Summary 2012 WY 158

Summary of Decision December 14, 2012

Chief Justice Kite delivered the opinion for the Court. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Case Names: NORTHERN LARAMIE RANGE FOUNDATION, a Wyoming non-profit corporation, NORTHERN LARAMIE RANGE ALLIANCE, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company, and WHITE CREEK RANGE, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company v. CONVERSE COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, and WASATCH WIND INTERMOUNTAIN, LLC d/b/a Pioneer Windpark I, LLC, and Pioneer Windpark II, LLC.

NORTHERN LARAMIE RANGE FOUNDATION, a Wyoming non-profit corporation, NORTHERN LARAMIE RANGE ALLIANCE, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company v. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, INDUSTRIAL SITING DIVISION, and WASATCH WIND INTERMOUNTAIN, LLC d/b/a Pioneer Windpark I, LLC, and Pioneer Windpark II, LLC.

Docket Numbers: S-12-0060; S-12-0061

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Converse County, Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge.

Representing Appellants: Peter C. Nicolaysen and Pamela M. Brondos of Nicolaysen and Associates, P.C., Casper, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Nicholaysen.

Representing Appellee Converse County Board of County Commissioners: No appearance.

Representing Appellee Wasatch Wind Intermountain, LLC: Brent R. Kunz and Lucas Buckley of Hathaway & Kunz, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming; John A. Masterson and Alaina M. Stedillie of Rothgerber Johnson & Lyons LLP, Casper, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Masterson.

Representing Appellee Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality, Industrial Division: Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Jay A. Jerde, Deputy Attorney General; Luke J. Esch, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument made by Mr. Esch.

Date of Decision: December 14, 2012

Facts: This appeal involved two permitting actions for a wind energy project in the mountains of Converse County. In Case No. S-12-0060, the Northern Laramie Range Alliance, LLC (NLRA), Northern Laramie Range Foundation (NLRF) and White Creek Ranch, LLC (“the objectors”) challenged the district court’s affirmance of the Converse County Board of County Commissioners’ (Board) decision to grant Wasatch Wind Intermountain, LLC’s (Wasatch) application for a Wind Energy Conversion System Permit (WECS permit). They also challenged the district court’s rulings that NLRA and NLRF did not have standing to appeal the Board’s decision. The Court concluded NLRA has standing, but NLRF does not. They further ruled the Board properly granted Wasatch’s application for a WECS permit. Consequently, in Case No. S-12-0060, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part.

In the second case, Case No. S-12-0061, NLRA and NLRF (“the objectors”) challenged the district court’s affirmance of the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality, Industrial Siting Council’s (ISC) decision to grant a state industrial siting permit for construction of the project. The Court concluded the agency acted within its authority, and there was sufficient evidence to justify its decision. Consequently, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision in Case No. S-12-0061

Issues: The issues in the Converse County case, Case No. S-12-0060, may be summarized as follows:

1. What is the appropriate standard of review of the Board’s action?

2. Do NLRF, NLRA and/or White Creek Ranch have standing to appeal?

3. Did the Board act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, abuse its discretion or otherwise act in a manner not in accordance with law when it was ruled Wasatch’s application was complete and granted it a WECS permit?
         a. Was the traffic study adequate?

         b. Was there sufficient evidence of financial assurances?

4. Were proper notifications given to nearby landowners?

5. Were the objectors denied due process of law?

The issues raised in Case No. S-12-0061 are:

1. Was it lawful for the ISC to issue the industrial siting permit subject to Special Condition #19 which required Wasatch to provide further evidence of its financial resources prior to construction of the project?

2. Did the ISC properly conclude that, with the inclusion of Special Project #19, Wasatch had met the financial assurance requirement and was entitled to a permit?

3. Were the ISC’s findings that the project will not pose a threat of serious injury to the environment or to the social and economic condition or inhabitants in the affected area supported by substantial evidence?

