Showing posts with label foreclosure. Show all posts
Showing posts with label foreclosure. Show all posts

Thursday, August 01, 2013

Summary 2013 WY 77

Summary of Decision June 21, 2013

Justice Burke delivered the opinion for the Court. Affirmed.

Case Name: ORO MANAGEMENT, LLC v. R.C. MINERAL & ROCK, LLC

Docket Number: S-12-0223

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Fremont County, Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff/Defendant): William L. Miller, Miller and Fasse, P.C., Riverton, Wyoming

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff/Defendant): Joel M. Vincent, Vincent and Vincent, Riverton, Wyoming

Date of Decision: June 21, 2013

Facts: Appellant, ORO Management, LLC, (“ORO”) filed suit against Appellee, R.C. Mineral & Rock, LLC (“R.C.”), seeking to set aside a foreclosure sale. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of R.C. ORO challenges that decision in this appeal. ORO contends that summary judgment was improper because R.C. failed to provide sufficient notice of its intent to foreclose, and because a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to whether the published notice of foreclosure accurately stated the amount due under the loan.

Issues: ORO presents a single issue for our review: Did the district court [err] in granting the Defendant/Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment?

Holdings: The district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of R.C. is affirmed.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Thursday, September 13, 2012

Summary 2012 WY 116

Summary of Decision September 5, 2012

Justice Golden delivered the opinion for the Court. Affirmed.

Case Name: MARK D. BRODERICK v. WYO CENTRAL FEDERAL CREDIT UNION        
Docket Number: S-12-0021


Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, Honorable Catherine E. Wilking, Judge.

Representing Appellant: Stephen R. Winship of Winship & Winship, P.C., Casper, Wyoming

Representing Appellee: Thomas M. Hogan, Attorney at Law, Casper, Wyoming

Date of Decision: September 5, 2012
Facts: In 2005, the Wyo Central Federal Credit Union (Credit Union) filed an action in state district court against Mark Broderick (Broderick) seeking judgment and foreclosure on a note and mortgage on which Broderick had defaulted.  Broderick immediately filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, which stayed the Credit Union’s state court action.   Following the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceedings, which cured Broderick’s original default under the note and mortgage but did not discharge the debt, Broderick again defaulted on the note.  In 2010, the Credit Union amended its original complaint and again sought judgment and foreclosure on its note and mortgage.  The district court granted the Credit Union summary judgment both on the amount the Credit Union demanded as due and owing under the note and on the attorney fees and costs it requested pursuant to the mortgage enforcement terms.  Affirmed.

Issues:  Broderick presents the following issues on appeal, all of them relating to the award of attorney fees and costs:

1.         Whether the determination by a state court of an oversecured creditor’s attorney fees incurred in a bankruptcy proceeding is subject to the Preemption Doctrine?

2.         Whether Appellee should be denied its attorney fees by its failure to submit these fees to the Bankruptcy Court for approval?

3.         Whether Appellee proved its damages with a reasonable degree of certainty?
 
Holdings: The district court acted within its discretion in its award of fees and costs to the Credit Union, and its order did not violate bankruptcy law or procedure.  Affirmed.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Thursday, February 23, 2012

Summary 2012 WY 24


Summary of Decision February 23, 2012

[SPECIAL NOTE:  This opinion uses the "Universal Citation."  It was given an "official" citation when it was issued.  You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation.  You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered.  When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number.  The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance] 

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: REDCO CONSTRUCTION, a Wyoming Corporation v. PROFILE PROPERTIES, LLC, a Wyoming LLC.

Citation:  2012 WY 24

Docket Number: S-10-0255


Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Michael K. Davis, Judge.

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Justin Kallal of Justin Kallal, PC, Jackson, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Raymond W. Martin of Sundahl, Powers, Kapp & Martin, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Date of Decision: February 23, 2012

Facts: This case is a lien foreclosure case involving a landlord, a tenant and a contractor. Profile Properties, LLC (Profile) leased commercial real property to Clean Start, LLC (Clean Start).  Clean Start sought to renovate the property to convert it from office space to a commercial laundry facility.  Profile granted Clean Start permission to renovate the property on the condition that Clean Start would pay for the renovations, and Clean Start thereafter contracted with Redco Construction (Redco) to perform the work.  When Clean Start defaulted on its payments to Redco, Redco filed a lien against Profile’s property.

