Showing posts with label res judicata. Show all posts
Showing posts with label res judicata. Show all posts

Monday, March 10, 2014

Summary 2014 WY 34

Summary of Decision March 10, 2014

Justice Burke delivered the opinion of the Court. Affirmed.

Case Name: JOSEPH DAX v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Docket Number: S-13-0222

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable Daniel L. Forgey, Judge

Representing Appellant: Pro se.

Representing Appellee: Peter K. Michael, Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; Jeffrey S. Pope, Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: March 10, 2014

Facts: Appellant, Joseph Dax, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence.

Issue: The dispositive issue in this case is whether Mr. Dax’s motion to correct an illegal sentence is barred by res judicata.

Holdings/Conclusion: We agree with the district court that this motion is barred by res judicata, and affirm.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note, when you look at the opinion, that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quotation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance.]

Thursday, January 23, 2014

Summary 2014 WY 9

Summary of Decision January 23, 2014

Justice Hill delivered the opinion of the Court. Affirmed.

Case Name: DONALD GEE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Docket Number: S-13-0142

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County the Honorable David B. Park, Judge

Representing Appellant: Donald Gee, Pro se.

Representing Appellee: Peter K. Michael, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; and Jeffrey Pope, Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: January 23, 2014

Facts: Donald Gee, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. Finding that Gee’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, we affirm the district court’s order.

Issue: Did the district court err in summary dismissal of both [Gee’s] pro se petition for correction of illegal sentence and petition to correct sentence?

Holdings/Conclusion: Gee had multiple opportunities to assert his current sentencing claims and prosecute appeals related to those claims, and he offers no acceptable justification for his failure to do so. Gee’s claims are thus barred by res judicata, and we affirm the decision of the district court.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note, when you look at the opinion, that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quotation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance.]

Wednesday, May 08, 2013

Summary 2013 WY 53

Summary of Decision May 8, 2013

Justice Hill delivered the opinion for the Court. Dismissed.

Case Name: R. MARK ARMSTRONG v. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, JOHN CORRA, JAMES UZZELL, ROBERT DOCTOR, and DALE ANDERSON, as Individuals in Their Personal Capacity and in Their Official Capacity

Docket Number: S-12-0210

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Michael Davis, Judge.

Representing Appellant: R. Mark Armstrong, Pro se.

Representing Appellee: Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; John D. Rossetti, Deputy Attorney General; and Thomas W. Rumpke, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: May 8, 2013

Facts: R. Mark Armstrong challenged an order dismissing his breach of contract claims against the State of Wyoming’s Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ).

Issues: Armstrong indentifies twelve issues, but his argument seems to be limited to three basic questions for this Court, which we rephrase as follows:

1. Regarding the breach of contract, Armstrong claims the DEQ breached a settlement agreement by treating his resignation as unconditional and failing to satisfy the conditions. Further, because Armstrong’s resignation was included in the settlement offer, the governor of Wyoming should have approved the settlement. Also, the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act does not bar his contract claims.

2. Armstrong asserts that the State should be stopped from raising res judicata as a defense, and further, judicial estoppels should preclude the State from claiming the breach of contract issues were decided in federal court.

3. In his third and final argument, Armstrong discusses his defamation claims, claiming that defamation affected his ability to acquire and maintain employment.

Holdings: Based upon Armstrong’s failure to follow the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Court dismissed.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Thursday, March 21, 2013

Summary 2013 WY 35

Summary of Decision March 20, 2013


Justice Voigt delivered the opinion for the Court. Affirmed.

Case Name: STEVEN DAVID LUNDEN v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Docket Number: S 12 0145

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, Honorable David B. Park, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff/Defendant): Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Chief Appellate Counsel; David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff/Defendant): Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; Theodore R. Racines, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Darrell D. Jackson, Faculty Director, Emily N. Thomas, Student Director, Alan J. Dees, Student Intern, Prosecution Assistance Program.

Date of Decision: March 20, 2013

Facts: The appellant, Steven David Lunden, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence. On appeal, he claims that the judgment and sentence entered after he pled guilty to misuse of a credit card and forgery are illegal because he was not advised that his guilty pleas may result in the disqualification of his right to possess firearms pursuant to federal law.

Issues: Did the district court err when it denied the appellant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence?

Holdings: We decline to consider the merits of the appellant’s claim because it is being raised for the first time on appeal. We also find that, had this claim been raised before the district court, it would have been barred by res judicata. We affirm.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Thursday, September 27, 2012

Summary 2012 WY 128

Summary of Decision September 27, 2012

Justice Burke delivered the opinion for the Court. Affirmed.

Case Name: STEVEN A. DELOGE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Docket Number: S-12-0044


Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, Honorable Thomas T.C. Campbell, Judge.

Representing Appellant: Pro se.

