Showing posts with label estate. Show all posts
Showing posts with label estate. Show all posts

Tuesday, December 10, 2013

Summary 2013 WY 150

Summary of Decision December 10, 2013

Justice Kite delivered the opinion for the Court. Affirmed.

Case Name: THE ESTATE OF JOAN M. MARUSICH v. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, OFFICE OF HEALTHCARE FINANCING/EQUALITYCARE

Docket Number: S-13-0036

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Albany County, the Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

Representing Appellant: Craig C. Cook and Dennis C. Cook of Cook & Associates, P.C., Laramie, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Craig C. Cook.

Representing Appellee: Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; Kristin M. Nuss, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Nuss.

Date of Decision: December 10, 2013

Facts: After Joan M. Marusich died, the State of Wyoming ex rel. Department of Health, Office of Healthcare Financing/Equalitycare (Department) filed a lien against the home she owned with her husband, William Marusich, as tenants by the entirety. The Department sought to recover the cost of Medicaid benefits paid on behalf of Mr. Marusich, who had predeceased Mrs. Marusich. The Estate of Joan M. Marusich (Marusich Estate) filed a petition to remove a false lien. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, ruling that under the relevant federal and state laws, the lien was appropriate. After the district court entered a final judgment on the amount of the lien and denied the Marusich Estate’s motion to amend the petition, the estate appealed.

Issues: The Marusich Estate presents the following issues on appeal: Whether property owned by a married couple as tenants by the entireties may be subject to a lien against property in the estate of the surviving spouse for recovery of Medicaid expenses paid solely on behalf of the predeceased spouse. Whether the remedial provisions of W.S. § 29-1-601(b) may be invoked against appellee as claimant on a legally groundless and impermiss[i]ble recorded claim of lien. Whether the district court erred when it denied a motion to amend petition to conform the pleadings to the underlying cause of action in quiet title that was argued by the parties on cross motions for summary judgment. The Department’s issues are similar, though phrased differently.

Holdings/Decision: The district court correctly granted summary judgment upholding the Department’s lien. The district court stated in its decision letter that the Department was entitled to attorney fees and costs and the Department submitted an affidavit in support of its claim, the record does not indicate that the district court ever awarded fees and costs. In fact, the Marusich Estate concedes no such order was ever entered. We will not, therefore, further address the issue of whether the Department was entitled to attorney fees and costs. The quiet title claim propounded by the Marusich Estate was based upon the validity of the Department’s Medicaid lien. In fact, the motion to amend the petition specifically stated that the Marusich Estate “does not seek to amend or alter any factual allegation in its original Petition or prayer for relief. . . . The proposed amendment will not, in any way, alter Petitioner’s legal arguments already presented in this matter.” As the district court properly recognized, the validity of the lien had already been decided. Whether the Marusich Estate’s claim was restyled as a quiet title action or not, the result would be the same. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Marusich Estate’s motion to amend the petition. Affirmed.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Monday, August 18, 2008

Summary 2008 WY 95

Summary of Decision issued August 15, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Capshaw v. Osbon

Citation: 2008 WY 95

Docket Number: S-07-0228

Appeal from the District Court of Washakie County, the Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge.

Representing Appellant: Billie L.M. Addleman and Gary R. Scott of Hirst & Applegate, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee Osbon: Mary Helen Reed of McCarty and Reed, LC, Cody, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee Corbett: John P. Worrall of Worrall & Greear, PC, Worland, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: Capshaw entered into a contract to purchase a large portion of real estate held by the Corbett Trust. Corbett, one of the beneficiaries of the Corbett Trust, joined with a number of other beneficiaries in objecting to the sale to Capshaw. Osbon, trustee for the Corbett trust, filed a motion to intervene which motion was granted.
The parties largely frame their appellate arguments around whether Capshaw should have been allowed to intervene and participate in the matter. Capshaw claimed that as an intervening party she should have been given an opportunity to be heard. Corbett argued that the court erred in allowing Capshaw to intervene.
Although there may be legitimate issues concerning whether the motion to intervene was properly granted, Corbett did not appeal on the Order Granting Motion to Intervene. Capshaw’s notice of appeal only challenged the order on the declaratory judgment action. Because Corbett failed to appeal from the order granting the motion to intervene, the Court did not have jurisdiction to determine whether the motion was properly granted. The Court proceeded on the basis that Capshaw was properly made a party to the action below.
The order allowing Capshaw was entered after the hearing on the matter had already occurred and on the same day the declaratory judgment order was entered. Capshaw was not given the opportunity to present argument or evidence regarding the question of whether the sale should have been approved. Capshaw had no opportunity to protect her interest, if any, in the property.

