Summary 2013 WY 33

Summary of Decision March 19, 2013


Justice Hill delivered the opinion for the Court. Affirmed.

Case Name: STEVEN A. DELOGE v. SCOTT HOMAR, LARAMIE DISTRICT ATTORNEY and CHEYENNE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Docket Number: S-12-0130

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, Honorable Michael Davis, Judge.

Representing Appellant: Steve A. DeLoge, Pro se.

Representing Appellee: Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; John D. Rossetti, Deputy Attorney General; and Patricia L. Bach, Senior Assistant Attorney General for Laramie County District Attorney’s Office; and J. Mark Stewart of Davis and Cannon, LLP, Cheyenne, WY, for Cheyenne Police Department.

Date of Decision: March 19, 2013

Facts: In 2011, Steven DeLoge filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for damages arising out of property confiscated from his home in 1999 when he was arrested and convicted on six counts of sexual assault. The district court dismissed Mr. DeLoge’s complaint as time barred, and in his fifth appearance before this Court, Mr. DeLoge appealed.

Issues: Mr. DeLoge appears pro se and presents the following issues on appeal:

Issue I: Whether the district court correctly dismissed the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint finding the claims barred by statute of limitations and failure to file governmental claims?

Issue II: Whether the district court opinion and order on motions to dismiss the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint denied [DeLoge] full and fair adjudication based on the merits of the case?

Issue III: Whether the Supreme Court should consider barring [DeLoge] from further litigation relating to this matter.

Holdings: The district court properly dismissed Mr. DeLoge’s Section 1983 complaint for damages as time barred, and the district court’s decision is therefore affirmed, and the Court direct that Mr. DeLoge be prohibited from filing any further litigation relating to the subject matter of this case in any court of the State of Wyoming without first having obtained leave of this Court to do so.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summary 2011 WY 83

Summary of Decision May 24, 2011


[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Belden v. Lampert

Citation: 2011 WY 83

Docket Number: S-10-0237

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=462291

Appeal from the District Court of Goshen County, Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): Gary Lee Belden, pro se

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Misha Westby, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: May 24, 2011

Facts: Appellant filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contending he was denied his constitutional right of access to the courts because he did not have adequate access to Wyoming legal research materials in a Nevada state correctional facility. Appellant challenges the district court’s dismissal of his suit based on a failure to state a claim.

Issues: Whether Appellant’s Complaint set forth facts sufficient to support the allegation that inadequate access to legal research materials at a Nevada prison law library caused an actual injury. Whether Appellant’s transfer to a different corrections facility five days prior to the hearing on Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss prejudiced Appellant’s ability to represent himself at the hearing.

Holdings: The fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law. An inmate alleging a denial of the right of access to the courts must demonstrate an actual injury. In the present action, Appellant’s Complaint states that the alleged inadequacies of the Nevada prison library impeded his ability to assert a claim within “time barriers in state court.” Construing the Complaint liberally, Appellant asserts that the alleged inadequacies of the Nevada prison library prevented him from filing a petition for post-conviction relief within the applicable statute of limitations. Although it is clear that the statute of limitations for post-conviction relief has long since expired, Appellant’s Complaint gives absolutely no indication that Appellant had a claim for post-conviction relief at any time. Appellant did not allege any basis upon which a petition for post-conviction relief could have been filed, and he did not allege any facts to indicate the existence of a viable claim for post-conviction relief. Wyo. Stat. 7-14-103(a) bars claims that could have been raised in a direct appeal, as well as claims that were decided on the merits or on procedural grounds “in any previous proceeding which has become final.” Without any facts to indicate that Appellant could have filed a viable petition for post-conviction relief, it cannot be determined that Appellant has been injured by the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. Accordingly, the facts set forth in Appellant’s Complaint, when viewed in the light most favorable to him, do not allege an actual injury. Furthermore, Appellant was able to file at least five petitions seeking relief from his conviction while he was an inmate at the Nevada state prison, and he was represented by court-appointed counsel in at least one of those actions. Those petitions were reviewed at length and were denied on the merits. Appellant’s ability to conduct this volume of legal activity provides further indication that he retained meaningful access to the courts.

Appellant’s second issue concerns his transfer to a different corrections facility shortly before the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss. Because this issue was raised for the first time on appeal, it was not addressed.

Affirmed.



J. Burke delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2010 WY 12

Summary of Decision issued February 9, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Boyer-Gladden v. Deputy Sheriff Hill

Citation: 2010 WY 12

Docket Number: S-09-0102

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge.

Representing Appellant Boyer-Gladden: Bernie Q. Phelan, The Phelan Law Firm, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee Hill: Kay Lynn Bestol of Sundahl, Powers, Kapp & Martin, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee Glick: Nancy D. Freudenthal and Mark Stewart of Davis & Cannon, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming; Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Theodore R. Racines, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Boyer-Gladden claimed that while she was a pretrial detainee in the Laramie County Detention Facility, she was sexually assaulted by a detention deputy.

