Showing posts with label promissory estoppel. Show all posts
Showing posts with label promissory estoppel. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 14, 2014

Summary 2014 WY 4

Summary of Decision January 14, 2014

Justice Hill delivered the opinion for the Court. Affirmed.

Case Name: CURTIS F. SYMONS v. WAYNE R. HEATON and TIMOTHY S. TARVER, Co Administrators of the Estate of Gary L. Plachek

Docket Number: S-13-0082

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Sheridan County the Honorable Robert E. Skar, Judge

Representing Appellant: H. W. Rasmussen, Sheridan, WY.

Representing Appellee: Timothy S. Tarver, Sheridan, WY.

Date of Decision: January 14, 2014

Facts: After Gary Plachek died intestate, leaving an estate worth approximately $300,000.00, his friend and caretaker Appellant Curtis Symons (Symons) filed a claim against the estate in the amount of $259,200.00. Symons sought compensation for the care and services that he provided to Plachek during the last nine years of Plachek’s life. After the co-administrators denied Symons’ claim, Symons brought an action against them. The district court disposed of the action upon a motion for summary judgment by the estate, and this appeal followed.

Issues: Symons states his issues as follows: The trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Symons’ claim based on an implied-in-fact contract. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Symons’ implied-in-law contract claims.

Holdings: We affirm the district court’s order finding no question of material fact existed and that Symons failed as a matter of law on his claims for implied-in-fact contract, promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Thursday, September 19, 2013

Summary 2013 WY 105

Summary of Decision September 13, 2013

Justice Voigt delivered the opinion for the Court. Affirmed.

Case Name: JEFFREY BARNES and SHERRIE BARNES v. MELISSA COONEY, VAL
PENDLETON, and COLDWELL BANKER COUNTRY ESTATES

Docket Number: S-13-0024

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Lincoln County the Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

Representing Appellant: William R. Fix, William R. Fix, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: Matthew E. Turner, Mullikin, Larson & Swift LLC, Jackson, Wyoming.

Date of Decision: September 13, 2013

Facts: The appellants purchased a home in Lincoln County, Wyoming. Dissatisfied with some aspects of the construction and purchase of the home, the appellants sued a development company, the building contractor, the real estate agency involved in the transaction, a real estate agent, and, eventually, the real estate broker. The appellants alleged breach of contract, breach of express warranty, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, fraud in the inducement, professional malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence. The defendants, some of whom are now the appellees in this appeal, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which motion was granted by the district court. This appeal followed.

Holdings: We will summarily affirm the district court’s ruling because the appellant’s brief fails in all respects to meet the requirements of W.R.A.P. 7.01(e)(2) and (f). The brief contains a statement of the standard of review, along with lengthy deposition excerpts. Beyond that, however, it is void of any factual analysis, cogent legal argument, or citation to pertinent authority that might enlighten this Court as to how the appellants were damaged by any conduct of the appellees. In addition to summarily affirming the district court, this Court will also, pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05, certify that there exists no discernible cause for this appeal, and will impose costs and attorney’s fees against the appellants, in favor of the appellees consistent with that rule. The appellees shall file an appropriate certificate of costs and attorney’s fees within fifteen days from the publication of this opinion. The resolution of this case in this manner should come as no surprise. This Court has a long history of rejecting deficient briefs and imposing sanctions where appropriate. Affirmed.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Monday, March 21, 2011

Summary 2011 WY 50

Summary of Decision March 21, 2011

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Orthopedics of Jackson Hole, P.C. v. Ford

Citation: 2011 WY 50

Docket Number: S-09-0136

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=461833

Appeal from the District Court of Fremont County, The Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Gary R. Scott of Hirst Applegate, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Paul J. Hickey and O’Kelley H. Pearson of Hickey & Evans, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming; and Joel M. Vincent of Vincent & Vincent, Riverton, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Vincent.

