Summary 2013 WY 133

Summary of Decision October 22, 2013

Justice Burke delivered the opinion of the Court. Affirmed.

Case Name: DUSTIN LEE YEAROUT v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Docket Number: S-13-0073

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Sheridan County the Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge

Representing Appellant: Pro se.

Representing Appellee: Peter K. Michael, Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; Jeffrey S. Pope, Assistant Attorney General; Brian J. Fuller, Student Intern.

Date of Decision: October 22, 2013

Facts: In 2010, Appellant pled guilty to three burglary charges. On recommendation of the parties, Appellant received three concurrent sentences of four to seven years in prison, with the sentences being suspended in lieu of one year in jail and seven years supervised probation. The district court ordered intensive supervised probation and required Appellant to participate in and complete an in-patient substance abuse treatment program. Appellant completed the program.

In 2012, as a result of probation violations, the district court revoked Appellant’s probation and reinstated the original sentence. The district court awarded credit for thirty-six days of pre-sentence confinement. In 2013, Appellant filed a motion seeking credit for an additional 691 days, for the time he had spent in jail, in treatment, and on probation. The district court granted Appellant’s petition in part, awarding credit for the 365 days Appellant had served in the county jail. The district court ruled that Appellant was not entitled to credit for the time spent in the treatment program or on probation. Appellant appealed the district court’s partial denial of his motion.

Issue: Whether Appellant is entitled to credit against his sentence for the time he spent in an in-patient substance abuse treatment program and for the time he spent on intensive supervised probation.

Holdings/Conclusion: The record does not support Appellant’s contention that he could have been charged with escape during the time he spent in a treatment facility or during the time he spent on probation. Therefore, those periods of time were not “official detention,” and Appellant is not entitled to credit for those periods. The decision of the district court is affirmed.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note, when you look at the opinion, that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quotation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance.]

Summary 2013 WY 124

Summary of Decision October 9, 2013

Justice Burke delivered the opinion for the Court. Affirmed.

Case Name: ROBERT STEVEN HANKINS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Docket Number: S-12-0160

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Albany County, the Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

Representing Appellant: Anthony C. Gold, Law Office of Anthony C. Gold, Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: Peter K. Michael, Interim Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; Jeffrey S. Pope, Assistant Attorney General; Brian J. Fuller, Student Intern.

Date of Decision: October 9, 2013

Facts: Mr. Hankins appeals his convictions on charges of burglary and attempted sexual assault. He claims that the district court infringed on his constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his choice.

Issues: The issue in this appeal is whether Mr. Hankins was denied a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice.

Holdings/Decison: We conclude that the district court did not deprive Mr. Hankins of a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice. Affirmed.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summary 2013 WY 117

Summary of Decision September 30, 2013

Justice Burke delivered the opinion for the Court. Affirmed.

Case Name: JOEL RANDY FERGUSON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Docket Number: S-12-0278

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County the Honorable Thomas T.C. Campbell, Judge

Representing Appellant: Office of the State Public Defender: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Patricia L. Bennett, Assistant Public Defender. Argument by Ms. Bennett.

Representing Appellee: Gregory A. Phillips, Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney
General; Jeffrey S. Pope, Assistant Attorney General; Jennifer E. Zissou, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Zissou.

Date of Decision: September 30, 2013

Facts: In 2005, Appellant was convicted of eleven counts of burglary relating to breakins at various businesses in Cheyenne. At his initial arraignment, Appellant peremptorily disqualified District Judge Nicholas G. Kalokathis under W.R.Cr.P. 21.1(a), and the case was assigned to District Judge Peter G. Arnold. After presiding over the trial, Judge Arnold recused himself from the sentencing proceedings in order to avoid the potential perception of bias resulting from his former attorney-client relationship with several of the victims. Judge Arnold assigned the case to Judge Kalokathis for sentencing. Judge Kalokathis proceeded to sentence Appellant to consecutive terms of 4 to 8 years for each of the convictions, for a total of 44 to 88 years. Perhaps as a result of the fact that the earlier motion to disqualify Judge Kalokathis was not reduced to writing, neither party realized, at the time, that the assignment to Judge Kalokathis was prohibited by the peremptory disqualification.

Appellant, Joel Randy Ferguson, challenges the district court’s order granting, in
part, and denying, in part, his motion to correct an illegal sentence. We conclude that
Appellant’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

Issues: Appellant presents the following issues: 1. Whether the district court imposed an illegal sentence in violation of Mr. Ferguson’s rights to due process of law. 2. Whether the district court imposed an illegal sentence in violation of Mr. Ferguson’s rights to be protected from double jeopardy.

The State raises an additional issue: Does res judicata bar Mr. Ferguson’s current appeal of the
legality of his sentence?