WGCA claim: The sexual assault occurred on Nov. 9, 2004. Boyer-Gladden’s claim was presented to Laramie County on June 15, 2006, well within the two-year period mandated by § 1-39-113(a). Boyer-Gladden filed her complaint in district court on Dec. 22, 2006 but the deputy was not served until Oct. 5, 2007. Consequently, the suit was not commenced within the one-year statutory period. The state law tort claims against the deputy under WGCA were time-barred.
State law tort claim (Hill): The district court initially denied the deputy’s motion for summary judgment on this claim on the ground that sexual assault was outside the deputy’s scope of duties. After the Krenning decision, the district court reconsidered and granted summary judgment finding that Boyer-Gladden consistently pled and argued that the deputy was acting within the course and scope of his duties and that the WGCA was applicable. The Court found that decision to be correct as it applied to the only state law tort claim appealed (for intentional infliction of emotional distress.) The statute of limitations governing WGCA was correctly applied. Both this case and Krenning are concerned with what was pled rather than what was done.
Federal civil rights claim (Hill): The Court concluded that the § 1983 claim against the deputy was made in his personal capacity rather than his official capacity. Therefore, the summary judgment granted to the deputy on the claim was reversed because it was based upon the district court’s conclusion that there was no evidence the deputy had violated a custom or policy of the county or the sheriff’s office. Such evidence is not required to show a personal-capacity violation of § 1983.
State law tort claims (Glick): There was no evidence in the record that the sheriff, within the scope of his own duties negligently hired or supervised the deputy, or failed to enact reasonable rules for the protection of inmates. In fact, the only evidence in regard to the accusations was that sexual contact between detention deputies and inmates violated the rules of the sheriff’s office, that the deputy had been trained under those rules, and that the sheriff had no knowledge of the deputy’s conduct until after the fact and that the sheriff immediately suspended and then terminated the deputy’s employment. Neither the sheriff nor the county was liable for the tortuous conduct of the deputy because that conduct did not occur within the deputy’s scope of duties and neither the sheriff nor the county was liable for the conduct of the sheriff even though within the scope of his duties, because his conduct was not tortuous.
Federal civil rights claim (Glick): Boyer-Gladden’s § 1983 action against the sheriff was in his official capacity. A governmental entity cannot be held liable solely on a theory of respondeat superior. A governmental entity may only be liable in quite particular circumstances. The plaintiff must demonstrate that through its deliberate conduct the municipality was the “moving force” behind the injury alleged. The sheriff was sued in his official capacity and there was no evidence that a custom or policy of the county or of the sheriff played any part in the alleged violation of Boyer-Gladden’s civil rights.

Conclusion: The Court affirmed the ruling of the district court, with the exception of the summary judgment granted on the § 1983 personal–capacity action, and the Court remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

J. Kite specially concurring, joined by J. Burke: The Justices wrote to address an issue raised by footnote 3 regarding whether failure to comply with the statute of limitations contained in § 1-39-114 deprived the court of jurisdiction. Such an analysis was unnecessary in the instant case because Boyer-Gladden’s claim was barred by her failure to file within one year of the filing of her claim as provided in § 1-39-114.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/yc9tb3o .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2007 WY 188

Summary of Decision issued December 4, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Layland v. Stevens

Citation: 2007 WY 188

Docket Number: S-07-0046

Appeal from the District court of Laramie County, the Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): Robert T. Moxley of Robert T. Moxley, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Christine Cox, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Thomas W. Rumpke, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Cox.

Issue: Whether Deputy Stevens was entitled to qualified immunity from suit for constitutional violations allegedly arising out of Mr. Layland’s arrest.

Facts/Discussion: Layland was arrested and charged with kidnapping and witness intimidation. He filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Stevens alleging various civil rights violations. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment and after a hearing the district court granted Stevens’ motion and dismissed the case.
Standard of Review: The issue the Court found determinative was whether qualified immunity barred Layland’s claims against Stevens. The presence or absence of qualified immunity is a question of law the Court reviews de novo.
Qualified immunity shields public officials from suit on § 1983 civil rights claims when they are performing discretionary functions unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” To avoid that defense, Layland was required to show that Stevens’ arrest of him without a warrant violated his Fourth Amendment right and that the contours of that right were sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would have understood his actions violated the right. In concluding that Laylands’ rights were not violated, the district court relied on U.S. v. Little. The factors for determining whether a person has been illegally seized include: the threatening presence of several officers; the brandishing of a weapon; physical touching; aggressive language; retention of the person’s personal belongings by an officer; a request to accompany the officer to the police station; the absence of other members of the public; and whether the interaction occured in a nonpublic, small or enclosed space. The district court applied the factors and concluded that Layland failed to show that he had a clearly established right not to be arrested. On that basis they concluded Stevens was entitled to qualified immunity.
The Court used a different analysis stating that controlling precedent makes it clear that qualified immunity shielded Stevens from suit for damages if a reasonable officer could have believed Layland’s arrest was lawful in light of established law and the information Stevens possessed. Even if Stevens was mistaken in concluding that probable cause existed, he nevertheless was entitled to qualified immunity if his decision was reasonable.
Layland relied on Payton v. New York and Mickelson v. State asserting that he did not consent to the entry and that no exigent circumstances existed justifying his arrest without a warrant. The Court noted that the United States Supreme Court has not extended the rule in Payton to premises other than a private home. According to the record, Layland’s shop was neither a place of business nor his private residence. In addition, the evidence presented did not establish a lack of consent as it clearly did in Mickelson.

Holding: Under the facts presented the Court concluded as a matter of law that a reasonable officer could have concluded he had consent to enter the building to question Layland and probable cause to arrest him without a warrant.

Affirmed.

J. Kite delivered the opinion.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2etdha .