Summary 2013 WY 45

Summary of Decision April 17, 2013

Justice Voigt delivered the opinion for the Court. Affirmed.

Case Name: MEGAN B. GOLDEN, f/k/a MEGAN B. GUION v. TODD A. GUION

Docket Number: S-12-0196

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Sheridan County, Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge.

Representing Appellant: Megan B. Golden, pro se.

Representing Appellee: Robert W. Brown and Amanda K. Roberts of Lonabaugh & Riggs, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming.

Date of Decision: April 17, 2013

Facts: The appellant, Megan B. Golden (Wife), appealed the district court’s order regarding the distribution of property following the divorce of the appellant and her former husband, the Appellee, Todd A. Guion (Husband). Wife argued that the district court abused its discretion when it divided property contrary to the evidence presented at the trial and when it failed to consider the financial condition in which the parties were left after the divorce. Husband claims that Wife’s brief is riddled with procedural errors, with the fatal error being the omission of the trial transcript from the record.

Issue: Did the district court abuse its discretion when it divided the property as it did in the divorce decree?

Holdings: Wife failed to comply with W.R.A.P 3.02(b) by failing to provide this Court with a transcript of the district court proceedings. Because this Court could not review the evidence, they could not find that the district court abused its discretion in how it divided the parties’ property. Further, because there was no transcript in the record, the Court could not certify that there was reasonable cause to bring this appeal and awarded reasonable costs and attorney’s fees to Husband pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.5

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summary 2011 WY 94

Summary of Decision June 16, 2011


[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Allen v. Anderson

Citation: 2011 WY 94

Docket Number: S-10-0215

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=462903

Appeal from the District Court of Park County, Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Matthew D. Winslow of Keegan & Winslow, Cody, Wyoming

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Alex H. Sitz III of Meinecke & Sitz, Cody, Wyoming

Date of Decision: June 16, 2011

Facts: Appellee and Appellant were involved in a long-term, non-marital relationship. Upon separation, the parties agreed that each should have ownership of personal property in their respective possession. Appellant alleges that Appellee wrongly took some of his personal property into her possession. The district court determined that Appellent failed to claim the personal property at issue in a timely fashion and thus effectively abandoned his claim to it.

Issues: Whether the District Court erred in applying the incorrect legal standard when it held that Appellant abandoned the subject personal property. Whether the District Court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous when it held that Appellant abandoned the subject personal property.

Holdings: The solution to this appeal actually lies entirely in the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement. A settlement agreement is a contract and, therefore, subject to the same legal principles that apply to any contract. The settlement agreement unambiguously awards ownership of these items to Appellee. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Appellee was awarded the real property on which the loafing shed housing the personal property is situated. All items of personal property on the land, including the items in the loafing shed, came into Appellee’s possession as incident to the ownership of the real property. Since the settlement agreement also grants Appellee ownership of all items of personal property in her possession, the items in the loafing shed became her property.

The fact that the personal property at issue was not itemized does not make the settlement agreement silent on the issue. The settlement agreement clearly states its purpose is to settle the matter of ownership of all items of personal property. The parties were granted all personal property in their respective possession. No personal property falling within this category was itemized. Instead, the parties itemized items that were in the other’s possession or in joint possession that they wanted. As Appellant recognized in refusing to allow Appellee to have items of personal property in his possession that she had forgotten to itemize, he is not entitled to any items in Appellee’s possession that he forgot to itemize.

All personal property on the land therefore was in Appellee’s possession and granted to her under the terms of the settlement agreement. Affirmed.

J. Golden delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2011 WY 59

Summary of Decision April 12, 2011

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Wunsch v. Pickering

Citation: 2011 WU 59

Docket Number: S-10-0004

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=461954

Appeal from the District Court of Teton County, Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): Matthew Giacomini and Andrew Reid, Springer and Steinberg, Denver, Colorado.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Lea Kuvinka, Kuvinka & Kuvinka, Jackson, Wyoming.

Date of Decision: April 12, 2011

Facts: The district court resolved a dispute between the parties concerning an amount of money Appellant owed Appellee pursuant to the provisions of their divorce settlement agreement regarding the distribution of fees from the financial services business they had operated and Appellant continued to operate.

Issues: Whether the district court abused its discretion by issuing an order compelling Appellant to produce documents that were irrelevant or not in his possession, custody, or control. After the district court entered default against Appellant as a sanction for failing to produce the documents as ordered, whether the district court erred as a matter of law by restricting Appellant’s participation in the subsequent hearing on damages. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s award of damages.

