Summary 2012 WY 23

Summary of Decision February 22, 2012


[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: State of Wyoming v. Holohan

Citation: 2012 WY 23

Docket Number: S-11-0078

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=465106

Original Proceeding, Petition for Writ of Review, District Court of Uinta County, The Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

Representing Petitioner: Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Rehurek.

Representing Respondent: John P. LaBuda and Jessica M. Stull of LaBuda Law Office, P.C., Pinedale, Wyoming. Argument by Ms. Stull.

Date of Decision: February 22, 2012

Facts: After initiating a traffic stop, a Wyoming Highway Patrol trooper found marijuana in Respondent’s vehicle. Respondent was charged with two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of his vehicle, claiming the trooper lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop at the time he activated his flashing lights and could not use events occurring after activating his lights to justify the stop. The district court agreed and granted the motion, basing its conclusion on its finding that the video and other evidence did not support the trooper’s testimony that the vehicle crossed the center or fog lines several times before he activated his lights. The State filed a petition for writ of review of the district court’s order which this Court granted.

Issues: Whether the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop to exist at the moment an officer makes his show of authority (activating his light bar), and whether traffic violations occurring after the show of authority may be used to establish reasonable suspicion for the stop.

Holdings: After de novo review the Court concluded the ultimate seizure was constitutional. The district court found, based on the trooper’s testimony, that the vehicle kept going for approximately two miles before stopping after the trooper activated his flashing lights. The trooper further testified that he saw the vehicle swerving side to side as it traveled the two miles before stopping, and saw the driver and one of the passengers switch seats. Applying these facts to the law, the Court concluded that the driver of the vehicle did not submit to the trooper’s show of authority and there was no Fourth Amendment seizure until the vehicle pulled off the highway and stopped. At that point, the trooper had probable cause to stop the vehicle for weaving erratically and a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based upon the driver’s failure to pull over in response to the flashing lights. There having been no seizure until then, the evidence was not fruit of an illegal seizure and was admissible. The Court reversed the district court’s order granting the motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings.


C.J. Kite delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2011 WY 91

Summary of Decision June 6, 2011


[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Hageman v. Goshen County School District No. 1

Citation: 2011 WY 91

Docket Numbers: S-10-0009

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=462428

Appeal from the District Court of Goshen County, the Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge.

Representing Appellants: Kara Brighton and Harriet M. Hageman, Hageman & Brighton, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Ms. Hageman.

Representing Appellees: Tracy J. Copenhaver, Copenhaver, Kath, Kitchen & Kolpitcke, LLC, Powell, Wyoming.

Date of Decision: June 6, 2011

Facts: In an effort to address a perceived drug and alcohol problem among its students, Goshen County School District No. 1 adopted a policy requiring all students who participate in extracurricular activities to consent to random testing for alcohol and drugs. Appellants initiated litigation, claiming that the Policy is unconstitutional. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the School District. Appellants challenge that decision in this appeal.

Issues: These issues were raised by the Appellants and adopted by the Appellees: Whether the district court erred in refusing to declare that the District’s “Mandatory Drug Testing for Students Involved in Extracurricular Activities” violates [the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures of] Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution. Whether the district court erred in refusing to declare that the District’s Drug Testing Policy violates Article 1, §§ 2 and 3 of the Wyoming Constitution, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Whether the district court erred in refusing to declare that the District’s Drug Testing Policy violates Article 1, § 6 of the Wyoming Constitution, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Whether the district court erred in refusing to enjoin the District from implementing the Drug Testing Policy. Whether the district court erred in granting the District’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Holdings: The Court acknowledged that Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution protects public school students from unreasonable searches and seizures. In considering whether the testing mandated by the School District’s Policy is reasonable under all of the circumstances, the Court recognized that students, particularly those who participate in extracurricular activities, are already subject to more stringent rules and regulations than adults, and so have limited expectations of privacy in the school setting. The Court found that the School District’s Policy adequately preserves the students’ personal privacy rights, and appropriately limits the degree of invasion into those rights. The Court concluded that the School District has a compelling interest in providing for the safety and welfare of its students, and that it therefore has a legitimate interest in deterring drug and alcohol use among students. On the closest question of all, the Court determined that the School District showed that its Policy requiring random, suspicionless drug and alcohol testing for all students who participate in extracurricular activities is rationally related to furthering its interest in deterring drug and alcohol use among students.

The Court further concluded that the Coalition did not demonstrate that the School District’s Policy subjects students to searches that are unreasonable under all of the circumstances. Accordingly, the Court held that the School District’s Policy does not violate Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.

The equal protection argument, as presented by the Coalition, can succeed only if the Coalition also succeeds on its search and seizure claim. The Court’s conclusion that the School District’s Policy does not subject students to unreasonable searches and seizures is, therefore, determinative of the Coalition’s equal protection claim as well.

