Summary 2014 WY 46

Summary of Decision April 9, 2014

Justice Davis delivered the opinion of the Court. Reversed.

Case Name: SAMUEL P. SNELL v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Docket Number: S-13-0164

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, the Honorable Thomas W. Rumpke, Judge

Representing Appellant: Office of the State Public Defender: Diane Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Chief Appellate Counsel; Diane E. Courselle, Director, and Grant Smith of the Defender Aid Program, University of Wyoming College of Law. Argument by Mr. Smith.

Representing Appellee: Peter K. Michael, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; Jeffrey Pope, Assistant Attorney General; Caitlin Young, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Young.

Date of Decision: April 9, 2014

Facts: Appellant Samuel P. Snell was arrested and charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol. He filed a motion to suppress the results of his blood alcohol concentration (BAC) test, claiming that the affidavit supporting the search warrant authorizing his blood to be taken for testing failed to demonstrate probable cause. The motion was denied, and Appellant was subsequently convicted by a jury of driving with a BAC of at least 0.08% for a fourth or subsequent time in ten years, a felony. He now challenges the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress as well as the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction.

Issue: Did the affidavit supporting the application for a warrant to draw Appellant’s blood contain sufficient information for a judicial officer to make an independent judgment that there was probable cause that Appellant had been driving while intoxicated?

Holdings/Conclusion: We find that the affidavit in support of the search warrant is deficient because it contains bare conclusions. Consequently, we must hold that the district court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress the results of his BAC test. We reverse.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note, when you look at the opinion, that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quotation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance.]

Summary 2013 WY 123

Summary of Decision October 9, 2013

Chief Justice Kite delivered the opinion for the Court. Reversed and remanded.

Case Name: KEITH VOGT v. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Docket Number: S-12-0283

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County the Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

Representing Appellant: Bernard Q. Phelan, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; Douglas J. Moench, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: October 9, 2013

Facts: Keith Vogt was stopped for failing to use his turn signal and subsequently arrested for driving while under the influence of a controlled substance (DUI) in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(b) (LexisNexis 2009). He refused to submit to chemical testing. The Wyoming Department of Transportation (the State) notified him that his driver’s license would be suspended for six months. Mr. Vogt requested a hearing. After the hearing, the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) found there was probable cause for the arrest and upheld the suspension. Mr. Vogt appealed the ruling to the district court, which affirmed the OAH decision. He then appealed to this Court, claiming reasonable suspicion did not exist for detaining him beyond the scope of the initial traffic stop and the OAH ruling that probable cause existed to arrest him for DUI is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

Issues: The issues for this Court’s determination are: 1. Whether reasonable suspicion existed to detain Mr. Vogt for field sobriety tests after he was stopped for a traffic violation; 2. Whether the OAH’s determination that probable cause existed to arrest Mr. Vogt for DUI was clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

Holdings: The totality of the circumstances simply does not support the OAH’s conclusion that probable cause existed to arrest Mr. Vogt for driving while under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances. Particularly in light of the fact that the PBT was negative for alcohol and searches of Mr. Vogt’s vehicle and his person prior to his arrest produced no evidence of controlled substances, we conclude a prudent, reasonable and cautious police officer would not have arrested him for DUI. The OAH’s conclusion that probable cause existed to arrest Mr. Vogt for DUI was clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. We reverse and remand to the district court with directions to remand to the OAH for entry of an order reversing the driver’s license suspension.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summary 2012 WY 131

Summary of Decision October 5, 2012

Chief Justice Kite delivered the opinion for the Court. Affirmed.

Case Name: CARL ANTHONY DIMINO v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Docket Number: S-12-0014

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge.

Representing Appellant: Diane Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina N. Olson, Chief Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee: Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Lucas J. Esch, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: October 5, 2012

Facts:  After conditionally pleading guilty to possession with intent to deliver marijuana, Carl Anthony Dimino challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence discovered during a search of his vehicle.  He maintained that he was unconstitutionally detained for a drug dog sniff after a traffic stop and that the subsequent search of his vehicle was illegal. 

Issues: Mr. Dimino states a single issue on appeal:

Did the trial court err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of his illegal detention and the subsequent search of his rental vehicle?

The State articulates two issues, which we rephrase:

Did the trooper have a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify detaining Mr. Dimino momentarily so the trooper’s drug dog could walk around the rental car for a free air sniff?

Did the trooper have probable cause to search Mr. Dimino’s rental car, with or without the drug dog alert?

Holdings:  The Court affirmed, concluding the trooper had reasonable suspicion to detain him and the search was legal.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summary 2012 WY 87

Summary of Decision June 19, 2012


Chief Justice Kite delivered the opinion for the Court. The convictions and sentences were affirmed.

