Cloud Computing - Technology Savior or Privacy Nightmare?

Cloud computing and the concept of SaaS (Software as a Service) are some newish techno terms you may be hearing more of in the last few years. Even if you haven't heard these terms, odds are you may be actually participating in cloud computing. If you use an online email service (for example, Google Mail (gmail) or Yahoo), you are definitely flying in the cloud.

Wikipedia defines cloud computing as "a style of computing in which dynamically scalable and often virtualized resources are provided as a service over the Internet". That reads more or less like Greek to me, so I found a better definition from Dennis Kennedy in his blog post "Nine Legal Technology Trends for 2009 - The Year of Hunkering Down".

4. Get Your head into the Cloud. You will hear even more talk about “cloud computing” and “software as a service” (SaaS) in 2009. In simplest terms, I’m referring to ways both programs and data can be hosted and managed on the Internet through a third-party provider.

Are you using Google Apps or Docs? How about Microsoft Live or Zoho? These are all third-party service providers that hold your information on the Internet (the cloud) through their servers.

As Kennedy mentions in his short description of cloud computing and SaaS, these options provide several benefits (inexpensive, not needing to invest in expensive software and hardware, as well as technology expertise). However, there are also concerns, client privacy being one of the biggies.

One of today's articles from Law.com's Legal Technology addresses some of the legal issues surrounding cloud computing. "Cloud Computing Brings New Legal Challenges" by Shari Claire Lewis begins with a timeline of sorts describing the evolution of storing data, beginning with holding and controlling all data on-site and eventually growing into the option of lessening costs by outsourcing application usage and information storage to third-party providers. Lewis then moves right into the issues of data confidentiality, noting that "[a]s with other forms of "outsourcing," businesses' duties to protect private or confidential data do not end with their transfer of the data to third-party vendors for storage or processing." Lewis also points to other concerns in how cloud computing can effect pretrial discovery, especially electronic discovery. She concludes that:

As with many issues of technology, counsel will need to understand not just the legal precedent concerning cloud servers, but also the particular facts concerning their business' use of cloud servers, the type of data that is stored in the cloud, and the location and document retention practices of the service provider.

Collection Update #5

Finally, the reporters are on the shelves! At this point, all current legal research materials are back in the library and on the shelves. Coming soon from storage will be our remaining historical materials: treatises, federal government documents, and the British collection.

Here is what we have on the shelves so far: treatises, Wyoming legislative information, reporters, current and historic state statutes, ALRs, digests, CFRs, and Federal Registers.

Free Online Seminar: BriefTools & CiteAdvisor: An Integrated Document Review System

For those of you who have Westlaw access, here's a free training opportunity from Westlaw. And if you don't have Westlaw access in your office or home, you can use the law library's free public Westlaw access!

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Sign up for this informative online seminar that will illustrate how to use West BriefTools and West CiteAdvisor to quickly and easily produce accurate and perfectly formatted legal documents.

Some tips you'll learn include:

• Assure your brief cites only good law
• Locating and leveraging internal documents that are relevant to your case or topic
• Give yourself an advantage in monitoring the status of authority that your opposition cites
• How to format legal citations within briefs, motions, decisions, opinions, and law review articles
• Selecting your jurisdiction and the formatting rules (i.e. Bluebook) you want to follow
• Building and inserting tables of authorities
  

Plus, since it's a live, interactive seminar, you'll have a chance to ask questions.

Registration is simple. Select a day and time that works best for you, then click on it to sign up:

Webinar Times
Tuesday, July 7, 2009, 10AM Central Standard Time
Thursday, July 9, 2009, 2PM Central Standard Time

If you're not available for this seminar, or if you'd prefer a one-on-one teleconference regarding your specific research needs, please call 1-800-328-0109 to speak with your dedicated attorney trainer for training.

Official, Authentic, Permanent? -- Not Online

Written by Katie Jones*

Primary online legal resources in Wyoming are not official. Nor have they been authenticated. And which state agencies that provide the online legal information have addressed the issue of permanent public access[1]? So, what does this mean? Can we still use them? Are they reliable? What happens if you refer to a statute that was printed from the Legislative Service Office web site instead of providing a certified copy of that statute from LSO itself?

