Summary 2013 WY 101

Summary of Decision August 28, 2013

Justice Hill delivered the opinion for the Court. Affirmed

Case Name: ZYGMUNT JOHN SAMIEC v. SUSAN KAY FERMELIA, f/k/a SUSAN KAY SAMIEC

Docket Number: S-12-0269

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Sweetwater County the Honorable Nena James, Judge

Representing Appellant: Jon Aimone of Lemich Law Center, Rock Springs, WY

Representing Appellee: Eric F. Phillips, Rock Springs, WY

Date of Decision: August 28, 2013

Facts: Father challenges an order interpreting divorce decree provisions that govern payment of counseling and medical expenses for the parties’ children.

Issues: On a stipulated case, did the District Court err in answering a question which it had not been asked to answer? Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it denied Fathers’ Motion for Continuance to allow the presentation of evidence on the question, which the District Court answered but had not been asked to answer?

Holdings: Affirmed.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summary 2013 WY 29

Summary of Decision March 13, 2013

Justice Hill delivered the opinion for the Court. Affirmed.

Case Name: KENNETH JAMES HUCKFELDT v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Docket Number: S-12-0183

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Sweetwater County, Honorable Nena James, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff/Defendant): W. Keith Goody, Cougar, WA.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff/Defendant): Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; Theodore R. Racines, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Darrell D. Jackson, Prosecution Assistance Clinic, Emily N. Thomas, Student Director; and Adrianna J. Potts, Student Intern. Argument by Mr. Racines.

Date of Decision: March 13, 2013

Facts: A jury convicted Kenneth Huckfeldt of sexual assault in the first degree and sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree. Huckfeldt appeals the district court’s denial of a continuance motion and the court’s admission of uncharged misconduct evidence of his prior conviction for sexual assault of a minor.

Issues: Huckfeldt presents the following issues for our review:

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Huckfeldt’s motion for continuance of the trial due to a missing witness and was it mistaken when it found that the public defender did not use due diligence?

Did the district court abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence testimony of the victim that resulted in a prior conviction of Mr. Huckfeldt for sexual assault?

Holdings: The Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Huckfeldt’s continuance motion or its admission of uncharged misconduct evidence. Affirmed.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summary 2010 WY 56

Summary of Decision issued April 28, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: M&M Auto Outlet v. Hill Investment Corp.

Citation: 2010 WY 56

Docket Number: S-09-0160

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge.

Representing Appellant M&M: Stephen R. Winship of Winship & Winship, PC, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee Hill: Richard D. Bush, David Evans and John A. Coppede of Hickey & Evans, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: M&M and Hill, doing business as First Financial, Inc. (FFI) entered into a contract in which FFI agreed to purchase vehicle loans from M&M and perform collection activities on the loans at its expense. In the event an M&M customer became delinquent on a loan, the contract provided that M&M would pay FFI the “full recourse amount.” Alleging that M&M failed to pay the full recourse amount on delinquent loans in accordance with the contract, FFI filed a complaint for breach of contract.

Meaning of the contract: From the four corners of the agreement, it was clear the parties intended the agreement to be a full recourse agreement in which FFI would purchase from M&M the loans M&M made to its customers, M&M’s customers would then make payments on the loans directly to FFI and FFI, at its expense, was responsible for collection activities, except for repossession expenses. The disagreement concerns the lengths to which FFI was required to go in collecting payments, and that is something the agreement did not address. If M&M desired FFI’s collection efforts to include specific activities, it was free to incorporate the terms in the agreement.
Alleged Breach by FFI: M&M claimed it was excused from performing under the agreement because FFI breached the agreement when it failed to perform its collection activities in good faith. The agreement unambiguously provided that FFI was entitled to full recourse from M&M in cases where its collection activities proved unsuccessful. Because the parties’ business relationship spanned several years and both parties were experienced in the used car financing business, the Court was unwilling to infer that duties existed absent clear language in the contract or evidence indicating that was the parties’ intent at the time the agreement was executed.
Mitigation of damages: The contract clearly stated that in the event FFI was unsuccessful in collecting the amounts due, it was entitled to full recourse as expressly defined in the agreement. The agreement did not require FFI to repossess the vehicles as part of its collection activities. For the Court to conclude so would have imposed a duty on FFI that the contract did not require.
Sufficiency of the evidence to support summary judgment: W.R.C.P. 56(e) requires an affidavit be made on personal knowledge; set forth facts which are admissible in evidence; demonstrate the affiant’s competency to testify on the subject matter of the affidavit; and have attached to it the papers and documents to which it refers. Shaw, FFI’s general manager, attached a summary identifying the problem accounts, the date recourse was declared, buyback amount, accrued interest and the total due. The affidavit also included the full recourse program agreement and a list of the designated accounts he provided to M&M. W.R.E. 1006 provides that writings which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a summary as long as the party makes the documents available for exam and copying by the opposing party. There was no contention that FFI did not make the actual documents available to M&M.
Prematurity of summary judgment: M&M asserted the summary judgment was premature because discovery had not been completed. On the same day as the summary judgment hearing, M&M signed a withdrawal of its motion to compel discovery stating that FFI had satisfactorily amended its discovery responses. Given that M&M stated it was satisfied with the discovery responses, the Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of the motion for continuance.