Representing Appellee: Gregory A. Phillips, Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jeffrey S. Pope, Assistant Attorney General

Date of Decision: September 27, 2012

Facts:  Appellant, Steven A. DeLoge, pled guilty to six counts of second-degree sexual assault in 2000 and was sentenced to six consecutive life terms.  In this appeal, Appellant, acting pro se, challengeed the district court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence under W.R.Cr.P. 35(a).

Issues:  Appellant presents the following issues:

1.      Whether the district court correctly concluded that the claims of illegal sentence were barred by the doctrine of res judicata?

2.      Whether the district court correctly denied correction of factual inaccuracies in the pre-sentence investigation report?

3.      Whether the applied sentencing enhancement provision of W.S. 6-2-306(b)(i) creates an illegal sentence by violating the Wyoming and United States Constitutions?

Holdings:  Appellant’s claims are barred by res judicata.  Appellant failed to raise any issue relating to the PSI report in his direct appeal, and is barred from litigating the issue in this appeal.  In an effort to show good cause as to why he did not raise the issue earlier, Appellant claimed that he became aware that the inaccuracies remained in his PSI report at the time of his most recent parole hearing.  The report, however, has remained unchanged for the past ten years, and Appellant’s objections at the sentencing hearing indicate that he was aware of the alleged errors at that time.  Consequently, Appellant failed to show good cause as to why he did not make this argument previously. Affirmed.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Monday, March 19, 2012

Summary 2012 WY 40

Summary of Decision March 19, 2012


[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court
Case Name: Joseph Dax v. The State of Wyoming

Docket Number: S-11-0182

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=465269

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, Honorable David B. Park, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff/Defendant): Joseph F. Dax, Pro se.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff/Defendant): Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Justin A. Daraie, Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: March 19, 2012

Facts: Joseph F. Dax filed this pro se appeal contesting an order denying him credit for time served. Dax claimed he should have received credit against his state sentence for time spent in pre-trial detention on a federal charge.

Issues: Although no issue was stated in Dax’s brief, he argued in the body of his brief that his state sentence should have been credited with time served, beginning from his date of arrest on the federal charge.

Holdings: Res judicata bars review of the issue raised by Dax because he did not take advantage of the opportunity to raise it multiple times before. In this case, he did not show good cause to excuse those failures. Affirmed.

Justice Hill delivered the opinion for the court.

Wednesday, September 28, 2011

Summary 2011 WY 137


Summary of Decision September 28, 2011

[SPECIAL NOTE:  This opinion uses the "Universal Citation."  It was given an "official" citation when it is issued.  You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation.  You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered.  When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number.  The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance] 

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name:  Winstead v. State of Wyo.

Citation:  2011 WY 137

Docket Number: S-11-0069


Appeal from the District Court of Big Horn County,  the Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant):  Craig Winstead, pro se.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff/Defendant):  Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Senior Assistant Attorney General

 Date of Decision: September 28, 2011

Facts:  Appellant entered a plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to three counts alleging third degree sexual assault and the prosecutor agreed to dismiss three counts alleging incest. The district court convened a change of plea hearing followed by a sentencing hearing.  The district court sentenced Appellant to serve sentences of ten to fifteen years on each count with the sentence on the first count to be served first and the sentences on the second and third counts to be served consecutively to the first sentence and concurrently with each other.  Appellant subsequently filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 35(a), claiming his sentences should have merged and asking the court to order that he serve his sentences concurrently.  The district court denied the motion.  Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal; subsequently, however, he moved for dismissal of the appeal.  This Court granted the motion.  

A few months later, the prosecutor filed a motion to amend the judgment and sentence.  The prosecutor asserted the original judgment and sentence did not contain a finding of the period of pre-sentence confinement as required by W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(2)(E) and (F) and sought clarification of whether Appellant was to serve count IV first and counts V and VI concurrently to each other but consecutively to count IV.  The record contains an affidavit from the detention center stating Appellant served 396 days pre-sentence confinement for which he should be credited.  The district court took no action on the motion. 

A few months after, Appellant also filed a motion for sentence reduction based on compliant behavior during his confinement.  The district court ordered the penitentiary to submit a progress report within thirty days.  The record contained nothing further concerning the motion or the court’s order.

Subsequently, Appellant filed a motion asking the district court to enter a judgment and sentence nunc pro tunc reflecting that he was entitled to credit for 396 days presentence confinement.  He attached the same affidavit referenced above.  The district court granted the motion and amended the judgment and sentence nunc pro tunc to require that Appellant receive credit for the presentence confinement.

A few months later, Appellant filed a motion to correct illegal sentence under W.R.Cr.P. 35(a) and asking for appointment of counsel.  He asserted that his sentence was illegal under the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment and the sentences should have merged.  He asked the district court to correct the sentence by ordering that the three sentences be served concurrently. After a hearing, the district court entered an order denying the motion, finding that the offenses involved three different victims and the sentences were not illegal.  Appellant appealed.                  