Case Name: BRYAN ELLIS PHELPS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

JUSTIN LINDALE FITCH v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Docket Number: S-11-0215; S-11-0216

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, Honorable Michael K. Davis, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff/Defendant): Dion J. Custis of Dion J. Custis, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff/Defendant): Gregory A. Phillips, Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Justin A. Daraie, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Daraie.

Date of Decision: June 19, 2012

Facts: A Wyoming Highway Patrol trooper stopped Bryan Ellis Phelps and Justin Lindale Fitch for a traffic violation, detained them, conducted a drug dog sniff of their vehicle and, after the dog alerted to the presence of controlled substances, searched the vehicle and found marijuana. Messrs. Phelps and Fitch were each charged with three felonies. They moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search and the district court denied the motion. They subsequently entered pleas of guilty to one of the counts, while reserving their right to appeal the denial of their suppression motion. On appeal, they challenge that denial as well as the district court’s denial of a discovery motion.

Issues: Messrs. Phelps and Fitch present the following issues for our consideration:

I. Was there reasonable cause to stop the vehicle?

II. Did the traffic stop exceed the scope of an investigatory detention?

III. Was the dog’s alert sufficient to establish probable cause for a search of the vehicle?

IV. Did the district court abuse its discretion and commit reversible error by denying the Appellants’ motions to discover[1] and to suppress?

The State asserts the initial stop was justified, the initial questioning was reasonably related to the stop, reasonable suspicion supported continued questioning, and probable cause existed to search the vehicle.

Holdings: The Court affirmed the convictions and sentences.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summary 2011 WY 145

Summary of Decision October 20, 2011


[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Orchard v. State of Wyoming, Department of Transportation

Citation: 2011 WY 145

Docket Number: S-11-0084

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=464647

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): R. Michael Vang, Fleener & Vang, Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Gregory A. Phillips, Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; Douglas J. Moench, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Michael T. Kahler, Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: October 20, 2011

Facts: Appellant was arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol. As a result, the Wyoming Department of Transportation advised him that it was suspending his driver’s license pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 31-6-102. Appellant contested the suspension before the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), and the OAH upheld the suspension. He sought review in the district court, and the court affirmed the OAH’s order. Appellant challenges the district court’s order, contending that the police officer who arrested him lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop.

Issues: Whether the arresting officer presented sufficient facts within his Officer’s Signed Statement and certified record to support his claim that he received an anonymous REDDI report and observed sufficient facts while on routine traffic patrol that would allow him to make contact with the Licensee and ultimately arrest him for “driving while under the influence of alcohol” (DWUI).

Holdings: The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects persons from unreasonable searches and seizures. A routine traffic stop constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief. The decision to stop an automobile is justified when the officer has probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred or when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that the particular motorist is engaged in criminal activity. An officer’s personal observation of a traffic violation provides probable cause to initiate a stop. An investigatory stop may be justified by reasonable suspicion where a police officer is able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.

In cases where reasonable suspicion originates from an anonymous informant’s tip to the police, the tip may provide reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop if it carries sufficient indicia of reliability. Where an anonymous informant makes no prediction of future behavior indicating a special familiarity with the respondent’s affairs, the investigating officer is required to corroborate the tip in some other fashion, usually by observing either a traffic violation or driving indicative of impairment.

In the present case, the arresting officer’s narrative stated that, as he passed a vehicle matching the description in the REDDI report, he noticed that the vehicle drifted over the double yellow centerline. The officer further stated that he turned around to follow the vehicle, and then noticed that they did not activate their blinker when turning right into a gas station. The officer activated his emergency overhead lights and initiated a traffic stop of Appellant’s vehicle.

Appellant does not dispute that the officer’s observations, as presented in his narrative report, provide sufficient justification for a stop. He contends, however, that the officer did not see Appellant driving his vehicle. He argues that the video recordings of the traffic stop and the witness testimony indicate that the officer never saw a traffic violation and simply approached Appellant as he was gassing up his car for the next morning and his car happened to match a REDDI report.

The hearing examiner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, and that those findings support a determination that the stop of Appellant’s vehicle was reasonable under either a reasonable suspicion or probable cause analysis. An observed violation of a traffic law, by itself, provides an officer with probable cause to initiate a traffic stop. Observation of traffic violations may also provide sufficient corroboration of a REDDI report to justify an intrusion based on reasonable suspicion that a motorist is driving while under the influence. The arresting officer’s signed statement indicated that he observed Appellant commit two traffic violations, and the statement was supported by the videos presented at the contested case hearing. In one of the recordings, Appellant can be heard asking the officer why he was stopped. This statement indicates that Appellant was indeed “stopped” by the officer, and it appears to contradict Appellant’s claim that he had been parked at the gas station for three to five minutes before being approached by the officer. Further, in response to Appellant’s inquiry as to why he was stopped, the officer stated that he stopped him for drifting over the centerline and failing to use his turn signal.