The Court did not need to agree or disagree with the district court’s conclusion, because they found a more fundamental flaw in the Coalition’s due process claim. As stated above, a party claiming an infringement of his due process rights must demonstrate both a protected interest and an impermissible infringement on that interest. The Coalition has not demonstrated any infringement because it did not show, or even allege, that any of its members had sought and been denied judicial review of any decision made by the Superintendent pursuant to the Policy. The Coalition’s speculation that judicial review might be denied in the future is insufficient to support a due process claim now. Until this Court is presented with a case in which judicial review has been denied, it is premature to consider the Coalition’s claim that the Policy violates due process. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment against the Coalition on this claim.

Because the Coalition has failed to prove that the School District’s Policy is unconstitutional, there is no basis for their claim that they are entitled to a permanent injunction against implementation of the Policy, or for their claim that the district court erred in granting the School District’s motion for summary judgment. In conclusion, the Court agreed with the observation of Justice Breyer of the United States Supreme Court: “I cannot know whether the school’s drug testing program will work. But, in my view, the Constitution does not prohibit the effort.” The Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in the School District’s favor.

Justice Burke delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2010 WY 133

Summary of Decision issued October 6, 2010

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Dods v. State

Citation: 2010 WY 133

URL: http://tiny.cc/2lwr6

Docket Number: S-09-118

Appeal from the District Court of Albany County, Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): R. Michael Vang, of Fleener & Vang, Laramie, WY

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Leda M. Pojman, Senior Assistant Attorney General


Date of Decision: October 6, 2010

Facts: A state trooper observed Appellant’s minivan passenger side tires cross the white fog line by approximately eight inches for about five seconds/several hundred yards. The trooper initiated a traffic stop. Upon contacting Appellant, the trooper smelled raw marijuana coming from the vehicle. Eventually, a search of the vehicle produced approximately 60 pounds of marijuana. Appellant was charged with one count of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and one count of felony possession of marijuana. He filed a motion to suppress, which the district court denied, finding that the trooper was authorized to initiate the stop. Appellant subsequently entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver.

Issues: Whether the arresting officer possessed sufficient facts to stop Appellant and ultimately was there probable cause to search and seize Appellant pursuant to Article 1 Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.

Holdings: Under the language of Wyo. Stat. 31-5-209 (2009), when an officer merely observes someone drive a vehicle outside the marked lane, he does not automatically have probable cause to stop that person for a traffic violation. The use of the phrase “as nearly as practicable” in the statute precludes such absolute standards and requires a fact-specific inquiry to assess whether an officer has probable cause to believe that a violation has occurred. However, the facts in this case warrant the conclusion that Appellants’ one-time lane deviation, being extensive both in time and distance, constituted a violation of Wyoming law, and thus warranted the invasion of Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Taking into account the totality of circumstances, the district court’s decision denying Appellant’s motion to suppress is affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the opinion for the court.

J. Voigt filed a specially concurring opinion. If the trooper saw what he says he saw, then he was justified in making the traffic stop. However, there are a couple of conceptual difficulties. First is the question of whether a traffic stop must be justified by probable cause or by the lower reasonable suspicion standard. Wyoming law is not at all clear in that regard. The cases cited in the majority opinion, as well as the majority opinion itself, do not seem to come down clearly on one side or the other on this question. Of even more concern, however, is the fact that this is one bizarre statute. Apparently, it is not a crime if one violates the statute a little bit, but it is a crime if one violates the statute somewhat more than a little bit. If you stay in your lane, you have not violated the statute, but if you go out of your lane, you may have violated the statute. In the context of the present case, if the appellant’s conduct may or may not have provided the officer with reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to believe that the appellant violated the statute, how on earth is the appellant supposed to have notice, before the fact, that his conduct will violate the statute? The point is that a traffic code provision, like any criminal law, is supposed to describe the conduct that is prohibited. Additionally, given a particular set of evidentiary facts, judges should not be allowed to declare differently whether that conduct justified a traffic stop. But under the statute in question, that is precisely the case. Both the citizenry and law enforcement require more guidance than that.

Summary 2010 WY 107

Summary of Decision issued July 30, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Frazier v. State

Citation: 2010 WY 107

Docket Number: S-09-0205

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge.

Representing Frazier: Dion J. Custis, Dion J. Custis, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Frazier entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of possessing marijuana with the intent to deliver. He reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Frazier maintains that evidence obtained in the search of the vehicle should have been suppressed because no reasonable suspicion existed to detain him for a dog sniff of his vehicle following the conclusion of a traffic stop.

