Thursday, February 23, 2006

Summary 2006 WY 22

Summary of Decision issued February 22, 2006

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance.]

Case Name: Edrington v. State

Citation: 2006 WY 22

Docket Number: 05-146

Order Affirming Judgment and Sentence of the District Court

The text of the order follows:

This matter came before the Court upon Appellant’s pro se “Motion for Brief,” filed herein February 3, 2006. On November 14, 2005, Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel filed a “Motion to Withdraw as Counsel,” pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 1400, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). This Court, after a careful review of the record and the “Anders brief” submitted by counsel, entered its “Order Granting Permission for Court Appointed Counsel to Withdraw and Conditionally Affirming the Judgment and Sentence of the District Court,” on November 29, 2005. That Order provided that the district court's “Judgment and Sentence of the Court” would be summarily affirmed unless the Appellant, Christopher D. Edrington, raised points of his choosing which convinced this Court that the appeal herein is less than wholly frivolous. Now, after a careful review of Appellant’s “Motion for Brief,” this Court finds that the Appellant has failed to raise such points with this Court. Therefore, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 1400, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), this Court finds that the District Court’s Judgment and Sentence of the Court in this matter should be affirmed. It is, therefore, ORDERED that the District Court's Judgment and Sentence of the Court, which was filed February 24, 2005, be, and the same hereby is, affirmed.

By the Court: C.J. Hill

Link to the order: http://tinyurl.com/onrrr .

Tuesday, February 21, 2006

Summary 2006 WY 21

Summary of Decision issued February 21, 2006

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Powell v. Estate of Fletcher

Citation: 2006 WY 21

Docket Number: 05-84

Appeal from the District Court of Sweetwater County, Honorable Nena R. James, Judge

Representing Appellant (Petitioner): Jody L. James of James and Scott, PC, Rock Springs, Wyoming and Edward G. Collister, Jr. of Collister & Kampschroeder, Lawrence, Kansas.

Representing Appellee (Respondent): George Lemich and Clark Stith of Greenhalgh, Beckwith, Lemich, Stith & Cannon, PC, Rock Springs, Wyoming.

Date of Decision: February 21, 2006

Issues: Whether the district court erred when it placed the burden on Appellant to prove her marriage to Fletcher had not been dissolved and found that Appellant had not sustained that burden.

Holdings: The probate court’s findings of fact are reviewed to determine whether they are clearly erroneous, inconsistent with the evidence, or contrary to the great weight of the evidence. The district court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. As a general rule, one who is already married cannot subsequently marry another and any such marriage is void. However, there is a countervailing preference in the law to uphold the validity of a marriage, even when it appears that one of the parties to the marriage has been married before. In light of these competing propositions, a presumption exists that a subsequent marriage is valid and, as a consequence, any prior marriage entered into by one of the parties is presumed to be dissolved through death or divorce. To overcome this presumption, the party asserting the validity of the first marriage must prove to the trier of fact, through clear and convincing evidence, that the previous marriage had not been dissolved by death or divorce when the second marriage was contracted. Evidence that the spouse asserting the validity of the prior marriage thoroughly searched records in any jurisdiction where unavailable spouse lived and may have legally sought a divorce will normally be sufficient. In the instant case, Appellant did not search for records of any divorce that may have been obtained by Fletcher. Because no search was conducted in the instant case, the probate court did not err in concluding that Appellant did not satisfy her burden.

The decree of the district court was affirmed.

J. Voigt delivered the opinion for the court.

Link to the case: http://tinyurl.com/ksmwq .

Tuesday, February 14, 2006

How-to: Keyboard Shortcuts

Keyboard shortcuts can save time and help prevent repetitive strain injuries. Here are some shortcuts for commonly-used browser and system functions. These shortcuts are based mainly on the Windows operating system, but I have included some notes for Mac users as well. There are many more shortcuts to available, including shortcuts specific to other operating systems (i.e., Linux) and browsers (i.e., Opera). For more shortcuts, run a Google search for “keyboard shortcuts”.

Notes for Mac OS X users:

  • Mac OS X uses Cmd instead of Ctrl; Option instead of Alt; Return instead of Enter.
  • The function keys (F1 through F12) are usually only applicable to Windows, since Mac OS X reserves these for other functions.

