Summary 2010 WY 14

Summary of Decision issued February 12, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Phillip v. State

Citation: 2010 WY 14

Docket Number: S-09-0080

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Assistant Attorney General

Facts: This matter arose out of a fight that occurred in a bar in Casper, Wyoming, on July 18, 2008. During the altercation, the appellant bit off a piece of the ear of another patron, and as a result was charged with one count of aggravated assault and battery. The appellant pled not guilty and a jury trial was held. The jury found the appellant guilty as charged. The appellant timely appealed.

Issues: Whether the district court erred when it gave the jury an instruction regarding an aggressor’s right to self-defense claiming that there was no evidence presented at trial that supported a finding that he was the aggressor in the conflict. Whether the district court erred when it admitted into evidence the appellant’s Affidavit of Indigency for impeachment purposes.

Holdings: The appellant did not object at trial to the instruction to which he now takes exception. Therefore the appellant’s claim will be reviewed under a plain error analysis.

The instruction at issue read:

YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that generally, the right to use self-defense is not available to one who is the aggressor or provokes the conflict. However, if one who provokes a conflict thereafter withdraws from it in good faith and informs his adversary by words or actions that he wants to end the conflict, and he is thereafter pursued or attacked, he then has the same right of self-defense as any other person.

There is no dispute that the appellant and the victim had been engaged in a verbal confrontation, based on the appellant’s, the victim’s, and the witnesses’ testimonies. It is also not disputed that the victim threw the first punch. However, the record also shows the victim testified he only punched the appellant after the appellant came toward him in an aggressive manner. In instances such as that presented here, where opposing parties claim the other was the aggressor, the task on appeal is not to weigh the evidence, but only to determine whether the district court could reasonably conclude that there was competent evidence from which the jury might find the party claiming self-defense was the aggressor. The instruction on self-defense as given was a correct statement of Wyoming law, and the jury was presented with testimony that could reasonably support a finding that the appellant was the aggressor. Therefore, the appellant has failed to show a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law, thereby failing to prove plain error.
The affidavit of indigency contained a sworn statement which was inconsistent with the appellant’s trial testimony. Showing that a witness made statements inconsistent with his testimony is one of five recognized means of impeachment. The purpose of this type of impeachment evidence is to show a witness to be generally capable of making errors in his testimony. The admissibility of evidence of prior inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes is not without limits, however. The cross-examiner may not impeach a witness on a collateral matter. Collateral matters are generally considered to include facts irrelevant to the substantive issues in the case and facts which are not independently provable by extrinsic evidence, apart from impeachment purposes. The test which determines if a matter is collateral is whether the matter could be introduced for any purpose other than to contradict. When a defendant in a criminal action takes the witness stand in his own defense, his credibility becomes an issue. Credibility of witnesses is always a question of fact for the trier of fact to determine. The evidence of the prior inconsistent statement in the present action was offered, admitted, and ultimately used for the purpose of challenging the appellant’s credibility. Furthermore, it is conceivable that the Affidavit of Indigency and the statements contained therein would have been independently admissible for purposes other than to show contradiction. Finally, whether evidence was collateral is a question primarily left to the discretion of the district court and, upon reviewing the entire record, it cannot cannot be said that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the affidavit.
Under the maxim, falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, as strictly interpreted, if a witness testifies falsely as to any one material part of his testimony, his testimony should be discarded as a whole, and cannot be relied on for any purpose whatever, unless strongly corroborated; but this rule is not inflexible. It is true that the maxim should only be applied, if applied at all, where a witness falsely testifies to a material fact. However, under the facts presented here there is a question whether the falsus in uno maxim, as a separate legal concept, was ever even considered by the jury. The jury was told it was at liberty to disregard any witness’s testimony if it believed from the facts that the witness’s testimony was false. Likewise, the prosecutor never told the jury that it must disregard all of the appellant’s testimony because of the inconsistencies, as required by strict application of the falsus in uno maxim. Rather the prosecutor merely referenced the inconsistencies and told the jury it may consider such inconsistencies when judging the appellant’s credibility. Thus, the falsus in uno maxim was never plainly invoked in either the jury instructions or in any of the prosecutor’s comments. To find otherwise would require speculation and assign meaning not expressly conveyed in either instance. Furthermore, even if the jury was erroneously instructed on the falsus in uno concept, the appellant fails to point to anything in the record showing that the jury applied this maxim to his prejudice. The jury may have assigned more weight to the victim’s version of the events, or found the state’s evidence to be more credible; however, nothing in the record indicates that the jury disregarded all or even part of the appellant’s testimony.
The appellant asserts the admission of the Affidavit of Indigency violated his constitutionally protected right to equal protection by implicitly revealing to the jury that he was represented by a court-appointed attorney. The appellant contends that as an indigent, he was wrongfully subjected to ill feelings, resentment, and a general belief that those who are represented by public defenders are more likely to be guilty than those represented by retained counsel. The appellant cites no authority holding that that admission of an indigency affidavit, under the circumstances and for the purpose presented here, amounts to a violation of law. In fact, the only authority the appellant cites involves a defendant being presented to a jury in prison clothing and shackles – clearly a different scenario than the present. Furthermore, the appellant provides no support for his statements that the public is resentful of defendants represented by court-appointed counsel and automatically assume the individual is guilty. While it is clear from the record that the affidavit was used at trial, the appellant fails to show a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law or that he was unfairly prejudiced.
Next the appellant claims that admission of the Indigency Affidavit resulted in a violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. It is difficult to discern the thrust of the appellant’s argument inasmuch as he does not specify what information contained in the affidavit might have been incriminating. The appellant cites one tangentially related case and then concludes, without analysis or argument, that that case should govern here. The case cited, United States v. Hardwell is readily distinguishable from the present case. In Hardwell, the defendant was convicted of money laundering. The prosecution introduced the defendant’s financial affidavit into evidence in its case in chief as substantive evidence of the fact the defendant did not have a legitimate source of income. The lack of a legitimate source of income was a key element to the money laundering charge. The court held such use of that evidence violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Here, in contrast, the affidavit was not used as substantive evidence, but only for purposes of impeachment, and not until the appellant was testifying during the presentation of his case. The United States Supreme Court has held that such a use is proper and not in contravention of a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights. In Harris v. New York the Court held that voluntary statements made by a defendant, although later deemed inadmissible as substantive evidence by the Fifth Amendment, could be used as impeachment evidence against the defendant if he testifies. , Miranda v. Arizona bars the prosecution from making its case with statements of an accused made while in custody prior to having or effectively waiving counsel. However, it does not follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissible against an accused in the prosecution’s case in chief is barred for all purposes, provided of course that the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards. Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury. Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution here did no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process.
The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances. As a result, it is unnecessary to determine whether the evidence admitted via the Affidavit of Indigency in the present action was obtained in violation of the appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights inasmuch as the evidence here was used only for impeachment purposes.
Finally, the appellant contends that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when he was compelled to answer the questions on the Affidavit of Indigency without counsel present. Once again, it is unnecessary for us to determine whether the appellant’s right to counsel was, or was not, abridged here inasmuch as the same principle discussed in the Fifth Amendment discussion applies in the context of an alleged Sixth Amendment violation. That is, even if the evidence was unlawfully obtained because a defendant’s right to counsel was not properly observed, the evidence may still be used for impeachment purposes. The prosecution must not be allowed to build its case against a criminal defendant with evidence acquired in contravention of constitutional guarantees and their corresponding judicially created protections. But use of statements so obtained for impeachment purposes is a different matter. If a defendant exercises his right to testify on his own behalf, he assumes a reciprocal obligation to speak truthfully and accurately In the present case, because the evidence contained in the affidavit was used only for impeachment, the appellant’s claim that he was denied his right to counsel must necessarily fail.