Initial stop: During the initial stop for the offending license plate bracket, while writing the warning ticket, the Trooper asked Frazier about his travel plans. The few questions relating to travel plans were not unreasonable.
Consent to additional questioning: After Frazier exited the patrol car with the warning, the Trooper initiated additional questioning to which Frazier contends he did not voluntarily consent. The Trooper asked if he could ask a few more questions, Frazier responded affirmatively and the Trooper commented that he didn’t have to answer any more questions if he didn’t want to. Frazier did not identify the presence of other coercive factors that might have affected his decision to answer more questions. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would feel free to decline the Trooper’s requests.
Detention until canine unit arrived: Once the Trooper asked for permission to search the car and Frazier declined, the detention was no longer consensual and required reasonable suspicion. The Trooper noted four factors he relied upon that led to his suspicion that Frazier was transporting illegal drugs: his inconsistent travel plans, odor suppressing agents, the map open to California, and the persistent and extreme nervousness. Each of the factors might be innocent but under the totality of the circumstances test, individually innocuous factors can combine to arouse a reasonable suspicion for the experienced officer.
Length of detention: The Trooper called for the canine unit immediately after Frazier was informed he was detained. There was a 53 minute wait for the canine unit to arrive. The Court found previously that similar waiting times did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Conclusion: The district court’s decision on the motion to suppress was not clearly erroneous.

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/25tp5tb .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance using the Universal Citation format, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2010 WY 46

Summary of Decision issued April 20, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Nava v. State

Citation: 2010 WY 46

Docket Number: S-09-0144

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge.

Representing Appellant Nava: Scott Powers of Law Office of Scott Powers, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Anna C. Swain, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Nava appealed from his conviction for felony possession of a controlled substance. He claimed that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence found in his car during a traffic stop.

Nava contended that after he was issued a warning citation and told he was free to leave, the trooper’s further questioning resulted in custodial interrogation and he should have been “Mirandized” before being subjected to questions. General on-the-scene questioning as to facts and statements volunteered freely without compelling influences are not custodial interrogation. Four factors are relevant to the determination: whether a suspect is questioned in familiar or neutral surroundings; the number of officer present; the degree of physical restraint; and the duration and character of the interrogation. Nava did not analyze the trooper’s further questioning using the factors. He argued that the Appellant never felt free to leave any time after the issuance of the citation. The Court stated the subjective feelings of neither the trooper nor Nava were relevant to the question of whether a particular interrogation was custodial. The Court’s review of the record revealed the trooper was not required to give Miranda warnings before further questioning.
Next, the Court considered whether Nava’s consent to the search of his vehicle was valid. Consent is considered within the “totality of the circumstances” with no single factor determinative. Nava relied upon O’Boyle v. State. The State relied upon the Court’s decisions in Marquez-Guittierrez v. State and Marinaro v. State. The Court stated the factual circumstances in the State’s cases were similar to the instant case and the reasoning compelling. The Court found Nava voluntarily consented to the search.

Conclusion: Nava was not in police custody and therefore not entitled to Miranda warnings before further questioning after he received a warning citation and was told he was free to leave. Also, no violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures occurred because Nava voluntarily consented to the further questioning and subsequent search of his vehicle.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/y6zpqlu.

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance using the Universal Citation format, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 104

Summary of Decision issued August 21, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Johnson v. State

Citation: 2009 WY 104

Docket Number: S-09-0029

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiffs): Kenneth DeCock of Plains Law Offices, LLP, Gillette, Wyoming

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Senior Assistant Attorney General

Date of Decision: August 21, 2009

Appellant entered a conditional plea of guilty to conspiracy to deliver marijuana, reserving the right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress. In this appeal, he challenges, the legality of the search of his residence under both the Wyoming and United States Constitutions.

Issues: Whether law enforcement’s entry into the Appellant’s residence a violation of the Appellant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. Whether law enforcement’s entry into the Appellant’s residence a violation of the Appellant’s right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure as guaranteed by Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.

Holdings: The Court explicates its standard of review in every appeal that comes to it. The standard by which an action is reviewed drives the analysis and, ultimately, the final determination. The key word is “review.” Implicit in the term is that there are findings from a trial court to be reviewed. On the factual side, fact-finding is a basic responsibility of a trial court. Trial courts are therefore required by W.R.Cr.P. 12(f) to state their essential findings of fact on the record. Without such findings, the appellate court must engage in a de novo review. Certainly, there have been occasions where this has been reluctantly done under the theory that the Court can affirm on any ground supported by the record. The court has never, however, analyzed when such leniency might be granted, or even if it is ever appropriate under the language of Rule 12(f).

Rule 12(f) is meant to create a record that allows for proper appellate review. If appropriate appellate review is possible, then, although the court is loath to do so, it will proceed with review even in the face of a violation of Rule 12(f). Failure to comply with Rule 12(f) puts the Court in the unenviable position of making findings of fact de novo. Its decisions then must be based on written words in a cold record without the benefit of seeing and hearing any live witnesses testify or assessing their credibility and weight of the testimony. This is not a task in which an appellate court should engage. It is a vital function of trial courts to make findings of fact based on evidence it believes credible.
Because fact finding is an essential function of trial courts, the absence of Rule 12(f) findings will be overlooked only when the circumstances of the record make just one conclusion possible, or leave no doubt as to the trial court’s assessment of credibility.