Holding: Corbett failed to appeal from the order allowing Capshaw to intervene in this matter and therefore cannot challenge that order in this appeal. Inasmuch as Capshaw was a party to the dispute below, she should have been given notice and an opportunity to be heard in those proceedings. Because that did not occur, the Court reversed and remanded for a new hearing.

Remanded.

J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/6brrye .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Friday, February 01, 2008

Summary 2008 WY 11

Summary of Decision issued February 1, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Milnes v. Milnes

Citation: 2008 WY 10

Docket Number: S-07-0123

Appeal from the District Court of Platte County, the Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Douglas Fowler, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Don W. Riske and Sean C. Chambers of Riske, Salisbury & Kelly, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: Coray sought review of the district court’s order that settled several disputes which arose over his Mother’s estate largely in favor of his brother, Jesse.

Manufactured Home – Real Estate or Personal Property: The Court reviewed the district court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard and the conclusions of law were reviewed de novo. The district court concluded that the manufactured home was real property that went with the land on which it was located. They did not view the fact that it had been historically taxed as personal property as determinative of the issue. The district court properly included relevant facts and circumstances in reaching its decision.
The Credit Card:
The district court’s factual findings with respect to the credit card were brief. They consisted of Jesse’s testimony that the credit card was obtained by him, on his Mother’s behalf, and that although he recognized he bore responsibility for the credit card as well, that responsibility was in addition to the primary responsibility that was his Mother’s. The district court accepted Jesse’s testimony as true and ordered that Coray pay that claim. The Court concluded that the district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and that the record was sufficient to sustain the district court’s fact findings.
Coray’s Debt to the Estate:
The Court reviewed the district court record and agreed the debt Coray owed to the decedent was not a gift. The district court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous.

Holding: The Court concluded that the findings of fact and conclusions of law challenged by Coray were sound and that the district court’s Order and Judgment should be affirmed.

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2ebehh .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 10

Summary of Decision issued February 1, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Christensen v. Christensen and Hamblin

Citation: 2008 WY 10

Docket Number: S-07-0061

Appeal from the District Court of Teton County, the Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): David G. Lewis, Jackson, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Defendants; Defendant-Intervenors): Franklin J. Falen, Brandon L. Jensen, Kathryn Brack Morrow of Budd-Falen Law Offices, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: Wynn Christensen, Renee C. Hunter and Rex E. Christensen (Buyers) brought an action against their siblings, C. Burke Christensen, Peggy C. Miller, Joan S. Hamblin and Diane C. Buxton (Sellers) seeking an interpretation of a stock purchase agreement and enforcement of a provision of their mother’s will.
When the Court reviews orders granting summary judgment, they consider the record de novo.