Holdings: In the Converse County case, Case No. S-12-0060, the Court agreed with the district court that White Creek Ranch, as an adjacent landowner, had standing to appeal the Board’s decision because it asserted the project threatened its scenic views and wildlife habitat and migration, interests which are sufficient under Northfork. The Court disagreed with the district court regarding NLRA and concluded that it had standing through its members to appeal. NLRF, however, did not have standing; its claims were simply too general and speculative to separate its asserted injury from that of the general public. The Court also held that the arbitrary and capricious standard was appropriate for the review of the Board’s decision, given the administrative process was an informal public hearing. On the merits, the Court concluded the Board did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by determining Wasatch had presented sufficient traffic study and financial assurance information. In addition, the proper notifications were provided and the objectors were not denied due process of law. The Court, therefore, affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s decision in Case No. S-12-0060.

In the ISC case, Case No. S-12-0061, the Court concluded the ISC was not required to rely solely on Wasatch’s individual financial resources, but could consider the financial evidence relative to its proposed investor, Edison. The ISC also properly conditioned Wasatch’s permit by requiring additional financial assurance prior to commencement of construction. The agency did not err in allowing Wasatch to evaluate different “affected areas” for the various interests identified in the statutes. Finally, the record contained substantial evidence to support the ISC’s conclusion that Wasatch’s proposed facility will not pose a threat of serious injury to the environment or to the social and economic condition or inhabitants in the affected area. The Court, therefore, affirmed the district court’s decision in Case No. S-12-0061.
Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summary 2012 WY 65

Summary of Decision May 9, 2012


[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: RICKY D. MILLER and CHRISTOPHER L. GONZALEZ v. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, TOM FORSLUND, Director, TOM JOHNSON, Chemical Testing Supervisor, JAMES L. MOORE, Laboratory Supervisor

Docket Number: S-11-0197

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=465570

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Michael K. Davis, Judge
Representing Appellant (Plaintiff/Defendant): Cole N. Sherard, Wheatland, WY.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff/Defendant): Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General, and Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General.

Date of Decision: May 9, 2012

Facts: After being separately cited and arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol (DWUI) in violation of Wyoming law, Ricky D. Miller and Christopher L. Gonzalez petitioned the district court for review of agency inaction by the Wyoming Department of Health (WDOH). Miller and Gonzalez requested that the district court require the WDOH to retroactively decertify the chemical test operators (hereinafter “officers”) who had performed chemical tests of Miller’s and Gonzalez’s breath to determine the quantity of alcohol in their respective bodies. On motion by the WDOH, Tom Forslund, in his official capacity as director, Tom Johnson in his official capacity as chemical testing laboratory manager, and James L. Moore, in his official capacity as laboratory supervisor (collectively referred to as “Department”), the district court dismissed the “Petition for Judicial Review” on the grounds that Miller and Gonzalez lacked standing to bring the action and that the matter is not ripe for review. Miller and Gonzalez challenged the order dismissing their petition.

Issues: Miller and Gonzalez presented two issues for consideration: Is the Appellants’ Petition for Judicial Review, challenging the WDOH failure to decertify the officers’ certification to perform chemical analysis ripe for review by this Court? Do the Appellants have standing to petition the district court to order the WDOH to decertify these officers for failing to comply with [its] own administrative rules and regulations for chemical testing?

Holdings: Miller and Gonzalez lacked standing to bring the action set forth in their “Petition for Judicial Review.” Affirmed.

Justice Hill delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2011 WY 6

Summary of Decision January 11, 2011

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Williams v. City of Gillette, Wyoming

Citation: 2011 WY 6

Docket Number: S-10-0070

URL: http://tinyurl.com/69dtmgy

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): Bruce B. Williams, pro se.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Kate M. Fox and Amanda K. Ferguson of Davis and Cannon, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Date of Decision: January 19, 2011

Facts: Appellant appeals an Order Dismissing Case for Lack of Standing entered by the district court of Campbell County on March 18, 2010. Appellant contends that the district court’s conclusion that he lacked standing to commence suit against the City of Gillette (City) as well as its 22,221 eligible voting citizens for damaging his freedom of speech, is erroneous.

Issues: Whether the district court erred when it dismissed Appellant’s complaint for lack of standing.

Holdings: The Court concludes that Appellant does not have standing to bring this appeal. He was not a party to the events he claims violated his freedom of speech. He was not in the car when the original incident took place and was never cited with any ticket. In fact, Appellant was only aware of the events surrounding the incident after reading a newspaper article. The mere fact that he read a newspaper article does not vest him with the status of party.