Date of Decision: March 21, 2011

Facts: Appellant is a professional organization founded by five orthopedic surgeons in 1998. Appellee is an orthopedic surgeon who joined the organization in 2000, at which time he received one share of stock. In 2005, Appellee left the professional organization. The parties could not agree on the value of the one share of stock, prompting Appellee to commence the instant legal action. Appellee brought a petition for a declaratory judgment as to the value of the stock as well as other causes of action. Appellant counterclaimed that in leaving at the time he did, Appellee breached his fiduciary duty to the organization. Appellant also brought a promissory estoppel counterclaim against, asserting it incurred extra costs based on an alleged promise by Appellee, made in 2004, to continue working for Appellant for five to ten years. After a bench trial, the district court accepted the valuation of the stock as presented by Appellee. The district court also denied all Appellant’s counterclaims.

Issues: 1) Whether the trial court erred when it found that Appellee signed a 1998 shareholder’s agreement, and thus that it was that agreement that was the relevant agreement for purposes of valuing Appellee’s one share of Appellant’s stock; 2) Whether the trial court erred when it then reformed the 1998 shareholder’s agreement and failed to apply the valuation formula contained in that agreement; 3) Whether the trial court erred when it failed to apply the valuation formula agreed to by Appellee in a shareholders’ meeting in August 2003; 4) Whether the trial court erred when it denied Appellant’s Motion in Limine, and allowed Appellee on the eve of trial to change the theory of his case as to the relevant valuation formula; 5) Whether the trial court erred when it found that Appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence its counterclaims for promissory estoppel and breach of fiduciary duty.

Holdings: The Court reversed the district court’s decision as to the valuation of the stock and remanded for further proceedings on the issue. The district court had reasoned that neither the 2003 Formula nor the 2005 Agreement applied because they were not unanimously adopted, as required by the terms of the original 1998 Agreement. Although legally technically correct, the conclusion was improper because it went beyond the issues presented by the parties, who, in their pleadings and all pretrial proceedings, agreed the language of the 2003 Formula would govern the valuation in the context of this litigation. The Court further found the legal and factual evidence in the record was sufficient to determine the proper value of the stock, which was the amount accepted by the appellee at trial.

As to the Appellant’s counterclaims, the Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the counterclaims. On the issue of promissory estoppel, the Court found that Appellant failed to meet its burden of proving, under the strict standard of proof required, that it acted in reliance on the appellee’s statement. Specifically the Court found no evidence that Appellant, through the actions of its shareholders, entered into a fifteen year lease because of the Appellee’s stated intention to continue practicing five to ten years.

As to the issue of a breach of fiduciary duty, framed as a claim in the context of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-16-830(a), the Court found the statute did not apply to the current situation, had nothing to do with Appellee’s statutory corporate responsibilities because Appellee resigned as an employee, and that Appellee exercised good faith under the circumstances.

In summary, the court reversed the district court’s decision as to the valuation of the stock and remanded for further proceedings on the issue. However, the district court was correct in denying Appellant’s claims for promissory estoppel and breach of fiduciary duty, and that part of the judgment was affirmed.

J. Golden delivered the opinion for the court.

Friday, July 02, 2010

Summary 2010 WY 89

Summary of Decision issued June 29, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Harper v. Fidelity & Guaranty Life Ins. Co.

Citation: 2010 WY 89

Docket Number: S-09-0119

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge.

Representing Harper: Stephen R. Winship of Winship & Winship, PC, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing Fidelity: Julie Nye Tiedeken of McKellar, Tiedeken & Scoggins, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: Mr. Harper, husband of Gail Harper, bought a life insurance policy and died within two months of doing so. Fidelity refused to pay the claim because they insisted that Mr. Harper misrepresented/omitted the state of his health in the claim application.

