Summary 2014 WY 50

Summary of Decision April 17, 2014

Justice Burke delivered the opinion for the Court. Affirmed.

Case Name: RONALD S. KAMMERER, JR. v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Docket Number: S-13-0070

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County the Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge

Representing Appellant: Office of the State Public Defender: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel. Argument by Mr. Morgan.

Representing Appellee: Peter K. Michael, Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; Jeffrey S. Pope, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Delicath.

Date of Decision: April 17, 2014

Facts: Appellant, Ronald S. Kammerer, Jr., challenges his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-302(j) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-307(a)(d). He contends that Wyoming’s Sex Offender Registration Act (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-19-301 through 7-19-307) (“WSORA” or “the Act”) violates the prohibitions against ex post facto laws contained in the United States and Wyoming Constitutions.

Issues: Appellant presents the following issues: 1. Does Wyoming’s Sex Offender Registration Act violate the United States Constitution, Art. 1, § 10, prohibition against enacting ex post facto laws? 2. Does Wyoming’s Sex Offender Registration Act violate the Wyoming Constitution’s prohibition of ex post facto laws?

The State presents an additional issue: 1. Did the district court commit plain error by not finding that the Wyoming Constitution provides greater protection than its federal analog and that the Wyoming Sex Offender Registration Act violates that greater protection?

Holdings/Conclusion: We agree with the State. Both constitutions clearly prohibit the passage of ex post facto laws. Consequently, in order to find that the Wyoming Constitution provides “greater” protection, we would be forced to conclude that Wyoming’s definition of an ex post facto law, as applied to this case, is broader than the definition of that term as it is used in the United States Constitution. We have no reason to draw such a conclusion, and Appellant has provided no cogent argument or persuasive authority to support a claim that Wyoming’s definition of an ex post facto law is broader than the federal definition. To the contrary, we expressly adopted the Supreme Court’s definition of an ex post facto law, as one “which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission,” in Smith v. State, ¶ 55, 199 P.3d at 1068. Accordingly, we find no merit in Appellant’s claim that the Wyoming Constitution provides greater protection against ex post facto laws than its federal counterpart. Affirmed.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summary 2014 WY 15

Summary of Decision January 28, 2014

Justice Burke delivered the opinion for the Court. Justice Davis concurring generally and with special concurrence in which Justice Voigt joins. Chief Justice Kite and Justice Golden (ret.) dissenting.

Case Name: KERRY and CLARA POWERS, on behalf of themselves and the citizens of Wyoming, and CINDY HILL, on behalf of herself and as the SUPREINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION v. THE STATE OF WYOMING and MATTHEW H. MEAD, GOVERNOR, in his official capacity.

Docket Number: S-13-0052

*To see the full opinion, which includes general concurrence, special concurrence and dissent, please follow this link: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

W.R.A.P. 11 Certification from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Thomas T.C. Campbell, Judge.

Representing Appellants: Angela C. Dougherty, Dougherty Law Office, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellees: Peter K. Michael, Attorney General; John G. Knepper, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Michael.

Date of Decision: January 28, 2014

Facts: This matter comes before us as four certified questions from the district court for the First Judicial District of Wyoming. These questions ask us to determine whether Senate Enrolled Act 0001 violates the Wyoming Constitution.

Certified Questions: The district court certified four questions to this Court. However, we find the following question to be dispositive: Does Senate Enrolled Act 0001 violate Wyoming Constitution Article 7, Section 14?

Conclusion: The first certified question from the district court states: “Does Senate Enrolled Act 0001 violate Wyoming Constitution Article 7, Section 14?” We answer that question as follows: Yes. The “prescribed by law” provision in Article 7, Section 14 does not provide the legislature with unlimited authority to prescribe the powers and duties of the office of Superintendent. The legislative authority to prescribe is limited by the responsibility of “general supervision of the public schools” that was entrusted to the Superintendent in Article 7, Section 14. The legislature can prescribe powers and duties of the Superintendent, but it cannot eliminate or transfer powers and duties to such an extent that the Superintendent no longer maintains the power of “general supervision of the public schools.” The 2013 Act impermissibly transfers the power of general supervision from the elected constitutional office of Superintendent to the statutory office of Director of the Department of Education who is appointed by the Governor. Under the Act, the Superintendent no longer maintains the power of general supervision of the public schools. SEA 0001 is unconstitutional. In light of our response to the first certified question, it is unnecessary to consider Appellants’ challenges to the Act on the constitutional grounds identified in the remaining certified questions. We remand to the district court for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.

*To see the full opinion, which includes general concurrence, special concurrence and dissent, please follow this link: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summary 2013 WY 14

Summary of Decision February 1, 2013

Chief Justice Kite delivered the opinion for the Court.