Appellant cannot demonstrate how his right to freedom of speech has been damaged in any way. In fact, Plaintiff has expressed his disapproval of the incident through various opinion pieces he has authored in the newspaper. Because his alleged injury is speculative in nature, Appellant lacks a sufficient interest to present the Court with a justiciable controversy. Affirmed.

Justice Hill delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2009 WY 61

Summary of Decision issued May 1, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Yoeuth v. State; Loo v. State

Citation: 2009 WY 61

Docket Number: S-08-0136; S-08-0170

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, the Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge.

Representing Appellant Yoeuth: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellant Loo: Dion J. Custis, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Loo and Yoeuth challenged the district court’s denial of their motions to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop and subsequent search of the vehicle’s trunk.

Mr. Loo, the initial stop: Loo and Yoeuth moved to suppress the evidence (thirty-seven pounds of marijuana) found when the trooper searched the trunk of the rental car that Loo was driving. Loo maintained that he suffered violations of his rights under both Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution and under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court must determine whether under all the circumstances, the trooper’s actions were reasonable and in compliance with state and federal constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures. The test is whether the initial stop is justified and the focus is on a fact-based reasonableness inquiry. The district court determined that the trooper was justified in stopping Loo based on the specific fact that he has observed a traffic violation.
The initial detention: The trooper’s questions were limited to the topics of Loo’s right to operate the car and their travel plans. Based on the findings, the district court concluded the detention was reasonable both under Wyoming and United States law.
The second round of questioning: At the end of the initial detention, the trooper informed Loo that he was free to go and asked if Loo would answer a few more question and he agreed. The district court determined the consent to be voluntary and that the questioning did not violate his rights. The Court agreed.
The canine sniff: The Court reviewed the list of factors articulated by the trooper as giving rise to reasonable suspicion including a perfume odor that dissipated over time; the existence of two rental agreements; Loo’s unusually high nervousness; the drug detection dog sniffing Loo when he entered the patrol car; and the trooper’s knowledge that traffickers often rent more than one car. Based on the factors, the Court concluded that the trooper had reasonable and articulable suspicions of ongoing criminal activity.
The search of the trunk: Under the United States Constitution, when a trained drug dog alerts during an exterior sniff of a vehicle, there is probable cause to search that vehicle.
Ms. Yoeuth, standing as a passenger: Yoeuth argued the district court incorrectly ruled that she did not have standing to pursue a direct challenge to the validity of the trooper’s actions which wrongfully denied her the opportunity to assert the trooper violated her constitutional rights. The Court noted that a passenger who is rightfully present in a vehicle has a reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore has standing to challenge governmental invasion of that expected privacy. A review of the transcript suggested that the district court was not making an oral ruling that she lacked standing but was seeking clarification of whether Yoeuth asserted standing base upon alleged violation of her own rights, or of the rights of Loo.
Loss of standing by denial of ownership: The district court ruled that Yoeuth lacked standing to challenge the validity of the search of the trunk because she renounced any interest in the trunk by stating that she did not put anything in the trunk. Yoeuth argued that her statement was not a sufficiently unequivocal denial of ownership to establish that she abandoned her expectations of privacy in the trunk or its contents. The Court discussed Garzon and Andrews noting that Yoeuth’s circumstances were closer to those in Garzon. The Court determined that her comment did not amount to an unequivocal denial of ownership and concluded that she did have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the search of the trunk.
Opportunity to assert her constitutional challenges: The district court found the trooper had reasonably articulable suspicions of illegal activity allowing him to detain Loo during the dog sniff. The same suspicions applied to Yoeuth. The dog’s alert at the trunk provided the trooper with probable cause. That conclusion applies equally to Loo and Yoeuth. Yoeuth had a full opportunity to present the district court with all the facts and arguments in support of her motion to suppress. But she provided no basis for the district court to reach a different result than it did for Loo.

Conclusion: The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motions to suppress in both cases.

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/cxzkm7 .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 122

Summary of Decision issued October 9, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Catamount Construction v. Timmis Enterprises

Citation: 2008 WY 122

Docket Number: S-08-0023

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge.