Browsing

Internet ExplorerFirefox
Go Back to the last pageALT + <--ALT + <--
Go Forward to the next pageALT + -->ALT + -->
Stop the page from loadingEscape (Esc)Escape (Esc)
Stop background soundsEscape (Esc)Escape (Esc)
Refresh/Reload the pageF5 or Ctrl + F5F5 or Ctrl + F5
Go to your HomepageAlt + HomeAlt + Home
Scroll downSpacebarSpacebar
Scroll upShift + SpacebarShift + Spacebar
New windowCtrl + NCtrl + N
Close the windowAlt + F4Alt + F4
Right click (context menu)Shift + F10Shift + F10
Increase the text sizeCtrl + +Ctrl + +
Decrease the text sizeCtrl + -Ctrl + -
Find on this pageCtrl + FCtrl + F
PrintCtrl + PCtrl + P
New tab Ctrl + T
Next tab Ctrl + Tab or Ctrl + PageDown
Previous Tab Ctrl + Shift + Tab or Ctrl + PageUp
Close tab Ctrl + F4

Windows: System and Programs
Open Start menuWindowsKey* or Ctrl + ESC
Open Windows ExplorerWindowsKey + E
Switch between open programsAlt + Tab
Delete item permanently (without placing it in the Recycle Bin)Shift + Delete
Minimize all open windowsWindowsKey + M
Maximize all open windowsWindowsKey + Shift + M
Close window/programAlt + F4
Open a menuALT + underlined letter in menu
Open FileCtrl + O
HelpF1
Select all the items in the current windowCtrl + A
Find & replace menuF5
CopyCtrl + C
CutCtrl + X
PasteCtrl + V
BoldCtrl + B
UnderlineCtrl + U
ItalicCtrl + I
Redo the last actionCtrl Y
Undo the last actionCtrl Z

*WindowsKey = Windows Key

http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;en-us;q126449
http://blogs.msdn.com/ie/archive/2006/02/08/527702.aspx
http://www.mozilla.org/support/firefox/keyboard

Monday, February 13, 2006

Summary 2006 WY 20

Summary of Decision issued February 13, 2006

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Martinez v. State

Citation: 2006 WY 20

Docket Number: 04-238

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Megan Hayes, Special Assistant Public Defender.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: February 13, 2006

Issues: Whether the State violated the appellant’s constitutional rights by threatening or coercing a potential defense witness. Whether appellant’s trial counsel were ineffective. Whether the constitutionality of the appellant’s sentence was raised properly in the district court. Whether the appellant was sentenced based on inaccurate information.

Holdings: The Court reviewed the record for the constitutional complaint by applying the de novo standard and concluded that the detectives’ response in the instant case did not amount to the “highly intimidating” statements, “excessive in number and badgering in tone or phrasing”, and “obviously threatening” that past cases have identified as so coercive as to raise constitutional concerns. The nexus between the government’s alleged conduct and the loss of material and favorable testimony was also tenuous. The record does not indicate that the witness was unwilling to testify or that he was no longer available to the defense due to improper governmental conduct.
The question of ineffective counsel requires the appellant to meet the two prong standard that counsel’s performance was deficient and that prejudice resulted. The Court has stated that the appellant must demonstrate the existence of a reasonable possibility that, absent that deficiency, the result of the proceedings would have been different. The Court reviewed the instances appellant discussed regarding victim buttons worn by the victim’s family, out-of-court contact with jurors, a sleeping juror and autopsy photographs. The Court did not find that the appellant satisfied his burden with respect to any of the above stated issues.
The question of the constitutionality of sentencing was not “specifically phrased and completely argued” in district court. Merely stating that the statute is unconstitutional because it violated the appellant’s “due process rights” is too conclusory an assertion to permit the Court’s review in the instant case. Appellant disputed a passage in the presentence investigation report as violating his due process right to be sentenced only on accurate information. The Court noted that other information in the presentence investigation report supported the passage to which he objected. The district court provided appellant with an opportunity to dispute the passage at issue during the sentencing hearing. Upon review of the record the Court could not find that the district court sentenced the appellant on unreliable, undocumented or inaccurate information.

The decree of the district court was affirmed.

J. Voigt delivered the opinion for the court.

Link to the case: http://tinyurl.com/862fo .

Thursday, February 02, 2006

Summary 2006 WY 19

Summary of Decision issued February 2, 2006

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Rodenbaugh v. Miller

Citation: 2006 WY 19

Docket Number: 05-94

Appeal from the District Court of Teton County, Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

Representing Appellant (Petitioner): James K. Lubing of James K. Lubing Law Office, Jackson, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Respondent): Jill Dean LaRance of LaRance & Syth, PC, Billings, Montana.