Redco thereafter filed a complaint against Profile and Clean Start, alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel, and seeking to foreclose on its lien against Profile’s real property.  The district court interpreted Wyoming’s lien statutes to allow a lien against a landlord’s real property for the debt of a tenant under two circumstances: 1) if the landlord agreed to pay for the improvements to the property; or 2) if the tenant was acting as the landlord’s agent in contracting for the improvements.  It then granted Profile’s motion for summary judgment finding that Profile did not agree to pay for the renovations to the property and that Clean Start was not acting as Profile’s agent in contracting for the improvements.

Issues:  Redco presents the following single issue on appeal: Did the trial court err as a matter of law by finding that for a valid mechanic’s lien to exist for improvements placed upon the landlord’s property by the tenant, “specifically authorized” as used in W.S. 29-2-105(a)(ii), requires the finding of something akin to an agency relationship between the landlord and tenant and granting summary judgment to the Defendant?

Holdings: The Court found that the district court correctly interpreted Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 29-2-105(a)(ii) to require a finding of agency between the landlord and tenant before a mechanic’s lien may attach to the landlord’s property for work performed at the tenant’s behest.  In this case, that relationship did not exist.  The decision of the district court was affirmed.

Justice Golden delivered the opinion for the court.



Friday, July 08, 2011

Summary 2011 WY 106

Summary of Decision July 8, 2011


[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Elk Ridge Lodge, Inc. v. Sonnett

Citation: 2011 WY 106

Docket Number: S-10-0191, S-10-0192

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=463902

Appeal from the District Court of Sublette County, Honorable Marvin L. Tyler, Judge

Representing Elk Ridge Lodge (Plaintiff/ Third-Party Defendant): Larry B. Jones and William L. Simpson, Burg, Simpson, Eldredge, Hersh & Jardine, Cody, Wyoming.

Representing The Sonnetts (Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs): Wendy Z. Burgers-Sonnett and George M. Sonnett, Jr., Washington, Virginia

Date of Decision: July 8, 2011

Facts: The Sonnetts purchased approximately twenty acres of land and improvements in Sublette County, Wyoming, from Elk Ridge Lodge, Inc. To finance part of the purchase price, the Sonnetts gave Elk Ridge a promissory note secured by a mortgage on the property. They later defaulted on the note, and Elk Ridge filed suit against the Sonnetts seeking judgment and foreclosure on the property. The Sonnetts responded with counterclaims against Elk Ridge claiming breach of the implied covenant against emcumbrances. Both parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Elk Ridge on its foreclosure claim, and against the Sonnetts on their counterclaims. In Docket No. S-10-0192, the Sonnetts appeal that decision. The district court also denied Elk Ridge’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the terms of the promissory note and mortgage. In Docket No. S-10-0191, Elk Ridge appeals that decision.

Issues: Issues S-10-0192: Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Elk Ridge, and in denying summary judgment to the Sonnetts, on the Sonnetts’ counterclaim of breach of warranty (breach of the implied covenant against encumbrances), ruling, as a matter of law, that language contained in the deed of conveyance excluded a recorded encumbrance from Elk Ridge’s warranty. Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Elk Ridge’s claim for a money judgment and request for a decree of foreclosure where the Sonnetts’ counterclaim may diminish or defeat Elk Ridge’s claim. Whether the district court erred by granting summary judgment to Elk Ridge on its request for the equitable relief of foreclosure where the Sonnetts invoked equity in defense and where the court made no findings as to the equities.

Issue S-10-0191: Whether the decision of the trial court, in denying Elk Ridge Lodge, Inc.’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, was an abuse of discretion.

Holdings: The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case with admissible evidence. The necessary elements of a foreclosure claim are (a) the agreement; (b) a default; (c) a notice of default and declarations thereof; and, (d) the amount due. A review of the record confirms the district court’s ruling that Elk Ridge established its prima facie case for summary judgment on its foreclosure claim. The Sonnetts do not dispute these facts, and indeed, admitted nearly all of them in their answer to Elk Ridge’s foreclosure complaint. The Sonnetts assert, however, that summary judgment in favor of Elk Ridge was precluded by their counterclaim against Elk Ridge for breach of the covenants of the Warranty Deed conveying the property from Elk Ridge to the Sonnetts.