Issue:  Whether Appellant’s claim was barred from review by the doctrine of res judicata.  If not, whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for correction of an illegal sentence. 

Holdings:  The court affirmed the judgment and sentence, finding the appeal barred by res judicata. The Court found that Appellant had several opportunities to assert his claim that his sentence was illegal, but that he failed to do so and likewise failed to show that he had good cause for not bringing the issue to the courts’ attention. 

In an effort to show that he had good cause for not raising the issue, Appellant had asserted that in some instances he was not represented by counsel and was not schooled in the law and, in the instances in which he had representation, his attorney controlled the issues raised and he was not aware his sentence was illegal.  He argued that he became aware of the merger issue only after he was incarcerated and had access to legal research. The court noted that failing to recognize the factual or legal basis for a claim or failing to raise a claim despite recognizing it does not constitute good cause for not bringing an issue to the court’s attention  

Although holding Appellant’s appeal barred and determinative of his claim, the Court briefly addressed Appellant’s assertion that his sentences merged.  The Court observed that Appellant pled guilty to and was sentenced for sexually assaulting three different victims.  The facts showed that his acts in assaulting victim A could have been accomplished without assaulting victims B or C.  The assault against each of the three victims involved a distinct offense.  The Court stated that the concept of merger simply has no application when crimes are perpetrated against different victims.  Hannah v. U.S., 666 A.2d 845, 855 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

C.J. Kite delivered the opinion for the court.

J. Voigt in special concurrence, agreed with the result reached via the majority opinion, but wrote separately to repeat the concerns about the doctrine of sentencing merger that are set forth in Najera v. State, 2009 WY 105, ¶ 17, 214 P.3d 990, 995 (Wyo. 2009).

Wednesday, September 21, 2011

Summary 2011 WY 134


Summary of Decision September 21, 2011

[SPECIAL NOTE:  This opinion uses the "Universal Citation."  It was given an "official" citation when it is issued.  You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation.  You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered.  When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number.  The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance] 

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name:  Grynberg v. L&R Exploration

Citation:  2011 WY 134

Docket Number:  S-11-0037


Appeal from the District Court of Sweetwater County, The Honorable Jere A. Ryckman, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff):  William L. Hiser, Brown & Hiser, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming; Jon Aimone, Lemich Law Center, Rock Springs, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. Hiser.

Representing Appellee (Defendants):  Paula A. Fleck, Holland & Hart LLP, Jackson, Wyoming; Steve Andersen, Holland & Hart LLP, Boise, Idaho; Christina F. Gomez, Holland & Hart LLP, Denver, Colorado.  Argument by Mr. Andersen.

Date of Decision: September 21, 2011

Facts:  Appellant and her husband are co-owners of a petroleum company registered in the State of Utah that has been involved in acquiring, exploring, developing, and producing oil and natural gas fields.  In 1960, Appellant’s husband and several individuals entered into a joint venture agreement for the purpose of developing oil and natural gas fields primarily in Wyoming.  Originally, Appellant’s husband had a 41.5% interest in the gas field and Appellee owned the remaining 58.5% interest.  In the 1990s, Appellant’s husband assigned 99% of his interest in the gas field to Appellant.

Over the years, Appellant and Appellee entered into agreements authorizing Appellant’s company to recover damages for Appellee’s interests in the gas field by filing suit against various entities.  In exchange for pursuing Appellee’s claims and advancing the costs and fees of litigation, Appellant was to receive a percentage of any amounts recovered.  In 2000, an accountant for Appellee raised questions concerning Appellant’s husband’s accountings and payments to the joint venture participants.  When Appellant’s husband learned that he was being questioned, he and Appellant filed suit against Appellee in their home state of Colorado.  In response to the Colorado action, Appellee filed a petition in New York seeking a court order compelling the Appellant and her husband to arbitrate the dispute in accordance with the arbitration provisions contained in the joint venture agreement.     

The New York court granted the motion to the extent that it dismissed Appellant from the proceeding, denied the motion as to Appellant’s husband, granted Appellee’s arbitration petition and ordered Appellant’s husband “and all others acting on his behalf” to refrain from initiating any court proceedings in Colorado.  Appellant’s husband appealed up to NewYork’s highest court, but both courts rejected the appeal and affirmed the order.

 Less than two months later, Appellant filed a complaint in Colorado state district court identical to the earlier Colorado complaint except that Appellant’s husband was not named as a plaintiff.  Finding that the two complaints involved “identical claims and facts,” the Colorado court consolidated the cases and entered an order staying them until resolution of the New York proceedings.   The Colorado court also found Appellant’s actions frivolous and awarded attorney’s fees and costs.
     