Materiality: Mrs. Harper contested the district court’s finding that there was no issue of material fact as to whether Fidelity properly rescinded Mr. Harper’s insurance policy. Mrs. Harper argued that a representation or omission in an insurance application is material if knowledge or ignorance of it would naturally influence the judgment of the insurer in making the contract, or in estimating the character of the risk or setting the premium thus making it a question for the jury to decide. Materiality is determined by asking whether reasonably careful and intelligent persons would have regarded the omitted facts as substantially increasing the chances of the events insured against so as to cause a rejection of the application or different conditions, such as higher premiums. Mr. Harper’s omissions were material. He did not disclose several health conditions on his application. Even though there were material misrepresentations, summary judgment was appropriate because they were of such a nature that there was no dispute to the materiality. Thus, there were no genuine issues of material fact and Fidelity was entitled to summary judgment.
Duty to investigate: Mrs. Harper argued that Fidelity had a duty to further investigate Mr. Harper’s answers on his application. An insurer has no duty to investigate the truthfulness of an applicant’s responses unless it has notice that those responses might not be truthful or accurate. Mr. Harper represented in his application that the statements were complete, true and correctly recorded. Based upon the law and Mr. Harper’s assertions, Fidelity was under no duty to investigate.
Promissory estoppel: Harper was clearly not the picture of health and although he may have applied to another life insurance company there was nothing in the record apart from his wife’s assertions which suggested another company would have insured him.
Good faith and fair dealing: Fidelity rescinded the policy of insurance because it determined after obtaining an opinion from the chief underwriter that there were material misrepresentations, omissions, and incorrect statements made on the application which if they had been known at the time would have caused the application to have been rejected. There is no question of material fact that § 26-15-109 allows rescission under those circumstances.
Reasonable expectations doctrine: The Court failed to see how any claim would exist under the doctrine of reasonable expectations because Mr. Harper was advised that the information in the application would be relied upon in issuing the insurance. The policy contained a contestability clause and Mr. Harper verified the answers with his signature.

Conclusion: There is no issue of material fact as to whether Fidelity properly rescinded Mr. Harper’s insurance policy. His application contained omissions and misrepresentations and summary judgment is appropriate where the misrepresentations are of such a nature that there can be no dispute as to its materiality. An insurer is under no duty to investigate the truthfulness of an applicant’s responses unless it has notice that those responses might not be truthful or accurate. There was no basis to conclude that the equities in this instance required the insurance contract be enforced under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing was not breached and no claim existed under the doctrine of reasonable expectations.

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/24l8lh3 .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance using the Universal Citation format, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Tuesday, June 09, 2009

Summary 20009 WY 75

Summary of Decision issued June 8, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Wagner v. Reuter

Citation: 2009 WY 75

Docket Number: S-08-0142

Appeal from the District Court of Washakie County, the Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge.

Representing Appellant Wagner: David M. Clark of Worrall & Greear, PC, Worland, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee Reuter: Mary Helen Reed of McCarty, Reed and Earhart, LC, Cody, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: Wagner sued the Reuters to recover the value of field work allegedly performed on a farm purchased by the Reuters, asserting claims of breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment and to recover damages for the Reuters’ alleged conversion of irrigation tubes owned by Wagner.

Field work: The Court agreed that the promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment claims were precluded by the existence of an enforceable contract. By the contractual language, the Reuters obligated themselves to pay for the completed field work. The amount due was to be settled outside the contract. It was irrefutable the provision was breached. The district court erred in its determination that the contract was not breached. The issue of damages was still pending.
Irrigation tubes: Wagner did not meet all five of the elements necessary to establish a claim for conversion. He left the irrigation tubes in question on the farm after the contractual deadline for removal. Later the Reuters used some of them thinking Wagner no longer wanted them. When contacted by Wagner, the Reuters immediately surrendered the tubes on his demand.
Award of costs: Having determined that summary judgment on the breach of contract claim was improper, the Court concluded that no basis existed for an award of costs to the Reuters.

Conclusion: The Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the claims of promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment and conversion. It reversed the grant of summary judgment on Wagner’s breach of contract claim and remanded for further proceedings on the claim. Because the case was remanded, the award of costs was vacated.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, remanded.

J. Golden delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/nfee4m .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Friday, December 21, 2007

Summary 2007 WY 185

Summary of Decision issued November 16, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Baker v. Ayres and Baker Pole and Post, Inc.

