Summary 2009 WY 53

Summary of Decision issued April 13, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Krafczik v. Morris

Citation: 2009 WY 53

Docket Number: S-08-0003; S-08-0079

Appeal from the District Court of Albany County, the Honorable Jeffrey A. DOnnell, Judge.

Representing Appellant Krafczik: Steve C.M. Aron, Aron and Hennig, LLP, Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee Morris: Stacy L. Rostad and Jason M. Tangeman, Anthony, Nicholas & Tangeman, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: In 2004 Mr. Allan Kraczik executed a Warranty Deed conveying to Morris an interest in a rental property he owned in Laramie, Wyoming. The deed established Krafczik and Morris as owners of undivided one-half interests as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. In late 2004, Krafczik’s cousin, Joseph Krafczik and his wife were appointed as guardians of Mr. Krafczik. The Krafcziks filed suit on behalf of Mr. Krafczik against Morris claiming that she obtained the property interest through undue influence. While the litigation was pending, the Krafcziks executed a Quitclaim Deed with the express purpose of terminating her rights of survivorship. They filed a motion for approval of that conveyance in their conservatorship case.

Undue influence: The Krafcziks claimed the district court’s factual findings were contrary to the evidence. The Court reviewed the record and noted the evidence could have supported the existence of a confidential relationship but it could have supported the contrary as well. However, there was very little evidence that Mr. Krafczik’s mental condition left him dependent upon Morris. In contrast, there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings that he did not depend upon her in completing his daily activities, his financial affairs, or his personal affairs.
Motion at the close of plaintiffs’ case: After the Krafcziks presented their case during the bench trial, Morris made a motion for judgment on partial findings arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish the existence of a confidential relationship between Mr. Krafczik and Morris. The district court denied the motion explaining that the Krafcziks had presented sufficient evidence to survive the motion for judgment but the court had not concluded that a confidential relationship existed.
Court approval of a conservator’s property conveyance: The Krafcziks as conservators executed a Quitclaim Deed by which they attempted to convey Mr. Krafczik’s joint tenancy to himself as a tenancy in common in an effort to destroy Morris’ right of survivorship. It was undisputed they did not receive approval of the transaction from the district court. The Court considered the question of whether they should have. The deed was executed as an independent act regardless of the outcome of the litigation and not in furtherance of the prosecution or defense of any claim. The Quitclaim Deed represented an incomplete conveyance because the Krafcziks executed it prior to obtaining court approval and Mr. Krafczik died before the district court confirmed the sale.

Conclusion: There was substantial evidence to support the district court’s conclusion that there was not a confidential relationship between Morris and Mr. Krafczik. The Quitclaim Deed was an incomplete conveyance because the Krafcziks executed it prior to obtaining the district court’s approval and Mr. Krafczik died before the district court confirmed the sale.

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/cbzooc .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 29

Summary of Decision issued March 4, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: White v. Woods; Adamson v. Woods

Citation: 2009 WY 29

Docket Number: S-08-0078; S-08-0085

Appeal from the District Court of Albany County, the Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge.

Representing Appellant Whites: Philip White, Jr., Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee Adamson: Pro se.

Representing Appellee Woods: Frank J. Jones, Wheatland, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: The Woods filed suit in district court seeking to quiet their title to several small pieces of property located in the interior of their ranch property. Among the defendants were Adamson and the Whites. The district court entered summary judgment against Adamson and the Whites. Their separate appeals were consolidated before the Court.
Background: Tax deeds in Wyoming: There are many specific and detailed requirements applicable to tax sales and tax deeds. Particularly relevant here are the requirements that, upon applying for a tax deed, notice must be provided in a specified manner to the person in whose name the taxes were assessed, to the person in actual possession or occupancy of the property, to the record owner, and to mortgagees. After receiving a tax deed, the tax-sale purchaser must file the notices and proofs of service to be recorded as instruments affecting the conveyance of real property. Wyoming courts have required strict compliance with the statutory requirements and have declared tax deeds invalid for relatively minor deviations from the requirements. The problems facing tax deed purchasers are due in part to a strong policy of protecting the former owner’s rights to redeem and recover his property. In 1975, the legislature enacted provisions meant to promote more stability and better marketability for tax deeds. Adamson and the Whites purchased their lots thirty-five years ago and obtained their tax deeds nearly thirty years ago but have never taken possession of their lots. In contrast, the Woods have used the lots as part of their ranch. Their principle claim was that they had acquired title by adverse possession. When the Woods acquired their ranch, the tax deeds were of record. Because the Woods did not own the ranch when the lots were sold for taxes, it is not clear they should benefit from the policy favoring former owners and their rights to redeem and recover property.
The Woods’ claims against Adamson and the Whites: The Woods filed for summary judgment stating they had acquired the property by the combination of a quit claim and a warranty deed. The Woods challenged the Adamson and Whites’ tax deeds on the basis of noncompliance with the statutory requirements for providing notice to interested parties. It is undisputed the Woods did not own or claim an interest in the property when the lots were sold at the tax sale or when Adamson and the Whites applied for their tax deeds, but the Woods appear to claim that they are entitled to challenge the tax deeds as successors. The question of whether summary judgment was precluded by the existence of genuine issues of material fact is intertwined with the issue of standing. After reviewing the record, the Court stated there remained the question of whether the Woods were successors in interest to the Kents. The Woods were not the owners at the time of the tax sale or tax deed, so the Court reviewed the record to determine whether they submitted facts adequate to show that they were prejudiced or injured and that a favorable court decision would provide them redress. The record was devoid of facts establishing that the Woods were the successors in interest to the Kents. Based on the record, Adamson was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because even if his tax deed was invalid, the Woods had no valid claim to the property. A court decision in their favor could not vest title in the Woods or otherwise redress their alleged injury.
Statutes of limitation: The parties have disputed whether two different statutes of limitation bar the Woods’ challenge to the tax deeds. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-132(a) or § 39-13-108(e)(vii)(D). By its plain language, the first statute applies only if the grantee has been in possession of the property for six months. The record demonstrated that the Whites never took possession of the lot, so the statute of limitation did not apply. The Whites claimed constructive possession but the Court stated that the Woods had been in possession of the land from the date of purchase and continuously since then, using it as part of their ranch activities. The second statute mentioned was a limitation on actions for the recovery of real property. The Woods’ action in the case was not one to recover the property since they were in possession of it. The Whites have never been in possession and the statute of limitation never commenced to run in favor of the Whites. It does not bar the Woods’ quiet title action.
Payment of property taxes: The Whites asserted they have paid property taxes on the lot ever since the tax sale and insist that the payment of taxes must mean something to the law. The legislature has provided remedies for tax purchasers whose tax deeds are discovered or adjudged to be invalid.