Date of Decision: February 2, 2006

Issues: Whether the district court abused its discretion when it determined that a substantial change of circumstances warranting a modification of child support did not exist when it did not examine Appellee’s cash flow, ability to pay and total financial situation.

Holdings: The process of review when child support is the issue is abuse of discretion. Child support guidelines identify a base from which the judge must invoke the exercise of discretion. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-311 forms the centerpiece of Appellant’s argument. The amount of child support owed by a parent is calculated by examining each parent’s “income” and thereafter determining each parent’s “net income” as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-303(a)(iii). Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-308 requires reliable and accurate financial affidavits and disclosures by parents. A significant problem in this case is that the Court was not certain whether the parties and the district court were on the right page of the right statutes. It appears that Appellee’s income was not calculated in the manner required by the governing statutes and applicable case law. It also appears that perhaps too much income was attributed to Appellant. The Court reviewed the district court record and concluded that the findings of fact and conclusions of law were not supported by the record. The district court’s conclusions were contrary to the great weight of the evidence. They were not drawn from objective criteria, and the district court did not exercise sound judgment with regard to what is correct under the circumstances and did so arbitrarily and capriciously.

The case was reversed and remanded.

C.J. Hill delivered the opinion for the court.

Link to case: http://tinyurl.com/ajap7 .

Summary 2006 WY 18

Summary of Decision issued February 2, 2006

[SPECIAL NOTE: These opinions use the "Universal Citation." They were given "official" citations when they were issued. You should use these citations whenever you cite these opinions, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinions that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Chauncey v. State

Citation: 2006 WY 18

Docket Number: 04-119

Appeal from the District Court of Sheridan County, Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge.

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Kenneth Koski, Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Diane Courselle, Director, University of Wyoming Defender Aid Program; James Mowry, Student Intern; and Christopher Humphrey, Student Intern.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: February 2, 2006

Issues: Whether the Appellant’s due process rights were violated because the prosecution failed to provide him with reports from two law enforcement interviews.

Holdings: Brady v. Maryland and its progeny impose an affirmative duty on the prosecutor to learn of favorable evidence in the state’s control and divulge such evidence to the defendant. The Appellant received two documents prior to sentencing that he claims were exculpatory and should have been disclosed pursuant to Brady. The first was a summary of an interview with state’s witness CS conducted by DCI. The second is an interview of defense witness Richardson conducted by DCI. Much of the Appellant’s argument can be dismissed because he mischaracterizes the content of the interview of CS. A prosecutor is not required to deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial. When the material sought has no bearing in the case, it is not favorable and non-disclosure is not error. The question of whether the CS interview should have been disclosed as favorable and material evidence because it had value as an impeachment tool remained. The Court reviewed the record and concluded that where a witness for the State has been exhaustively impeached, both generally and to the specific issue by the suppressed evidence, the court does not believe that one additional piece of cumulative information makes the verdict unworthy of confidence.
The Court reviewed the record to determine whether the Richardson interview was suppressed, favorable and material. While the Richardson interview was suppressed and favorable to the appellant, the State was correct that in this case, the information was not material. It was clear from the record and the transcript of Richardson’s testimony in a previous trial that Richardson was deeply involved in using and selling narcotics and she also played a role in manufacturing methamphetamine. Her efficacy as a witness would also be marred by the fact that she had no firsthand knowledge of any contact between CS and the Appellant on the night in question. During cross-examination she admitted to lying and not telling everything during her interviews. The Court determined that Richardson’s interview was not material and its nondisclosure was not a violation of Brady.

The district court's judgment is affirmed.

J. Voigt delivered the opinion for the court.

Link to case: http://tinyurl.com/7dmuv .

Summary 2006 WY 17

Summary of Decision issued January 26, 2006

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Miller v. State

Citation: 2006 WY 17

Docket Number: 05-33

Appeal from the District Court of Lincoln County, Honorable Jere Ryckman, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Mike Cornia, Evanston, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Causey.

Date of Decision: January 26, 2006

Issues: Whether denying Appellant the ability to question the State’s only witness regarding his recent conviction violated Appellant’s right to confrontation. Whether the admission of Justin Miller’s statements to the circuit court judge implicating Appellant was error requiring reversal. Whether the presentation of evidence and argument involving Justin Miller’s guilty plea was plain error. Whether there was sufficient evidence presented to support Appellant’s convictions, under the alternate theories of delivery presented to the jury.