In addition, the testimony from the witness who was present when the arresting officer received the REDDI alert does not contradict any material fact set forth in the arresting officer’s narrative. Although the witness’s statements may create a dispute as to whether the officer received the report while he was “on routine patrol,” this alleged inconsistency in the officer’s narrative does not negate the possibility that the officer observed Appellant between the time that the officer left the restaurant and stopped Appellant at the gas station.

The Department of Transportation’s certified record, which included the arresting officer’s signed statement, constitutes relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the determination that the arresting officer had probable cause or reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop of Appellant’s vehicle.

Finally, Appellant contends that the arresting officer did not have probable cause to make an arrest. Appellant, however, did not raise this issue in the proceedings before the OAH. With the exception of certain jurisdictional or fundamental issues, the court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. This rule is equally applicable to appeals from administrative decisions as to those from district courts. Appellant has made no argument and has offered no authority indicating that he presents a “jurisdictional” or “fundamental” issue.

Affirmed.



J. Burke delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2011 WY 143

Summary of Decision October 14, 2011


[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Tiernan v. State

Citation: 2011 WY 143

Docket Number: S-11-0058

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=464631

Appeal from the District Court of  Albany County, Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): R. Michael Vang of Fleener & Vang, Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; Douglas J. Moench, Senior Assistant Attorney General; John S. Shumway, Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: October 14, 2011

Facts: A Wyoming State Trooper stopped Appellant on suspicion of driving while impaired after he observed his vehicle cross the center line and the fog line a couple of times. The trooper conducted field sobriety tests and arrested Appellant for driving under the influence of alcohol. Appellant refused to submit to chemical testing and the Wyoming Department of Transportation (WYDOT) advised him that it intended to suspend his driver’s license. Appellant requested a hearing during which he argued the trooper was not justified in stopping him. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the suspension. Appellant appealed to the district court, which affirmed the OAH order. He has appealed the district court’s ruling affirming the OAH order. He contends the trooper failed to present sufficient facts to support the stop for a lane violation.

Issues: Whether the DVD recording taken from the trooper’s patrol car supports the conclusion that he had probable cause to stop Appellant for failing to maintain a single lane of traffic in violation of Wyo. Stat. 31-5-209(a)(i) (2011).

Holdings: The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. A routine traffic stop constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief. Detention of a motorist is justified when the officer has probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred or has a reasonable articulable suspicion that the particular motorist is engaged in criminal activity.

Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause and requires a fact-centered inquiry based on the totality of the circumstances. To the extent that the distinction between the two standards has been blurred, the Wyoming Supreme Court has stated that a law enforcement official’s personal observation of a traffic law violation provides probable cause to initiate a traffic stop. Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to detain the drivers after the initial stop is a separate question the resolution of which depends on the circumstances. Likewise, the question of whether an officer has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying a traffic stop in the absence of personally observing a traffic violation is a separate question which is determined based upon the totality of the circumstances. In cases like the present one, however, the question is whether the evidence supports the conclusion that the trooper had probable cause to stop Appellant’s vehicle for failing to maintain a single lane of traffic.

In present action, the OAH examined all of the surrounding circumstances in determining whether the trooper was justified in stopping Appellant’s vehicle, including the trooper’s report, the DVD and Appellant’s argument that the DVD refuted the report. Upon consideration of all of the circumstances, the OAH concluded the trooper was warranted in stopping the vehicle.

An examination of the entire record shows substantial evidence supports the agency’s decision. The trooper stated in his report that he observed the vehicle cross over the center line, drift back to the right and cross over the fog line and drift again over the fog line at the approach of another vehicle. In addition to these statements, the OAH reviewed the DVD and found that although it did not depict clearly whether Appellant’s vehicle crossed over the lines because of its poor quality and limited duration, it did show the vehicle drifting from one side of the lane to the other more than once and, therefore, corroborated the trooper’s statements. Taken together, the report and the DVD constitute relevant evidence from which a reasonable mind might conclude that the trooper had probable cause to stop Appellant’s vehicle for a traffic violation.

Affirmed.







C.J. Kite delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2011 WY 110

Summary of Decision July 14, 2011


[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: State v. Juarez

Citation: 2011 WY 110

Docket Number: S-10-0260

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=464084

Original Proceeding Petition for Writ of Review from the District Court of Carbon County, Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

Representing Appellant (Petitioner): Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Justin A. Daraie, Assistant Attorney General.

Representing Appellee (Respondent): Robert T. Moxley of Robert T. Moxley,, Cheyenne, WY.

Date of Decision: July 14, 2011

Facts: The State of Wyoming challenges the district court’s order granting Appellee’s motion to suppress for an illegal traffic stop. The State contends that the district court erred in ruling that Juarez was not required to signal his merge from an entrance ramp onto an interstate highway.