Case Name: MAX MAXFIELD, in his individual capacity v. STATE OF WYOMING

Docket Number: S-12-0084

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Certified Questions from the District Court of Laramie County, Honorable Thomas T.C. Campbell, Judge.

Representing Appellants: Bradley T. Cave, P.C., Holland & Hart LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General.

Date of Decision: February 1, 2013

Facts: Max Maxfield, the Secretary of State for the State of Wyoming, filed a declaratory judgment action in district court challenging the constitutionality of Wyoming’s term limit statute. The State responded, asserting among other claims, that Mr. Maxfield’s complaint did not present a justiciable controversy and, in any event, the statute was constitutional. The Court accepted certification of the issues from the district court.

Certified Questions: The district court certified the following questions to this Court:

1. To proceed under the Wyoming Declaratory Judgment Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-37-101 through 1-37-115, Mr. Maxfield must present a justiciable controversy. To do so, he must show existing and genuine rights or interests, not theoretical ones. Does this case present a justiciable controversy?

2. Is the term limit law for statewide elected officials (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-5-103(a)(i)), constitutional and enforceable, or are the qualifications provided by the Wyoming Constitution exclusive?

Holdings: Answering the first certified question, the Court held that Mr. Maxfield has presented a justiciable controversy. Answering the second certified question, the Court held that § 22-5-103(a)(i), the term limit law for statewide elected officials, is unconstitutional with respect to the offices of secretary of state, auditor, treasurer, and superintendent of public instruction and the qualifications for those offices provided by the Wyoming Constitution are exclusive.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summary 2008 WY 152

Summary of Decision issued December 19, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Sublette Cty. Sch. Dist. #9 et al v. McBride State Superintendent of Pub. Instruction

Citation: 2008 WY 152

Docket Number: S-08-0073

W.R.A.P. 11 Certified Questions from the District Court of Sublette County, the Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge.

Representing Appellant Schools: Mark W. Gifford and Kelley A. Anderson of Law Offices of Gifford & Brinkerhoff, Casper, Wyoming, for Sublette School District #1; Tracy J. Copenhaver of Copenhaver, Kath, Kitchen & Kolpitcke, LLC, Powell, Wyoming for Sublette School District #9 and Lincoln County #1; Ford T. Bussart of Bussart, West & Tyler, PC, Rock Springs, Wyoming, for Campbell School #1; Joel M. Vincent of Vincent & Vincent, Riverton, Wyoming, for Fremont School District #24.

Representing Appellee: Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Michael R. O’Donnell, State’s School Finance Counsel, Special Assistant Attorney General.

Certified Questions: Is Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102(c) unconstitutional in light of the amendment to Article 15, Section 17 of the Wyoming Constitution? Do ex post facto principles impact the Wyoming Department of Education’s calculation of rebated revenue if the districts have encumbered, obligated or spent any of the funds sought by the Department?

The issue that first must be determined is whether the 2006 Amendment was impliedly repealed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102(c). If the Amendment was impliedly repealed then the district may well be required to rebate to the Department one hundred percent of the difference between their local funding revenues and the statewide average revenues for the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 fiscal years as opposed to the historical amount of seventy-five percent. If it was not repealed then the five school districts are obligated only to rebate the traditional seventy-five percent rebate for those two years and may retain the remaining twenty-five percent, which roughly translates into a collective dispute over $97,550,113.36.
There is no express clear abrogation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102(c). It was necessary for the Court to decide if there was an obvious, clear, and strong conflict between the 2006 Amendment and § 21-13-102(c) in effect at that time. After review, the Court determined that the provisions of the pre-existing statute were not inconsistent with the subsequent constitutional amendment, so there was no basis on which to declare the statute impliedly repealed. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102(c) remained in effect until the Legislature expressly repealed the statue in 2008.
The five appellant school districts also asked the Court to go one step further in declaring that § 21-13-102(c) did not create unconstitutional, wealth-based disparities in the amount of education funding distributed by the State, even with the seventy-five percent cap. The districts argued that unconstitutional inequality was related solely to funding levels that primarily or predominantly depend upon local wealth as opposed to funding levels that simply permit educational enhancements based on local wealth. The Court has never directly considered the constitutionality of the seventy-five percent rebate limit. Previous comments were a neutral observation of the fact that under prior legislation, excess rebate funds could be recaptured by the school districts as a possible source of funding for local enhancements.