Holdings: Denial of Right to Confrontation: Appellant’s constitutional claim is a question of law which is reviewed de novo. The State filed a motion in limine to prohibit the defense from inquiring into criminal charges then pending against their witness Justin Miller. The district court granted the State’s motion. The Court reviewed the district court record and stated that it did not see how Appellant’s right to effectively cross-examine Justin Miller was impaired by the liminal ruling. The district court had specifically stated that it would revisit the issue if defense counsel could produce a more significant reason for the introduction of the evidence.
Justin Miller’s Statements in the Circuit Court: Appellant did not object at trial to the evidence challenged on his appeal so the plain error standard of review was applied. The Court carefully reviewed the record and concluded that no reasonable possibility existed that the jury’s verdict would have been different in the absence of the challenged testimony and the prosecutor’s comments.
Evidence of Justin Miller’s Guilty Plea: Appellant did not object to this testimony or to the prosecutor’s statements at issue so the plain error standard was applied. Miller claimed Kwallek v. State and the line of cases following it was the basis for the violation. The Court stated that Kwallek was inapplicable. Kwallek precludes the State from presenting evidence of guilty pleas of accomplices of co-conspirators in it’s case-in-chief under circumstances that might tend to implicate the defendant’s guilt by association. Here, Justin Miller was not an accomplice or co-conspirator in the crimes for which Appellant was on trial.
Evidentiary Sufficiency: The Bush line of cases held that when a crime may be committed in alternative ways, and the jury is instructed on each alternative and returns a general verdict of guilt, the verdict must be set aside unless sufficient evidence exists to support a finding of guilt as to each alternative. Here, the elements instruction given to the jury on the charged offense did not contain alternative elements upon which Appellant’s convictions could be based. The Court’s review of the record disclosed ample evidence from which the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was guilty.

The decree of the district court was affirmed.

J. Golden delivered the opinion for the court.

Link to the case: http://tinyurl.com/97f4o .

Summary 2006 WY 16

Summary of Decision issued January 26, 2006

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Briefing.com v. Jones

Citation: 2006 WY 16

Docket Number: 04-196

Certified Questions from the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, The Honorable William F. Downes, Judge.

Representing Appellants (Plaintiffs): Thomas A. Nicholas, III and Robert C. Jarosh of Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, Wyoming; and Paul E. Chronis and Melissa Eckhause of McDermott, Will & Emery, Chicago, Illinois.

Representing Appellees (Defendants): William P. Schwartz, William B. Campbell, and Janet Lewis of Ranck & Schwartz, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming.

Date of Decision: January 26, 2006

Certified Questions: (1) Would the Wyoming Supreme Court adopt a common-law cause of action for misappropriation of trade secrets and/or confidential information when former employees of a company are alleged to have misappropriated their former employer’s trade secrets and/or confidential information to start a competing business? (2) If the answer to question number 1 is yes, what are the elements of the cause of action?

Discussion: The certifying order from the United States District court for the District of Wyoming provided a statement of Alleged Facts Relevant to Certified Questions as well as the Nature of the Controversy in Which the Questions Arose.
Misuse or misappropriation of a trade secret as a tort was part of the common law adopted by the Wyoming legislature as the “rule of decision” for the State. The numerous statutes in Wyoming recognizing the confidentiality of trade secrets in particular contexts reveal the legislature’s commitment to trade secret protection, yet they do not constitute such a “covering of the whole field” as to evidence legislative intent to abrogate the common law rule. As Wyoming has advanced into the modern commercial world along with the rest of the United States, its people have the same need for trade secret protection as do the rest of the people of the country. Consequently, the Court had no hesitation in declaring that the tort of misuse or misappropriation of trade secrets is part of the law of the jurisdiction. The Court adopted the cause of action as it appears on Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition because it represents the common law cause of action in its modern and most appropriate version.

Answers to Certified Questions: (1) The common law cause of action for misappropriation of trade secrets and/or confidential information when former employees of a company are alleged to have misappropriated their former employer’s trade secrets and/or confidential information to start a competing business is part of the common law in the State of Wyoming. (2) The elements of the cause of action are those contained in Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (1995), §§ 39 through 45.