In the instant case, the record on appeal does not allow for application of this narrow exception. The issue is whether Appellant’s consent for law enforcement officers to search his premises was voluntary. The existence and voluntariness of a consent to search is a question of fact to be decided by the trial judge in the light of all attendant circumstances. Thus, the case before the Court is a fact-driven case where the legal principles at issue turn almost solely on the district court’s interpretation of the facts.
The district court was presented with conflicting evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding Appellant’s consent. Despite the contradictory stories surrounding those circumstances the district court did not make any credibility determinations or expressly resolve any factual disputes. The district court was presented also with legal argument under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution, yet the district court likewise failed to announce the legal principles on which it was relying. Given the dual lack of findings, the Court lacks any basis for review. Remand is thus required.

Upon remand, the district court must make specific findings of fact. The district court must then determine based on the totality of those facts whether, in light of the mandates of both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution, Appellant’s consent to the officers’ entry into the mobile home was voluntary. The district court should consider all relevant factors bearing on the question of voluntariness, including, but not limited to, the officers’ demeanor; Appellant’s mental capacity; the detective’s statements about the search warrant and associated search; deception, trickery or threats; and the presence of other coercive factors.

In this case, effective review is impossible because of the complete lack of factual findings and legal reasoning given by the district court for its denial of Johnson’s motion to suppress. The record is remanded for the limited purpose of the entry of a supplemental order including the factual findings required by Rule 12(f) as well as a statement by the district court of the conclusions of law it has reached on those findings. The Supreme Court retains jurisdiction and will determine if rebriefing is warranted after the new order is entered in the record. The district court shall have ninety (90) days in which to enter its supplemental order and return the record to the Court.

Remanded.

J. Golden delivered the opinion for the court.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/m75ntt

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 67

Summary of Decision issued May 21, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Feeney v. State

Citation: 2009 WY 67

Docket Number: S-08-0087

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Dion J. Custis of Dion J. Custis, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Assistant Attorney General.

After conditionally pleading guilty to a controlled substance offense, the Appellant challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence discovered during a search of the vehicle he was driving. He maintained that he was detained in violation of his constitutional rights.

Issue: Whether the appellant’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution was violated so as to require suppression of evidence and dismissal of charges.

Holdings: The appellant conceded that the traffic stop was justified and that the trooper’s initial questioning inside the patrol car was proper and did not exceed the scope of the stop. However, the appellant claims that he did not consent to further questioning after he exited the trooper’s vehicle and that the trooper did not have reasonable suspicion to further detain him once the appellant received his warning ticket.

The appellant raised his claim under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1 § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution. When a litigant endeavors to interpret the Wyoming Constitution independent of the Federal Constitution, the litigant “must provide a precise, analytically sound approach when advancing” such a claim. Six factors must be analyzed when a separate state constitutional claim has been raised: 1) the textual language; 2) the differences in the text; 3) constitutional history; 4) preexisting state law; 5) structural differences; and 6) matters of particular state or local concern. The appellant’s attempt to present an independent state constitutional claim falls short. Although he mentions the above-cited factors, he fails to analyze any of them, or even generally describe how Article 1 § 4 might provide him greater protection than the Fourth Amendment.

There are three tiers of interaction between police and citizens for Fourth Amendment purposes. The least intrusive contact between a citizen and police is a consensual encounter. A consensual encounter is not a seizure and does not implicate Fourth Amendment protections. The second tier is the investigatory or Terry stop, named after the seminal case Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1. An investigatory detention is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. However, because of its limited nature, a law enforcement officer is only required to show “the presence of specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime” in order to justify the detention. The most intrusive encounter between police and a citizen is an arrest. An arrest “‘requires justification by probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing a crime.

A traffic stop is more analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest; therefore the reasonableness of such a stop is analyzed under the two-part test articulated in Terry v. Ohio: 1) whether the initial stop was justified; and 2) whether the officer’s actions during the detention were “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first instance.

During a routine traffic stop, a law enforcement officer may request a driver’s license, proof of insurance and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation. Generally, the driver must be allowed to proceed on his way without further delay once the officer determines the driver has a valid driver’s license and is entitled to operate the vehicle. In the absence of consent, an officer may expand the investigative detention beyond the purpose of the initial stop only if there exists an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or is occurring. The existence of objectively reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is determined by evaluating the totality of the circumstances. The “whole picture” must be considered, common sense and ordinary human experience are to be employed, and deference is to be accorded a law enforcement officer’s ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions. Each factor adding up to reasonable suspicion need not be examined individually, they are evaluated to see how convincingly they fit together into a cohesive, convincing picture of illegal conduct.