The American Association of Law Libraries (AALL) completed a survey that resulted in the State-by-State Report on Authentication of Online Legal Resources[2] and answers, as of March 2007, the question, “How trustworthy are state-level primary legal resources on the Web?” AALL also held a national summit in April 2007. The summit, Authentic Legal Information in the Digital Age (http://www.aallnet.org/summit/), brought together national leaders to explore legal and technological solutions to ensure that state online legal information can be authenticated and will be preserved. In addition to members of the AALL Executive Board and leaders, outside delegates included representatives from the American Bar Association, National Conference of State Legislators, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and officials from state courts, state legislatures, state archives and the Federal government.

The Summit addressed the concepts of what is official[3] and authentic[4] legal information, especially as reported in the survey by each individual state's online legal information. The survey targeted six sources of law: state administrative codes and registers, state statutes and session laws, and state high and intermediate appellate court opinions. Survey results showed that a significant number of state online resources are official but none are authenticated or afford ready authentication by standard methods. State online primary legal resources are, therefore, not sufficiently trustworthy. These are the key findings supporting the need to address at the very least authentication and permanent access of our state online legal resources[5]:

• States have begun to discontinue print official legal resources and substitute online official legal sources. [Alaska, Indiana, Tennessee, Utah, District of Columbia]


• Ten states & D.C. have deemed as official one or more of their online primary legal resources. [Alaska, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia]


• One or more of the online primary legal sources of eight states have “official traits,” where evidence as to the actual status of the resources is conflicting. [Alaska, California, New Jersey, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, District of Columbia]


• States have not acknowledged important needs of citizens and law researchers seeking government information; they have not been sufficiently deliberate in their policies and practices.


• No state’s online primary legal resources are authenticated or afford ready authentication by standard methods.


• Eight states have provided for permanent public access (PPA) to one or more of their online primary legal resources. [Alaska, California, Indiana, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas and Utah]
  

Kathy Carlson, Wyoming State Law Library director, responded to the survey for Wyoming (http://www.aallnet.org/aallwash/authen_rprt/StateReports.pdf). Her report noted that while the chain of custody for Wyoming's online legal resources is secure, the online versions are not deemed official and are not authenticated. When preparing for this article, I contacted several agencies to review the status of Wyoming's online agency rules, statutes, legislative session laws, and Supreme Court opinions.

Amber Green, in the Secretary of State's Compliance Division, verified that the online Wyoming Rules Database (http://soswy.state.wy.us/AdminServices/RulesOverview.aspx) is not considered official and they have not addressed or plan to address authentication procedures. Procedurally, rules are submitted to the legislature through the Legislative Service Office, then reviewed by the Attorney General, signed by the Governor and published by the Secretary of State. An official, certified print copy may be obtained from the Secretary of State. While the online rules may not be official, you can be certain that they will be permanently accessible, as per the Secretary of State Rules on Rules, Chapter 1, Section 8, Copies of Rules.

Wyoming's online legislative resources (session laws and statutes specifically) are also not considered official. Dan Pauli, Legislative Services Office Director, confirmed that LSO is the official custodian of the code database (W.S. 28-8-105(a)(v)) and authorized to contract with a publisher to provide a print version of the statutes (W.S. 28-8-105(c)). Pauli noted that he often provides a notarized affidavit with a copy of a statute from their official code database. There are currently no designs to implement authentication or make the online session laws (http://legisweb.state.wy.us/sessions/legsess.htm) or statutes (http://legisweb.state.wy.us/titles/statutes.htm) official. And while a published print form is statutorily mandated where the online version is not, Pauli said that free online access is planned as long as enough server space is available. Beginning with the 2008 Budget Session, LSO has placed online the published version of the 2008 Session Laws.