Issues: Whether the district court erred in holding that Wyo. Stat. 31-5-217 is ambiguous and does not require motorists to signal when merging onto an interstate roadway; a ruling which led the court to find a traffic stop was illegal and to suppress the evidence subsequently discovered.

Holdings: There is no reason to believe the Wyoming Legislature necessarily intended the use of a turn signal when entering the interstate from a designated on-ramp. As with most traffic-related statutes, Wyo. Stat. 31-5-217 is intended to promote safety and there is no basis to conclude that a motorist is absolutely required to signal to enter the interstate in every instance. The intended course of such vehicles is known and obvious to other motorists; such drivers have no other choice but to enter the interstate. Their course does not require a lane change or a turn, or even necessarily right to left “movement.”

There was no error in the district court’s order granting Appellee’s motion to suppress for an illegal traffic stop.

Affirmed.



J. Hill delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2011 Wy 100

Summary of Decision June 27, 2011


[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Vasco v. The State of Wyoming, Department of Transportation

Citation: 2011 WY 100

Docket Number: S-10-0235

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=463498

Appeal from the District Court of Albany County, Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

Representing Appellant (Petitioner): R. Michael Vang of Fleener & Vang, Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Respondent): Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; Douglas J. Moench, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: June 27, 2011

Facts: Appellant was arrested for interference with a police officer and for driving under the influence of alcohol. He refused to submit to chemical testing, and the Wyoming Department of Transportation (WYDOT) advised him that it was suspending his driver’s license for six months. He requested a hearing, at the conclusion of which the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the suspension. Appellant sought review in the district court, which affirmed the OAH order. Appellant appealed to this Court, claiming the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest him.

Issues: Whether probable cause existed to arrest Appellant for interference, such that the evidence that he had been driving under the influence of alcohol obtained thereafter was admissible and sufficient to support suspending his driver’s license.

Holdings: Appellant contends his arrest for interference with a police officer was unlawful because the officer lacked probable cause for the arrest. He argues further that because the interference arrest was unlawful, all of the evidence obtained thereafter was tainted and should have been suppressed. Because the suspension of his driver’s license depended upon a lawful arrest for DUI and the evidence giving rise to his DUI arrest resulted from an unlawful interference arrest, Appellant submits, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine barred the evidence of either arrest and the suspension of this license must be rescinded.

Probable cause for a warrantless arrest exists when, under the totality of the circumstances, a prudent, reasonable, and cautious peace officer would be led to believe that a crime has been or is being committed and the individual arrested is the perpetrator. Appellant was arrested for violating Laramie Municipal Ordinance § 9.04.030, which provides in pertinent part that “No person shall resist any police officer . . . in the discharge of his duties or in any way interfere with or hinder or prevent him from discharging his duty . . . or endeavor to do so.” The State had the burden of proving probable cause existed to arrest Appellant for interference.

From the totality of the circumstances, a prudent, reasonable and cautious peace officer would have been led to believe that Appellant was resisting, interfering, hampering or preventing the discharge of his duties. When asked for identification, Appellant gave a false name and attempted to walk past the officer. When the officer told him to stop, informed him that he was investigating a hit and run accident and asked again to see some identification, he hindered the officer’s efforts by opening, closing and putting his wallet back in his pocket several times without letting the officer see his driver’s license. He also disregarded the officer’s order to stay where he was and answer questions by attempting to go inside his apartment. After the officer warned him that he would be arrested for interference if he did not produce his driver’s license, Appellant nudged past him and headed for his apartment. By these acts, Appellant gave the officer probable cause to believe that he was hindering him from discharging his duty to investigate the hit-and-run accident. There was probable cause to arrest Appellant for interference with a police officer.

The officer also had probable cause to believe Appellant had been driving under the influence of alcohol. At the time the officer stopped and questioned Appellant, he knew the Nissan truck involved in the hit-and-run accident was registered to him and the driver had left the scene on foot. Additionally, he had seen Appellant who he knew from previous contact, walking from the direction of the accident toward his apartment. Upon stopping and questioning him, the officer smelled alcohol on Appellant’s breath and noticed his eyes were red and he was swaying. After arresting him for interference, the officer searched Appellant and found a set of keys with a Nissan remote control. The officer subsequently confirmed that the keys belonged to the Nissan involved in the accident. Additionally, he learned that another officer had found a beer bottle on the ground outside the passenger door of the Nissan and that the beer bottle fell out when the person whose vehicle the Nissan hit went looking for the driver and opened the passenger door. With that information, there was probable cause to believe that Appellant had been driving the Nissan while under the influence of alcohol and was required to advise Appellant, who was then lawfully under arrest, in accordance with the Wyoming implied consent statutes.

Affirmed.