Holdings: WRE 401 provides that relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” If the account information sought by Appellee indicated that clients formerly invested in the parties’ joint accounts had moved those investments through Appellant’s individual account, that would tend to make it more probable that those joint accounts had been replaced and pursuant to the settlement agreement Appellee would be owed one half of the fees. To the extent the information related only to Appellant’s individual clients, that would tend to make it less probable that those accounts had been replaced. The district court could reasonably determine that the documents sought by Appellee were relevant. “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery.” W.R.C.P. 26(b)(1). The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the order to compel the production of these documents.

Appellant’s objection that the documents were not in his possession, custody, or control is unsupported by facts in the record. Although Appellant did not have client commission statements requested, he could have obtained copies from the parent company of his business. As to the tax records, it appears that Appellant did produce all of the requested information except for the tax returns and 1099 Forms for 2008. Appellant repeatedly represented that the 2008 tax returns were still being prepared, and so were not yet in existence. He asserted that his 1099 Forms for 2008 were unavailable for the same reason. From a practical standpoint, the assertion that the 1099 Forms for 2008 were still unavailable as of September 30, 2009, seems untenable. Moreover, in one hearing, Appellant’s counsel stated that “The 1099 for 2008 has been ordered and should be here,” another admission that the document was not beyond Appellant’s control.

After careful review of the record, it was not unreasonable for the district court to conclude that the documents requested by Appellee through discovery were relevant and within Appellant’s possession, custody, or control. It was not an abuse of discretion to issue an order compelling Appellant to produce the disputed documents.

Appellant claims that, during the hearing held on damages, the district court denied his right to participate in the proceedings by improperly prohibiting him from presenting evidence relating to the damages he owed Appellee. He asserts that the district court erred as a matter of law in restricting his participation in the hearing, and because this raises a question of law, it must be reviewed de novo. However, the record reflects that Appellant was afforded an opportunity to participate in the damages hearing, and that he did participate. The real basis of his complaint is that the district court excluded most of the evidence he sought to introduce at that hearing.

Because the effect of the entry of default was to establish that the disputed accounts had been replaced, evidence offered by Appellant to show that the accounts had not been replaced was irrelevant. Because the entry of default decided the issue of whether the accounts had been replaced, and decided it against Appellant, any evidence suggesting that the accounts had not been replaced was irrelevant, and the district court did not err in excluding it.

As with the previous issue, Appellant’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s award of damages is based on a misconception of the effect of the entry of default against him. The default judgment amounted to a ruling that the inactive accounts had all been replaced by Appellant and Appellee would have been owed a portion of the fees for those accounts. Appellee was no longer required to prove that any of the accounts had been replaced. She merely had to prove what her damages were if all the accounts had been replaced. The calculation of the amount of fees Appellee would have been owed was done by the Administrator/Accountant who had been appointed during mediation to perform the accounting required under the settlement agreement for the purpose of establishing the “projected amount” Appellee would be owed if the accounts were all replaced. After the district court entered default establishing, in effect, that all the accounts were replaced, this evidence was sufficient to prove Appellee’s damages.

Affirmed.



J. Burke delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2011 WY 41

Summary of Decision March 9, 2011

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Walters v. Walters

Citation: 2011 WY 41

Docket Number: S-09-1052, S-10-0059

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=461804

Appeal from the District Court of Larame County, Honorable Michael K. Davis, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): Kristin Shaun Wilkerson of Trent & Wilkerson Law Office, Laramie, Wyoming

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Mary T. Parsons of Parsons & Cameron, Cheyenne, Wyoming

Date of Decision: March 9, 2011

Facts: The two appeals consolidated for decision in this opinion arise out of the divorce litigation between Appellant and Appellee. In appeal No. S-09-0152, Appellant challenges the district court’s property distribution set forth in the Judgment and Decree of Divorce. In appeal No. S-10-0059, Appellant appeals from the district court’s order in the post-divorce proceeding that found her in civil contempt and imposed sanctions.

Issues: Appeal No. S-09-0152

Whether the district court abused its discretion, commit serious procedural error and/or violate a principle of law by finding Appellant in contempt. Whether the district court abuse its discretion by punishing Appellant through its distribution of property. Whether the district court’s division of marital property was clearly erroneous, against the great weight of evidence, and/or otherwise not supported by substantial evidence.


