Summary 2013 WY 124

Summary of Decision October 9, 2013

Justice Burke delivered the opinion for the Court. Affirmed.

Case Name: ROBERT STEVEN HANKINS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Docket Number: S-12-0160

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Albany County, the Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

Representing Appellant: Anthony C. Gold, Law Office of Anthony C. Gold, Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: Peter K. Michael, Interim Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; Jeffrey S. Pope, Assistant Attorney General; Brian J. Fuller, Student Intern.

Date of Decision: October 9, 2013

Facts: Mr. Hankins appeals his convictions on charges of burglary and attempted sexual assault. He claims that the district court infringed on his constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his choice.

Issues: The issue in this appeal is whether Mr. Hankins was denied a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice.

Holdings/Decison: We conclude that the district court did not deprive Mr. Hankins of a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice. Affirmed.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summary 2012 WY 161

Summary of Decision December 20, 2012


Justice Hill delivered the opinion for the Court. Affirmed.

Case Names: KYLE F. REGAN v. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

JOSEPH B. PARSONS v. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Docket Numbers: S-12-0074; S-12-0075

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Albany County, Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge.

Representing Appellants: R. Michael Vang of Fleener & Vang, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; Douglas J. Moench, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Michael T. Kahler, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: December 20, 2012

Facts: This opinion encompasses two separate appeals from two separate appellants, but both appeals challenged the implied consent advisement as affected by the same Laramie ordinance. While the appeals have not been consolidated, we join them for the purposes of opinion.

Kyle Regan and Joseph Parsons, in separate incidents, were both arrested for driving while under the influence (DWUI). Following their arrests, each appellant consented to chemical testing. Regan’s test showed that he had a 0.26 percent blood alcohol concentration, and Parsons’ test showed that he had a 0.16 percent blood alcohol concentration. Based on the test results, each appellant had his driver’s license administratively suspended. Each appellant likewise challenged the administrative suspension, claiming that his consent to chemical testing was invalid because he had been threatened with jail time under a local Laramie ordinance if he did not consent to the testing. In each case, the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) issued an order upholding the suspension, and each appellant appealed that order.

Issues: Regan and Parsons both present the same issues on appeal:

I. This matter should be stayed pending resolution of pending declaratory judgment action involving enforcement of Laramie Municipal Ordinance 1592.

II. [Were Appellants] read proper implied consent advisements after being arrested for a DWUI under Laramie Enrolled Ordinance 1592?

III. Does the creation of minimum mandatory jail time for an alleged refusal to submit to a chemical test under Laramie’s new DWUI constitute a “critical stage” for purposes of application of the Wyoming right to an attorney and distinguish the case from Mogard v. City of Laramie, 2001 WY 88, ¶¶ 26-31, 32 P.3d 313, 324-25 (Wyo. 2001)?

IV. Are Laramie’s new drinking and driving laws in conflict with State law and therefore preempted?

Holdings: The OAH ruled in accordance with law in determining that Regan and Parsons were given the statutorily required implied consent advisements, and it properly declined to rule on their remaining contentions as beyond the scope of the administrative proceeding and outside the jurisdiction of the OAH. Affirmed.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summary 2011 WY 159

Summary of Decision November 30, 2011


[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Large v. State

Citation: 2011 WY 159

Docket Number: S-11-0068

URL: http://www.blogger.com/goog_1064640164

Appeal from the District Court of Park County, Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Stewart M. Young, Faculty Director, Prosecution Assistance Program.

Date of Decision: November 30, 2011

Facts: The appellant was charged with six crimes arising from an incident when he stole and crashed a vehicle. In this appeal he claims that his right to a speedy trial was violated and that he was denied his right to counsel without being adequately instructed and warned of the dangers of proceeding without counsel.

Issues: Whether the appellant received a speedy trial. Whether the district court properly informed the appellant of the dangers of proceeding without counsel and the penalties he faced.

Holdings: Speedy trial questions are governed by both the rules of criminal procedure and the federal constitution. W.R.Cr.P. 48 governs the time period between arraignment and trial; however, delays between the time of charge and the time of trial are also subject to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(2) requires that: “A criminal charge shall be brought to trial within 180 days following arraignment unless continued as provided in this rule.” In deciding this issue, we must first determine the proper date of arraignment.

The appellant argues that date of the arraignment hearing should be construed as being on October 28, 2009 because that was the date originally set for that purpose. The appellant’s trial began on September 27, 2010, which would have resulted in a 334-day delay between arraignment and trial – far exceeding the 180 days allowed in W.R.Cr.P. 48. While the appellant advocates for that date, he also concedes that the October 28, 2009, hearing did not meet the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 10, as no charges were read and no plea was entered. The State argues that the actual arraignment had to be delayed until April 14, 2010, which date resulted in a delay less than the 180 days prescribed by W.R.Cr.P. 48. The State contends that the appellant caused most of the delay between his arrest and arraignment as he continually undermined his appointed attorneys’ efforts effectively to represent him.