C.J. Kite delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2011 WY 72

Summary of Decision April 25, 2011


[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Harvey v. State (Department of Transportation)

Citation: 2011 WY 72

Docket Number: S-10-0194

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=462045

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): R. Michael Vang, Fleener & Vang, Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; Kenneth J. Miller, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Douglas J. Moench, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: April 25, 2011

Facts: Appellant challenges an order from the district court affirming the suspension of his driver’s license under Wyo. Stat. 31-6-102 (2009) for operating a forklift along the side of a highway while under the influence of alcohol. Appellant contends the trooper who stopped him for failure to display a slow moving vehicle emblem as required by Wyo. Stat. 31-5-921(d) did not have probable cause to justify the stop.

Issues: Whether the arresting officer presented sufficient facts to find that Appellant violated the elements of Wyoming’s Implied Consent law, specifically that the officer presented sufficient “admissible” evidence to support that he observed a valid violation of Wyoming Stat. 31-5-921(d).

Holdings: Appellant does not dispute that he failed to display a slow moving vehicle emblem on the forklift while operating it on the highway. Rather, he argues that the failure to display such an emblem was not a violation of Wyo. Stat. 31-5-921(d) and, accordingly, did not provide the trooper with probable cause to initiate the traffic stop.

The phrase “special mobile equipment designed for operation at speeds not in excess of twenty-five (25) miles per hour,” as used in Wyo. Stat. 31-5-921(d) unambiguously includes forklifts. Although the Legislature did not define the term “special mobile equipment,” the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used indicates that a forklift is included. First, it is clear that a forklift is “mobile equipment” as contemplated by the statute and it is unnecessary to resort to dictionary definitions of those terms. Second, the word “special,” in the sense in which it is used to describe “special mobile equipment,” is defined as “distinguished by some unusual quality,” or “designed or selected for a particular purpose, occasion, or other end.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2186 (3d ed. 2002). Looking to the definition of a forklift, which is “a machine for hoisting heavy objects by means of a row of steel fingers,” a forklift falls squarely within the broad connotations associated with the phrase “‘special’ mobile equipment.” Turning next to the second part of the phrase used in the statute, there is no difficulty determining that a forklift is “designed for operation at speeds not in excess of twenty-five (25) miles per hour.” Appellant has presented no evidence relating to the speed of the particular forklift he was driving or forklifts in general. Despite the fact that a forklift may be capable of speeds greater than 25 miles per hour, however, the principal virtue for which a forklift is designed is lifting capacity, not speed, and it can be safely concluded that a forklift is not designed to transport heavy objects at speeds greater than 25 miles per hour. In sum, reasonable persons can agree with consistency and predictability that a forklift is “special mobile equipment designed for operation at speeds not in excess of twenty-five (25) miles per hour” under Wyo. Stat. 31-5-921(d).

Finally, Appellant argues that Wyo. Stat. 31-5-921(d) should be interpreted in light of Section 921(h), which provides that the emblem required in subsections (d) and (e) of this section shall comply with current standards and specifications of the American Society of Agricultural Engineers. He claims that there is nothing in the Agricultural Engineers standards which indicates that forklifts are covered by those standards. Regardless of whether forklifts are mentioned in the Agricultural Engineers standards, Appellant’s argument misses the mark. Whether a slow moving vehicle emblem is in compliance with the standards and specifications of the American Society of Agricultural Engineers has no bearing on the issue of whether forklifts are governed by Wyo. Stat. 31-5-921(d).

The trooper had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred based on Appellant’s failure to display a slow moving vehicle emblem on the forklift. Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2011 WY 19

Summary of Decision February 9, 2011

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Parks v. State

Citation: 2011 WY 19

Docket Number: S-10-0136

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=461739

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Appellant Counsel.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: February 9, 2011

Facts: Appellant was charged with a third offense for possession of a controlled substance, a felony under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i). He entered a conditional guilty plea and reserved the right to appeal the district court’s decision denying his motion to suppress.

Issues: Whether he district court erred in finding that there was probable cause to stop Appellant’s vehicle for an improper display of a license plate under Wyo. Stat. 31-2-205.

Holdings: Wyo. Stat. 31-2-205 provides that a license plate be plainly visible and clearly legible. This language is unambiguous. “Visible” means “capable of being seen,” “perceptible by vision,” “easily seen,” “conspicuous.” “Plainly” means “with clarity of perception or comprehension,” “clearly,” “in unmistakable terms.” “Legible” means “capable of being read or deciphered,” “distinct to the eye,” “plain.” The requirements that a license plate be “plainly visible” and “clearly legible” indicate that a license plate must not be obstructed in any manner. This interpretation is in accord with the purpose of the statute. License plates need to be easily read in order to facilitate law enforcement and ordinary citizens in reporting and investigating hit-and-run accidents, traffic violations, gas-pump drive offs, and other criminal activity. The plain language and the purpose of the statute indicate that a trailer ball mounted in a place that causes it to partially obstruct a license plate from view, such as on Appellant’s vehicle, is a violation of Wyo. Stat. 31-2-205. Thus, the traffic stop in this case was justified based on an observed violation of Wyo. Stat. 31-2-205.