Representing Appellant: Raymond W. Martin of Sundahl, Powers, Kapp & Martin, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: Julie Nye Tiedeken of McKellar, Tiedeken & Scoggin, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: General contractor Catamount filed suit against several of its subcontractors, alleging defective work on a house in Cheyenne. The subcontractors filed motions to dismiss, asserting that Catamount had no standing to maintain its suit because it was defunct as the result of bankruptcy. The district court granted the subcontractors’ motions.

Standing: One of the primary cases that the district court relied upon in reaching its decision was Liberty Trust Co. Employees Profit Sharing Trust v. Holt. The federal district court considered the issue of whether a Chapter 7 corporate debtor had an existence or life outside the bankruptcy estate. NLRB v. Better Building Supply Corp. reached the opposite conclusion and stated that a corporation is not entitled to discharge its debt in a liquidation proceeding under Chapter 7. The Court agreed with NLRB and others to state that corporate existence is a matter of state law. Bankruptcy does nothing to change the existence of a corporation. Even if the bankruptcy in the instant case had triggered a de facto dissolution of the corporation and even though Catamount had been administratively dissolved by the Wyoming Secretary of State, it could still sue and be sued.
Justiciable Controversy: There must be a violation of a genuine, existing right; the Court will not issue advisory opinions addressing future speculative matters. Catamount claims that its subcontractors including Crayton are ultimately responsible for the Steeles’ damages if they are proven.

Holding: The Court concluded that corporate existence was a matter of state law and under Wyoming law a dissolved corporation may sue and be sued. Therefore Catamount has standing to maintain their action.

Reversed and remanded.

J. Kite delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/3ppxa6

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

2008 WY 88

Summary of Decision issued July 29, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Northfork Citizens for Responsible Dev. v. Park County Bd. of County Commr.

Citation: 2008 WY 88

Docket Number: S-07-0258

Appeal from the District Court of Park County, the Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge.

Representing Appellants: Anthony Todd Wendtland and Debra J. Wendtland, Wendtland & Wendtland, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee, Park County Bd. of County Commr.: Bryan A. Skoric, County Attorney and James F. Davis, Deputy County Attorney, Park County Attorney’s Office, Cody, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee, Worthington Group of Wyoming, LLC: Dawn Rae Scott and Laurence W. Stinson, Bonner Stinson, PC, Powell, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: In a series of administrative decisions, the Park County Commissioners approved plans by Worthington Group of Citizens, LLC to develop a residential subdivision known as Copperleaf. Northfork Citizens for Responsible Development, David Jamison and Robert Hoszwa sought judicial review. Jamison and Hoszwa own and live on property adjoining Copperleaf adjacent to the area where Worthington proposes to develop duplexes.
Standing under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act has been explained as including one who has a legally recognizable interest in that which will be affected by the action. A potential litigant must show injury or potential injury by alleging a perceptible harm resulting from the agency action. The lesson of the decisions in Hoke and Hirschfield was that adjoining landowners have standing to appeal land use decisions that result in a substantial increase in the allowed housing density. If Jamison and Hoszwa are correct in their assertion that the County’s 1985 approval of duplex development has expired, then the County’s decisions approving Copperleaf will result in a substantial increase in housing density.

Holding: Because Jamison and Hoszwa have established standing in the case, Northfork also has standing. Accordingly, the Court found error in the district court’s order dismissing their appeal.

Reversed and remanded.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/56dvy2 .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2007 WY 151

Summary of Decision issued September 20, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Halliburton v. Gunter; Halliburton v. Gunter

Citation: 2007 WY 151

Docket Number: 06-205; S-07-0076

W.R.A.P. 11 Certified Question from the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, the Honorable William F. Downes, Judge

Appeal from the District Court of Sweetwater County, the Honorable Jere A. Ryckman, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant/Intervenor): Roger E. Shumate and James C. Worthen of Murane & Bostwick, LLC, Casper, Wyoming. Argument in Case No. 06-205 by Mr. Shumate.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Kent W. Spence and M. Kristeen Hand of The Spence Law Firm, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming. Argument in Case No. 06-205 by Mr. Spence.

Issue: The underlying question in these related cases is whether the personal representative appointed to pursue a wrongful death action under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-38-102(a) must be a resident of the State of Wyoming as is required for intestate estate administrators under the probate code, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-201(c). The Court declined to answer the question because the probate court did not err in denying a wrongful death action defendant’s motion to intervene in the probate for the purpose of challenging appointment of the personal representative, and because that wrongful death action defendant likewise does not have standing to challenge that appointment in the wrongful death action, itself.

