. Opinion testimony, however, is not improper simply because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. An interpretation of the evidence by a witness, even though that interpretation may be important in establishing an element of the crime and thus leading to the inference of guilt, is not in the same category as an actual conclusional statement on the guilt or innocence of the accused party. Thus, error occurs only where the testimony constitutes a direct opinion about the accused’s guilt rather than relates information to assist the jury in resolving the factual issues placed before it. In this case, the arresting officer never testified or offered a conclusion about whether Appellant was a drug dealer or that she was guilty of any particular offense. The officer’s testimony merely informed the jury about the meaning and significance of certain items of physical evidence collected at the scene, and left the ultimate conclusion for the jury. The officer’s testimony was not impermissible comments on Appellant’s guilt but, rather, was opinion evidence offered to aid the jury in understanding and resolving the factual issues of the case. Such testimony does not rise to the same level of impropriety that the rule on opinion testimony guards against. Its admission therefore did not violate a clear and unequivocal rule of law.
When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the evidence, and any applicable inferences that may be reasonably drawn from it, are viewed in the light most favorable to the State. It is the jury’s responsibility to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw reasonable inferences from the facts.
Possession of a controlled substance is proved when the evidence establishes that the accused either individually or jointly with another exercised dominion and control over the substance, had knowledge of its presence, and knowledge that the substance was a controlled substance. Direct evidence of the defendant’s actual possession of the substance is not required. Rather, constructive possession is all that is necessary and such may be proved by circumstantial evidence linking together a series of facts allowing a reasonable inference that the defendant had the requisite knowledge and control of the substance. In the present action, a careful review of the record shows ample evidence from which the jury reasonably could infer that Appellant possessed the methamphetamine. The arresting officer’s testimony reveals that a tin containing two small baggies of methamphetamine and women’s jewelry, as well as forty-seven baggies of the type used to package the drug, were found in the area where Appellant had been situated in a pickup truck. A scale covered with methamphetamine residue was located on top of the passenger rear tire where Appellant had briefly stopped before stepping to the back of the truck. The officer had not observed another person around the rear tire prior to the discovery of the scale. Finally, Appellant had a syringe and $970.00 in cash on her person. The State’s evidence indicates that, at the time of her arrest, Appellant was unemployed and had no known source of income. Additionally, there was evidence that Appellant had exclusive possession of the truck for a period of time immediately preceding the discovery of the methamphetamine and other drug items. From the evidence presented, a reasonable inference can be drawn that Appellant knew what was in the tin and had exerted control over it. A reasonable inference can also be drawn that Appellant exercised dominion and control over the scale, knew that the residue on the scale was methamphetamine and that she placed it on the truck’s tire to avoid its detection. Additionally, a reasonable inference can be made from the quantity of methamphetamine, the scale, the baggies and the amount of cash Appellant was carrying that she possessed the methamphetamine with the intent to deliver it to others. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and giving it all reasonable inferences, evidence is sufficient to sustain Appellant’s convictions.
Affirmed.
J. Golden delivered the opinion for the court.
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