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2010 WY 38

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Lovato v. State

Citation: 2010 WY 38

Docket Number: S-09-0073

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny Lynn Craig, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts: Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to two drug-related charges, reserving his right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion.

Issues: Whether the trial court erred in finding that (1) there was "probable cause" to conduct a traffic stop of Appellant's car; and (2) the scope of the traffic stop was not exceeded by the trooper's actions.

Holdings: When district court's decision to deny a motion to suppress is reviewed, the appellate court will defer to the district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.

In the present action, Appellant's initial contact with the trooper was an investigatory traffic stop, not an arrest. The distinction is significant because it takes less to justify a traffic stop than an arrest. Because of its limited nature, a law enforcement officer is only required to show "the presence of specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime" in order to justify the detention.

The trooper in the present action readily admitted that this stop was prompted by the information provided by the confidential informant that Appellant was carrying illegal drugs. The trooper believed that this information, by itself, was insufficient to justify a stop. However, an officer is permitted to make a traffic stop if he personally observes a traffic violation, without regard to his subjective intent. The trooper testified that he observed two traffic violations. Almost as soon as he spotted Appellant's car, he "could see the sunlight glinting off of a crack on the windshield on the upper left side of the windshield." This, the trooper testified, suggested a possible violation of Wyo. Stat. 31-5-955(a). A short time later, the trooper observed that he was unable to read the car's rear license plate number because of "a dark-tinted license plate cover on the rear license plate." This suggested a possible violation of Wyo. Stat. 31-2-205(a)(i).

Appellant points out in that there were inconsistencies in the testimony about the location of the crack in the windshield and as to when the cracked window violation was added to the warning ticket issued Appellant for his traffic offenses. However, after considering conflicting evidence, the district court found the exact position of the windshield crack is immaterial in determining whether the trooper possessed the necessary level of suspicion to stop Appellant. The uncontroverted fact is that a windshield crack existed that was noticeable from both the interior and exterior of the vehicle. The finding of the district court is consistent with the trooper's testimony. Although Appellant's evidence to the contrary is sufficiently persuasive that the district court might reasonably have found in his favor, it did not, but that alone does not make the finding clearly erroneous.

Evidence about the license plate cover is also troublesome. According to the trooper, he could not read the license plate on the back of Appellant's car, but could read the one on the front "just fine." According to both Appellant and his wife, there were identical license plate covers on the front and the back of the car. In addition, the trooper described the license plate as "dark-tinted," and testified that the date sticker on the upper left corner of the license plate was "covered by the frame of the license plate protector." The actual license plate cover was accepted into evidence during the suppression hearing. It is the same translucent plastic material throughout, with no frame that could have blocked the trooper's view of the date sticker. While the plastic is not entirely transparent, it is a stretch to describe it as dark-tinted. The plastic is shiny, however, and it is conceivable that in some angles of sunlight, the combination of glare and tinting could make the license plate harder to read. The trooper did not mention the angle of the sunlight or any other such details, but he did testify unequivocally that the license plate cover obscured his view of the license plate on the rear of Appellant's car. The appellate court is not in a position to assess the credibility of this testimony, or to weigh it against the conflicting evidence. The district court was in that position. Based on its findings of fact, the district court concluded that the trooper possessed more than the necessary reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant because he personally observed Appellant driving in violation of two statutes. Having deferred to the district court's findings of fact, there was sufficient probable cause to provide the trooper with the reasonable suspicion necessary to stop Appellant. The initial stop was justified.

A traffic stop must be of reasonably short duration, and that there are limits to the questions that may be asked of the detained driver. An investigative detention must be temporary, lasting no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, and the scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification. During a routine traffic stop, a law enforcement officer may request the driver's proof of insurance, operating license, and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation or warning. The officer may detain the driver and his vehicle only for the period of time reasonably necessary to complete these routine matters. Once the driver has produced a valid driver's license and proof that he is entitled to operate the vehicle, he must be allowed to proceed without further delay. During the stop, an officer generally may not ask the detained motorist questions unrelated to the purpose of the stop, including questions about controlled substances, unless the officer has reasonable suspicion of other illegal activities.