Dissent: C.J. Hill and J. Golden would have referred the responsibility for answering the certified questions to the legislature. They expressed concern about adopting the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition as the vehicle for filling the gap for not having given recognition to a civil remedy to protect trade secrets. The Justices stated that the majority of jurisdictions now use UTSA or other legislative enactments to govern the area of law.

J. Voigt delivered the opinion for the court.
C.J. Hill dissenting, joined by J. Golden.

Link to the case: http://tinyurl.com/czjes .

Summary 2006 WY 15

Summary of Decision issued January 24, 2006.

[SPECIAL NOTE: These opinions use the "Universal Citation." They were given "official" citations when they were issued. You should use these citations whenever you cite these opinions, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinions that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Alcorn v. Sauer Drilling Co.

Citation: 2006 WY 15

Docket Number: 05-51

Appeal from the District Court of Sweetwater County, the Honorable Jere Ryckman, Judge.

Representing Appellant (Employee/Claimant): Donald J. Rissler, Rissler & Gosar & Bundy, Riverton, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Employer/Respondent and the State of Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division): Stephenson D. Emery, of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville; Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Steven R. Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kristi M. Radosevich, Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: January 24, 2006

Issues: Whether the hearing officer erred in denying Appellant’s claim for TTD benefits because he failed to comply with applicable filing requirements.

Holdings: Temporary total disability is defined as that period of time an employee is temporarily and totally incapacitated from performing employment at any gainful employment or occupation for which he is reasonably suited by experience or training. The period of temporary total disability terminates at the time the employee completely recovers or qualifies for benefits under W.S. 27-14-405 or 27-14-406. The purpose of temporary total disability benefits is to provide income for an employee during the time of healing from his injury and until his condition has stabilized. In order to be entitled to TTD benefits, a claimant must: (1) obtain a treating healthcare provider's certification that he is temporarily totally disabled; and (2) file the claim for TTD benefits within sixty (60) days of the first day of certified disability. At the contested case hearing, Appellant conceded that, for the time period in dispute, he did not file a TTD claim within 60 days of the first day of certified disability. He contended, however, that he was excused from compliance with the statutory filing requirements because his case was "pending before the Division as a contested case.". In June 1995, the Division terminated TTD benefits because, in its opinion, the employee had reached maximum medical improvement. The employee appealed this determination. While the appeal was pending, the employee failed to re-certify for TTD benefits. The OAH determined that the employee had not reached maximum medical improvement and, despite the employee's noncompliance with the re-certification requirements, awarded the employee retroactive benefits for the time during which the appeal had been pending. The applicable statutes and rules are not silent regarding the procedural requirements which must be met by a claimant for an initial award of TTD benefits. The unambiguous language of the pertinent statutes and rules requires timely filing of the TTD claim and certification by a healthcare provider. A claimant's failure to file a timely claim limits the Division's opportunity to effectively monitor and evaluate a claimant's entitlement to TTD benefits. The failure to properly file an initial TTD claim also undermines an employer's right to offer light duty work to the employee in lieu of TTD benefits. Based upon the foregoing, the OAH properly denied Mr. Alcorn's claim for retroactive TTD benefits on the basis that Mr. Appellant failed to file a timely TTD claim properly certified by one of his healthcare providers for the time period at issue.


The decision of the district court is affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the opinion for the court.

Link to the case: http://tinyurl.com/7tdou .

Summary 2006 WY 14

Summary of Decision issued January 24, 2006

[SPECIAL NOTE: These opinions use the "Universal Citation." They were given "official" citations when they were issued. You should use these citations whenever you cite these opinions, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinions that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Mulinnix LLC. V. HBK Royalty Trust
Hickman v. Groves

Citation: 2006 WY 14

Docket Number: 05-80, 05-81

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

Case No. 05-80

Representing Appellants (Plaintiffs): Cameron S. Walker of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing Parnell Appellees (Defendants): James L. Edwards of Stevens, Edwards, Hallock & Carpenter, Gillette, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee Pennaco Energy, Inc.: S. Thomas Throne of Throne & Hurst, Sheridan, Wyoming.

Case No. 05-81

Representing Appellants (Defendants): Cameron S. Walker of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing Appellees (Plaintiffs): Kendal R. Hoopes and Jay A. Gilbertz of Yonkee & Toner, Sheridan, Wyoming.

