Showing posts with label motion to dismiss. Show all posts
Showing posts with label motion to dismiss. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 02, 2013

Summary 2013 WY 38

Summary of Decision April 2, 2013

Justice Voigt delivered the opinion for the Court. Affirmed.

Case Name: VILLAGE ROAD COALITION v. TETON COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY;

DON GRONBERG, SUE GRONBERG, JIM FARMER, CHRISTY FOX, JENNY FOX, DENNIS CHICHELLI, SUE CHICHELLI, DEBORAH FOX, DON LANDIS, BEVERLY LANDIS, SCOTT AUSTIN, HOLLY AUSTIN, ROBIN MOYER, PETER MOYER, DOUG HANSON, ANNA MARIE HANSON, BARBARA SELLAS, DEBORAH D. WARD, PAUL PERRY, PAM ROMSA, LOU BREITENBACH, KEN JERN, and SHERRIE JERN v. TETON COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY.

Docket Number: S-12-0096; S-12-0104

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Teton County, Honorable Timothy C. Day, Judge.

Representing Appellant in Case No. S-12-0096: Phelps H. Swift, Jr. of Wilson, Wyoming.

Representing Appellants in Case No. S-12-0104: Peter F. Moyer of Jackson, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee in Case Nos. S-12-0096 and S-12-0104: Kim D. Cannon and Tenille L. Castle of Davis and Cannon, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Cannon.

Date of Decision: April 2, 2013

Facts: This opinion represents the consolidation of two related appeals. The plaintiffs in the underlying dispute appealed the district court’s decision to grant Teton County Housing Authority’s (TCHA) motion to dismiss for lack of standing. Separately, Village Road Coalition (VRC) appealed the district court’s decision to deny VRC’s motion to intervene in the underlying dispute for failure to file its motion in a timely fashion.

Issues: 1. Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying VRC’s motion to intervene?

2. Was the district court’s decision to grant TCHA’s motion to dismiss in accordance with the law?

Holdings: The plaintiffs and TCHA had been involved in a protracted dispute centered on TCHA’s purchase of residential property in the neighborhood where the plaintiffs reside. VRC sought to intervene in the underlying dispute, but was not timely in filing its motion to intervene. Because VRC’s interests and relief sought were duplicative of those presented by the plaintiffs, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision denying the motion to intervene. The district court granted TCHA’s motion to dismiss TCHA’s declaratory judgment action for lack of standing. The plaintiffs failed to allege a tangible interest that had been harmed by the acquisition of the property, so the Court affirmed.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Thursday, January 17, 2013

Summary 2013 WY 8

Summary of Decision January 17, 2013

Justice Burke delivered the opinion for the Court. Reversed and remanded. Justice Voigt respectfully dissented.

Case Name: EDWARD VENARD v. JACKSON HOLE PARAGLIDING, LLC, a Wyoming LLC, TOM BARTLETT, SCOTT HARRIS, MATT COMBS, JON HUNT, ANDREW FRYE, and JEFF COULTER

Docket Number: S-11-0232

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Teton County, Honorable Timothy C. Day, Judge.

Representing Appellant: P. Richard Meyer and Robert N. Williams, Meyer & Williams, Attorneys at Law, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Meyer.

Representing Appellees: Cameron S. Walker, Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, Casper, Wyoming; Timothy E. Herr, Herr & Zapala, LLP, San Jose, California; and David G. Lewis, Jackson, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Walker.

Date of Decision: January 17, 2013

Facts: Appellant, Edward Venard, filed suit against Appellees in Wyoming district court to recover damages for personal injuries sustained during a paragliding lesson. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss seeking to enforce a forum selection clause contained in a “Release, Waiver and Assumption of Risk Agreement” that Mr. Venard had signed as a condition of his membership with the United States Hang Gliding and Paragliding Association (USHPA). Several of the Appellees had signed similar agreements with USHPA, but none of the Appellees was a party to the agreement between Mr. Venard and USHPA. Based upon the forum selection clause, Appellees contended that California was the appropriate forum for litigation of the dispute. The district court agreed and granted motion to dismiss. Mr. Venard challenged that decision in this appeal.

Issue: Did the district court abuse its discretion by granting Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss based on a forum selection clause in the Release, Waiver and Assumption of Risk Agreement signed by Mr. Venard?

Holdings: The forum selection clause contained in the agreement between Mr. Venard and USHPA is not enforceable as between the parties to the present litigation. Appellees were not parties to that contract and did not consent in advance to the jurisdiction of the California courts. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Justice Voigt respectfully dissented. To read the full opinion and dissenting opinion, please click on the URL link above.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Friday, June 29, 2012

Summary 2012 WY 88

Summary of Decision June 20, 2012


Justice Burke delivered the opinion for the Court. Affirmed.