According to the dispatch records kept by the Wyoming Highway Patrol, the trooper initiated the traffic stop of Appellant at 11:01:23 a.m. and the canine unit arrived at the scene at 11:05:38, and reported by radio at 11:06:09 that the dog had alerted on Appellant's car. Appellant concedes that the drug detection dog's alert gave the troopers probable cause to detain him further, search his car, and subsequently search his person. Thus, the initial detention that Appellant challenges lasted only from the initiation of the traffic stop until the drug detection dog alerted, a total of four minutes and forty-six seconds. The limited amount of time that the trooper was in verbal contact with Appellant does not indicate that his initial detention was unreasonably prolonged. As to the subject matter of the questions, the trooper testified that he asked the driver several questions regarding his trip, as far as his origin - his origin and destination. Questions regarding travel plans are an acceptable area of inquiry during a traffic stop. There is no indication that the trooper used these questions to prolong Appellant's detention unreasonably. Appellant's detention was prolonged, and his car was searched, not because of his questioning by the trooper, but because the drug detecting dog alerted on his car. Having considered the totality of the circumstances, it cannot be said that the district court erred in concluding that the trooper's questioning of Appellant was reasonable.

The district court's denial of Appellant's suppression motion is affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the opinion for the court.

Link: http://bit.ly/9fyt8i.

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance using the Universal Citation format, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 85

Summary of Decision issued July 21, 2008

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Kunselman v. State

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=452054

Citation: 2008 WY 85

Docket Number: S-07-0167

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Diane M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Senior Assistant Attorney General

Date of Decision: July 21, 2008

Facts: Appellant entered a conditional plea of no contest to a charge of felony possession of methamphetamine. She reserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of her motion to suppress the methamphetamine evidence seized during a search of her purse following a traffic stop.

Issues: The estimate of the speed of Appellant's pickup truck on a Wyoming highway did not meet the requirements of probable cause or reasonable suspicion necessary for search, seizure or investigatory detention and any evidence obtained as a result of such search or seizure should be suppressed.

Holdings: A guilty plea or nolo contendere plea waives appellate review of all non-jurisdictional claims. Constitutional challenges to pretrial proceedings, including claims of unlawfully obtained evidence, as in this case, fall into the category of non-jurisdictional claims which do not survive a valid guilty plea or nolo contendere plea. The only exception to the waiver rule can be found in W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2), which allows a defendant to plead guilty while reserving the right to seek review on appeal of any specified pretrial motion. However, a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, while providing a mechanism for appellate review, does not provide carte blanche permission for an appellant to present any and all arguments on appeal. Instead, an appellant may only argue those issues which were clearly brought to the attention of the district court. In her motion to suppress and her argument at the suppression hearing, Appellant focused on the scope and duration of the stop and the subsequent search of her purse. She did not argue that there was insufficient cause to perform a stop for speeding nor did she contest in any manner the reasonableness of the initial traffic stop. In fact, in her motion to suppress, Appellant acknowledged as a factual matter that was stopped for exceeding the posted speed limit. Under well-established precedent, Appellant's conditional plea of no contest preserved only those issues raised in her suppression motion. Appellant did not contest the legality of the initial traffic stop in the district court and, accordingly, waived her right to make that argument on appeal.

The challenged questioning occurred after Appellant's detention on the traffic violation had terminated. The propriety of any further interaction at that juncture depends on Appellant's consent or the presence of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Whether Appellant voluntarily consented to the additional questioning is a question of fact which must be determined in light of the totality of the circumstances. Some of the factors which may be considered in assessing whether the consent was voluntary include: the way the request was phrased by the trooper, whether Appellant knew she could refuse the request, and the presence of other coercive factors. The record discloses that: (1) the entire traffic stop was very brief, with the initial traffic detention lasting about ten minutes; (2) Appellant remained in her vehicle while the trooper prepared the traffic citations; (3) she was not questioned concerning matters unrelated to the motor vehicle infractions; (4) Appellant knew she was free to go at the time the request was made; (5) the trooper's conduct throughout the encounter was professional and neither threatening nor otherwise overbearing; and (6) Appellant's consent to further questioning was unhesitant and immediate. Under the totality of the circumstances, Appellant's consent was voluntary. A reasonable person in Appellant's position would have felt free to refuse the trooper's request and proceed on her way. Consequently, constitutional boundaries were not transgressed in this instance.

In response to questioning, Appellant admitted having marijuana. She then produced a small flowered purse and stated, "It's in there." By handing the purse to the officer Wright, Appellant gave implicit consent for the trooper to look inside. Furthermore, Appellant's admission that the purse contained marijuana provided probable cause for the trooper to search it. Thus, the trooper's search of Appellant's purse was constitutionally reasonable under the circumstances.

Appellant waived her right to contest the validity of the initial traffic stop when she failed to present that issue to the district court. Appellant voluntarily consented to further questioning after the traffic stop was completed, and the subsequent search of her purse was proper. The judgment and sentence of the district court is affirmed.

J. Golden delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2008 WY 54

Summary of Decision issued May 14, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Holman v. State

Citation: 2008 WY 54

Docket Number: 06-140

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge.