Holdings: The record is clear that Appellant violated a court order in this case. The Court entered a mutual restraining order which would have prevented either party from expending substantial funds of the marital estate without a further order of the Court. Despite this order, Appellant used funds to build a home after it was entered. Appellant never asked the Court to authorize the expenditures. It has therefore been proven by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant willfully violated a court order and is in contempt of court. The district court did not explicitly impose a punishment or sanction on Appellant, but rather explicitly reserved sanctions “which may be imposed in the event of failure to comply with any of the divorce decree’s conditions.” Thus the district court did not punish her contemptuous conduct by awarding certain undisclosed property to Appellee in the division of marital property. Appellant is unable to indicate what property was awarded to him as punishment. The district court has considerable discretion to form a distributive scheme appropriate to the peculiar circumstances of the individual case including the respective merits and credibility of the parties. Both parties presented evidence about the origin and value of the marital property in question and the district court properly considered that evidence in making the property division. A review of the record shows that that the district court could reasonably conclude as it did when dividing the property and that it is equitable from the perspective of the overall distribution of marital assets and liabilities.

The Judgment and Decree of Divorce is affirmed.


Issues: Appeal No. S-10-0059

Whether Appellee proved that Appellant violated court orders issued in the divorce proceedings. Whether the district court abused its discretion, committed procedural error, or violated a principle of law by finding Appellant in civil contempt of court and awarding compensatory damages of $10,000.00.


Holdings: Having heard the testimony and considered the evidence concerning the alleged violations the district court concluded that the Appellee had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant willfully failed to return the property and documents that she had been ordered to return to Appellee in the divorce decree. The district court was in the best position to assess the witnesses’ credibility and weigh their testimony. A review of the entire record shows that the district court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous. However, no evidence of Appellee’s actual losses was presented and, absent that, the sum of $10,000 awarded to him is speculative and arbitrary and, reluctantly, cannot stand. Consequently, the award is reversed.

J. Golden delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2011 WY 30

Summary of Decision February 23, 2011

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Olsen v. Olsen

Citation: 2011 WY 30

Docket Number: S-10-0121

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=461775

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, Honorable Thomas T.C. Campbell, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): Carl S. Olsen, pro se.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Candy M. Olsen, pro se.

Date of Decision: February 23, 2011

Facts: In this divorce action, the district court granted custody of the parties’ children to Appellee divided the parties’ property, ordered their real property be sold to pay a debt to Appellee’s mother and granted a judgment in favor of Appellee’s mother for any deficiency remaining after the proceeds of the sale were applied to the debt.

Issues: Whether the court rushed to conclusions or decisions based upon assumptions of which there are not sufficient facts or evidence to support; whether the judge did not recuse himself for bias. Whether the court allowed an incomplete Financial Affidavit by one party, but complained of the other party’s Financial Affidavit; whether it was contrary to law for a court to assign who will claim minor children as dependants on federal income taxes without a waiver of release; whether it was contrary to the law to dismiss admissions and other documents merely because they were filed pro se; whether the court considered improper testimony: both testimony that was not given under oath and testimony that was hearsay; whether any and all debts incurred by the Appellee, without the explicit consent and/or agreement of the Appellant, are her liability alone and the Appellant should not be held liable for such debts, as per Wyoming Statute; whether the
adequately considered the applicable factors in deciding who should have physical custody of the children.


Holdings: On the questions relating to the propriety of the district court’s factual and evidentiary determinations, the problem with Appellant’s argument is that he did not provide a transcript of the trial or a statement of the evidence in accordance with W.R.A.P. 3.03. Because Appellant of this failure, the Court must accept that the district court’s findings were supported by sufficient evidence and its evidentiary rulings were not erroneous. Consequently, the district court’s rulings on those issues are summarily affirmed.

Federal law does not preempt Wyoming courts from allocating the dependent tax credit in the same manner they allocate other marital assets in divorce proceedings. As such, the district court was within its authority when it ruled that Wife was entitled to the credit. In order to avoid a contempt finding, Appellant is required to execute the forms required by the Internal Revenue Service.
The district court has the authority and responsibility to dispose of the parties’ assets and liabilities. As part of that task, the district court can order sale of the real property to facilitate the division of assets and payment of debt. Because there is an inadequate record on appeal, there is no basis for the Court to review the district court’s rulings that the parties owed a debt to Appellee’s mother, the parties are each responsible for one half of the debt, and the property should be sold to pay the debt.