Date of Decision: January 24, 2006

Issues: Whether the reservation of "oil and commercial gravel rights" included gas or coalbed methane. Whether "circumstances surrounding" an unambiguous document should be considered when determining the intent of the parties to a deed. Whether a document without words of conveyance recorded 20 years after the date of the deed changed the ownership transferred by the deed.

Holdings: The party asserting a particular trade usage of a term has the burden of proving the existence of the trade usage. Appellants attempted to prove that ranchers, who may not have been highly educated or sophisticated, often referred to their entire bundle of minerals rights as "oil rights" without distinguishing between oil and gas. Consequently, they maintained the use of the term "oil rights" in the deeds was meant to include the gas, as well as the oil. The Appellees agreed that, in the 1940s, people may have used the term "oil rights" in casual conversation to mean a broader variety of mineral rights. Nevertheless, they claimed, in formal documents such as deeds, landowners (including ranchers) were more specific and described with particularity the interests being conveyed and/or reserved. According to the Appellees, the term "oil rights" was used in the deeds to mean simply that *oil and not gas*. In deciding whether the Appellants had satisfied their burden of proof, the district court considered the understanding of persons who had occasion to negotiate land transactions at the time the deeds were executed and found that while the general term "oil rights" was undoubtedly used during informal discussions to refer to the bundle of rights associated with surface and sub-surface holdings, warranty deeds recorded during the period habitually referred with more exacting specificity to those substances being reserved by the grantor in a conveyance. The testimony and documentary evidence presented at the trial supports the district court's conclusion that the term "oil rights" in the deeds did not include "gas." The ultimate goal of the interpretation of any contract, including a deed, is to discern the intention of the parties to the document. In doing so, the court first looks to the plain meaning of the words of the deed. The plain meaning of a contract's language is that meaning which the language would convey to reasonable persons at the time and place of its use. The function of the parol evidence rule is to prevent parties from supplementing or contradicting the terms of the contract. Once the terms of the agreement are identified, the parol evidence rule ceases to operate. The rule does not prohibit use of extrinsic evidence of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed to interpret the meaning of its terms. By allowing evidence of the circumstances surrounding execution of the deed, courts are more apt to arrive at the parties' true intention at the time of the execution of the deed. Custom and usage of a particular place or trade can be proved to give to the words of a written contract a meaning different from that which would be given to the words by their more general usage without violating the parol evidence rule. Therefore, evidence of usage may be admissible to give meaning to apparently unambiguous terms of a contract where other parol evidence would be inadmissible. Thus, circumstances known to the parties at the time they entered into contract, such as what that industry considered to be the norm, or reasonable or prudent, should be considered in construing a contract, while the parties' statements of what they intended the contract to mean are not admissible. Custom and usage may be proved to show the intention of parties to a written contract or other instrument in the use of phrases of a peculiar technical meaning which, when unexplained, are susceptible of two or more plain and reasonable constructions. Parol evidence may be admitted to establish a technical meaning where certain provincialisms and technicalities of science and commerce have acquired a known, fixed and definite meaning different from their ordinary meaning by legal custom or usage. Thus, in the interpretation of technical terms used in a contract, it is proper to consider the meaning given to those terms in the course of prior dealings between the parties, as well as by business or trade custom or usage. The correct rule with reference to the admissibility of evidence as to trade usage under the circumstances presented here is that while words in a contract are ordinarily to be construed according to their plain, ordinary, popular or legal meaning, as the case may be, if in reference to the subject matter of the contract, particular expressions have by trade usage acquired a different meaning, and both parties are engaged in that trade, the parties to the contract are considered to have used them according to their different and peculiar sense as shown by such trade usage. Parol evidence is admissible to establish the trade usage, and that is true even though the words are in their ordinary or legal meaning entirely unambiguous, since, by reason of the usage, the words are used by the parties in a different sense." Pursuant to its plain language, the Declaration of Interest did not affect the parties' interests in the mineral estate. It was signed only by the parties who were the grantees in the original deed, so it could not modify the interests transferred and/or reserved in the original deed. Furthermore, the Declaration of Interest did not contain words of conveyance indicating the grantees were relinquishing or conveying any interest they held to the appellants. Although no particular words are required to convey real property, the language of the document must indicate a specific intention to convey the property. There were no such words of conveyance included in the Declaration of Interest. Consequently, the declaration failed to modify legal title to the property.

Affirmed.

J. Kite delivered the opinion for the court.

Link to the case: http://tinyurl.com/8f7bu .

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