The Stock Purchase Agreement:
Buyers contend the district court misinterpreted the agreement when it concluded that it permitted the Sellers to sell their stock to a third party. Sellers claimed the district court correctly concluded that the agreement permitted them to transfer their stock to a third party if Buyers did not exercise their right to purchase the stock within 30 days of receiving notice. When the Court considers the meaning of a contract, they focus on the parties’ intent and if possible, from the language used in the agreement. Article 5 provided a mechanism by which the stockholders could purchase the shares of any stockholder who during his or her lifetime wished to withdraw from the company. Considering Article 5 in the context of the entire agreement and giving the words their plain and ordinary meaning in light of the stated purpose of the agreement, the Court concluded the agreement required any stockholder wishing to sell his stock to give written notice of that desire to the other stockholders and the corporate secretary. The Court further concluded that the other stockholders had the right to purchase the total shares owned by the other stockholders excluding the seller within 30 days of the notice. If a particular stockholder was unable or unwilling to buy the stock or his proportionate share, the other stockholders had the right to purchase the balance. Generally, the law favors the free alienability of property interests. Absent language clearly reflecting the parties’ intent to restrict the transfer of a property interest, the Court was not inclined to conclude that was the parties’ intent.
The Will Provision:
In deciding the issue presented, it would be appropriate for the Court to consider evidence of circumstances surrounding execution of the stock purchase agreement in determining parties’ intent. It would not be appropriate to consider the will. The will, executed in 1982 provided no context to the setting in which the stock purchase agreement was negotiated and signed ten years earlier. It was irrelevant to the interpretation of the agreement.
Sellers’ Offer:
The record showed that each Seller gave separate written notice to the corporate secretary of their desire to sell all of their shares. It was also undisputed that by email, Burke Christensen notified Buyers that all four sellers were willing to sell and there was no dispute that Buyers received the email. The Court concluded that Sellers fulfilled the requirements of the agreement by giving notice in January and waiting 30 days which made discussion of the February notice unnecessary. Having fulfilled the requirements, Sellers were free to sell to a third party and had no obligation to give Buyers a second opportunity to purchase their shares. Having no such obligation, they likewise were not required to state a sale price in accordance with Article 7.

Holding: The Court affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Sellers on the claims brought under the stock purchase agreement. They held the will was not relevant to the issues presented and that any challenge to the will should have been made in accordance with the Idaho Probate Code.

Affirmed.

J. Kite delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2tw2dt .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Thursday, September 20, 2007

Summary 2007 WY 151

Summary of Decision issued September 20, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Halliburton v. Gunter; Halliburton v. Gunter

Citation: 2007 WY 151

Docket Number: 06-205; S-07-0076

W.R.A.P. 11 Certified Question from the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, the Honorable William F. Downes, Judge

Appeal from the District Court of Sweetwater County, the Honorable Jere A. Ryckman, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant/Intervenor): Roger E. Shumate and James C. Worthen of Murane & Bostwick, LLC, Casper, Wyoming. Argument in Case No. 06-205 by Mr. Shumate.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Kent W. Spence and M. Kristeen Hand of The Spence Law Firm, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming. Argument in Case No. 06-205 by Mr. Spence.

Issue: The underlying question in these related cases is whether the personal representative appointed to pursue a wrongful death action under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-38-102(a) must be a resident of the State of Wyoming as is required for intestate estate administrators under the probate code, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-201(c). The Court declined to answer the question because the probate court did not err in denying a wrongful death action defendant’s motion to intervene in the probate for the purpose of challenging appointment of the personal representative, and because that wrongful death action defendant likewise does not have standing to challenge that appointment in the wrongful death action, itself.

Facts/Discussion: Intervention: The Court reviewed “intervention”, including the cases which described their standard of review: Masinter v. Markstein and State Farm v. Colley. The Court stated they agreed with the district court’s reasoning and reliance upon Murg v. Barnsdall Nursing Home.
In the absence of an incompetent administrator, one can contest appointment of the administrator only if one is entitled, in one’s own right, to act as administrator. A potential wrongful death action defendant is not so entitled.

Standing:
The existence of standing is reviewed de novo. The district court also relied upon standing in denying Halliburton’s access to a declaratory judgment in the probate action. Standing requires a legally protectable and tangible interest at stake in the litigation. The district court properly concluded that Halliburton had no genuine legal interest in the probate court’s appointment of Gunter as personal representative. The Court’s conclusion that Halliburton lacked standing to raise the issue carried over into the federal court wrongful death action as well. Halliburton’s personal stake is the same in both cases. Therefore, inasmuch as Halliburton lacked standing to challenge the appointment of the personal representative, it would be inappropriate for the Court to answer the underlying substantive question of the validity of the appointment.