However, The district court’s ruling that Appellee’s mother was entitled to a judgment against each party for any deficiency remaining after the proceeds of the sale are applied to the debt is another matter. The district court granted a judgment to a nonparty. The authority of the court in a divorce action to divide property is simply ancillary to its authority to dissolve the marriage. The primary subject of a divorce action is the dissolution of the marriage, and the only proper parties to such an action are the spouses seeking to be divorced. Thus, Appellee’s mother was not an appropriate party in the divorce action; consequently, the district court committed an error of law by granting a judgment in her favor. On remand, the district court should revise its order to delete the judgment in favor of Appellee’s mother.

Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.



C.J. Kite delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2010 WY 78

Summary of Decision issued June 15, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Sanning v. Sanning

Citation: 2010 WY 78

Docket Number: S-09-0202

Appeal from the District Court of Albany County, the Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge.

Representing Lee Sanning: C.M. Aron of Aron & Hennig, LLP, Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing Jamison Sanning: Devon P. O’Connell of Pence and MacMillan LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: The district court awarded a cabin to Jamison (Wife) as part of the property distribution incorporated into the parties’ divorce decree. Lee (Husband) claimed the district court abused its discretion by relying upon sentimental value to award the cabin to Wife and the court’s factual findings regarding the cabin were not supported by the trial evidence.
Wife’s grandparents owned a cabin located on state land adjacent to Priest Lake in Idaho. When grandparents were in their eighties they decided to dispose of the cabin because it had become too expensive and difficult to maintain. The Sannings purchased it for $50,000 using money from Husband’s family. When the Sannings filed for divorce they could not agree on the distribution of the marital property. Husband claimed the district court improperly awarded the cabin based upon sentimental value. He argued that Broyles v. Broyles prohibited consideration of sentimental value in awarding property. Although Broyles states that sentimental value may not typically be used to establish damages for property wrongfully converted, it does not state that sentimental value cannot be considered in awarding property in a divorce case. In Wallop v. Wallop, the Court reviewed a property distribution that included awarding the husband a ranch that had belonged to his family for many years. Similarly, in the instant case, the district court considered the statutory factors when it awarded the cabin to Wife.

Conclusion: The district court specifically stated that it was considering the statutory factors and there was nothing in the record to indicate otherwise. Under these circumstances, the award of the cabin to Wife does not shock the conscience of the Court nor appear to be so unfair and inequitable that reasonable people cannot abide it. The district court properly exercised its discretion when it awarded the cabin to Wife, on the condition that she reimburses Husband for the money gifted by his family to purchase the cabin.

Affirmed.

J. Kite delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2fdww2k .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance using the Universal Citation format, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 140

Summary of Decision Issued November 12, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Zaloudek v. Zaloudek

Citation: 2009 WY 140

Docket Number: S-09-0016

Appeal from the District Court of Unita County, Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): William L. Combs, Combs Law Office, Evanston, Wyoming

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Richard J. Mulligan, Mulligan Law Office, Jackson, Wyoming; Heather Noble, Jackson, Wyoming

Issues: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in its divorce decree ordering an equitable division of the property.

Holdings: While the divorce was pending, Appellee sought permission from the district court to take some of the hay stored at the Evanston property to feed the two horses she was keeping. Appellant objected. After a hearing held by telephone, the district court denied Appellee’s request for permission to take the hay but, instead, ordered Appellant to pay for hay to be purchased from another source. Appellant filed a motion asking the district court to reconsider its ruling, claiming that the payment of money was relief that had not been sought by Appellee, and that the parties had presented no testimony or other evidence during the hearing to support the order. The district court apparently chose to deny Appellant’s motion to reconsider and, instead, issued the written order that had been prepared and submitted by Appellee. On appeal, Appellant claims that the district court’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, unsupported by the evidence, and contrary to law. The record does not support that assertion. In the motion, Appellee sought alternative forms of relief. First, she asked for permission to remove hay from the property. Alternatively, she requested payment for the costs of boarding the horses. The relief granted by the district court falls within this alternative request. Appellant had notice of this claim for relief and there was no error in the district court’s consideration of this issue.

In granting a divorce, the court shall make such disposition of the property of the parties as appears just and equitable, having regard for the respective merits of the parties and the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the party through whom the property was acquired and the burdens imposed upon the property for the benefit of either party and children. The district court has discretion to determine what weight should be given each of these individual factors, and to divide the property as appropriate to the individual circumstances of each case. The justness and fairness of a marital property division cannot be gauged with a simple comparison of the amount of property awarded to each party. Rather, the disposition should be performed with regard to the respective merits of the parties, the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the party through whom the property was acquired, and the burdens imposed upon the property for the benefit of either party.