Conclusion: The Court determined that the district court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of the Woods in their challenges to the tax deeds of Adamson and the Whites.

Reversed and remanded.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/bo43ea .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2007 WY 184

Summary of Decision issued November 16, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: West America Housing Corp. v. Pearson

Citation: 2007 WY 184

Docket Number: S-07-0068

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

Representing Appellants (Defendants): Mary Elizabeth Galvan, Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Don W. Riske and Sean C. Chambers of Riske, Salisbury & Kelly, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Issues: Whether a fully executed quitclaim deed, acknowledging payment of consideration and containing no reservation of rights may be set aside as void for lack of consideration under the doctrines of merger and estoppel by deed. Whether the trial court’s setting aside the quitclaim deed from Pearson to Oltman was plain error, requiring reversal to give effect to the doctrines of merger and estoppel by deed. Whether conveyance of the subject property to a party to the deed, by quitclaim deed, was sufficient to confer title in the property to the grantee, who could then dispose of the property by quitclaim deed to a subsequent grantee.

Facts/Discussion: Appellants challenge a January 2007 order of the district court which found that (1) a quitclaim deed from Pearson to Oltman was void for lack of consideration and (2) that subsequent quitclaim deeds were void because they were fraudulent conveyances. The Court made note that Joelson, Shoopman, Craver and Oltman purported to own WAHC. The district court’s order also quieted title to the disputed property in Pearson but did not award him any monetary damages.
Standard of Review: When a matter has been tried before the district court without a jury, the Court’s review of the court’s findings of fact is under the clearly erroneous standard. The issues raised in the appeal were not addressed to the district court in the proceedings below.
Appellants asserted the district court committed plain error because the principles of merger and estoppel by deed mandated reversal of the district court’s order. They also asserted that the doctrine of “merger” precluded the district court from concluding that there was no consideration paid to Pearson for the quitclaim deed because the quitclaim deed acknowledged that he received the consideration. The Court referred to their holding in Rehnberg v. Hirschberg that a contract for the sale of realty is executory until closing, at which time the contract has been executed, it merges with the deed and is no longer separately enforceable. The Court specifically stated they did not mean to dilute the important role of the doctrine by concluding that they would not consider Appellants’ contentions in that regard under the plain error rule. They noted that based on the evidence it was not plain error for the district court to conclude that the deed at issue was void for lack of consideration.
The Court stated in Kennedy Oil v. Lance Oil & Gas Co., Inc. that estoppel by deed was based upon the covenants contained in a warranty deed and does not therefore arise from a conveyance via quitclaim. The Court rejected Appellant’s claim of plain error because it was not argued to the trial court and because the plain error rule does not mandate that the Court consider it.
Since the Court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the initial quitclaim deed was void, it flowed that the succeeding deeds were also void. However, the district court determined that they were fraudulent conveyances. The record reflects that Oltman conceded that the second and third quitclaim deeds were recorded with intent to defraud Pearson.

Holding: Based on the evidence it was not plain error for the district court to conclude that the deed at issue was void for lack of consideration. The district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and its application of the law not in error. The order setting aside those conveyances and declaring them void was not erroneous.

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the opinion.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/37o75b .