Summary 2011 WY 38

Summary of Decision March 4, 2011

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Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Mowery v. State

Citation: 2011 WY 38

Docket Number: No. S-10-0127

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=461797

Appeal from the District Court of Washakie County, Honorable Robert E. Skar, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; Diane E. Courselle, Director, UW Defender Aid Program; E. Jeannee Nunn, Student Intern.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jessica Y. Frint, Student Director, Jessica G. Van Norman, Student Intern.

Date of Decision: March 4, 2011

Facts: Appellant appeals a conviction for felony interference with a peace officer, in violation of Wyo. Stat. 6-5-204(b) (2009). She contends the district court erred in allowing the State to amend the information to remove the charge of attempting to interfere with a peace officer. She also asserts that the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of self-induced intoxication.


Issues: Whether the district court abused its discretion under Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 3(e) when it allowed the last minute amendment of the information removing the charge of attempting to interfere with a peace officer since it prejudiced her defenses of self-induced intoxication. Whether the trial court erred when it declined to Appellant’s proposed instruction which provided that self-induced intoxication is a defense to the crime of intentionally and knowingly causing bodily injury to a peace officer in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b).

Holdings: Appellant faced conviction under the original information for both the attempted and completed versions of felony interference with a peace officer. However, self-induced intoxication is a defense only to the attempted crime, and not to the completed crime. When the State amended the information, the possibility of conviction for the attempted crime was eliminated. But Appellant continued to face, as she did from the beginning of the proceedings, the possibility of conviction for the completed crime if the State proved its case. Despite having ample opportunity to present a defense to the completed crime, Appellant presented no other defense apart from self-induced intoxication. The fact that Appellant’s intoxication defense was negated by the removal of the attempted crime from the charge against her did not prejudice her substantial rights. She was on notice of the attempted and completed versions of the crime from the beginning of the case, and the attempted version was based in the same statutory provision and arose out of identical factual circumstances as the completed crime. The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to amend the information.

“Specific intent” is most commonly used to refer to a special mental element that is required above and beyond any mental state that is attached to the physical act of a crime. Specific intent crime is often described as one that involves an intent to do some further act or achieve a future consequence in addition to the basic physical act of the crime. When the statute sets out the offense with only a description of the particular unlawful act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, the trial judge asks the jury whether the defendant intended to do the outlawed act. Such intention is general intent. When the statutory definition of the crime refers to an intent to do some further act or attain some additional consequence, the offense is considered to be a specific intent crime and then that question must be asked of the jury. In Wyo. Stat. 6-5-204(b), the mere use of the words “intentionally and knowingly” does not transform the crime of felony interference with a peace officer into a specific intent crime. Because the accused does not have to intend a further act or future consequence beyond the injury to a peace officer, the completed offense described in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b) is a general intent crime. Thus, the completed version of felony interference with a peace officer is not a specific intent crime and, accordingly, self-induced intoxication is not available as a defense.

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2009 WY 88

Summary of Decision issued July 10, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Morris v. State

Citation: 2009 WY 88

Docket Number: S-08-0177

Appeal from the District Court of Uinta County, the Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge.

Representing Morris: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and Eric M. Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney general; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: A jury convicted Morris of felony property destruction.
Sufficiency of the evidence that Morris “knowingly” destroyed property: The district court did not instruct the jury on the meaning of the term “knowingly” or how it was to be construed in the context of the remaining statutory language. Morris contended that because the State did not provide proof that he knew his act would deface the vehicle or that he had any intent at all to damage it, the conviction cannot stand. Applying the ordinary meaning of the words to the language contained in the statute, it was clear to the Court that Morris violated the statute if, with awareness, deliberateness or intention, he defaced the vehicle; it likewise was clear that he did not violate the provision if he inadvertently or involuntarily defaced the vehicle. Testimony included a statement that Morris slid across the top of the car and that the witness heard metal buckling as he slid. The Court stated that the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.
Failure to instruct jury concerning “knowingly”: The Court has previously held that the word “knowingly” is not a technical term requiring an instruction on its meaning, and due to the lack of any established rule requiring an instruction on the meaning of “knowingly”, Morris could not establish plain error.
Allowing prosecutor to define “knowingly”: During closing argument the prosecutor made a statement regarding the definition of knowingly and referred to Black’s Law Dictionary. The plain language of the statute required the State to prove that Morris, with awareness, deliberateness or intention defaced the vehicle. Evidence that Morris inadvertently defaced the vehicle would not have been sufficient to support a conviction under the statute. The Court agreed with Morris that the prosecutor misstated the law when she told the jury that all the State had to show was that he jumped on the car and that it did not have to show that he intended to damage it. Giving the words their plain meaning, the statute required proof that Morris deliberately damaged the vehicle or intended that result. Evaluating the statement within the context of the entire record, the Court concluded that Morris demonstrated he was denied a substantial right which materially prejudiced him. Had the prosecutor not told the jury that all the State had to prove was that Morris jumped on the vehicle, and that it did not have to prove that he intended to cause damage, there was a reasonable probability that the jury would have concluded from the State’s evidence that his act was inadvertent and he was not guilty of property destruction.
Restitution: Morris claimed the district court erred in ordering him to pay restitution in the amount of $1400, the estimated valued of the vehicle before the damage. The State requested restitution based upon the 2007 Kelly Blue Book value for a car of the same year, make and model in fair condition. It was not clear from the record whether the district court ordered Morris to pay that amount because defense counsel did not object to the PSI or because it concluded the fair market value was the appropriate measure of restitution. In the context of a civil action, when property is not entirely destroyed, the proper measure of damages is its value before the damage less its value after the damage.

Conclusion: The State presented sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. The Court has previously held that the word “knowingly” is not a technical term requiring an instruction on its meaning. The prosecutor’s misstatements meant that there was a reasonable probability the jury would have concluded from the evidence that Morris’ act was inadvertent and he was not guilty of property destruction. The proper measure of restitution, when property has not been completely destroyed, is the value of the item before the damage less the value after the damage.

Reversed and remanded.

J. Hill delivered the decision.

J. Golden, concurring in part, dissenting in part: The Justice concurred in the disposition of the question regarding jury instructions. He agreed that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Morris’ conviction but disagreed with the majority opinion’s reasoning on that issue. He stated the opinion blurred the distinction between general intent and specific intent crimes. The Court has consistently ruled that criminal statutes that include the mental element “knowingly” are general intent crimes. By its plain language, § 6-3-201 is a general intent crime. The State was simply required to prove that Morris intentionally jumped on the car and not that he intended to cause damage to it. The evidence clearly supported that conclusion.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/n2xx8g .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]