Although one statutory factor to be considered in dividing property in a divorce is the party through whom the property was acquired, a party is not automatically entitled to all of that property. Under Wyoming law, all marital property is subject to equitable division upon divorce. In the present action, Appellant was not entitled to a larger portion of the couple’s retirement assets just because he had earned more money than Appellee.

Appellant also asserts that some of the retirement assets were acquired before the marriage, and therefore not part of the marital estate. This argument has merit, but the difficulty is that neither party provided any evidence of the value of the retirement assets at that earlier date. The record suggests that the parties were unsuccessful in obtaining this evidence, even though subpoenas were issued to the asset managers. Without evidence of the value of the retirement assets at the earlier date, the district court had no basis for excluding the pre-marital portion from division. The district court’s refusal to speculate was not unreasonable, and was not an abuse of discretion.

The divorce decree in the present action reflects that the district court considered the statutory factors. It found that “most of the assets have been acquired during the marriage and . . . that those assets have appreciated during the marriage.” The court determined that “an equitable distribution merits an equal distribution of the parties’ assets and liabilities.” It further found that “an equal division of the parties’ assets would adequately allow each party to have sufficient income with which to support his or her individual living expenses.” These findings and conclusions are sufficiently supported by the evidence of record, and are not so unfair or inequitable as to constitute an abuse of discretion.

Appellant also asserts that the district court did not follow proper procedure when it entered the divorce decree. He complains that the district court adopted the proposed divorce decree submitted by Appellee, without allowing Appellant an opportunity to approve the order as to form or to assert any objections. Appellant claims that this violated W.R.C.P. 58(a). W.R.C.P. 58(a) is the procedure used when the judge orally announces a decision and asks one of the parties, usually the prevailing party, to draft an order reflecting that decision. In the present action, the district court did not announce a decision at the end of the trial, and did not ask one of the parties to submit an order. Instead, it directed both parties to submit proposed divorce decrees. Both parties did so. In this way, the district court was reminded or made aware of the positions, arguments, and objections of both parties. Thus, there was no violation of W.R.C.P. 58(a).

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the opinion for the court.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/yavp38u .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 134

Summary of Decision issued November 6, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Pond v. Pond

Citation: 2009 WY 134

Docket Number: S-08-0253

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Dwight F. Hurich, Hurich Law Office, Gillette, Wyoming

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Rex O. Arney and Vincent P. Schutte of Brown, Drew & Massey, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming

Issues: Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in making an equitable division of the assets and debts of the parties, when the Trial Court provided the marital estate should be equalized but then failed to consider the debts each party would take.
Holdings: The disposition of marital property is committed to the sound discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of that discretion. Abuse of discretion occurs only when the disposition shocks the conscience of the Court and appears so unfair and inequitable that reasonable persons could not abide it.

Dividing a marital estate is not necessarily a mechanical process but rather is guided by considering the factors in Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-114 (2009). The district court has the discretion to determine what weight should be given each of these individual factors and to form a distributive scheme appropriate to the peculiar circumstances of each individual case. The goal of marital property division is to reach an equitable result.

In the instant appeal, Appellant contends that, by using the term “equalize,” the district court intended both parties to receive roughly equivalent dollar amounts from the division of the marital estate. In Wyoming, the distribution of a marital estate is equalized within the context of the respective equities of the parties. In other words, in a divorce proceeding a district court is required to divide property equitably, not necessarily monetarily equally. Indeed, a just and equitable distribution is as likely as not to be monetarily unequal. There is nothing in the record or the district court’s final order to support Appellant’s assumption that the district court intended to order a 50/50 monetary split. Specifically, there is no evidence that the district court failed to take into account the debts of the parties in reaching its final distributive scheme. At trial, Appellant introduced an exhibit representing the marital debts. The district court, in its final order, expressly accepted the exhibit as accurately reflecting the debts. The final order explicitly divided the debt between the parties as the district court determined equitable. The district court then ordered Appellant to pay Wife to equalize the “marital estate,” not just the marital assets. It is extremely doubtful the district court neglected to take the marital debt into account in its decision when the final order so thoroughly discusses the debt. Since all existing indicators point to the district court’s final order “equalizing” the marital estate with both the assets and the liabilities in mind, when it used the term “equalize,” the district court intended to divide the property equitably but not equally.