Conclusion: M&M could have, but did not include specific collection activities in the contract with FFI. The Court declined to rewrite the agreement under the circumstances of the instant case. The agreement unambiguously provided that FFI was entitled to full recourse from M&M in cases where its collection activities proved unsuccessful. The agreement did not require FFI to repossess vehicles. The affidavit and documents provided for the motion for summary judgment were sufficient. M&M’s argument that discovery was not complete and so its motion for continuance should have been granted was not borne out by the record.

Affirmed.

J. Kite delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2ao9n7l .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance using the Universal Citation format, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 131

Summary of Decision issued November 10, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Wunsch v. Pickering

Citation: 2008 WY 131

Docket Number: S-07-0039

Appeal from the District Court of Teton County, the Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge.

Representing Appellant Wunsch: Colin M. Simpson of Simpson, Kepler & Edwards, LLC, the Cody, Wyoming division of Burg Simpson Eldredge Hersh and Jardine, PC.

Representing Appellee Pickering: Lea Kuvinka of Kuvinka & Kuvinka, PC, Jackson, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: James and Kelly Wunsch (n/k/a Pickering) were joint owners and operators of a financial services business. In their divorce proceedings, they executed a property settlement agreement which was later fully incorporated into their divorce decree. The agreement included a provision that they would share equally fees earned on joint client accounts, and that if Mr. Wunsch replaced any such account, then they would share equally fees on the replaced account until such time as Kelly had received in fees an amount equal to two times the annual earnings on the amount replaced.
At the time of their divorce, the parties engaged in extended negotiations to achieve a settlement agreement. Section 22 treated the division of the Wunsch Financial business and business assets. The section was copied in its entirety to the opinion.

Denial of Motion for Continuance: The district court heard argument on and denied Mr. Wunsch’s motion for continuance and no record of the hearing was made. The day following the motion hearing, the district court conducted the hearing on the issue of Section 22.A interpretation. The district court stated the provision was clear and unambiguous and should be enforced according to its terms. Mrs. Wunsch was to receive two times the annual earnings on any amounts replaced from the “SAM” accounts.
The Court reviewed the record of the proceedings and stated they could not say that the district court’s decision agreeing with Mrs. Wunsch against the motion was so arbitrary as to deny Mr. Wunsch due process. The transcript of the hearing at which the Section 22.A interpretation was contested revealed that Mr. Wunsch’s counsel fully, capably, and zealously presented Mr. Wunsch’s position on that issue.
Interpretation of Section 22.A of the Agreement: The Court applies the standards of contract construction to construe divorce property settlement agreements. The question of whether the contract is unambiguous is a question of law. The contract’s meaning is also a question of law. The standards of construction include: in reading a contract the Court’s primary purpose is to determine the true intent and understanding of the parties at the time and place the contract was made; the Court considers the contract as a whole; the Court strives to avoid a construction which renders a provision meaningless; if the Court identifies an ambiguous term or portion of the contract, it strives to ascertain the meaning from the contract as a whole; and the parties’ intention is what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would conclude the manifestations to mean. When the Court applied the standards to the instant case, they found Mrs. Wunsch’s position that in the agreement the parties specifically stated how each item of property would be divided, sold or otherwise disposed of, more persuasive.

Holding: The Court considered the parties’ arguments in light of its standards of contract construction. The language of the agreement was unambiguous in stating that if Mr. Wunsch replaced any of the joint client accounts, the parties would share equally the fees on the replaced accounts until such time as Mrs. Wunsch had received in fees an amount equal to two times the annual earnings on the amount replaced. The Court rejected Mr. Wunsch’s construction of the agreement because it defied the plain meaning of the agreement and would rewrite a critical word in the key sentence of Section 22.A.