In this case, the district court’s order denying the motion to suppress listed the factors it found provided the trooper reasonable suspicion to further detain the appellant. It appeared to the court that there were numerous factors present that led the trooper to conclude that he had reasonable suspicion that some illicit activity was occurring. These factors included: 1) the overwhelming smell of dryer sheets emanating from the car with no dryer sheets or laundry in sight; 2) there was only one small bag visible in the back seat; 3) the appellant exhibited extreme nervousness and this nervousness did not subside even after the appellant was informed he would only be receiving a warning; 4) the appellant’s travel plans were inconsistent with the rental agreement; and, 5) upon being questioned about his travel plans, the appellant initially claimed he had called the rental company to inform them of his intention to return the car in Massachusetts but then stated he never had any intention to return the car in California.

Fourth Amendment precedent is clear that the scent of a potential masking agent is one factor which may be considered in a reasonable suspicion analysis. The strong odor of dryer sheets, especially in the case of rental cars, which typically do not need strong air fresheners, is a factor that may be properly considered in a determination of reasonable suspicion. The district court properly considered this factor in its reasonable suspicion analysis.

Generic nervousness is of little significance in establishing reasonable suspicion because the average citizen is usually nervous when stopped by law enforcement for a routine traffic violation. It is generally accepted that nervousness upon the initial confrontation is normal and the telling information is whether the citizen calmed after the initial few minutes of the encounter. The trooper testified that during the short conversation that took place at the driver’s side window of the appellant’s vehicle, the appellant was acting very nervous. He appeared to be trying to avoid conversing. The trooper testified that, based on his experience, most individuals make eye contact with him and their attention is focused on him during a traffic stop, as most individuals want to know the reason for the stop, what they did wrong, and whether the trooper is going to give them a ticket. The trooper also testified that he found it unusual that the appellant’s nervousness continued even after the trooper informed him that he was only going to write him a warning for speeding. The trooper also noted the appellant’s continued nervous behavior while the trooper reviewed the rental agreement. The trooper testified that in his experience most motorists will engage him in conversation as he looks over a rental agreement, asking him what he is looking for or offering to help the trooper by providing additional information. Finally, even after the trooper told the appellant he was only issuing him a warning and that he was free to go, the trooper described the appellant’s continued nervousness. Thus, it was proper for the district court to consider the appellant’s continuing nervousness as a factor in the reasonable suspicion determination.

Unusual or inconsistent travel plans are a proper consideration in a reasonable suspicion analysis. During their initial conversation, the appellant told the trooper that he was returning home to Massachusetts from California where he had been visiting friends. The trooper became suspicious of this statement after seeing that the terms of the rental agreement required the appellant to return the vehicle to California. Further, the trooper testified that he was concerned that although the rental agreement required the vehicle to be returned to the same location where it was rented, the appellant’s statements indicated that it was actually one-way rental. The trooper testified that in his experience, one-way rental vehicles are often used to transport illegal drugs. Finally, although the appellant represented to the trooper that he had called the rental company to resolve the discrepancies in the rental agreement, when the trooper contacted the rental company, they had no record of any contact by the appellant. The district court properly considered this factor in its reasonable suspicion analysis.

These behaviors and observations when considered in isolation, could be interpreted as innocent. However, when considered together, they justify a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. Looking at the whole picture, the district court’s determination is affirmed inasmuch as the overwhelming smell of dryer sheets, the appellant’s extreme and continuing nervousness, and the appellant’s behaviors related to the irregularities in his travel plans provided the trooper with reasonable suspicion to detain the appellant until the K-9 unit arrived.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the opinion for the court.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/lv8r65 .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summary 2009 WY 35

Summary of Decision issued March 10, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Latta v. State

Citation: 2009 WY 35

Docket Number: S-08-0065

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiffs): Dion J. Custis., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Jeremy C. Schwendiman, Student Intern.

Facts: Before he pled guilty to felony possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle after a traffic stop. The district court denied his motion, and Latta now claims on appeal that the district court erred in denying the motion because, although he conceded that the initial stop was legal, he did not voluntarily consent to the trooper’s second round of questions and the trooper did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying his detention until a drug dog arrived.

Issues: Whether the trial court abused its discretion and commit reversible error when it denied Appellant’s Motion to Suppress.

