Summary 2010 WY 20

Summary of Decision issued February 25, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Wyo. Outdoor Council v. Wyo. DEQ

Citation: 2010 WY 20

Docket Number: S-09-0062

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge.

Representing Appellant Wyo. Outdoor Council, Powder River Basin Resource Council: Steve Jones, Watershed Protection Program Attorney, Wyoming Outdoor Council, Lander, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee Wyo. DEQ, Water Quality Div.: Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Jay A. Jerde, Deputy Attorney General; John Burbridge, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Representing Appellee Marathon Oil Co.: Brent R. Kunz of Hathaway & Kunz, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming; John C. Martin, Duane A Siler, and Ben A. Ellison of Patton Boggs LLP, Washington, DC.

Representing Appellee Petroleum Assoc. of Wyoming: John A. Masterson of Rothgerber Johnson & Lyons, LLP, Casper, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: After the Wyo. Environmental Quality Council (EQC) adopted the DEQ proposed revisions to Chapter 1 of the Wyoming Water Quality Rules and Regulations (WWQR&R), the Wyo. Outdoor Council and the Powder River Basin Resource Council filed a petition challenging the new rules. The petitioners filed the DEQ as the respondent. Finding that the proper party was the EQC, which the petition did not name, the district court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

Whether the district court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction because the petition did not name the EQC: The DEQ and EQC were created by the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act. The DEQ is a department within the executive branch and consists of six divisions including the water quality division. The director of DEQ appoints administrators for each division. The administrators enforce and administer the Environmental Quality Act and the rules and standards promulgated under the Act. Administrators also receive public comment and after consultation, recommend rules to the director. The EQC is responsible for conducting public hearings on changes the DEQ proposes to the DEQ rules. EQC is also charged with approving or disapproving the DEQ’s proposed rule changes. EQC is responsible for conducting public hearings on changes the DEQ proposes to the DEQ rules. The EQC is also charged with approving or disapproving the DEQ’s proposed rule changes. DEQ and its divisions are responsible for recommending, enforcing and administering DEQ rules and changes to the rules. The DEQ was a proper party to the district court appeal. As the administrative agency statutorily charged with carrying out the purposes of the Environmental Quality Act, the DEQ represented the State’s legal interest at the public hearing before the EQC. As stated in Antelope Valley, an administrative agency such as DEQ, acting in its regulatory or rulemaking capacity is a proper respondent to a district court appeal.
Joinder of EQC: Having concluded that the DEQ was a proper party to the appeal, it was not necessary for the Court to consider Petitioners’ argument that if DEQ was not a proper party they should have been allowed to join the EQC. The Intervenors contended that the joinder would not have been proper whether or not DEQ was a necessary party because by the time the issue was raised, the thirty day time limit imposed by W.R.A.P. 12.04(a) had passed. The Court concluded that the district court could have admitted the EQC as a party after the time for filing the petition for review had passed because there is nothing to suggest otherwise in either the statutes governing administrative actions or the rules governing judicial review of administrative action. Rule 19 requires joinder of all parties having a real interest in a proceeding. Rule 20 allows joinder of defendants against whom a right to relief is asserted and if questions of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. Rule 21 allows a district court to drop or add parties at any stage of an action and on such terms as are just.

Conclusion: The EQC and the DEQ were both proper parties to the proceeding. The district court obtained jurisdiction when the petition naming the DEQ was filed. The district court erred in dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the EQC was not named in the petition.

Reversed.

J. Kite delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/ylmbjr8 .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 26

Summary of Decision issued February 25, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Vargas Limited Partnership v. Four “H” Ranches Architectural Control Comm.

Citation: 2009 WY 26

Docket Number: S-07-0022

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge.

Representing Appellant Vargas/Martin: Michael H. Reese, Cheyenne, Wyoming; Ronald L. Brown, Fort Collins, Colorado.

Representing Appellee Four “H”: John B. Rogers of Rogers and Rogers, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: Four “H” Ranches Architectural Control Committee (ACC) brought suit on behalf of adjoining landowners in a residential subdivision located in Laramie County to enforce the subdivision’s declaration of protective covenants and enjoin the construction or improvements of several buildings by Vargas Limited Partnership and Kit Martin (known collectively as Martin) on their property in the subdivision.

Real Party in Interest: Restrictive covenants are contractual in nature and are interpreted in accordance with principles of contract law. The real party in interest requirement protects a defendant from the vexation of a multiplicity of actions, with the possible burden of multiple recoveries, all emanating from the same cause. Although the parcel owners never developed a homeowners association, the Court noted that many courts have held that where lots in a subdivision are sold subject to common restrictive covenants an express reservation of a right of enforcing such covenants does not conclusively negate an intent that such covenants were also for the benefit and enforceable by other owners. Several owners of parcels in the Four “H” subdivision testified in support of the ACC’s enforcement action. If a homeowners association or one or more parcel owners were in the future to claim an enforcement right against Martin for covenant violations litigated in the instant action, they would be estopped to do so. The judgment in this action protects Martin.
Whether Construction was Incomplete: After examining the evidence in the record, the Court held that the district court’s findings of fact that the construction of Building A prime, Building A double prime, and Building B was incomplete were supported by the record.
Abuse of Discretion: The Court reviewed the district court’s order for Martin to remove the buildings in question in light of the record. The district court’s conclusions were drawn from objective criteria and demonstrated the proper exercise of sound judgment.

