Showing posts with label punitive damages. Show all posts
Showing posts with label punitive damages. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 31, 2009

Summary 2009 WY 45

Summary of Decision issued March 31, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Cramer v. Powder River Coal, LLC

Citation: 2009 WY 45

Docket Number: S-08-0049

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, the Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge.

Representing Appellant Cramer: C. John Cotton, Cotton Law Offices, Gillette, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee Powder River Coal: Billie Addleman and Richard Mincer, Hirst Applegate, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: Cramer brought suit against the owner and the operator of Caballo Mine, seeking to hold them liable for damages he suffered in an accident that occurred while he was working at the mine site as an employee of Weld Test Inspection & Service. The Caballo Mine is a large surface coal mine located in the Powder River Basin and is owned and operated by two affiliated companies, Powder River Coal, and Caballo Coal known as “PRC”.

Release: PRC requires visitors to the mine to sign their Release. Cramer as a contractor was considered a visitor and was required to sign it. Throughout pretrial proceedings, the parties sharply disputed the meaning and significance of the Release. Their disagreements were raised before the district court numerous times in the context of discovery disputes and motion hearings. As a result, the district court issued several different rulings and decisions regarding the Release.
Limiting discovery concerning PRC’s financial status: The district court granted protective orders to PRC regarding discovery requests for financial information related to Cramer’s punitive damages claim. The parties referred to Campen v. Stone where the Court adopted an approach and procedure for the discovery and presentation of evidence of the financial status of a defendant when punitive damages are sought. The Court reviewed the record and noted the list of facts asserted by Cramer were sufficient only to support a claim of ordinary negligence.
Exclusion of the Release from evidence: The Release was a statement made by PRC that could tend to make it more likely that PRC had breached its duty of taking reasonable precautions to protect visitors from foreseeable hazards. However, not all relevant evidence is admissible. The district court excluded the Release on the basis that it was potentially misleading or confusing to the jury.
Limiting discovery regarding the Release: For the most part, Cramer did not specify which discovery request that PRC should have been required to answer, nor does he suggest how discovering that information might have helped his case.
Claim for “damages for violation of duties imposed by contract”: Cramer pleaded a cause of action alleging that PRC’s conduct violated duties imposed by federal coal leases. He also presented evidence concerning certain MSHA regulations and instructed the jury that regulatory violations could be used as evidence in support of his negligence claim. The three cases Cramer cited, Downtown Auto Parts, Inc. v. Toner, Becker v. Mason and Natrona County v. Blake did not support his contention that PRC’s alleged breach of contract provided him with a basis for pursuing a separate tort claim against PRC apart from the negligence claims he pursued at trial.
Expert testimony regarding whether PRC violated applicable regulations: The record established that the district court allowed all of the expert testimony offered by Cramer dealing with the regulations and the standard of care. When a statute or regulation establishes the applicable standard of care with reasonable clarity, expert testimony as to that standard and its breach are unnecessary. It was not unreasonable for the district court to determine that the expert opinion testimony in this instance was unnecessary and not helpful to the jury.
Response to jury question: The Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to remain consistent with its prior ruling that the expert’s opinion was not admissible because it was not helpful to the jury.
Applying collateral estoppels to claims involving cervical injuries: The Division allowed the claims for the injuries to Cramer’s foot and knee but denied the claim for neck injuries on the basis that he failed to prove that it was caused by or related to his workplace accident. In his suit against PRC, Cramer included claims for damages relating to his neck injury. Because the jury found that PRC was not liable for any of Cramer’s damages, any issue relating solely to damages was moot.

Conclusion: The Court agreed with the district court that Cramer failed to make a prima facie showing of a viable punitive damages claim. Given the district court’s conclusion that the Release was only marginally relevant, it was not unreasonable for it to exclude it from evidence. Expert opinion testimony is unnecessary when a statute or regulation establishes the applicable standard with reasonable clarity.

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/ctst2q .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Tuesday, May 15, 2007

Summary 2007 WY 82

Summary of Decision issued May 15, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Vroman v. Town & Country Credit Corp.

Citation: 2007 WY 82

Docket Number: 06-170

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): William D. Bagley, of Bagley, Karpan, Rose & White, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Dale W. Cottam and Billie L.M. Addleman, of Hirst & Applegate, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Issues: Whether the district court erred in failing to award damages for the injury resulting from the admitted negligence and admitted breach of contract of Town & Country. Whether the district court erred in failing to award punitive damages.

Facts/Discussion: Vroman initiated the instant case seeking damages for a mortgage refinancing transaction gone awry. Town & Country admitted liability. The district court entered its Judgment and Order in favor of Town & Country because it found that Vroman was not entitled to damages.
Standard of Review: The Court reviews a district court’s findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard.
The purpose of compensatory damages is to place the injured party in the position he or she would have been in had the wrongful conduct not occurred. The Court found that the district court’s decision in the matter did not leave Vroman in the position she would have been in if Town & Country had adequately performed its duty. Vroman incurred damages because Beneficial’s mortgage and WyHy’s mortgage were not satisfied and released during the refinancing. In light of the Town & Country’s admission of liability and the undisputed evidence relating to the additional mortgage payments, the Court concluded that the district court erred in failing to award damages to Vroman to recoup the $13,969.93 she paid.
The district court denied claims for damages for the amount of closing costs on her house and rental property and to compensate for damage to her credit rating. The breach did not cause Vroman to incur the closing costs, so the Court agreed with the district court’s decision to decline to award money with respect to those claims. Vroman failed to prove that her credit rating suffered. The Court agreed with the district court’s decision to reject the damages claimed for lost rental income because the amount of cash that would be disbursed was clearly identified on the settlement statements signed at closing. Fraud was also alleged by Vroman. It must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Vroman failed to direct the Court to any evidence in the record supporting the allegation of fraud and as a result, the Court was unable to find the district court had erred in denying the claim.

Holding: The Court affirmed the district court’s decision denying punitive damages. The district court’s failure to award compensatory damages for the amounts Vroman incurred to satisfy her second mortgages was clearly erroneous. The Court reversed the district court’s decision denying compensatory damages and remanded.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded in part.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2umf9e .

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