Case Name: Kristen N. Spreeman v. The State of Wyoming

Docket Number: S-11-0237

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx
Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff/Defendant): Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel. Argument by Ms. Olson.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff/Defendant): Gregory A. Phillips, Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jackson M. Engels, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Engels.

Date of Decision: June 20, 2012

Facts: Appellant, Kristen N. Spreeman, challenged her conviction of felony driving while under the influence (DWUI) in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-5-233(b)(iii)(A) and (e). She claimed that she did not have three prior qualifying convictions, as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(e), to enhance her DWUI conviction to a felony.

Issues: Appellant presented the following issue:

Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss the felony “DUI” charge against her, since she did not have three prior qualifying convictions?

The State phrases the issue as follows:

Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(e), driving while under the influence becomes a felony if a defendant has three prior convictions in this or any other state under a law prohibiting “driving while under the influence.” One of Spreeman’s three previous Michigan convictions is for driving while “visibly impaired.” Is Michigan’s prohibition against driving while “visibly impaired” a law that prohibits driving “while under the influence,” for purposes of sentencing enhancement under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(e)?

Holdings: Affirmed.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]









Friday, March 04, 2011

Summary 2011 WY 39

Summary of Decision March 4, 2011

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Dana L. Graham v. The State of Wyoming

Citation: 2011 WY 39

Docket Number: S-10-0163

URL:http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=461798

Appeal from the District Court of Uinta Country, the Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge.

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Diane Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; and Kirk A. Morgan, Assistant Appellate Counsel. Argument by Mr. Morgan.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Leda M. Pojman, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Pojman.


Date of Decision: March 4, 2011

Facts: Appellant challenges the district court’s judgment and sentence finding her guilty of delivery of methamphetamine (second or subsequent offense). She maintains that the district court abused its discretion by denying the State’s motion to dismiss the charges against her (without prejudice to refile them). She also contends that the district court erred in excluding the testimony of an eye witness to her crime, on the basis that the district court was concerned that the witness might exercise his right not to incriminate himself (Fifth Amendment protections) and, thereby, deflect the jury’s attention from Graham’s criminal act. We will affirm.

Issues: Whether the court abused its discretion in denying the State’s motion to dismiss without prejudice, in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Whether the trial court erred when it excluded Appellant’s witness in violation of her Sixth Amendment rights without sufficient showing of the extent the witness would exercise his Fifth Amendment rights.


Holdings: The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the State’s pretrial motion to dismiss the information without prejudice. Appellant failed to produce a cogent argument or pertinent authority that the district court erred in not allowing Appellant to call a witness once he had clearly expressed his intent not to answer any questions that might serve to incriminate him with respect to the events after consulting with his attorney. Appellant contends that she was denied her right to compulsory process when he ultimately did not testify. Appellant further contends that the district court’s action with respect to the potential witness and his ultimate decision not to testify violated Appellant’s right to a fair trial. Although some of the proceedings associated with his decision not to testify were unusual, Appellant was not prejudiced by the State’s or the district court’s actions with respect to this issue. Appellant has not presented cogent argument or pertinent authority that these circumstances constitute reversible error. The judgment and sentence of the district court are affirmed.

Justice Hill delivered the opinion for the court.

Monday, June 28, 2010

Summary 2010 WY 86

Summary of Decision issued June 25, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Churchill v. Campbell Cty Memorial Hospital

Citation: 2010 WY 86

Docket Number: S-09-0195

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, the Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge.

Representing Churchill: Nicholas H. Carter and Stephanie M. Humphrey of the Nick Carter Law Firm, PC, Gillette, Wyoming.

Representing Hospital: Billie LM Addleman of Hirst Applegate, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: Churchill filed a complaint in 2009 pursuant to the WGCA alleging injury while awakening from a surgery performed at Campbell County Memorial Hospital. The district court granted the Hospital’s motion to dismiss. The district court ruled that the complaint should be dismissed because Churchill did not file a claim with the Medical Review Panel and that the complaint was barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.
The Court’s disposition was controlled by Bealieu II where the Court held that a complaint in a governmental claims action must allege compliance with the signature and certification requirements of the Wyoming Constitution. While the allegations indicated compliance with the statutory notice of claim requirements, the complaint did not allege compliance with the constitutional requirements.

Conclusion: Because Churchill’s complaint did not allege compliance with the constitutional requirements, the district court never acquired subject matter jurisdiction.

Dismissed.