Holdings: Appellant’s ad hoc assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel, raised in his reply brief, does not constitute good cause for failing to raise his present claims in the direct appeal from his convictions. Accordingly, we conclude that those claims are appropriately barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Notwithstanding our reliance on the principles of res judicata, however, we also find no merit in Appellant’s claim that his sentence violated due process or double jeopardy protections. The district court’s order granting, in part, and denying, in part, Appellant’s Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence is affirmed.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summary 2013 WY 67

Summary of Decision May 31, 2013

District Court Judge Wilking delivered the opinion for the Court. Affirmed.

Case Name: JESSY MICHAEL DENNIS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Docket Number: S-12-0190

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Michael Davis, Judge

Representing Appellant: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Chief Appellate Counsel; Eric M. Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel. Argument by Mr. Alden.

Representing Appellee: Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; Theodore R. Racines, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Christyne M. Martens, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Martens.

Date of Decision: May 31, 2013

Facts: A jury convicted Jessy Michael Dennis (Dennis), of aggravated burglary in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301(c)(i) (LexisNexis 2011). Dennis now appeals his conviction. He contends there was insufficient evidence of a corpus delicti and no evidence was presented to contradict the innocent intent expressed in his extrajudicial statements. He also argues the district court erred by declining his proposed specific intent instruction and adopting instructions that did not adequately explain the elements of aggravated burglary.

Issues: The State adequately describes the issues presented to the Court: Wyoming law requires independent proof of corpus delicti before an admission can be considered as evidence supporting a conviction. Dennis admitted he entered the victims’ unlocked home and took a pistol, which he later returned. The victims testified consistently with that admission--that someone entered their home without permission and removed a pistol. Did this testimony provide sufficient corroboration of Dennis’ admissions so that the jury could consider those admissions and so that the jury’s guilty verdict was supported by sufficient evidence? The test for jury instructions is whether they “leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime can be found to have been committed.” The district court gave jury instructions about aggravated burglary that closely tracked the applicable statutory language, and Dennis agreed at trial that those instructions correctly stated the law. However, he proposed an additional instruction on the specific intent element of aggravated burglary which the court refused because it was repetitive and confusing. Did the court adequately instruct the jury on the elements of aggravated burglary?


Holdings: We find that sufficient independent evidence was presented to corroborate Dennis’ extrajudicial statements and to convict him of aggravated burglary. We further find that the jury was properly instructed. Affirmed.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summary 2012 WY 16

Summary of Decision February 9, 2012

[SPECIAL NOTE:  This opinion uses the "Universal Citation."  It was given an "official" citation when it was issued.  You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation.  You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered.  When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number.  The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance] 

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Wyatt L. Bear Cloud v. The State of Wyoming

Citation:  2012 WY 16

Docket Number: S-11-0102

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=465081

Appeal from the District Court of Sheridan County, the Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge.

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Diane Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. Morgan.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jeffrey S. Pope, Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. Pope.

Date of Decision: February 9, 2012

Facts: On August 26, 2009, Appellant Wyatt Bear Cloud and two co-defendants were involved in the armed burglary of a residence in Sheridan, Wyoming.  During the course of the burglary, one of Bear Cloud’s co-defendants shot and killed one of the home’s residents.  Bear Cloud was charged with, and ultimately pleaded guilty to,  Murder in the First Degree (Felony-Murder), in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(a) (LexisNexis 2011); Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated Burglary, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-303(a) and 6-3-301(a) and (c)(i) (LexisNexis 2011); and Aggravated Burglary, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann.  § 6-3-301(a) and (c)(i) (LexisNexis 2011).  He was sixteen years of age at the time of these offenses.  In addition to his sentences on the burglary and conspiracy charges, Bear Cloud was sentenced to life imprisonment for his conviction for felony-murder.  He now appeals his convictions and sentences on numerous grounds. 

Issues:  Bear Cloud presents the following issues for review: 1) Was Appellant’s trial counsel ineffective, specifically by: (A) inviting intrusion into the attorney-client relationship, (B) waiving his meritorious appellate issues and (C) incorrectly advising him of the consequences of his pleas, thus rendering his pleas involuntary? 2) Is a motion to transfer a case to juvenile court a dispositive motion, so it may be the subject of conditional guilty pleas? 3) Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it refused to transfer Appellant to juvenile court? 4) Does the sentence of life in prison for a juvenile who did not commit or intend to commit a homicide violate the [Eighth] Amendment of the United States Constitution? 5) Does the sentence of life in prison for a juvenile who did not commit or intend to commit a homicide violate Art. 1, § 14 of the Wyoming Constitution? 6) Does the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment provided in the [Eighth] Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 14 of the Wyoming Constitution, prohibit the imposition of mandatory life imprisonment on a juvenile when the sentencing court cannot take into consideration the child’s age, culpability or other mitigating factors? 7) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas?  Appellee, the State of Wyoming, generally relies upon the same issues. 