There are two online options for Wyoming Supreme Court opinions, provided by the Supreme Court (http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx) and the Law Library (http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/). Again, these online versions are not considered official and are not authenticated. The Supreme Court has recently implemented an online docketing system, though, that places a watermark much like a date stamp on filings. Judy Pacheco, Clerk of the Supreme Court, and John Capron, Supreme Court Software Developer, both were intrigued by the possibility of authenticating Supreme Court opinions in the future. The Law Library cooperates with the Oklahoma State Court Network (OSCN) to provide online Wyoming Supreme Court opinions back to 1990. Authentication has not been discussed with OSCN as yet, though the I hope to work with them soon to discuss possible implementation. Permanent public access has also not been discussed or made policy for the Supreme Court online decisions. However, the intention is to continue making this legal resource freely accessible online.

One of the sessions during the AALL National Summit focused on suggestions for amending state laws to include authentication. Tim Coggins, Associate Dean for Library & Information Services at University of Richmond School of Law, used the example of Washington State legislation, H.B. 1859, which requires that if the Washington State Register is published exclusively by electronic means, that electronic copy is the official copy. A proposed legal solution would be to add, “and shall be authenticated by a certificate or mark that conveys information as to its certification, and shall be preserved for permanent public access.”[6] Since the Summit, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has approved the creation of a new Study Committee on Online Authentication of Legal Materials to investigate the issues and discuss the feasibility of a uniform law or model act on digital authentication.

With this background information, can we answer the questions at the beginning of this article? In reality, since Wyoming continues to rely on print legal information as official, should we be concerned that the online versions are not authenticated and may or may not be accessible in five, ten or fifty years? Has experience in Wyoming courts shown that most judges accept an online version of a legal resource? Aren't attorneys trusted as officers of the court to provide a correct copy of the statute, rule, or case? But then, how can you really know if it's correct? Can we expect to maintain the recognition that these resources are authoritative and reliable statements of law now and in the future without certainty that they are uncorrupted and complete?

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[1]Richard J. Matthews et al., State-by-State Report on Permanent Public Access to Electronic Government Information 2 (Chicago: IL: American Association of Law Libraries, 2003). Also available online at: http://www.aallnet.org/aallwash/State_report.pdf. Matthews et al., define permanent public access [PPA] as a “policy and practice that ensures applicable government information is preserved for current, continuous and future public access.”

[2]Richard J. Matthews and Mary Alice Baish, State-by-State Report on Authentication of Online Legal Resources (Chicago, IL: American Association of Law Libraries, 2007). Also available online at: http://www.aallnet.org/aallwash/authen_rprt/AuthenFinalReport.pdf.

[3]Id. at 8. Matthews and Baish define official as a “version of regulatory materials, statutes, session laws, or court opinions is one that has been governmentally mandated or approved by statute or rule. It might be produced by the government, but does not have to be. … This definition is firmly rooted in the print world. … The fixed nature of the print medium, coupled with the paper publication’s multiple copies and wide distribution, ensures that the print official legal resource, as “governmentally mandated or approved by statute or rule,” is an authentic resource. An online official legal resource offers no such automatic assurance.”

[4]Id. at 8. Matthews and Baish define authentic as a text “whose content has been verified by a government entity to be complete and unaltered when compared to the version approved or published by the content originator. Typically, an authentic text will bear a certificate or mark that conveys information as to its certification, the process associated with ensuring that the text is complete and unaltered when compared with that of the content originator.”

[5]Id. At 10-13.

[6]Baish, Mary Alice, AALL Reaches the Tipping Point in National Leadership on Digital Authentication, AALL Spectrum, July 2007, at 7. Also available online at http://www.aallnet.org/products/pub_sp0707/pub_sp0707_Wash.pdf.

*A much shortened version of this article was published in the Information Connection column (provided by law librarians at the Wyoming State Law Library and University of Wyoming Law Library) of the Wyoming Lawyer, October 2008, Volume 31, No. 5 (the article is available only in print).

Summary 2009 WY 77

Summary of Decision issued June 12, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Bloomer v. State

Citation: 2009 WY 77

Docket Number: S-08-0139

Appeal from the District Court of Park County, the Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge.