Facts/Discussion: Intervention: The Court reviewed “intervention”, including the cases which described their standard of review: Masinter v. Markstein and State Farm v. Colley. The Court stated they agreed with the district court’s reasoning and reliance upon Murg v. Barnsdall Nursing Home.
In the absence of an incompetent administrator, one can contest appointment of the administrator only if one is entitled, in one’s own right, to act as administrator. A potential wrongful death action defendant is not so entitled.
Standing: The existence of standing is reviewed de novo. The district court also relied upon standing in denying Halliburton’s access to a declaratory judgment in the probate action. Standing requires a legally protectable and tangible interest at stake in the litigation. The district court properly concluded that Halliburton had no genuine legal interest in the probate court’s appointment of Gunter as personal representative. The Court’s conclusion that Halliburton lacked standing to raise the issue carried over into the federal court wrongful death action as well. Halliburton’s personal stake is the same in both cases. Therefore, inasmuch as Halliburton lacked standing to challenge the appointment of the personal representative, it would be inappropriate for the Court to answer the underlying substantive question of the validity of the appointment.

Holding: A wrongful death action defendant does not have standing to challenge the appointment of the estate’s personal representative because a wrongful death action defendant does not have a personal stake or tangible interest in that appointment. Neither may a wrongful action defendant intervene in the probate estate action as a matter of right for the purpose of challenging the appointment of the personal representative. Finally, the district court sitting in probate did not err as a matter of law or abuse its discretion in denying permissive intervention of the wrongful death action defendant into the probate estate action.

C.J. Voigt delivered the opinion.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2yzd6m .

Summary 2007 WY 74

Summary of Decision issued May 9, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Hicks and Pronghorn Publishing, Board of Trustees of the Scenic Preserve Trust v. Dowd and Dowd; Board of Johnson County Commissioners

Citation: 2007 WY 74

Docket Number: 06-2

Representing Appellants (Plaintiffs): Dennis M. Kirven of Kirven and Kirven, PC, Buffalo, Wyoming.

Representing Appellees (Defendants Fred L. and Linda S. Dowd): Tom C. Toner of Yonkee & Toner, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee Board of Johnson County Commissioners: Greg L. Goddard, Deputy County Attorney, Buffalo, Wyoming.

Issue: Appellants presented 6 issues but the Court focused on the issue of standing: Whether Plaintiffs had standing to enforce the Scenic Preserve Trust.

Facts/Discussion: The case arose from a conservation easement established in 1993 on Meadowood Ranch in Johnson County.
Standing to enforce a charitable trust: The district court found the Scenic Preserve Trust (Trust) was a charitable trust. The Court agreed and after a review of the case concluded the action was one seeking to enforce the terms of the Trust. After discussing the common law of trusts, the Uniform Trust Code, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-110(d) and § 4-10-406(c), the Court concluded that a charitable trust may be enforced by a settler, the attorney general or a qualified beneficiary of the trust. Appellants’ only benefit from enforcement was that shared by other members of the public so they were not qualified beneficiaries and therefore lacked standing to enforce the terms of the Trust.
The Attorney General’s role: At the time the Attorney General declined to participate in the case, the district court had already ruled that Appellants had standing to pursue the action. Given that ruling, it was understandable the Attorney General allowed the private litigants to pursue the litigation. Given the Court’s holding that Appellants did not have standing, the Attorney General now has the opportunity to reassess his position.
Matters of great public interest and importance: Appellants’ arguments were not meaningfully developed. The “great public interest or importance” exception must be applied with caution where strict standards are applied. In the instant case, the Court concluded it did not qualify.
Public meetings law: Assuming that Appellants had standing to pursue the issue, they did not provide authority to support their position that the Trust was a subagency of the Board. The Board took its actions at a regularly scheduled public meeting, and the Court agreed with the district court that no violation of the public meetings law occurred.

Holding: The Court concluded the instant action was one to enforce the Scenic Preserve Trust. Appellants did not meet the definition of “qualified beneficiary” and therefore lacked standing to enforce the terms of the Trust.

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2c6zly .