J. Golden delivered the decision.

J. Kite, specially concurring, joined by J. Burke: The Justices would have affirmed on the basis that the district court properly concluded the applicable statute of limitations was § 1-3-107 and the complaint was not filed within two years of the alleged act, error, or omission as required by that statute. They disagree with the judicially created requirement that the complaint must allege compliance with Wyoming Constitution.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/28jfxp7 .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance using the Universal Citation format, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Wednesday, October 08, 2008

Summary 2008 WY 119

Summary of Order issued October 8, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: McCormack v. State

Citation: 2008 WY 119

Docket Number: S-08-0173

Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Appeal

The matter came before the Court upon a “Motion to Dismiss Appeal” filed in September, 2008 by the State of Wyoming Department of Family Services. After review of the motion, the Brief of Appellant, and the file, the Court found the motion to dismiss the appeal should be granted because Appellant did not challenge the nunc pro tunc order, only the original order on which he had not filed a timely appeal to challenge that order.

Dismissed.

J. Hill delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/47sqhj

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Wednesday, September 17, 2008

Summary 2008 WY 108

Summary of Decision issued September 17, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Bush v. State

Citation: 2008 WY 108

Docket Number: S-07-0247

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable David B. Park, Judge.

Representing Appellant: Diane M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. Morgan, Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee: Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: In 1990, Lynn Bush, the wife of David Bush, disappeared. In 2007, a jury convicted Bush of second degree murder in connection with his wife’s disappearance. Bush appealed.
Admission of Daughter’s out-of-court statements:
After the disappearance of Mrs. Bush, the Bush’s daughter was removed from the care of Mr. Bush and eventually placed with her maternal grandparents. While in their care, the daughter visited a licensed professional counselor and a psychiatrist. During counseling, the child made statements implicating Bush in her mother’s disappearance. The counselor and psychiatrist testified as to statements made by the daughter while in their care.
Admissibility under W.R.E. 803(4):
The district court ruled that the statements could come in as an exception to W.R.E. 803(4). The primary purpose of the counselor and psychiatrist was in diagnosis and treatment of the daughter. The counselor stated it was necessary to collect a history of the patient from the family and the patient herself. The testimony showed the child’s statements were consistent with the counselors’ purpose for seeing the child – treatment and diagnosis.
Admissibility – Confrontation Clause:
Bush claimed his right to confront the witnesses against him was violated when his daughter testified she could not remember what happened and then the district court allowed her testimonial hearsay statements to be presented through the counselor and psychiatrist. The Court found that the daughter was not unavailable as a witness. She appeared at trial, was placed under oath and testified. Thus, Bush was confronted with the witness and had the opportunity to cross-examine her. The Court stated that even if the daughter had been unavailable for purposes of the confrontation clause, the admission of her out-of-court statements did not violate the Sixth Amendment because they were not testimonial, i.e., their primary purpose was not to establish or prove past events potentially related to later criminal prosecution. Because the Court concluded the child’s statements in the present case were made for purposes of medical treatment and diagnosis, they were admissible under W.R.E. 803(4) whether or not the child was competent at the age of three when she made them.
Testimony by Video Teleconference:
The State had intended to call Paul and Caroline Martin as witnesses in the trial. Severe ill health on the part of Mr. Martin prompted a request for testimony by telephone. Eventually, the district court allowed for testimony of the Martins by video teleconference. The Court has not previously addressed the issue of whether a defendant’s confrontation right was violated by presentation of witness testimony via video teleconference. In Maryland v. Craig the United States Supreme Court stated that the right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is not absolute and may be compromised under limited circumstances. Pursuant to Craig, presentation of the Martins’ testimony by video teleconference was appropriate only upon a showing that it was necessary to further an important public policy and its reliability was otherwise assured. The Court concluded the district court properly applied the Craig test and properly admitted Mr. Martin’s testimony. However, Mrs. Martin was not ill and there was no medical recommendation against her traveling. The district court erred in allowing Mrs. Martin to testify by video teleconference but the error was harmless because her testimony was cumulative of her husband’s.
Denial of Alternative Suspect Evidence:
Following a hearing the district court concluded that the evidence the defense presented in its offer of proof was not sufficient to allow its presentation to the jury. The Court noted it had not addressed the issue since Lampitt v. State. The Court reviewed United States v. McVeigh, State v. Brown, State v. Cotto and United States v. Hall and stated the evidence Bush sought to have admitted did nothing more than raise a suspicion that Glendol Bush, his brother, may have been in the area and may have had something to do with the disappearance.
Delay in Filing Charges:
In states like Wyoming where there is no statute of limitations for criminal offenses, charges may be filed at any time during the accused’s lifetime unless the delay is found to have violated his constitutional right to due process. The Court adopted the rule articulated in United States v. Marion and have held that pre-charging delay is not a violation of due process absent a showing of both an intentional delay by the state to gain a tactical advantage over the accused and actual prejudice resulting from the delay. After the Court reviewed the record, it stated that Bush failed to meet his burden of showing actual prejudice from the delay.