Citation: 2007 WY 185

Docket Number: 06-260

Appeal from the District Court of Uinta County, the Honorable Denis L. Sanderson, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): Clark D. Stith, Rock Springs, Wyoming.

Representing Appellees (Defendants): Ford T. Bussart, Rock Springs, Wyoming.

Issues: Whether the district court erred by invoking promissory estoppel to defeat enforcement of a contract based upon pre-contract formation events. Whether the district court erred in imposing a constructive trust.

Facts/Discussion: This was a dispute over the proceeds of an insurance policy on the life of the late Alvin Baker. His widow, Appellant, contended that the district court misapplied claims of promissory estoppel and constructive trust when it awarded the insurance proceeds to Appellees.
Standard of Review:
In reviewing a judgment in which the trial court has set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court reviews the conclusions of law de novo. The Court reviews findings of fact for clear error.
Promissory Estoppel:
The trial court’s findings regarding Mr. Baker’s agreements prior to the 1993 Stock Purchase Agreement do not support the promissory estoppel claim asserted by the Appellees, and there is no evidence of any subsequent agreement. Having failed to establish the existence of a clear and definitive agreement, the first element of promissory estoppel, Appellees did not sustain that claim.
Constructive Trust:
A constructive trust is an equitable remedy imposed to compel a person who unfairly holds a property interest to hold that property in trust for the person for whom, in equity and good conscience, it should be held. Unjust enrichment occurs when a party receives something of value without payment, which was accepted and used so as to unjustly enrich the recipient of the goods or services. To determine whether Appellant was unjustly enriched, the Court stated it was necessary to determine who paid the insurance premiums. The Court reviewed the record of the trial court regarding the payment of the insurance premiums. They were paid by Mr. Baker and not the Company therefore Appellant did not receive something of value without paying for it and was not unjustly enriched. Having failed to prove unjust enrichment, Appellees could not sustain their constructive trust claim.
The Court also questioned whether the equities in the case favored any of the parties. Neither Mr. Baker nor Mr. Ayres transferred their life insurance policy to the Company, or named the Company as beneficiary. It was not readily apparent that equity should enforce an obligation against the Bakers that the Ayres also failed to meet.

Remaining Issues:
The Court stated it was unnecessary to resolve the evidentiary issues raised by Appellant because the evidence did not support the claims of the Appellees. The findings also failed to support claims of promissory estoppel and constructive trust.
Ms. Baker requested the trial court reinstate its previous judgment in favor of her. The record suggests it was not vacated or otherwise disturbed. The Court stated the trial court was in a better position to make that determination and may do so on remand. The Court also left the question of attorney’s fees for Appellant to the trial court.

Holding: The trial court’s findings regarding agreements made prior to the Stock Purchase Agreement did not support the promissory estopppel claim. Appellees failed to prove unjust enrichment so their claim of constructive trust failed. The Court reversed the judgment in favor of the Company and the Ayres and remanded to the trial court for entry of judgment in favor of Ms. Baker and for additional proceedings as may be needed to resolve the dispute.

Reversed and remanded.

J. Burke delivered the opinion.

J. Kite dissenting: The Justice did not agree that the district court’s findings failed to support the promissory estoppel claim. She would have held that a promissory estoppel claim based upon a prior agreement between two partners comprising a partnership was cognizable despite a later agreement between the soon to be shareholders to incorporate the partnership.
She stated the present case involved two agreements – the first between two partners in which they agreed to purchase insurance naming the partnership as beneficiary and the second between four corporate stockholders in which they agreed the corporation would procure insurance proceeds of which would be used to fund the buy/sell provision of the stock purchase agreement. She would hold that the existence of the 1993 stock purchase agreement did not extinguish a promissory estoppel claim based on the prior partnership agreement.
The Justice also disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the district court erred in imposing a constructive trust. In her view, Ms. Baker received something of value without payment and was unjustly enriched when she received both the insurance proceeds and the payment for the value of the Baker’s corporate shares.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/34ooek .

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