Summary 2012 WY 16

Summary of Decision February 9, 2012

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Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Wyatt L. Bear Cloud v. The State of Wyoming

Citation:  2012 WY 16

Docket Number: S-11-0102

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=465081

Appeal from the District Court of Sheridan County, the Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge.

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Diane Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. Morgan.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jeffrey S. Pope, Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. Pope.

Date of Decision: February 9, 2012

Facts: On August 26, 2009, Appellant Wyatt Bear Cloud and two co-defendants were involved in the armed burglary of a residence in Sheridan, Wyoming.  During the course of the burglary, one of Bear Cloud’s co-defendants shot and killed one of the home’s residents.  Bear Cloud was charged with, and ultimately pleaded guilty to,  Murder in the First Degree (Felony-Murder), in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(a) (LexisNexis 2011); Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated Burglary, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-303(a) and 6-3-301(a) and (c)(i) (LexisNexis 2011); and Aggravated Burglary, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann.  § 6-3-301(a) and (c)(i) (LexisNexis 2011).  He was sixteen years of age at the time of these offenses.  In addition to his sentences on the burglary and conspiracy charges, Bear Cloud was sentenced to life imprisonment for his conviction for felony-murder.  He now appeals his convictions and sentences on numerous grounds. 

Issues:  Bear Cloud presents the following issues for review: 1) Was Appellant’s trial counsel ineffective, specifically by: (A) inviting intrusion into the attorney-client relationship, (B) waiving his meritorious appellate issues and (C) incorrectly advising him of the consequences of his pleas, thus rendering his pleas involuntary? 2) Is a motion to transfer a case to juvenile court a dispositive motion, so it may be the subject of conditional guilty pleas? 3) Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it refused to transfer Appellant to juvenile court? 4) Does the sentence of life in prison for a juvenile who did not commit or intend to commit a homicide violate the [Eighth] Amendment of the United States Constitution? 5) Does the sentence of life in prison for a juvenile who did not commit or intend to commit a homicide violate Art. 1, § 14 of the Wyoming Constitution? 6) Does the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment provided in the [Eighth] Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 14 of the Wyoming Constitution, prohibit the imposition of mandatory life imprisonment on a juvenile when the sentencing court cannot take into consideration the child’s age, culpability or other mitigating factors? 7) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas?  Appellee, the State of Wyoming, generally relies upon the same issues. 

Holdings: The Court concluded that the district court did not err in denying  Bear Cloud’s motion to transfer the proceedings to juvenile court nor did it abuse its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.  To the extent his appellate claims survive the entry of a guilty plea, trial counsel was not ineffective in her representation of Bear Cloud.  Further, Bear Cloud’s assertion that his life sentence for felony-murder was unconstitutional, under either the United States Constitution or the Wyoming Constitution, failed.  A sentence of life imprisonment, with the possibility of parole, for a juvenile offender convicted of felony-murder satisfies the constitutional mandates of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 14 of the Wyoming Constitution.  Finally, Wyo. Stat. Ann.  § 6-2-101(b) was not rendered unconstitutional by its mandatory sentencing structure, even as applied to a juvenile offender, and particularly in light of the district court’s ability to consider mitigating circumstances when considering whether to transfer proceedings to juvenile court.  Bear Cloud’s convictions and sentences were affirmed in all respects.

Judge Donnell delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2008 WY 4

Summary of Decision issued January 14, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Yellowbear, Jr. v. State