Holding: The district court did not abuse its discretion or violate Bush’s Sixth Amendment confrontation right when it allowed a counselor and a psychiatrist to testify concerning statements made to them by the Bushes’ daughter. The statements were properly admitted under W.R.E. 803(4) as statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment. Additionally, the daughter appeared at trial, took the oath, testified and was subject to cross-examination, thus satisfying the confrontation clause. The district court likewise did not abuse its discretion or violate Bush’s confrontation right when it allowed Mr. Martin to testify by video teleconference. Under the circumstances, presentation of his testimony in that manner was necessary to further an important public policy and the reliability of the testimony was otherwise assured. The error in allowing Mrs. Martin to testify by video teleconference was harmless.
The district court properly excluded evidence of an alternate suspect. Much of the proffered evidence was speculative and did not provide a nexus between the suspect and the crime charged. As for the proffered testimony concerning the alternate suspect’s hearsay statements, the defense failed to show that the statements were trustworthy and reliable. The district court also did not err in denying Bush’s motion to dismiss on the basis of due process violations caused by the delay in charging him. Bush did not show actual prejudice or intentional prosecutorial delay to gain a tactical advantage.

Affirmed.

J. Kite delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/5xzjrc .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Friday, December 21, 2007

Summary 2007 WY 178

Summary of Decision issued November 6, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Cook v. City of Sheridan Police

Citation: 2007 WY 178

Docket Number: S-07-0025

Appeal from the District Court of Sheridan County, the Honorable David B. Park, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): H.W. Rasmussen and Newton “Rusty” S. Ludwig of Rasmussen & Ludwig, Sheridan, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Respondent): Clint A. Langer of Davis & Cannon, Sheridan, Wyoming.

Issues: Whether the court abused its discretion as a matter of law by concluding it did not have discretion to allow Christopher C. Cook’s notice of appeal to be amended. Whether the district court erred by considering the motion to dismiss filed by Mike Card, the City of Sheridan Chief of Police, because Mr. Card is not and cannot be a party. Whether the City of Sheridan is an indispensable party to this action.

Facts/Discussion: After the Sheridan Police Department Civil Service Commission (Commission) entered an order dismissing him from service with the Sheridan Police Department (Department), Cook filed a notice of appeal in the district court. Chief of Police, Mike Card, on behalf of the Department, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that Cook failed to comply with the W.R.A.P in that he filed a notice of appeal rather than a petition for review. The district court granted the motion.
Standard of Review:
When reviewing a district court order granting a motion to dismiss the Court accepts as true the facts alleged in the complaint and view them more favorably to the party opposing the dismissal. The Court reviews a district court’s decision to dismiss an appeal for failure to comply with the rules under an abuse of discretion standard. The ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did. When reviewing claims that a district court committed an error of law, the Court does not apply the abuse of discretion standard because a court does not have discretion with respect to such error.
Propriety of Dismissal:
In McElreath, the Court considered the question of whether a district court properly dismissed an appeal from a final agency ruling denying a claim for worker’s compensation benefits. The Court on review concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion. Unlike McElreath, here the district court concluded it had no authority to allow Appellant to amend his notice of appeal and so had no other choice but to dismiss. The Court stated in the instant case, that was contrary to W.R.A.P. 1.03 which expressly gives appellate courts discretion to take “such action as [they deem] appropriate” when a party fails to comply with the rules. In the case In re General Adjudication of Water Rights and Kittles v. Rocky Mountain Recovery, Inc. the Court treated a notice of appeal as a petition for review. They stated they saw no reason why a district court should not have similar discretion to treat a notice of appeal as a petition for review.
Indispensable and Proper Parties:
Appellant’s claims were not presented to the district court therefore the Court did not consider the issues. Neither did Appellant present argument that warranted an exception.

Holding: The Court reversed the district court’s order dismissing the notice of appeal on the ground that the district court erred as a matter of law in concluding its discretion was “very limited” and it’s only option was dismissal. The Court remanded to the district court for it to exercise its discretion under W.R.A.P. 1.03 by taking “such action as [it] deems appropriate.”

Reversed.

J. Kite delivered the opinion.

C.J.Voigt dissented joined by J. Golden: W.R.A.P. 12.01 and 12.03 clearly require the review of administrative agency decisions to be “instituted by filing a petition for review.” W.R.A.P. 12.04(a) requires the petition to be filed within 30 days after service of the final agency decision. If that requirement is not met, it can be overcome under W.R.A.P. 12.04(b) by a showing of excusable neglect, coupled with a request for a filing extension not to exceed an additional 30 days.
These Justices would not hold that the discretionary language of the second sentence of W.R.A.P. 1.03 went so far as to negate the specific requirement of W.R.A.P. 12.04(b) that excusable neglect be shown in order to enlarge the time for filing a petition for review. They also stated that McElreath was poor precedent because it relied upon Taffner in which the Court mistakenly applied present W.R.A.P. 9.04 in ruling upon an appellate error. McElreath and Taffner were inconsistent in their treatment of prejudice in the review of appellate error.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/3xgf2l .

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