Holding: A wrongful death action defendant does not have standing to challenge the appointment of the estate’s personal representative because a wrongful death action defendant does not have a personal stake or tangible interest in that appointment. Neither may a wrongful action defendant intervene in the probate estate action as a matter of right for the purpose of challenging the appointment of the personal representative. Finally, the district court sitting in probate did not err as a matter of law or abuse its discretion in denying permissive intervention of the wrongful death action defendant into the probate estate action.

C.J. Voigt delivered the opinion.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2yzd6m .

Monday, April 16, 2007

Summary 2007 WY 63

Summary of Decision issued April 13, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: These opinions use the "Universal Citation." They were given "official" citations when they were issued. You should use these citations whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Estate of Frost: Frost Construction Company v. Dodson, Co-Personal representative of Estate of James T. Frost

Citation: 2007 WY 63

Docket Number: 06-169

Appeal from the District Court of Big Horn County, the Honorable Hunter Patrick, Judge

Representing Appellants (Petitioner): T. Thomas Singer of Axilon Law Group, Billings, Montana.

Representing Appellee (Respondent): Marc C. Thompson of Webster & Thompson, LLC, Cody, Wyoming.

Issues: Whether the trial court erred in denying a claim that was timely asserted against the Estate solely because no affidavit accompanied the claim. Whether the trial court erred in holding that the claimant had failed to plead a constructive trust theory.

Facts/Discussion: The appeal concerns the interpretation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-704 and 2-7-712. In construing these statutes, the district court held that any claim filed against a probate estate must have an attached affidavit. As to the instant case, the court concluded that because there was no affidavit filed, the claim must be considered invalid and barred as if no claim had been filed.
Standard of Review: The determinative issue is a question of law concerning the construction of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-704.
Failure to File an Attached Affidavit: The creditor’s claim submitted against the Estate on behalf of the Company was dismissed for failure to file an attached affidavit. The dismissal required a strict interpretation of § 2-7-704(a). Dodson relied on the first sentence of the subsection but failed to incorporate the second sentence of subsection (a) which governed the case. The Claim filed by the Company was contingent on the Company establishing its equitable claims and was not a “claim which is due.” The Court compared their interpretation of the previous statute Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-222 and the current version noted above. The current version is substantially similar to its predecessor. However, the Court concluded the particulars may be set forth within the claim as opposed to an affidavit which is consistent with the long-time policy behind such claim requirements. The particulars are clearly set forth in the Claim Against Estate filed on June 18, 2003. Enough information was provided in the Company’s claim to sufficiently challenge the attention of the personal representative and enable him to act advisedly in the exercise of his discretion, subject to the right to require additional proof of the claim.
Failure to State a Proper Theory for Recovery: The district court found fault in the Company’s failure to plead the constructive trust theory with specificity. Dodson relied on W.R.C.P. 8(a). The Court stated that nothing in the Wyoming Probate Code, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-1-101 et seq., or Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-703 or 704 required a claimant to state the particular legal theories upon which the claim was based or to specify the evidence upon which the claim rested. The Court found no reason to deviate from the requirements set forth by the legislature.
The executor has the ability to request further information to clarify the claim. The executor in the instant case made no such request. If the executor was not satisfied with or was confused by the facts laid out in the Company’s claim, it was her burden to request additional particulars.

Holding: The district court erred in rejecting the Company’s claim due solely to its failure to file an attached affidavit, which was not required under these circumstances. The district court also erred by rejecting the Company’s constructive trust theory. The Court reversed the order of the district court and remanded for appropriate action.

Reversed and remanded.

Dist. J. Waldrip delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2b8wnw .

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