Holdings: The right of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed by article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. A waiver of constitutional rights under our constitution must appear by clear and positive testimony, and, if a search or seizure is based upon the proposition that consent was given, there should be no question from the evidence that consent was really voluntary and with a desire to invite search or further questioning, and not done merely to avoid resistance. Acquiescence and nonresistance have not been deemed sufficient under Wyoming law to establish consent.
The totality of the circumstances will be examined to determine if consent was voluntary. Among the factors considered are: the demeanor of the law enforcement officer, whether the individual was told he could refuse the request, the presence of other law enforcement officers, the length of the detention and nature of the questioning before consent was given, and other coercive factors.
In light of the totality of the factual circumstances in the present, Appellant’s consent was voluntary. The initial traffic stop was brief, the trooper’s conduct was professional, courteous, and non-coercive throughout the length of the entire encounter, and the consents given by Appellant were unhesitant and immediate. Even when considering the fact that the patrol car’s lights remained flashing and that there were two uniformed officers present, under the totality of the circumstances the consent to a second round of questions was voluntary. A reasonable person in the appellant’s position at the time would have felt that he could have said ‘no’ and proceeded on his way.
Having concluded that Appellant’s consent was voluntary, whether the Trooper had reasonable suspicion of illegal activity to warrant further questioning need not be considered. Voluntary consent obviates the necessity of determining whether the trooper had sufficient reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to pursue further questioning.

Conclusion: The district court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err as a matter of law in denying Appellant’s Motion to Suppress. The Judgment and Sentence of the district court is Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the opinion for the court.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/c5wurs .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Sumamry 2009 WY 18

Summary of Decision issued February 12, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Shaw v. State

Citation: 2009 WY 18

Docket Number: S-08-0055

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, the Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge.

Representing Appellant Shaw: Diane M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and Eric M. Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leta M. Pojman, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Shaw entered a conditional plea of guilty to felony possession of marijuana. The condition was that he be given leave to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his car by a Wyoming State Trooper.

Propriety of the Search and Seizure: In Speten v. State the Court described the analytical framework for evaluating issues such as in the instant case. The issue of the constitutionality of a search often focuses upon the question of whether or not the officer had probable cause to search, or reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigative detention. These cases are fact intensive and the Court considers the totality of the circumstances. The case began as a consensual encounter when the trooper stopped to aid Shaw who was stuck in deep snow. The trooper asked to see Shaw’s driver’s license which did not invoke any of the protections provided by the U.S. Constitution or the Wyoming Constitution. Once it was determined that Shaw had been driving, but had no driver’s license, the initial consensual encounter came to resemble a traffic stop or investigative detention. Little time passed from when the trooper realized Shaw had no license until she found the marijuana in the car. The trooper received permission from Shaw to look for proof of insurance and registration in the car. The district court concluded that the trooper had a legal right to enter the vehicle pursuant to Shaw’s consent. Once she entered the vehicle and smelled the marijuana, she possessed the requisite probable cause to search the vehicle for contraband. The district court concluded the marijuana was admissible at trial. Given that the Court could not find evidence in the record that Shaw’s consent was not knowing and voluntary, it was persuaded the district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous.

Conclusion: The Court held that Shaw’s consent for the trooper to enter his car was dispositive and declined to address the matter of inevitable discovery of the contraband during the inventory process.

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/at6a9k .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 8

Summary of Decision issued January 29, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: McGarvey v. State

Citation: 2009 WY 8

Docket Number: S-08-0070

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge.

Representing Appellant McGarvey: Diane M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and Kirk A. Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Interim Faculty Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; Eric Thompson, Student Director; and Jill Cottle Garrett, Student Intern.

Facts/Discussion: McGarvey entered conditional pleas of guilty to felony possession of marijuana and misdemeanor possession of methamphetamines. The condition attached to her plea was that she be permitted to pursue an appeal of the district court’s order denying her motion to suppress the evidence seized by the State at the time she was briefly stopped and then arrested.

McGarvey’s contentions were limited to improper searches and seizures under the United States Constitution. The Court referred to their decision in Speten v. State where it described the analytical framework for questions of probable cause. Questions about improper search and seizure are resolved by taking into account the totality of the circumstances. The Court noted that the officer had over 19 years of experience in law enforcement. In Flood v. State, the Court described the three tiers of interaction between police and citizens. The Court determined that the search and seizure in the instant case was not unreasonable. The district court might well have reasoned that the officer’s initial efforts were aimed at a consensual encounter when he followed McGarvey and her companion into the Parkway. McGarvey’s behavior quickly transformed the encounter into an investigatory stop and segued equally as rapidly into an arrest for disobeying the officer’s instructions and McGarvey’s possession of controlled substances.
The Court stated the search of the automobile was a more complicated question. The Court noted that it appeared there was a close temporal relationship between McGarvey’s occupation of the car and her arrest. The officer’s initial action was to merely look through the windows and observe what was in plain view. The Court concluded the factors weighed heavily in favor of categorizing the search as being one incident to her arrest and that the search of it was for evidence of the crime for which she was arrested. Taking into account all of the relevant evidence which the district court was privy to, the Court concluded that the findings were not clearly erroneous and that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Conclusion: The Court held that the district court properly denied McGarvey’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained incident to a search of her person and of her car.