Conclusion: The Court concluded that the 2006 Amendment to Wyoming Constitution, Article 15, Section 17, did not impliedly repeal Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102(c). That statute remained in effect until its express repeal in 2008, and the seventy-five percent limit on the special school district property tax rebate imposed by § 21-13-102(c) remained in place for the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 fiscal years for all Wyoming school districts. Accordingly, the five Appellant school districts were entitled to recapture any rebate amounts in excess of the seventy-five percent cap and are not now obligated to pay those sums over to the Department. Having so concluded, the Court declined to make any determination on the constitutionality of the now-repealed seventy-five percent cap. Finally, the determination that Appellants are entitled to retain their excess local funds for 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 moots the second certified question.
The answer to the District Court’s first Certified Question was “yes” in the sense that § 21-13-102(c) was not impliedly repealed by the 2006 Amendment.

Remanded.

D.J. Donnell delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/3lvmoq .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 61

Summary of Decision issued June 5, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Seymour v. State

Citation: 2008 WY 61

Docket Number: S-07-0255

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge.

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Dion J. Custis of Dion J. Custis, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Seymour pled guilty to felony possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. The issue was whether the search of Seymour’s vehicle violated his rights guaranteed by article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution or the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Under both the United States and the Wyoming Constitutions, the Court examines the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the consent was voluntary. The videotape of the stop reflected the Trooper’s courteous and respectful questions and Seymour’s assent to further questioning. This was not an instance where the driver was not informed that he was free to leave and that he was not required to consent to further questioning. The canine sniff was reasonable given the totality of the circumstances some of which included continued nervous behavior, a rental car not rented by the driver, the driver not knowing the last name of the renter of the car, and the driver intending to return the car prior to the end of the rental agreement which would increase his cost.

Holding: It was undisputed that the initial detention for speeding was justified and that it did not exceed the scope of the stop. After the Trooper told Seymour he was free to go, Seymour voluntarily consented to further questioning. His voluntary consent vitiated the requirement of showing reasonable suspicion for the second detention. Based upon the totality of the circumstances at the time the Trooper called for the canine unit, he had reasonable suspicion to detain Seymour for the purpose of the canine sniff. The detention did not violate Seymour’s rights under article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution or the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Affirmed.

J. Kite delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/55zkvl.

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 25

Summary of Decision issued March 6, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Sam v. State

Citation: 2008 WY 25

Docket Number: S-07-0057

Appeal from the District Court of Park County, the Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel, Wyoming State Public Defender Program.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Elizabeth C. Gagen, Chief Deputy Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Sam entered a plea of guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The plea was part of a negotiated plea bargain wherein he reserved his right to challenge the constitutionality of the search of his car which uncovered the evidence that incriminated him. The district court conducted a hearing in response to Sam’s motion to suppress the fruits of that search, which the State justified on the basis that it was conducted incident to his arrest for violation of a protection order and for driving while his license was suspended. The search at issue uncovered evidence of drug crimes. The district court concluded the search was proper under governing law.
The district court conducted a hearing and took evidence concerning the search and seizure issue. The Court noted their review was disadvantaged by the district court’s very limited findings. The Court stated that the resolution of the case turned on the application of their decision in Vasquez v. State. The Court recently applied Vasquez to Pierce v. State. In that instance the Court limited their consideration to only that exception which sanctioned a search of the car for evidence which might have related to the crime for which he was arrested.
In the instant case, the record was clear that the initial stop and the initial arrest were for violations of a protection order. The Court’s review of the record convinced them that the search was reasonable under all of the circumstances. The Court stated they did not think there was a requirement that a police officer be able to recite a specific list of what sorts of evidence might be relevant in such a circumstance but some items identified were cell phones or writings of any sort that indicated Sam’s intentions with respect to the individuals protected by the protection order. The officer was aware that Sam was the subject of a protection order and that he had violated it. The record suggested that it was a “pattern” of violating the protection order. In Vasquez, the Court said that a drunk driving stop justified the search of the car’s passenger compartment for intoxicants that could serve as evidence to support the crime. Here the Court stated it was equally apt there be a search for evidence that might serve to sustain Sam’s prosecution for violation of the protection order and/or that he might have been an imminent and serious danger to his victims, given his behavior over the preceding several days.

Holding: The district court’s order denying the motion to suppress was not erroneous. Therefore the Court affirmed Sam’s Judgment Upon Plea of Guilty and his sentence in all respects.

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the decision.

C. J. Voigt dissenting; J. Golden joined: The dissent stated that they did not disagree with the proposition that factors such as officer safety and the presence of evidence may justify the search of an arrested person’s vehicle. There was no showing in this case at the suppression hearing that those or similar factors existed. The Wyoming Constitution forbids the search of a car incident to the arrest of its driver unless the search is reasonable under all of the circumstances. This search, being purely a search incident to arrest without justification under all the circumstances, was unlawful.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/3c6k2c .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2007 WY 182

Summary of Decision issued November 15, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Pierce v. State

Citation: 2007 WY 182

Docket Number: 05-145

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Marion Yoder, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; and Ryan R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel. Argument by Ms. Yoder.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric A. Johnson, Director Jonathan Haidsiak, Student Director and Orintha Karns, Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance Program. Argument by Ms. Karns.