While Husband’s appellate argument is marginal, as is his compliance with the rules, the appeal is not so egregious as to merit sanctions.

Appellant has failed to establish that the district court erred in dividing the marital estate. The district court’s division of the marital estate, even if not equal, is equitable. The decision of district court is affirmed. Sanctions will not be imposed on the Appellant.

Affirmed.

J. Golden delivered the decision of the Court.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/yapokem .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 41

Summary of Decision issued March 19, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Forbis v. Forbis

Citation: 2009 WY 41

Docket Number: S-08-0063

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge.

Representing Appellant Forbis: Mitchell E. Osborn, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee Forbis: Matthew H. Romsa, John M. Kuker and James M. Peterson or Romsa & Kuker, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: Wife sought review of the district court’s divorce decree which ended her marriage to Husband. Wife asserted error in the district court’s division of the marital property. When the district court announced its decision from the bench on the division of the marital property, it awarded to Wife her premarital home, the parties’ interest in J & F Investments, LLC, the Crestliner boat, and two vehicles. To Husband, the court awarded the marital home, his premarital home, TD Real Estate, LLC, and two vehicles. Two days later, the district court sent a letter notifying the parties that it had erred in its oral pronouncement concerning the Cestliner boat stating that it had intended to award the boat to Husband instead of Wife.
The Court’s review of the record did not reveal evidence supporting Wife’s claim that the district court’s decision to award the boat to Husband was premised on a mistake concerning marital assets. The record reflected the district court misstated its intention regarding the boat in announcing its decision from the bench. The district court was not bound by its oral pronouncement and may modify its decision regarding marital assets until entry of the divorce decree.
Wife faulted the district court for not awarding her a judgment against Husband for $16,000 in premarital funds. However, she failed to identify any factual or legal grounds on which her claim was based.
Husband requested attorney fees and costs for having to defend what he claimed was a frivolous appeal. Sanctions under Rule 10.05 are not generally available on an appeal that challenges a trial court’s discretionary ruling.

Conclusion: The Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s allocation of the parties’ marital property.

Affirmed.

J. Golden delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/dh7vmw .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 94

Summary of Decision issued August 14, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Burnett v. Steeley

Citation: 2008 WY 94

Docket Number: S-07-0225; S-08-0051

Appeal from the District Court of Platte County, the Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge.

Representing Appellant: Jared S. Crecelius of Bailey, Stock & Harmon PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: William L. Hiser of Brown & Hiser, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: Following divorce proceedings, the district court entered a judgment requiring Burnett (Husband) to pay Steeley (Wife) the amount of $417,609 in cash or property by April 1, 2006. Burnett did not pay or make any effort to pay the judgment by the date due. The district court entered another order requiring Burnett to pay the amount owed to Steeley in cash. The court entered an order awarding Steeley attorney’s fees and costs.
Authority to Order Payment in Cash: The judgment was to be paid by April1, 2006. It was not paid and Burnett’s initial offer to transfer property involved parcels to which he did not have clear title. Burnett’s subsequent offers of property appeared to have included provisions or complications making acceptance by Steeley impossible or at least difficult in light of her financial situation and her out of state residence. Once the judgment became final, Steeley had the legal right to proceed with enforcement. The district court had the discretion to determine the manner in which to enforce the judgment including the discretion to order Burnett to pay the unsatisfied amount in cash.
Order of Interest Deemed Proper: Burnett claimed the district court erred in ordering him to pay interest on the judgment after May 1, 2007, the date when he offered to convey property by warranty deed to Steeley in satisfaction of the judgment. He contended that Steeley’s rejection of his offer tolled the accrual of statutory interest. The words “until paid” as used in § 1-16-102(a) do not require the payment of a judgment amount to be made and accepted by the prevailing party to toll the accrual of statutory interest. By paying the judgment to the district court, i.e. surrendering control to the court, the defendant has “paid” the judgment amount and stopped the accrual. Burnett did not pay the judgment amount to the district court. Depositing quitclaim deeds for property to which he did not have clear title did not constitute “payment” such as would stop the accrual of interest, nor did his offer to convey property by warranty deed upon receipt of $43,000 from Steeley.
Attorney’s Fees: On appeal of an award of attorney’s fees, the burden is on the party attacking the district court’s ruling to show an abuse of discretion, and the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did. Upon consideration of the motions, affidavits and the arguments of counsel, the district court entered an order granting Steeley’s attorney’s fees motion. Given the evidence presented, Burnett did not meet his burden of showing an abuse of discretion.