Conclusion: The evidence in the record could reasonably support the jury’s conclusion that the appellant was the aggressor in the altercation; therefore the district court did not err when it instructed the jury regarding an aggressor’s forfeiture of his right to self-defense. Additionally, the Affidavit of Indigency was properly admitted as a prior inconsistent statement under W.R.E. 613(b), and the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the affidavit. The appellant was unable to satisfy his burden of showing that the jury was erroneously instructed on the falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus maxim, or that even if so instructed, that he was prejudiced thereby. Finally, the appellant also failed to demonstrate that the admission of the Affidavit of Indigency resulted in an abridgement of his constitutionally protected right to equal protection, his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, or his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the opinion for the court.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/yg7axs7 .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2010 WY 1

Summary of Decision issued January 4, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Budig v. State

Citation: 2010 WY 1

Docket Number: S-09-0038

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge.

Representing Appellant Budig: Harry G. Bondi of Harry G. Bondi Law Offices, PC, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Graham M Smith, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Budig challenged his conviction for third-degree sexual assault and sexual abuse of a minor. Budig asserts that his constitutionally protected right to confrontation was violated and that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of the victim witnesses.
Right to confrontation: The Court noted their summary of the limits a court may place on cross-examination in Miller v. State. In order for there to be a violation of the right of confrontation, a defendant must show more than just a denial of the ability to ask specific questions of a particular witness. A defendant’s right is not unfettered but subject to the trial court’s discretion to prevent questioning that was repetitive or of marginal relevance. The trial court held a motion hearing regarding the character evidence he intended to address during cross-examination. The Court stated that since none of the evidence was directly related to Budig, its relevance was marginal and its probative value limited. Past sexual conduct evidence falls into the class of evidence the rape shield law was specifically designed to exclude. Budig was given the opportunity to challenge the victims’ credibility, motives, and biases using other admissible evidence.
Improper vouch for credibility of victims: Budig asserted that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of the victim witnesses in statements he made during closing argument. After reviewing the record provided on appeal and particularly the trial transcripts, the Court found that the prosecutor’s comments relating the victims’ actions to the general behaviors described by the expert were not tantamount to vouching for the victims’ credibility. The statements informed the jury about the relevance of the testimony and suggested how that testimony might assist the jury in determining the facts at issue. Relating the general behaviors described by the expert witness to the specific behaviors exhibited by the victims was important to effective prosecution in the instant case because one defense strategy was to argue that the victims’ behaviors were inconsistent with the allegations made.