Representing Appellant Bloomer: Diane M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling. Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric Johnson, Faculty Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; Eric K. Thompson, Student Director; and Curtis H. Cheney, Student Intern.

Facts/Discussion: Bloomer was convicted of two counts of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. He claimed the district court erred in denying his motion to quash the jury panel because the method used to select that panel violated principles associated with selecting a jury that represents a fair cross section of the community. In addition, he asserted that the district court refused to consider probation in violation of established legal principles.

Make-up of Jury Panel: The clerk’s method for jury selection: before each term of court, the clerk received a randomly selected list of 350 jurors’ names from the Secretary of State drawn from voter registration lists and driver’s license records. When a jury trial is scheduled, the district court clerk selects a number of jurors as recommended by the district judge. The names were chosen from the list in alphabetical order. Once the list is given to the district court as a jury panel, those names will not be subject to being called again, unless the clerk has gone through the entire list and it’s necessary to go back to the beginning of the list. The Court reviewed other jurisdictions’ decisions on this issue including Montana in State v. Azure, West Virginia, Arkansas in Henry v. State, Georgia, United States v. Eyster and United States v. Puleo from the 11th Circuit and Walker v. Goldsmith from the 9th Circuit. As was the case with other appellate courts, the Court does not approve of the method used because there are other more “tried and true” methods available that eliminate concerns raised by the instant appeal. The Court stated the method may not be used in any future cases. The only apparent reason for choosing the method used was so as not to inconvenience jurors. Bloomer failed to demonstrate that the method used by the district court clerk deprived him of a fair cross section of the community or that any distinctive group was systematically excluded from the jury panel. The Court concluded the district court did not err as a matter of law in denying Bloomer’s motion to quash the jury panel stating that if an error was made, it was harmless because the Court was unable to identify an irregularity that affected Bloomer’s substantial rights.
District Court’s refusal to Consider Probation: When Bloomer appeared at a Change of Plea and Sentencing Hearing, the district court stated that if he were found guilty on either one of the counts, there would be no request for probation. The Court found the district court’s comment troubling because it suggested that probation would not be considered if Bloomer opted for a trial. However, the Court measured the impropriety of the statement in the context of the entirety of the record on appeal. In the sentencing order, the district court considered the advisability of probation and rejected it as an option in sentencing given Bloomer’s offenses.

Conclusion: The Court stated that the method used in the instant case for seating a jury panel may not be used in any future cases but it concluded that because Bloomer failed to demonstrate the method deprived him of a fair cross-section of the community, the district court did not err. The Court was unable to conclude that the violation adversely affected a substantial right of Bloomer’s to his material prejudice. The district court clearly considered probation at sentencing despite his unfortunate remarks earlier in the proceedings.

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the decision.

C.J. Voigt, concurring in part and dissenting in part in which J. Burke joined in part: The Chief Justice concurred with the majority’s resolution of the jury panel issue but would have reversed on the second issue. He stated the facts were barely distinguishable from Guinn v. State where the Court reversed because the record left open the possibility that the sentencing decision was based in part upon the appellant’s exercise of his right to trial by jury.
J. Burke, dissenting: J. Burke disagreed with the majority’s resolution of the jury panel issue. The question was whether the jury selection process complied with Wyoming statutory requirements. The Justice stated it was unnecessary to rely on constitutional principles or decisions from other jurisdictions with different jury selection statutes. The procedures specified by statute insure a random selection process. The procedures used to select the jury panel for Bloomer did not result in a random selection from the set of 350 jurors on the base jury list.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/mt46ky .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 76

Summary of Decision issued June 9, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: In re: Guardianship of CPR & AR

Citation: 2009 WY 76

Docket Number: S-08-0108

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, the Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge.

Representing Appellant TR: Gregory L. Winn of Schilling & Winn, PC, Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee LVM & ARM: Janet L. Tyler, Laramie, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: TR (Mother) appealed a district court’s decision and order finding her unfit and appointing LVM and ARM (Grandparents) who are the children’s paternal grandparents, guardians of her two minor children, AR and CR.