Holding: After Burnett failed to satisfy the 2006 judgment, the district court had the authority to enforce it by ordering him to pay the unsatisfied amount in cash. They district court also properly ordered Burnett to pay statutory interest on the amount owing from the date it entered the judgment until it was paid. The court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded attorney’s fees Steeley incurred in enforcing the 2006 judgment.

Affirmed.

J. Kite delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/63ngv7 .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 14

Summary of Decision issued February 8, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Crayk, F/K/A/ Glover v. Glover

Citation: 2008 WY 14

Docket Number: S-07-0095

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Thomas T.C. Campbell, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): John J. Metzke, Hirst & Applegate, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Donald A. Cole, Cole & Cole, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: Crayk sought review of a district court order amending her original decree of divorce.
The amended decree was intended to comply with the USFSPA which requires an order to specifically provide for the payment of an amount expressed in dollars or as a percentage of disposable retired pay. The order from the district court appeared to award a percentage of the military retirement in question but it also included language about a fixed monthly payment. It contained two conflicting provisions. The Court was unable to reconcile the two provisions or to determine the intent of the district court.

Holding: The original order did not specifically address the COLA issue. The district court must make a determination as to which approach, “percentage” or “fixed dollar” was intended by the original decree. The amended decree is also at odds with the USFSPA which requires that the award be expressed as either a percentage or a fixed dollar amount. This award did both creating an ambiguity. The amended decree fails to accomplish the intended goal of creating a USFSPA-complaint order.

Reversed and remanded.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2jyrqx .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2007 WY 180

Summary of Decision issued November 13, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Richard v. Richard

Citation: 2007 WY 180

Docket Number: S-07-0038

Appeal from the District Court of Teton County, the Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): William R. Fix and Jenna V. Mandraccia of William R. Fix, PC, Jackson, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Lea Kuvinka of Kuvinka & Kuvinka, PC, Jackson, Wyoming.

Issues: Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied the Husband’s Motion to Vacate and Reset Hearing. Whether the district court erred in denying Husband’s Rule 60(b) motion.

Facts/Discussion: Husband sought review of an order of the district court that denied his motion for relief from the decree of divorce entered by the district court.
Denial of Motion for Continuance: The trial court has broad discretion in granting or denying a motion for continuance, and absent a manifest abuse of discretion, the reviewing court will not disturb such a ruling. Husband relied on Abraham where the Court held it was an abuse of discretion and a denial of due process to hold a hearing on a motion for summary judgment before the deadline for discovery had passed. The circumstances of Husband’s case differ from Abraham. The Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for continuance.
Denial of Rule 60(b) Motion: The district court’s order stated only that the motion was denied. Husband contended that the district court’s reliance on Section 17 of the agreement was misplaced. The Court noted that the district court may be affirmed on any valid basis appearing in the record. Husband’s assertion of error evaporated completely when the documentation in the record was taken into consideration. Courts favor property settlement agreements. The Court examined the settlement agreement entered into by the parties prior to their divorce. The parties acknowledged as a part of the agreement that it was fair and just and the evidence in the record bore that out.

Holding: The district court did not err in denying Husband’s motion for a continuance nor did the district court err in denying Husband’s Rule 60(b) motion.

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the opinion.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2qo6he .

Summary 2007 WY 114

Summary of Decision issued July 23, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Dowlin v. Dowlin

Citation: 2007 WY 114

Docket Number: 06-245

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, the Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): Steve C. M. Aron and Galen Bruce Woelk, of Aron and Hennig, LLP, Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): William L. Hiser, of Brown & Hiser, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

Issue: Whether the district court erred in concluding that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-402 and W.R.C.P. 60(b) do not create a tort duty that, if breached, gives rise to an independent cause of action for damages.