Conclusion: The judgment in the district court action protects Martin from future litigation of covenant violations. The record supported the conclusion that construction was incomplete. The district court’s conclusions were drawn from objective criteria such that the Court found no abuse of discretion.

Affirmed.

J. Golden delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/dknbn2 .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2007 WY 53

Summary of Decision issued March 28, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance with a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Shepard v. Beck

Citation: 2007 WY 53

Docket Number: 06-98

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, the Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): Patrick Dixon of Crowell, Chapin & Dixon, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Paul J. Drew of Drew Law Office, PC, Gillette, Wyoming.

Issues: Whether the district court erred when it concluded that Beck did not breach his employment contract. Whether the district court erred when it split the costs of an accounting audit between the parties instead of placing liability for the costs of the audit on Beck. Whether the district court erred when it declined to award attorney’s fees to Shepard. Whether the district court erred in its order regarding the division of corporate equipment between the parties.

Facts/Discussion: Shepard appeals a judgment and order of the district court finding that Beck did not breach an employment agreement with the professional corporation formed between Shepard, Beck and the corporation and ordering the corporation to dissolve.
Employment contract breach: Shepard argued that the district court’s findings of fact were inconsistent with their ultimate finding that Beck did not breach the employment contract. The Court’s standard for reviewing a district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law is that while the findings are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record. Findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.
The Court’s review of the record showed that Beck’s claim that Shepard was not a proper party was raised for the first time on appeal. Based on W.R.C.P. 17 and their decision in Gifford-Hill-Western, Inc. v. Anderson, the Court stated that a party’s failure to object that its opponent was not the real party in interest until the close of the evidence constituted a waiver of any objection on that ground. In addition, in the instant case, Beck individually sought a judgment from Shepard based on her status as an employee of the corporation, so he was estopped from claiming that Shepard was not a proper party to recover for any breaches of his similar employment contract.
Beck did not challenge the above-mentioned factual findings of the district court on appeal and those findings clearly indicated that the Beck’s actions violated his employment contract. The district court’s findings indicated that Beck’s actions constituted a breach of the express terms of the employment contract which was inconsistent with the district court’s general finding that Beck did not breach the contract. The Court stated that long ago they recognized that specific findings control when they conflict with a general finding. Therefore, they concluded that Beck did in fact breach the employment contract and the district court’s ruling in Beck’s favor was clearly erroneous.
Wipfli audit: Having determined that Beck breached his employment contract, the Court then addressed the costs Shepard could recover. The Court reviews awards of costs and attorney’s fees to determine if the district court abused its discretion. The cases cited by Shepard demonstrated the point that an accounting may be considered part of the costs of litigation and therefore may be awarded to the prevailing party. However, the district court determined that while Beck’s actions precipitated the need for the accounting, it was more properly considered a necessity to the mutually beneficial winding up of corporate affairs and not a cost incurred in enforcement of the corporate agreement. Under the circumstances outlined in the record, the Court stated it was within the district court’s broad discretionary powers to find the accounting was necessary in order to wind up the corporation’s business and that Shepard was not entitled to be reimbursed. The Court also noted Shepard was granted her other costs as the prevailing party below.
Award of attorney fees: Shepard claimed she was entitled to attorney fees under the fee shifting provision in the contract. Beck waived his right to object that Shepard was not a proper party to enforce the employment contract by not raising the defense below. Therefore, as prevailing party on the breach of contract claim, Shepard may collect her attorney’s fees as provided for by the contract. However, the district court order in the instant case did not specify whether it ordered each party to pay their own attorney fees under the “American Rule” or under its equitable powers. On remand, the district court was instructed that Shepard was contractually entitled to attorney fees, but such may be adjusted as appropriate under the federal lodestar test.
Division of corporate equipment: Shepard’s argument did not allege any dispute with the nature of the property taken by Beck. Shepard disagreed with the value attached to that property by the district court. On factual issues, the Court affirms the findings of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous. The Court stated the value of the property was supported by the appraisal found in the record and the Court therefore affirmed the distribution of corporate assets ordered by the district court.

Holding: While Beck may have breached his employment contract with the corporation, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered the parties to split the cost of the Wipfli audit evenly between them as part of the dissolution process. Further, Shepard failed to show error in the division of the corporate property. The district court should have ordered Beck to pay Shepard’s reasonable attorney’s fees due to his breach of the contract. The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for entry of an order finding Beck in breach and awarding Shepard reasonable attorney fees.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for entry of an order awarding reasonable attorney’s fees.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/3xllbc .