Citation: 2008 WY 4

Docket Number: 06-246

Appeal from the District Court of Hot Springs County, the Honorable David B. Park, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Sylvia Lee Hackl of Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Appellant was convicted of two counts of felony murder, and two counts of being an accessory to felony murder, all based upon the physical abuse and death of his daughter. In this appeal, Appellant questions whether the State had jurisdiction to prosecute him, whether the jury was properly instructed and whether the prosecutor committed misconduct during rebuttal closing argument.
Whether the crime occurred in “Indian country” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151, thereby depriving the State of jurisdiction over the appellant: The Court reviews subject matter jurisdiction de novo. The specific question of whether the scene of the crime was under the jurisdiction of the United States or the State of Wyoming was also reviewed de novo. The Court reviewed the post-treaty history of the Reservation as well as the federal jurisprudence that developed concerning federal and state jurisdiction in “diminished” reservations. The Court focused on the Surplus Land Act of 1905. The City of Riverton lies north of the Big Wind River on land that was ceded in that act. The Court next determined what intent the 1905 Act had as to the ceded lands by reviewing Supreme Court precedent. The Court applied the Supreme Court’s analytical construct to the 1905 Act and concluded that Congress intended a diminished reservation with the ceded lands losing their status as “Indian Country.” The Court noted that the facts in State v. Moss where the Court concluded that Congress had placed the ceded land outside the reservation and that it was no longer “Indian country” were nearly identical to those in the instant case. The Court concluded that it was the intent of Congress in passing the 1905 Act to diminish the Wind River Indian Reservation. While the City of Riverton may be located on lands that at one time were within the external boundaries of the reservation, those lands were no longer part of the reservation, and were not “Indian country.” Therefore, the State had jurisdiction in this criminal case.
Whether the district court committed reversible error by instructing the jury as to a parent’s duty to protect his or her child: The State charged Appellant with four theories of liability under one count. The verdict form and judgment and sentence made it appear as though Appellant were charged with and convicted of four separate crimes. Appellant was afforded a preliminary hearing on only one crime, was arraigned on only one crime, and entered a plea to only one crime, leading to the conclusion that he could be convicted of only one crime. The jury separately considered and determined each theory of guilt. The Court’s review of the record indicated that there was sufficient evidence to support each of the findings of guilt. Inclusion of the parental-duty instruction was erroneous but such error was harmless given the above circumstances. Prosecutors must be aware that they cannot charge both that a defendant acted as a principal and as an accessory before the fact, as two separate crimes, in one count.
Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct during rebuttal closing argument by inserting his own credibility and beliefs, by arguing facts not in evidence, and by presenting an argument that was not properly a rebuttal argument: The Court stated that review of the issue was not plain error because it was raised and decided by the court below. Rather, the Court was reviewing the denial of the motion for mistrial and the denial of the motion for a new trial. With specific regard to claims of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, the Court considers the alleged misconduct in the context of the entire argument, and the entire record, with the determinative factor being whether, in the absence of the error, the verdict might have been more favorable to the accused. The Court’s assessment was that it violated neither the spirit nor the letter of the ABA standards adopted as guidelines for prosecutorial argument.

Holding: The crime occurred in a location that was not part of the diminished Wind River Indian Reservation – a location no longer “Indian country” under guiding federal precedent. The State had jurisdiction to pursue the criminal charge. It was error for the district court to instruct the jury as to common law parental duties that were not encompassed within the charged crime. The error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the completed verdict form revealed juror unanimity as to Appellant’s guilt on all of the theories properly alleged under the statutes. The Judgment and Sentence should be amended to reflect the fact that only one charge was brought and that he was only convicted of one charge. The State’s rebuttal closing argument did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct in that nothing said therein was unfairly prejudicial so as to deprive the appellant of his right to a fair trial or otherwise impinge upon his substantial rights.

Affirmed, but remanded for amendment of the Judgment and Sentence.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2gtn9k .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 3

Summary of Decision issued January 10, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Booth v. State

Citation: 2008 WY 3

Docket Number: S-07-0004

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Donna D. Domonkos, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; and D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Appellant sought review of the district court’s judgment and sentence which found him guilty of first-degree, felony murder in the shooting death of a cab driver during a robbery and imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. He entered into a plea bargain wherein he agreed to plead guilty to felony murder in exchange for the State deleting the premeditation aspect of first-degree murder and dismissing Count II of the complaint aggravated robbery as defined by Wyo. Stat. 6-2-401. He contended that the State breached the plea agreement by introducing evidence of premeditation and that, therefore, he be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea.

Holdings: When a plea of guilty is entered as a result of a plea agreement, any promises made by the State must be fulfilled and whether a prosecutor has violated an alleged agreement is a question that is reviewed de novo. A plea agreement is a contract between the defendant and the State to which the general principles of contract law are applied. When determining whether a breach of the plea agreement has occurred a court must: (1) examine the nature of the promise; and (2) evaluate the promise in light of the defendant's reasonable understanding of the promise at the time the plea was entered. The State may not obtain the benefit of the agreement and at the same time avoid its obligations without violating either the principles of fairness or the principles of contract law.
Appellant’s argument is that he entered into the bargain believing that the State would not be permitted to offer evidence of the sort of premeditation which typically is used to support first-degree, premeditated murder. At the sentencing hearing, the State produced evidence which arguably was directed at the subject of premeditation, over the objection of the defense. That evidence at least suggested he premeditated the murder of whomever the cab driver might have been who answered his call and, furthermore, that he did not feel remorse about the crime. Of course, it also went to establishing that Appellant had committed the robbery and murder “knowingly” and “purposely.”
The plea agreement in this case could best be described as “sketchy.” Appellant asked that the language -- “delete the premeditation aspect of first-degree murder”—be read to encompass a conclusion that the prosecution could not offer evidence which suggested that Appellant did anything other than accidentally fire the pistol during the course of the robbery. To be sure, it is evident that the State did not agree with that interpretation at the time defense counsel uttered the words he used to describe his understanding of the plea agreement, because the prosecutor stated that the operative language for consideration in the instant case was that Appellant “unlawfully, knowingly, and purposely, in the perpetration of any robbery kill another human being….” It is, of course unfortunate, if not inexcusable, that a plea bargain of this magnitude, and in a case with such profoundly significant consequences, was not reduced to writing so that its perimeters could be better defined and understood. However, based on the record, the State did not breach either the letter or the spirit of the plea agreement.

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the opinion for the court.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/yqbtck .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]