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/ab88kb .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 1

Summary of Decision issued January 13, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Wilson v. Wyoming

Citation: 2009 WY 1

Docket Number: S-08-0020

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge.

Representing Appellant Wilson: Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel, Wyoming Public Defender; John D. King, Acting Faculty Director, Diane E. Courselle, Faculty Director, and Andy F. Sears, Student Intern, University of Wyoming Defender Aid Program.

Representing Appellee State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Wilson contended that the district court erred when it found that a police officer’s use of a patrol car computer to search for outstanding warrants did not constitute search and seizure. He also argued that the district court erred when it declined to find a search of Appellant’s person unconstitutional because the evidence did not support a finding that police used excessive force during the encounter.

Seizure: Initial Contact: Appellant claimed he was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when the officer stopped him on the street and asked for his name. Under both the federal and Wyoming state constitutions, a person has been seized only if in view of all circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. The Court has stated previously that a request for identification is not by itself a seizure. In Wilson v. State (1994), the Court found that a consensual encounter with police remained consensual when a police officer requested identification and ran a computerized warrant check using that information. The seizure occurred only after the citizen complied with the officer’s order not to leave while the check was being completed.
Search: Warrant Check: In Meek the Court stated that requesting an NCIC check was not sufficient to implicate constitutional rights. The situation in the instant case is similar. The search was complete within seconds while Appellant was in a consensual conversation with the officer. Appellant was in no way detained or restricted.
Suppression: Excessive Use of Force: The Court’s review of the record indicated that the district court had almost no evidence before it that would have allowed it to conclude that the force used by officers was excessive under the circumstances.

Conclusion: The district court did not err when it determined that Appellant’s initial contact with police was consensual and that running Appellant’s name through a warrant check computer did not constitute a search for constitutional purposes. The district court did not err in declining to find a search unconstitutional where the evidence presented did not support a conclusion that officers used excessive force in the conduct of that search.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/a8n4wr .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 63

Summary of Decision issued June 9, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Speten v. State

Citation: 2008 WY 63

Docket Number: S-07-0253

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, the John R. Perry, Judge.

Representing Appellant (Defendant): John Craig Abraham of Plains Law Offices, LLP, Gillette, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Teresa R. Nelson, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Ms. Speten appealed the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress as evidence methamphetamine discovered during a warrantless search of her purse.
Officers went to a commercial location to arrest Mr. Sandy. Speten was with Sandy at the time of his arrest. Speten was arrested as a result of the officers’ search of her purse. The officers stated they searched her purse to be sure she did not have any weapons and they found methamphetamine. The search was carried out without the Deputy having obtained a warrant. The Court reviewed the law governing warrantless searches as found in Hughes v. State, Pena v. State and Fenton v. State. They noted the list found in the case law is not exhaustive. Other constitutionally reasonable searches can include an inventory search of an impounded vehicle, a search of an arrestee’s companion, and the search of an arrestee’s shirt even if he is not wearing it. These holdings under state constitutional analysis were based upon officer safety concerns. The Court then reviewed the community caretaker function of law enforcement officers. In Lancaster v. State, the Court described how a community caretaker case may become an eventual arrest. The right to search or frisk for weapons arises out of the need for officer safety during an arrest, whether by warrant or not, is supported by probable cause or it arises out of the need for officer safety during an investigative detention. An officer safety concern does not necessarily exist at only one precise moment in time during an investigative detention and the Court believed the rationale of Terry would allow a limited search for weapons at any time during that detention that the officer safety concern becomes apparent.
The Court used the totality of the circumstances approach to judging reasonableness that is required for analysis under the State constitution. The Court found no facts that would support a conclusion that the greater protections of Article 1, Section 4 required reversal in the case.

Holding: Having concluded that the Deputy’s search of Speten’s purse was constitutional as a reasonable search for weapons during an investigative detention, the Court did not further consider any of the other theories and justifications discussed by the parties.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/5f5p8q .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 61

Summary of Decision issued June 5, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Seymour v. State

Citation: 2008 WY 61

Docket Number: S-07-0255

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge.

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Dion J. Custis of Dion J. Custis, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Seymour pled guilty to felony possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. The issue was whether the search of Seymour’s vehicle violated his rights guaranteed by article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution or the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Under both the United States and the Wyoming Constitutions, the Court examines the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the consent was voluntary. The videotape of the stop reflected the Trooper’s courteous and respectful questions and Seymour’s assent to further questioning. This was not an instance where the driver was not informed that he was free to leave and that he was not required to consent to further questioning. The canine sniff was reasonable given the totality of the circumstances some of which included continued nervous behavior, a rental car not rented by the driver, the driver not knowing the last name of the renter of the car, and the driver intending to return the car prior to the end of the rental agreement which would increase his cost.