The appellant did significantly delayed both his arraignment and trial by asking numerous times for appointment of a new attorney. The record is replete with efforts by the appellant to refuse, change or dismiss counsel. W.R.Cr.P. 48 specifically states that delays attributable to a defendant’s change of counsel or application thereof are excluded from the 180-day period under the rule.

In addition to the delays caused by the appellant’s efforts to change counsel, further delay occurred when it became necessary to determine the appellant’s competency prior to arraigning him. When the appellant’s competency became an issue, it was incumbent on the district court to address that matter prior to arraignment. W.R.Cr.P. 48 also specifically excludes from the speedy trial computation all proceedings related to the mental illness or deficiency of the defendant. Where the primary reason for the delay is the determination of the defendant‘s mental competency to stand trial, Wyoming law requires suspension of all criminal proceedings until the district court can make a determination of the defendant’s mental competency. In the present case, once the district court had adequately addressed the appellant’s competency, it arraigned him on the six charges and conducted his jury trial within 180 days of that arraignment.

As to the Six Amendment constitutionally imposed speedy trial requirements. Four factors are considered in determining whether a speedy trial violation has occurred: the length of delay; the reason for the delay; the defendant’s assertion of [his or her] right; and the prejudice to the defendant.

There is no precise length of delay that automatically constitutes a constitutional speedy trial violation. However, when the delay is so protracted as to be presumptively prejudicial, inquiry into the other factors is required. In the present case, although the 363-day delay between the appellant’s arrest and trial was long, it was not extraordinary. Nevertheless, the other three will be analyzed inasmuch as shorter delays have warranted such examination.

Regarding the second factor – the reason for the delay –the appellant was responsible for the majority, if not all, of the delay. Any delays attributable to the State are weighed against those attributable to the defendant. Unquestionably, delays attributable to the defendant may disentitle him to speedy trial safeguards. While no single factor is dispositive, under the particular facts presented here, this factor weighs heavily against the appellant’s speedy trial violation claim.

As to the third factor, the appellant obviously asserted his right to a speedy trial: once in his own handwritten motion, and once through his third appointed counsel. However, he did so while at the same time making a consistent and seemingly calculated effort to undermine the efforts of his court-appointed attorneys, which actions caused significant delays. Such conduct contradicted the appellant’s stated desire for a speedy disposition of his case.

Finally, the fourth factor focuses on the degree of prejudice that the appellant suffered as a result of the delay. Prejudice is assessed in light of the particular evils the speedy trial right is intended to avert: (1) lengthy pretrial incarceration; (2) pretrial anxiety; and (3) impairment of the defense. The appellant argues that he was prejudiced by the delay inasmuch as his incarceration “limited his legal research, hindered his ability to serve subpoenas and eliminated his ability to investigate.” Such difficulties, however, are not the result of any delay in prosecution, but instead, as explained by the district court, are problems inherent in the appellant’s decision to represent himself. It cannot be said that the appellant suffered any delay-related prejudice that he did not cause.

The delay in this case did not violate the appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires that a defendant in state court shall have the right to represent himself if the accused himself timely, knowingly, and intelligently requests the right to forgo counsel, and does not do so to cause delay. If a defendant elects to proceed without counsel, “the court must make him aware of the disadvantages and the dangers of self-representation..

In the present case, the district court cautioned the appellant that it considered “it detrimental for [the appellant] to not accept or employ counsel to represent [him].” Also, it expressly detailed the numerous “dangers and disadvantages to self-representation.” Furthermore, the district court properly explained to the appellant the charges and potential sentences he faced, and the appellant told the court he understood this advice. The district court concluded clearly and on the record that the appellant had “knowingly and intelligently waived [his] right to counsel. Finally, the court expressly told the appellant “that at any time you can change your mind to retain counsel to represent you or to petition the Court for appointment of counsel to represent you to assist with your defense.”

The district court adequately instructed the appellant on the dangers of proceeding without counsel and he was not denied the assistance of counsel.

Appellant was afforded a speedy trial as it occurred within the 180-day time period required by W.R.Cr.P. 48 and met the constitutional requirements of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Also, the appellant’s right to counsel was not violated as he was properly informed and warned of the dangers of proceeding without counsel.

Affirmed.