Affirmed.

J. Golden delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/6c4kgp .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2007 WY 202

Summary of Decision issued December 18, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Dunsmore v. Dunsmore

Citation: 2007 WY 202

Docket Number: 06-263

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Mitchell E. Osborn, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Phillip White, Jr., Laramie, Wyoming.

Issues: Whether the district court abused its discretion by rescinding the order allowing Father’s witnesses to testify by telephone at the time of trial (thereby excluding witnesses and evidence regarding the methamphetamine use of Mother and the exposure of the parties’ minor child to the drug). Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Father’s motion for a continuance after the Court rescinded its order allowing his witnesses to testify by telephone. Whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to keep the record open in order for Father to submit deposition testimony form the witnesses that were not allowed to testify by telephone.

Facts/Discussion: Father seeks review of a decree divorcing him from Mother contending the district court erred when it rescinded its Order Allowing Telephonic Testimony, denied Father’s Motion to Continue, and denied Father’s request to keep the record open so that Father could present deposition testimony.
Standard of Review: The Court will not overturn a decision of the trial court unless they are convinced that it constitutes an abuse of discretion or violates some legal principle.
Telephonic Testimony: In Wyoming, telephonic testimony is allowed in limited circumstances as stated in W.R.C.P. Rule 43(a). The court signed the order allowing telephonic testimony and later they rescinded it after considering Mother’s objection. Taking into consideration both attorneys’ arguments, the court’s commentary, and the resulting hearing from the record, the Court held that the district court could reasonably have reached the conclusion to rescind the order.
Motion to Continue: The granting of a continuance is among those matters within the trial judge’s discretion. The matter had been pending for quite some time in district court. The Court noted their decision in Byrd v. Mahaffey where they stated that a continuance will be granted only upon good cause and will deny a continuance where the problem which gives rise to the request is the fault of the movant. In the instant case, the record reflected the conflicts were due to Father keeping his son against court order, that at least one continuance had been granted due to scheduling conflicts and that his motion for telephonic testimony was filed only 5 days before trial.
Keeping the Record Open: The issue was presented without cogent argument or citation to pertinent authority. The Court did not consider the issue because Father failed to comply with appellate rules.

Holding: The Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rescinding the order to allow witnesses to testify telephonically or by denying Father’s Motion to Continue. The Court did not give substantive consideration to Father’s subsequent request to keep the record open because it was not supported by cogent argument or pertinent authority.

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the opinion.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2h4cfr .

Summary 2007 WY 180

Summary of Decision issued November 13, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Richard v. Richard

Citation: 2007 WY 180

Docket Number: S-07-0038

Appeal from the District Court of Teton County, the Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): William R. Fix and Jenna V. Mandraccia of William R. Fix, PC, Jackson, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Lea Kuvinka of Kuvinka & Kuvinka, PC, Jackson, Wyoming.

Issues: Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied the Husband’s Motion to Vacate and Reset Hearing. Whether the district court erred in denying Husband’s Rule 60(b) motion.

Facts/Discussion: Husband sought review of an order of the district court that denied his motion for relief from the decree of divorce entered by the district court.
Denial of Motion for Continuance: The trial court has broad discretion in granting or denying a motion for continuance, and absent a manifest abuse of discretion, the reviewing court will not disturb such a ruling. Husband relied on Abraham where the Court held it was an abuse of discretion and a denial of due process to hold a hearing on a motion for summary judgment before the deadline for discovery had passed. The circumstances of Husband’s case differ from Abraham. The Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for continuance.
Denial of Rule 60(b) Motion: The district court’s order stated only that the motion was denied. Husband contended that the district court’s reliance on Section 17 of the agreement was misplaced. The Court noted that the district court may be affirmed on any valid basis appearing in the record. Husband’s assertion of error evaporated completely when the documentation in the record was taken into consideration. Courts favor property settlement agreements. The Court examined the settlement agreement entered into by the parties prior to their divorce. The parties acknowledged as a part of the agreement that it was fair and just and the evidence in the record bore that out.

Holding: The district court did not err in denying Husband’s motion for a continuance nor did the district court err in denying Husband’s Rule 60(b) motion.

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the opinion.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2qo6he .