Holding: It was undisputed that the initial detention for speeding was justified and that it did not exceed the scope of the stop. After the Trooper told Seymour he was free to go, Seymour voluntarily consented to further questioning. His voluntary consent vitiated the requirement of showing reasonable suspicion for the second detention. Based upon the totality of the circumstances at the time the Trooper called for the canine unit, he had reasonable suspicion to detain Seymour for the purpose of the canine sniff. The detention did not violate Seymour’s rights under article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution or the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Affirmed.

J. Kite delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/55zkvl.

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 54

Summary of Decision issued May 14, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Holman v. State

Citation: 2008 WY 54

Docket Number: 06-140

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge.

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Thomas R.; Smith of Chapman Valdez at Beech Street Law Office, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General: Eric A. Johnson, Faculty Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; and Geoffrey Gunnerson, Student Director, Prosecution Assistance Program.

Facts/Discussion: Holman pled guilty to one count of third possession of a controlled substance reserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of his car at the time of his arrest.
The Court has stated that warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless justified by probable cause and established exceptions. The Court reviewed the record to determine if an exception applied. The Officer’s reason for conducting the search was clear: search incident to arrest. The officer presented no evidence that the search of the vehicle was conducted to ensure officer safety or preserve evidence. He offered no testimony regarding specific facts or circumstances indicating that those concerns were present in the instant case. The Court’s review of the record revealed no objectively identifiable facts in support of those concerns. The Court stated the State failed to meet its burden. The Court has recognized that the mobility and the diminished expectation of privacy in the use and regulation of vehicles, permits warrantless searches in circumstances where searches would not be reasonable in other contexts. Their review of the record revealed no circumstances which would cause a reasonably prudent person to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of the crime for which Holman was arrested, or any other crime. The limited nature of the search did not justify the otherwise impermissible search. Although a driver of a vehicle has a diminished privacy interest in the contents of his vehicle, it does not mean he has no expectation of privacy. The Court agreed it would be irresponsible to park the vehicle in a public place if the officer had cause to believe it contained contraband or other dangerous items. In the instant case, the officers searched without any reason to believe it contained evidence of any crime.

Holding: Upon their review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the search of Holman’s vehicle, the Court concluded that the search was not reasonable under any of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement and therefore violated Article I, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.

Reversed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

J. Hill concurred: J. Hill wrote to distinguish the present case from Pierce and Sam. He stated that the goal of the Court’s review is to determine whether or not the search and seizure was “reasonable” under the facts and circumstances presented by any given case. His analysis led to the conclusion that the stop, search and seizure was one prompted more by suspicion than by concrete fact. As a matter of law, he concluded that they were not reasonable and therefore they were unconstitutional.

J. Burke dissented: J. Burke stated that his analysis revealed that similar to Pierce, the decision in the instant case was inconsistent with Wyoming precedent establishing that the arrest itself is sufficient justification to search the arrested person and the area within his immediate control.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/5r8fyg .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2007 WY 190

Summary of Decision issued December 6, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Garvin v. State; Lockwood v. State

Citation: 2007 WY 190

Docket Number: S-07-0102

Appeal from the District Court of Albany County, the Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

Representing Appellants (Defendants): R. Michael Vang of Brown & Hiser LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Causey.

Issue: Whether the Defendants’ rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under Article 1 § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution would require suppression of evidence and dismissal of charges.

Facts/Discussion: Appellants entered conditional pleas of guilty to the charge of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. They reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of their respective motion to suppress the marijuana evidence discovered in Garvin’s rental vehicle following a traffic stop.
Standard of Review: When the Court reviews a district court’s suppression ruling they defer to the court’s findings on factual issues unless they are clearly erroneous.
In this consolidated appeal, Garvin and Lockwood contend the district court erred in denying their motions to suppress the marijuana evidence seized during a search of the rental vehicle Garvin was driving. Lockwood presented no argument on appeal that he was illegally detained or searched. The rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment are personal rights and only the person whose rights have been infringed may claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule. Since his rights were never violated, he had no standing to invoke the protections of that rule.
The reasonableness of a traffic stop is analyzed under the two-part test articulated in Terry v. Ohio which includes whether the initial stop was justified and whether the officer’s actions during the detention were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. The existence of objectively reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is determined by evaluating the totality of the circumstances. The circumstances included the existence of a one-way rental agreement, the strong odor of air-fresheners and dryer sheets, the open display of religious symbols, the defendant exhibiting extreme nervousness through the entire process, and the rental agreement which stated the car was to have been returned six days prior to the day in question.

Holding: After looking at the whole picture, the Court agreed with the district court’s legal conclusion there was reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to detain Garvin until the arrival of the canine unit. The aggregate of all the information available created reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, thus warranting Garvin’s further detention.

Affirmed.

J. Golden delivered the opinion.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2qusuy .