It is undisputed that Elk Ridge conveyed the property to the Sonnetts by Warranty Deed. A Warranty Deed includes the covenant that the property conveyed is free from all incumbrances. Consequently, any encumbrance on the seller’s title needs to be specifically listed and excluded from the warranty. Otherwise, the seller will be in breach of the warranty. Elk Ridge’s Warranty Deed did not specifically list and exclude the Master Plan. The Sonnetts contend that the Master Plan is an encumbrance, and therefore, that Elk Ridge breached its warranty. While Elk Ridge’s Warranty Deed does not specifically list and exclude the Master Plan, it more generally states that the deed is “SUBJECT TO reservations and restrictions contained in the United States patents or other matters of public record, to easements and rights-of-way of record or in use and to prior mineral reservations of record. It is undisputed that the Master Plan, having been recorded and indexed in the Sublette County property records, is “of public record.” Therefore, the district court’s conclusion that the Sonnetts’ breach of warranty claim is not viable, and that Elk Ridge was entitled to summary judgment on that claim is upheld. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Elk Ridge, and in denying summary judgment to the Sonnetts, on the Sonnetts’ counterclaim of breach of warranty.

As presented by the Sonnetts, their second issue arises only if we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Elk Ridge. Because that decision has been upheld, there is no need reach the Sonnetts’ second issue.

In their third issue, the Sonnetts point out that foreclosure is equitable relief, and that they “invoked equity in defense” of Elk Ridge’s foreclosure claim. The Sonnetts contend that it was error for the district court to grant foreclosure to Elk Ridge without making specific findings as to the equities. The Sonnetts are correct that the district court did not make a separate ruling on their equitable defenses to foreclosure. However, it is apparent that the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Elk Ridge implicitly ruled against the Sonnetts on these defenses. The Sonnetts’ equitable defenses were variations on their counterclaim that Elk Ridge wrongfully failed to disclose the existence of the Master Plan. As Elk Ridge’s nondisclosure did not violate the covenants of the Warranty Deed, the record does not support the applicability of the Sonnetts’ equitable defenses.

Segregation of fees between multiple clients and/or multiple claims is required when it is possible. Implicit in this directive is the requirement that a party must show segregation is impossible before he may recover for claims for which there is no authorization of fee shifting. Applying these legal concepts, the district court then made specific findings to support its decision. First, it found that Elk Ridge’s defense of the Sonnetts’ counterclaims were inextricably intertwined and impossible to segregate from Elk Ridge’s prosecution of the foreclosure action. In contrast, it found that the Sonnetts’ third party claims against the two shareholders of Elk Ridge were separable, and all fees and costs related to such must be segregated. It found that Elk Ridge had not adequately and appropriately segregated the hours worked, rate charged, and expenses incurred in defending issues against Elk Ridge and the individual Third-Party Defendants, Terry Reach and Daniel Fox, for piercing the corporate veil, intentional misrepresentation, fraud, and willful and wanton misconduct. The district court applied the rule that once a party is given an opportunity to present sufficient evidence of attorneys’ fees and fails to do so, the party will not be given another chance. While noting the “harsh result,” the district court denied Elk Ridge’s request for attorneys’ fees in its entirety. A careful review the district court’s ruling shows no error in its careful adherence to Wyoming precedent regarding the award of attorneys’ fees. Under the applicable standard of review, the ultimate question is whether the district court could reasonably conclude as it did. In this case, the district court presided over this litigation for nearly a year and a half before reaching its decision to deny Elk Ridge’s motion for attorneys’ fees. It had held numerous hearings and decided many different motions. Under the circumstances, the district court was in a better position than we are to decide whether the Sonnetts’ third party claims against Mr. Reach and Mr. Fox were inextricably intertwined with Elk Ridge’s foreclosure claim. The district court’s decision was not beyond the bounds of reason.

The district court’s decisions in both Docket No. S-10-0191 and Docket No. S-10-0192 are affirmed.





J. Burke delivered the opinion for the court.

Check out our tags in a cloud (from Wordle)!