Facts/Discussion: Lori Ann Walker (Walker, f/k/a Lori Ann Dowlin) filed a civil suit against her former husband, Charles Dowlin (Dowlin), requesting damages for “Fraud on the Court” allegedly committed during divorce proceedings. Her challenge was rooted in her contention that W.R.C.P. 60(b) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-401 establish a tort duty that was breached by Dowlin. Walker cited McCulloh v. Drake. The Court stated that in McCulloh, their holding was that the tort claim should be heard separately from the divorce. It did not suggest that the Court should recognize the new tort cause of action urged by Walker.
The Court then turned their attention to cases from other jurisdictions that Walker suggested supported her claim. They stated there was a wealth of authority from other jurisdictions that contradicted her claim. In addition, all of the cases she cited demonstrated that the appropriate remedy for alleged fraudulent conduct is to set aside the judgment, whether in the same or a different proceeding. The Court specifically noted MacArthur v. Miltich in which the Court held that once the time to file a motion had expired, the plaintiff was required to proceed in an independent action to set aside the judgment. The common thread through the cases was that the remedy provided was setting aside the judgment, not an award of damages.
Walker also argued the Court should follow the decision in Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, where the plaintiffs in an independent fraud suit alleged that the defendant failed to produce all documents requested during a prior suit’s discovery process. This failure to disclose allegedly induced the plaintiffs to settle for less than they otherwise could have negotiated. Apparently, Walker overlooked the subsequent history which held that plaintiff’s action was not one at law but was instead equitable in nature. Cresswell supports the Court’s conclusion that Walker’s only appropriate remedy was relief from the original divorce court judgment.
The Court stated they were troubled by Walker’s position that she was entitled to bring a tort claim to recover compensatory damages based on a property division in a divorce. Walker wished to have a jury in her tort proceeding decide the fundamentally equitable issue of dividing property in a divorce which would improperly remove the question from the judge’s hands where it belongs. To allow such a tort claim would allow a jury to become a de facto appellate court reviewing the divorce court’s decision. The Court stated they were aware of no legal principle that would allow or justify such an approach. The Court stated their decision was also supported by their policy of the finality of judgments.
Walker knew of some of the alleged fraudulent behaviors at the time of the divorce hearing because she filed her first complaint before the divorce trial. She filed her amended complaint between the time the divorce court issued its decision letter and the final divorce decree. The Court does not allow litigants to “sit on” useful information in one proceeding in order to collaterally attack the result in a subsequent action.

Holding: Both W.R.C.P. 60(b) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-401 provide a remedy to a litigant alleging that a judgment has been obtained fraudulently. The litigant may seek relief from the judgment in the form of modification or revocation of that judgment. For reasons that are not clear from the record, Walker chose not to seek that relief. Instead she sought an award of damages from a jury. There is no language in the rule or the statute that establishes a duty giving rise to a tort cause of action for damages, nor do any cases from Wyoming or other jurisdictions support the result she desires.

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2mtoxd .

Summary 2007 WY 72

Summary of Decision issued April 30, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Humphrey v. Humphrey

Citation: 2007 WY 72

Docket Number: 06-155

Appeal from the District Court of Teton County, the Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): W. Keith Goody of Alpine, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Lea Kuvinka of Kuvinka & Kuvinka, PC, Jackson, Wyoming.

Issues: Whether the district court erred when it valued Husband’s expectancy interest in the Humphrey Family Limited Partnership (FLP) at $578,000 and found that the interest should be taken into consideration in the division of property. Whether the district court erred when it found that the FLP was marital property, even though the Partnership was organized by Husband’s father as an estate planning device.

Facts/Discussion: Husband challenged a division of property ordered by the district court in his divorce when it considered the value of Husband’s interest in a family business for purposes of dividing property.
Standard of Review: The division of property is within the trial court’s sound discretion and the Court will not disturb the division absent an abuse of discretion.
Husband used the Court’s decisions in Dunham v. Dunham and Storm v. Storm for the proposition that the property at issue was merely an expectancy that could not be divided. The Court responded the cases had no bearing on the instant appeal. In this case, Husband currently owned the FLP interest thus there was no question regarding whether he would gain the interest in the future. His parent’s intent that the FLP and the LLC be considered estate planning devices also had no bearing on the issue because a current transfer of the property was made not a future revocable bequest.
The Court considered next whether the district court erred when it included the value of Husband’s interest as marital property. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114 guides a district court’s distribution of property in conjunction with a divorce. The Court referred to Wallop v. Wallop stating the trial court must consider the respective merits of the parties, the condition in which they will be left by the decree, the party through whom the property was acquired and the burdens imposed on the property for the benefit of either party and children. The district court acknowledged Husband individually owned the interest in FLP and also examined other facts and circumstances of the marriage. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined the value of husband’s interest should be considered in formulating an equitable property distribution. The Court noted that in Breitenstine v. Breitenstine the district court considered gifts and an inheritance received by husband during marriage when determining the division of property.

Holding: The district court did not abuse its discretion in considering the value of Husband’s FLP interest when dividing the marital assets.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2sgxr3 .