Conclusion: The Court held that Budig’s constitutionally protected right to confrontation was not abridged when the district court refused to allow him to question the victims about prior alleged sexual conduct or about specific instances showing the victims’ mean or manipulative character traits, which instances did not involve Budig. The prosecutor did not improperly vouch for the victims’ credibility during closing argument.

Affirmed.

J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/y8gcn4q .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 130

Summary of Decision issued October 23, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Drury v. State

Citation: 2008 WY 130

Docket Number: S-07-0250

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge.

Representing Appellant: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; John D. King, Faculty Director, Grant Curry and Jon Aimone, Student Interns of Defender Aid Program.

Representing Appellee: Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Appellant Drury was convicted by a jury of felony larceny under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402(a)(c)(i). The district court deferred judgment and sentencing until both sides could submit materials related to a mistrial motion the defense brought during Officer Brown’s testimony. The motion was denied and Judgment and Sentence entered on August 21, 2007.

Testimony Regarding Credibility: Appellant had the burden of showing that she was prejudiced by the district court’s denial of the motion for mistrial. The testimony at issue was inappropriate. Officer Brown testified about his training in interview techniques, made comments about Appellant’s credibility, his opinion of her guilt and about the credibility of other suspects he interviewed. The question was whether the error required reversal or was harmless under W.R.A.P. 9.04. It was evident from the record that defense counsel, the prosecutor and the district court all had difficulty controlling the witness. The Court considered the improper evidence in light of the trial as a whole. The Court also considered the strength of the testimony to determine whether the jury could have found differently in the absence of the improper testimony. In light of the overwhelming evidence and Appellant’s confession, the Court could not say that the jury would have found differently in the absence of improper testimony. For the same reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for mistrial.
Taped Interviews: Appellant admitted that the production of the recordings in question would have been impossible. The Court noted that the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered the question in United States v. Gomez and determined the issue was more properly one of due process to be decided under Brady v. Maryland and its progeny.
Due Process Rights: Appellant contended that her due process rights were violated when Officer Brown destroyed the recordings of Appellants’ and other witness’ interviews. A showing of bad faith is required where an appellant cannot show that the destroyed evidence had exculpatory value that would have been apparent before destruction. Appellant failed to allege that the tapes could have had exculpatory value or that Officer Brown should have been aware of that value before he destroyed the tapes. Each of the interviewed employees was interviewed at trial. Defense counsel did not question any of the witnesses about the substance of the interviews nor about the contents of the tapes. Appellant had access to the reports prepared by Officer Brown. There was no evidence that the tapes had any possible exculpatory value. Officer Brown destroyed the recordings as a part of his routine procedure.

Holding: The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s motion for a mistrial. The district court’s instructions to the jury were well-designed to mitigate any possible prejudice resulting from improper testimony. Any error in admitting the testimony was harmless in light of the compelling evidence presented against Appellant. Appellant failed to show that her due process rights were violated when tapes of witness interviews were destroyed. There was no dispute as to the content of the tapes, no showing of their having been exculpatory, and Appellant had access to all the witnesses as well as the interviewing officer and his reports of the interviews.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/65mw48 .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 124

Summary of Decision issued October 10, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Dean v. State

Citation: 2008 WY 124

Docket Number: S-08-0017

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge.