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Thomas R.; Smith of Chapman Valdez at Beech Street Law Office, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General: Eric A. Johnson, Faculty Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; and Geoffrey Gunnerson, Student Director, Prosecution Assistance Program.

Facts/Discussion: Holman pled guilty to one count of third possession of a controlled substance reserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of his car at the time of his arrest.
The Court has stated that warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless justified by probable cause and established exceptions. The Court reviewed the record to determine if an exception applied. The Officer’s reason for conducting the search was clear: search incident to arrest. The officer presented no evidence that the search of the vehicle was conducted to ensure officer safety or preserve evidence. He offered no testimony regarding specific facts or circumstances indicating that those concerns were present in the instant case. The Court’s review of the record revealed no objectively identifiable facts in support of those concerns. The Court stated the State failed to meet its burden. The Court has recognized that the mobility and the diminished expectation of privacy in the use and regulation of vehicles, permits warrantless searches in circumstances where searches would not be reasonable in other contexts. Their review of the record revealed no circumstances which would cause a reasonably prudent person to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of the crime for which Holman was arrested, or any other crime. The limited nature of the search did not justify the otherwise impermissible search. Although a driver of a vehicle has a diminished privacy interest in the contents of his vehicle, it does not mean he has no expectation of privacy. The Court agreed it would be irresponsible to park the vehicle in a public place if the officer had cause to believe it contained contraband or other dangerous items. In the instant case, the officers searched without any reason to believe it contained evidence of any crime.

Holding: Upon their review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the search of Holman’s vehicle, the Court concluded that the search was not reasonable under any of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement and therefore violated Article I, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.

Reversed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

J. Hill concurred: J. Hill wrote to distinguish the present case from Pierce and Sam. He stated that the goal of the Court’s review is to determine whether or not the search and seizure was “reasonable” under the facts and circumstances presented by any given case. His analysis led to the conclusion that the stop, search and seizure was one prompted more by suspicion than by concrete fact. As a matter of law, he concluded that they were not reasonable and therefore they were unconstitutional.

J. Burke dissented: J. Burke stated that his analysis revealed that similar to Pierce, the decision in the instant case was inconsistent with Wyoming precedent establishing that the arrest itself is sufficient justification to search the arrested person and the area within his immediate control.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/5r8fyg .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2007 WY 188

Summary of Decision issued December 4, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Layland v. Stevens

Citation: 2007 WY 188

Docket Number: S-07-0046

Appeal from the District court of Laramie County, the Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): Robert T. Moxley of Robert T. Moxley, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Christine Cox, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Thomas W. Rumpke, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Cox.

Issue: Whether Deputy Stevens was entitled to qualified immunity from suit for constitutional violations allegedly arising out of Mr. Layland’s arrest.

Facts/Discussion: Layland was arrested and charged with kidnapping and witness intimidation. He filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Stevens alleging various civil rights violations. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment and after a hearing the district court granted Stevens’ motion and dismissed the case.
Standard of Review: The issue the Court found determinative was whether qualified immunity barred Layland’s claims against Stevens. The presence or absence of qualified immunity is a question of law the Court reviews de novo.
Qualified immunity shields public officials from suit on § 1983 civil rights claims when they are performing discretionary functions unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” To avoid that defense, Layland was required to show that Stevens’ arrest of him without a warrant violated his Fourth Amendment right and that the contours of that right were sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would have understood his actions violated the right. In concluding that Laylands’ rights were not violated, the district court relied on U.S. v. Little. The factors for determining whether a person has been illegally seized include: the threatening presence of several officers; the brandishing of a weapon; physical touching; aggressive language; retention of the person’s personal belongings by an officer; a request to accompany the officer to the police station; the absence of other members of the public; and whether the interaction occured in a nonpublic, small or enclosed space. The district court applied the factors and concluded that Layland failed to show that he had a clearly established right not to be arrested. On that basis they concluded Stevens was entitled to qualified immunity.
The Court used a different analysis stating that controlling precedent makes it clear that qualified immunity shielded Stevens from suit for damages if a reasonable officer could have believed Layland’s arrest was lawful in light of established law and the information Stevens possessed. Even if Stevens was mistaken in concluding that probable cause existed, he nevertheless was entitled to qualified immunity if his decision was reasonable.
Layland relied on Payton v. New York and Mickelson v. State asserting that he did not consent to the entry and that no exigent circumstances existed justifying his arrest without a warrant. The Court noted that the United States Supreme Court has not extended the rule in Payton to premises other than a private home. According to the record, Layland’s shop was neither a place of business nor his private residence. In addition, the evidence presented did not establish a lack of consent as it clearly did in Mickelson.

Holding: Under the facts presented the Court concluded as a matter of law that a reasonable officer could have concluded he had consent to enter the building to question Layland and probable cause to arrest him without a warrant.

Affirmed.

J. Kite delivered the opinion.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2etdha .