J. Voigt delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2011 WY 143

Summary of Decision October 14, 2011


[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Craft v. State

Citation: 2011 WY 142

Docket Number: S-11-0039

URL: http://www.blogger.com/goog_1422358376

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Gregory A. Phillips, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jeremiah I. Williamson, Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: October 14, 2011

Facts: Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to felony possession of a controlled substance in violation of Wyo. Stat. 35-7-1031(c)(i)(A). He reserved the right to appeal whether he entered a valid waiver of counsel in a prior conviction that was used to enhance the present charge to a felony. Appellant contends his waiver was not “knowing and intelligent” because he did not act with a “full awareness” of his right to counsel and did not “understand the consequences” of his waiver. Appellant additionally contends that advisements concerning possible defenses to the crime and mitigating circumstances are necessary in order to effect a knowing and intelligent waiver. He also suggests that the Saratoga municipal court was required to advise him of the potential consequence that his conviction could be used to enhance future charges against him.

Issues: Whether Appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel when he pled guilty in a municipal court proceeding so as to allow that conviction to be used to enhance a later charge to a felony pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 35-7-1031(c)(i) (2009).

Holdings: In deciding whether a defendant has entered a valid waiver of counsel, it must first be determined whether the defendant’s waiver was voluntary. If the waiver was voluntary, then it must be determined whether the defendant waived the right knowingly and intelligently

In the present action Appellant concedes that his waiver of counsel was “voluntary.” He argues, however, that his waiver was not “knowing and intelligent” because he did not act with a “full awareness” of his right to counsel and did not “understand the consequences” of his waiver. Appellant contends that advisements concerning possible defenses to the crime and mitigating circumstances are necessary in order to effect a knowing and intelligent waiver. He also suggests that the municipal court was required to advise him of the potential consequence that his conviction could be used to enhance future charges against him.

Appellant has presented no Wyoming precedent, requiring that a defendant be advised of possible defenses, mitigating circumstances, or the possibility that a conviction can be used for future sentence enhancement prior to entering a valid waiver of counsel. Rather, Wyoming authority indicates that such advisements are not required. W.R.Cr.P. 11(b) sets forth the advisements that must be given to an unrepresented defendant before acceptance of a guilty plea. W.R.Cr.P. 11 does not mention possible defenses or mitigating circumstances. Further, a defendant does not need to be advised of the possibility of future sentence enhancement prior to the entry of a valid guilty plea. A trial court’s duty to insure that a defendant understands the consequences of a guilty plea before he enters one extends only to direct consequences of such a plea.

In addition, the United States Supreme Court, in Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004) has stated that constitutional requirement is satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea.” In light of this Supreme Court precedent, and the relevant Wyoming authority, the court was persuaded by Appellant’s argument that his waiver of counsel was invalid because he was not advised of possible defenses, mitigating circumstances, or the possibility that his conviction could be used for future sentence enhancement. A defendant does not need to be given such advisements in order to effect a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel.

Appellant also claims that his waiver of counsel was inadequate. However, Appellant was advised of his right to counsel, was specifically asked whether he wished to proceed with an attorney, twice stated that he did not wish to be represented by counsel, and did not dispute the waiver of counsel until presenting a collateral challenge in this appeal. Appellant does not claim that he did not fully understand the nature of the charge against him or the range of allowable punishment for the crime prior to entering his plea. Nor does Appellant assert that he was unaware of his right to counsel. The record shows that, at the time of the municipal conviction, Appellant was an adult and possessed a high school equivalent education. Further, the record provides no indication that Appellant had any kind of language difficulties or lack of verbal comprehension.

Thus, the advisements given in the municipal court proceeding complied with the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 11, and there is no indication in the record that Appellant did not understand those advisements, including the advisement that he had a right to an attorney. Consequently, Appellant’s assertion that he did not wish to be represented by counsel must be taken at face value. The district court did not err in finding that Appellant’s waiver of counsel in the municipal proceeding was knowing and intelligent.

Affirmed.





J. Burke delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2010 WY 61

Summary of Decision issued May 14, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Rodriguez v. State

Citation: 2010 WY 61

Docket Number: S-09-0179

Appeal from the District Court of Park County, the Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge.

Representing Rodriguez: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny Lynn Craig, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Rodriguez challenged the district court’s order revoking her probation and imposing the original prison sentence. She contended that her plea admitting the State’s allegations was obtained in violation of her right to counsel.
According to the plain language of the statute, the defendant may waive her rights only if she is advised of her rights, acts with a full awareness of those rights, and understand the consequences of waiving those rights. At the hearing the court did not properly advise Rodriguez of her right to counsel, took no steps to ascertain whether she understood that right, and never specifically asked her if she waived her right to counsel. The district court made no attempt to inform her of the repercussions of entering a plea, or of the disadvantages of proceeding to the sentencing phase without counsel.

Conclusion: An individual’s right to counsel is such a basic right that its denial can never be treated as harmless error. The entry of a plea is a critical stage of probation revocation proceedings. Rodriguez was not represented by counsel and did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive her right to counsel during that proceeding.

Reversed and remanded.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2e4ucdt .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance using the Universal Citation format, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]