Representing Appellant Bush: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. Morgan, Senior Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny Lynn Craig, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Appellant Dean was convicted of committing a third or subsequent battery against a household member. Dean contended the district court erred in permitting an expert witness to vouch for the credibility and truthfulness (or lack thereof) of witnesses who have been victims of domestic violence (and thus, also Mrs. Dean) as well as in permitting that same expert witness to provide improper character evidence concerning Mr. Dean. The only issue raised in the appeal is whether or not the district court erred in allowing the admission of Thurin’s testimony.
A qualified expert witness may testify about scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge if such testimony will help the jury understand the case. Thurin’s testimony was relatively brief. She acknowledged that she did not know Mrs. Dean and that she was not familiar with any part of the instant case. She opined that victims of domestic abuse frequently suffer from low self-esteem and believe they need the abuser to function in their day-to-day life. On average victims will be abused seven times before they leave the relationship. Victims may be kept isolated and economically deprived. They are sometimes threatened with losing their children or finances. Thurin spoke in generalities about the “cycle of violence” and qualified her descriptions with the caveat that every relationship is different. Mr. Dean objected to questions that Thurin answered about “truth telling” by victims of abuse. The Court quoted liberally from State v. Yusuf where the court in Connecticut stated that expert testimony properly may be admitted to assist the jury in understanding not whether the victim was credible on the witness stand but whether the victim’s conduct was consistent with the pattern and profile of a battered woman. The Court also made note of the case State v. Borelli where the expert testimony was a description of battered woman’s syndrome. In Arcoren v. United States, the appellate court considered a related issue that involved a recantation by a victim. The expert in that case testified as to battered woman syndrome and again the court ruled that it was scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge that would assist the jury to understand the evidence.

Holding: Because Ms. Thurin’s expert testimony did not purport to vouch for the credibility of Mrs. Dean, nor did it impugn the character of Mr. Dean, the Court found no error requiring reversal of Mr. Dean’s conviction

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/4bu2tp

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Sumamry 2008 WY 22

Summary of Decision issued February 28, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Large v. State

Citation: 2008 WY 22

Docket Number: 06-89

Appeal from the District Court of Sweetwater County, the Honorable Jere A. Ryckman, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): D. Terry Rogers, Interim Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Ryan R. Roden, Senior Assistant Public Defender; ; and David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Public Defender.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Ms. Large appealed her conviction on one count of Conspiracy to Commit Sexual Assault in the Second Degree in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-303(a)(v) and 6-1-303(a) and two counts of Sexual Exploitation of Children, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-303(b)(ii). She contended that the trial court allowed impermissible testimony that vouched for the victim’s credibility as well as testimony that constituted improper expert opinion of her guilt. She also challenged testimony that she asserted was inadmissible hearsay.

Dr. Gibson’s Testimony: Ms. Large contended that Dr. Gibson impermissibly provided opinion testimony of her guilt and vouched for the credibility of JL. The Court determined that Dr. Gibson’s expert testimony was permissible because it related to his diagnosis. The testimony regarding JL’s statements that she was abused by Ms. Large required a two-part test. The declarant’s motive must be consistent with the purposes of promoting treatment or diagnosis and the content of the disclosure must be that reasonably relied on by the expert. The record supported that the testimony was not erroneously admitted. The testimony that Ms. Large asserted was opinion testimony of her guilt was similar to testimony they have held to be improper in other cases such as Stephens. In evaluating the testimony, the Court noted the prosecutor’s closing argument stating that Dr. Gibson said that he believed sexual abuse had occurred at the hands of Ms. Large and David Dye. The Court concluded that the challenged testimony was an improper prosecutor-elicited opinion of guilt. As a general principle the choice between the plain error standard and the error per se standard depends upon whether the error is a “structural” or a “trial” error. The trial court concluded that opinion of guilt testimony was not a structural error. That did not resolve the question of whether an error per se approach was appropriate. The Court found no proper basis for applying an error per se standard of review to prosecutor-elicited opinions of guilt. While it may be error to admit an opinion of guilt, it is trial error rather than structural error. The Court stated they would no longer treat a prosecutor-elicited opinion of guilt as error per se. To the extent this decision conflicted with the Court’s holdings in Stephens, they overruled Stephens. The Court reviewed for plain error because Ms. Large did not object to the statements at trial. Given all of the evidence introduced against Ms. Ms. Large at trial, there was no reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to her in the absence of the challenged testimony.
Ms. England’s Testimony: The Court reviewed the record and stated that Ms. England did not improperly vouch for JL’s credibility. Ms. England’s reference to JL’s lying behavior was initially brief. It was defense counsel who attempted to capitalize on what might have been considered useful impeachment material. This opened the door and the Court saw nothing improper in the prosecutor’s treatment of the issue on re-direct.
Inadmissible Hearsay: The Court noted the four elements that determine whether W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) applied. In the instant case, the declarants testified at trial, Ms. Large had the opportunity to cross-examine them, although the testimony did not precisely mirror the out-of-court statements, they were sufficient to render the testimony of the foster mother and the investigator admissible. The record showed that the prior statements were in fact offered to rebut explicit charges of improper influence.

Holding: Ms. Large was not able to establish that Dr. Gibson’s opinion of guilt testimony was prejudicial. There was no plain error in the admission of Ms. England’s testimony considering that the defense opened the door when he attempted to capitalize on what might have been useful impeachment material. The record showed the defense theory throughout the trial was that the children had been improperly influenced to make false accusations. The record established that all four elements required to apply W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) were met in the instant case, so the trial court did not violate any clear and unequivocal rule of law when it allowed the testimony.

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/3yxy3v .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]