Holdings: The Court concluded that the district court did not err in denying  Bear Cloud’s motion to transfer the proceedings to juvenile court nor did it abuse its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.  To the extent his appellate claims survive the entry of a guilty plea, trial counsel was not ineffective in her representation of Bear Cloud.  Further, Bear Cloud’s assertion that his life sentence for felony-murder was unconstitutional, under either the United States Constitution or the Wyoming Constitution, failed.  A sentence of life imprisonment, with the possibility of parole, for a juvenile offender convicted of felony-murder satisfies the constitutional mandates of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 14 of the Wyoming Constitution.  Finally, Wyo. Stat. Ann.  § 6-2-101(b) was not rendered unconstitutional by its mandatory sentencing structure, even as applied to a juvenile offender, and particularly in light of the district court’s ability to consider mitigating circumstances when considering whether to transfer proceedings to juvenile court.  Bear Cloud’s convictions and sentences were affirmed in all respects.

Judge Donnell delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2010 WY 123

Summary of Decision issued August 31, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Budder v. State

Citation: 2010 WY 123

Docket Number: S-09-0241

Appeal from the District Court of Sheridan County, the Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge.

Representing Budder: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel, State Public Defender Program.

Representing State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Christyne M. Martens, Student Intern, Prosecution Assistance Clinical Program.

Facts/Discussion: Budder was convicted of burglary and wrongful taking or disposing of property. He challenged a jury instruction he argued relieved the State of proving all elements of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

The instruction used was virtually identical to an instruction approved by the Court in Vanvorst v. State. In Vanvorst, the defendant was arrested driving a stolen vehicle. Budder accepts that the instruction reflects a correct statement of law in cases where the defendant is caught in actual possession of recently stolen property. He argued it was nonsensical when applied to his case because of his denial of possession of the recently stolen cash. Instructions to a jury are to be written with the particular facts and legal theories of each case in mind. The applicability of an instruction hinges in part on whether the instruction is supported by an appropriate evidentiary basis. The State’s evidence against Budder included the testimony of Fox (who returned some of the stolen money to the victim) and other corroborating and circumstantial evidence. The evidence presented sufficed to support the giving of the instruction to the jury.
Additionally, Budder claimed it was improper for the trial court to give the instruction because there was no rational connection between the evidence and the inference. The focus should be on the relationship between his actual possession of the stolen cash, should the jury find such possession was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and the inference that Budder was involved in the theft of the cash.

Conclusion: The instruction was appropriate under the evidence introduced at trial by the State. The instruction permitted the jury to infer Budder was involved in the theft of cash if it first found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Budder possessed the cash, and that other facts and circumstances also supported the inference. The instruction did not deny Budder his defense. The instructions as a whole also conformed to the mandates of W.R.E. 303 by informing the jury that the State bore the burden of proving every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Affirmed.

J. Golden delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/234s3jr .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance using the Universal Citation format, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2007 WY 194

Summary of Decision issued December 11, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Crapo v. State

Citation: 2007 WY 194

Docket Number: 06-258

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable David B. Park, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Ryan R. Roden, Deputy Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Timothy Justin Forwood, Assistant Attorney General.

Issue: Whether the district court had statutory authority to order Mr. Crapo to pay restitution to burglary victims when he did not plead guilty to the burglaries or conspiracy to commit the burglaries and did not as part of his plea agreement, agree to pay restitution to the burglary victims.

Facts/Discussion: Appellant pled guilty to the crime of receiving, concealing, or disposing of stolen property. As part of his sentence, the district court ordered him to pay restitution.
Standard of Review: The standard of review the Court employs in evaluating a restitution order depends on whether the appellant is challenging the factual basis for the restitution order or is challenging the trial court’s authority to make the restitution award. Appellant contended his challenge was to the district court’s authority to order the contested restitution award. The proper standard of review is de novo.
The Court has held that restitution is not an inherent power of the district court. Rather, it is a power that exists solely by statute. The district court has authority to order restitution only for those losses resulting from the defendant’s criminal activity. The defendant must plead guilty to the crime, be convicted of the crime or admit to the crime.
Appellant’s situation is similar to that presented in Penner. It is undisputed that Appellant was never charged with committing any of the burglaries. The record does not contain any evidence that Appellant admitted to committing the crimes, nor does it contain any evidence of an agreement to pay restitution resulting from those crimes. Accordingly, the district court’s authority to order restitution was limited to pecuniary damages incurred by victims arising from that criminal activity. The State appeared to rely upon inferences to be drawn from Appellant’s guilty plea. The Court stated there was no support in the record for the State’s position. Given the lack of support in the record for a restitution order, the Court was unable to determine any proper restitution amount.
The Court noted that because of double jeopardy implications, restitution orders overturned for failure of proof will not be remanded for the purpose of relitigating the restitution issue.

Holding: Because the trial court improperly ordered restitution for losses not attributable to Appellant’s criminal activity and because the record does not provide any evidence to support a proper calculation of pecuniary damages that are properly attributable to Appellant’s criminal activity, the Court vacated the entire restitution portion of the judgment and sentence.

Reversed and remanded for entry of an amended judgment and sentence.

J. Burke delivered the opinion.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2w9tzj .