Admission of evidence; witness testimony: The decision of whether or not to admit evidence lies within the discretion of the trial court. The district court admitted printouts from the internet as evidence of a proper immunization schedule. The Court stated it was an abuse of discretion to take judicial notice of the facts contained in the document under Rule 201. However, the Court stated it was harmless because the properly admitted medical records showed that Mother did not comply with her own doctor’s immunization schedule. A letter from Father’s doctor describing the treatment of his neurofibromatosis was admitted. Although it was an abuse of discretion to admit the document, the Court found the error was harmless because the district court did not rely on information in the letter to reach its conclusion. Grandmother testified about her personal knowledge of neurofibromatosis which was acceptable to show Grandmother’s fitness to act as guardian.
Denial of motion to bifurcate: In order to show that the trial court abused its discretion, Mother would have to show that the district court’s refusal to bifurcate was outside the bounds of reason based on the criteria set forth in W.R.C.P. 42(b). Mother did not present any evidence that she was prejudiced under the standard by the failure to bifurcate. The determination of Mother’s fitness required extensive testimony from the same witnesses who would have been required to testify as to the best interests of the children in the appointment of Grandparents as guardians.
Were findings of fact inconsistent: The Court reviewed the testimony about the children’s living conditions. While it was apparent that Mother loved her children, the evidence at trial showed that she was not willing to parent or capable of parenting them at this time. Given the evidence, the Court could not conclude that the district court’s finding that Mother was presently unfit was inconsistent with the evidence, clearly erroneous, or contrary to the great weight of the evidence.
Best interests of the children: At the time the district court appointed Grandparents as guardians, Mother had been declared unfit and the children had been found to be in need of a guardian. Grandparents alone petitioned for guardianship. The Court did not find that the district court’s determination that it was in the best interests of AR and CR to appoint Grandparents as guardians inconsistent with the evidence, clearly erroneous, or contrary to the great weight of the evidence.

Conclusion: The Court found that the district court abused its discretion in admitting certain pieces of evidence at trial, but that the error was harmless because the court did not rely on that evidence in making its decision. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a motion to bifurcate the trial. The court’s findings that Mother was unfit and that it was in the best interests of AR and CR to appoint Grandparents as guardians were not inconsistent with the evidence, clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of the evidence.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/munw5z .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 20009 WY 75

Summary of Decision issued June 8, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Wagner v. Reuter

Citation: 2009 WY 75

Docket Number: S-08-0142

Appeal from the District Court of Washakie County, the Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge.

Representing Appellant Wagner: David M. Clark of Worrall & Greear, PC, Worland, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee Reuter: Mary Helen Reed of McCarty, Reed and Earhart, LC, Cody, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: Wagner sued the Reuters to recover the value of field work allegedly performed on a farm purchased by the Reuters, asserting claims of breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment and to recover damages for the Reuters’ alleged conversion of irrigation tubes owned by Wagner.

Field work: The Court agreed that the promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment claims were precluded by the existence of an enforceable contract. By the contractual language, the Reuters obligated themselves to pay for the completed field work. The amount due was to be settled outside the contract. It was irrefutable the provision was breached. The district court erred in its determination that the contract was not breached. The issue of damages was still pending.
Irrigation tubes: Wagner did not meet all five of the elements necessary to establish a claim for conversion. He left the irrigation tubes in question on the farm after the contractual deadline for removal. Later the Reuters used some of them thinking Wagner no longer wanted them. When contacted by Wagner, the Reuters immediately surrendered the tubes on his demand.
Award of costs: Having determined that summary judgment on the breach of contract claim was improper, the Court concluded that no basis existed for an award of costs to the Reuters.

Conclusion: The Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the claims of promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment and conversion. It reversed the grant of summary judgment on Wagner’s breach of contract claim and remanded for further proceedings on the claim. Because the case was remanded, the award of costs was vacated.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, remanded.

J. Golden delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/nfee4m .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]