Issues: Whether the search at issue in the instant case violated Article I, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution. Whether the search at issue in the instant case violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Facts/Discussion: A Casper police officer arrested Appellant for two traffic violations and proceeded to search the vehicle Appellant had been occupying prior to the arrest. Appellant later filed a motion in the district court to suppress the drug-related evidence that the officer seized from the vehicle.
Standard of Review: Findings on factual issues made by the district court considering a motion to suppress are not disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. The Court noted they were concerned in the appeal with the applicability of the search-incident-to-arrest exception.
Wyoming Constitution: The Court stated they have eschewed bright-line rules in considering non-consensual vehicle searches conducted incident to arrest, and instead favor an approach that requires a search be reasonable under all of the circumstances as determined by the judiciary in light of the historical intent of the state’s search and seizure provision. It was the State’s burden to prove that the search-incident-to-arrest exception applied and the applicability of such an exception was dependent upon all of the facts and circumstances viewed in their entirety. The Court stated that the state constitution requires that the Court be able to find a reasonable basis, articulable from the totality of the circumstances in each case, to justify a search. The Court stated that the instant case was clearly distinguishable from other cases in which the Court has upheld non-consensual searches under Article I, Section 4.
United States Constitution: The Court stated that the search clearly fell within the purview of New York v. Belton which established that arrest justifies the search of a vehicle’s passenger compartment, including any open or closed container in it, without consideration of the privacy interest involved.
The Court noted that the majority opinion was founded in Article I, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution, particularly as interpreted and applied in O’Boyle and Vasquez, passim. The dissent relied almost entirely upon United States Supreme Court cases and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court stated that the dissent’s argument was a plea for the adoption of a rule that officer safety always trumps a reasonableness analysis made under the totality of the circumstances when an arrest is made. It was also a plea to abandon O’Boyle and Vasquez and adopt the Belton bright-line rule that the Court previously rejected. United States v. Robinson, cited twice in the dissenting opinion in support of the concept of searching a vehicle incident to the arrest of its driver, involved a search of the arrestee’s person not his vehicle.

Holding: Having found that the search violated Article I, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution, the Court reversed the denial of Appellant’s suppression motion and remanded the matter to the district court.

Reversed and remanded.

C.J. Voigt delivered the opinion.

J. Burke dissented: He would have affirmed the district court’s decision that this was a valid search incident to arrest and reasonable under all of the circumstances. He felt the majority reached the opposite result by misapplying the standard of review, marginalizing officer safety as a factor to be weighed in the analysis and overlooking the most meaningful difference between the state and federal standards.

J. Hill dissented: He agreed with the material part of J. Burke’s dissent but wrote separately to emphasize his concern that the narrow slot carved out in the Vasquez case appeared to be widened by the majority decision in the instant case.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/38hov6 .

Summary 2007 WY 170

Summary of Decision issued October 30, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Keller, Jr. v. State

Citation: 2007 WY 170

Docket Number: S-07-0085

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, the Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Kurt A. Infanger of the Nick Carter Law Firm, PC, Gillette, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Rehurek.

Issue: Whether the investigative detention of the Appellant prior to seizure of the evidence violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article I, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.

Facts/Discussion: Appellant pled guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(ii) reserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence.
Standard of Review: When the Court reviews a district court’s decision on a motion to suppress evidence, they do not disturb the findings on factual issues unless they are clearly erroneous. The issue of law – whether an unreasonable search or seizure has occurred in violation of constitutional rights – is reviewed de novo.
Appellant contended that once he told the Deputy that the couple had been engaged in sexual activity, the Deputy had no reasonable suspicion of any unlawful activity that justified further detention. The Court disagreed stating that the test was whether the State could show the presence of specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime. The facts as shown in the record were sufficient to create reasonable suspicion. The facts included: the particular area where the car was parked; the “flurry of movement” seen in the front seat; the “old burnt smell” upon the opening of the window; the car seat in a reclined position making it hard to see Appellant or his hands; and Appellant appeared visibly nervous. Also, the Court noted the detention was very brief – a matter of minutes.

Holding: The totality of the circumstances facing the Deputy as he encountered Appellant and his companion in the pullout area gave him reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. His brief detention of the couple to investigate that suspicion was not unreasonable and did not violate the reasonable search and seizure provision of either the State or the Federal constitution.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the opinion.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/3yarlb .