After seven years, the arbitration panel unanimously concluded that Appellant’s husband had violated his fiduciary and accounting responsibilities and awarded Appellee substantial damages plus interest.  Appellant’s husband paid only part of the judgment, to Appellant, specifically the amount owing to her as assignee of his interest in Appellee.  Appellant’s husband failed to pay the balance and Appellee subsequently filed an action in Colorado to collect the unpaid portion. Appellant’s husband objected to the judgment.  The Colorado district court rejected the objection.  Appellant’s husband appealed, and The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed its district court’s decision.   

Meanwhile, Appellant filed a complaint in Wyoming for declaratory relief, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion against Appellee and numerous individuals and entities having an interest in the Appellee joint venture, claiming that the Appellee owed her compensation for services provided, and that she is entitled to payment of those amounts.  Appellee moved to dismiss the complaint under Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment under Rule 56.  The district court granted summary judgment for Appellee and dismissed the complaint on the basis of res judicata, finding that Appellant was in privity with parties involved in prior litigation in Colorado and New York, and that her complaint involved the same subject matter and issues resolved in those proceedings.  Appellant appealed, claiming the district court erred in holding that her claims were barred.  After she had filed her appellate brief, the New York Supreme Court issued a decision finding Appellant’s husband in contempt for colluding with Appellant to bring this action in Wyoming in violation of its order to refrain from further litigation involving Appellee and the issues before the arbitration panel.          

Issues: 1) Whether the district court properly entered summary judgment for Appellee when Appellee failed to file a separate statement of material facts demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue for trial as required by W.R.C.P. 56.1; and 2) Whether the district court correctly concluded that Appellant’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.  Appellee re-stated the issues and asked the Court to award it attorney fees and costs in defending this appeal.   

Holdings:  The Court affirmed and awarded attorneys fees and costs. 

As to the first issue, the Court held that Rule 56.1 is clear that upon filing any motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, a separate statement of material facts with pinpoint citations supporting the motion is required.  However, while the Court did not condone Appellee’s failure to comply with Rule 56.1, the Court concluded that the district court properly exercised its authority in determining that Appellant waived her objection to its consideration of Appellee’s motion and supporting materials when Appellant did not raise it until after the court had considered the materials and issued a ruling. 

As to the issue of res judicata, the Court found the issues and subject matter here identical to that raised in the New York and Colorado courts and resolved in New York after a seven day evidentiary hearing and numerous appeals. The Court found that those issues had been fully and finally resolved.  The Court held that Appellant, as the assignee of her husband’s interest in the joint venture, had received payment of her proportionate share, and  pursuant to the New York judgment, as co-owner of the petroleum company, she was not entitled to payment of anything from Appellee. Appellant was in privity with her husband as the assignee of his interest and, as co-owner of the petroleum company, is bound by the prior rulings.      

The Court also held that, in light of the lengthy New York proceedings, the orders staying and prohibiting other proceedings, and the contempt order, Appellant had no reasonable cause for this appeal and Appellee was entitled to attorney fees and costs.   

C.J. Kite delivered the opinion for the court.

Monday, September 19, 2011

Summary 2011 WY 130

Summary of Decision September 16, 2011


[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Graham v. State

Citation: 2011 WY 130

Docket Number: S-11-0053

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=464368

Appeal from the District Court of Sweetwater County, Honorable Jere A. Ryckman, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): James Phillip Graham, pro se.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Gregory A. Phillips, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; Susan G. O’Brien, Senior Assistant Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: September 16, 2011

Facts: Appellant was charged with ten counts of obtaining property by false pretenses, in violation of Wyo. Stat. 6-3-407(a)(i) (1999). Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pleaded no contest to four of the counts, and the State dismissed the remaining six. After accepting Appellant’s plea, the district court sentenced him to 30 to 36 months imprisonment on Count III, to be served concurrently with a federal sentence that Appellant was also about to begin serving. The district court sentenced him to five to seven years on each of Counts IV, V, and VI, these sentences to be served concurrently with each other, but consecutive to the sentence for Count III. The district court then suspended the sentences on Counts IV, V, and VI, and instead ordered ten years probation, also to be served consecutive to the sentence for Count III. In accordance with the plea agreement, Appellant was ordered to pay restitution to nine victims of the crimes originally charged. Although Appellant had agreed to pay restitution, he reserved the right to contest the amount of restitution, and he appealed the district court’s order as imposing excessive restitution on two of the counts. The district court’s order was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions in part in Graham v. State, 2001 WY 5 (Wyo. 2001). On remand, the district court entered a stipulated order reducing the amount of restitution in accordance with our directions.

Appellant served his sentence on Count III concurrently with his federal sentence. He was released from federal prison in 2002, and immediately began serving his probation on Counts IV, V, and VI. When his probation was revoked in 2007, the district court reinstated the probation with certain additional conditions. When Appellant’s probation was revoked again in 2008, the district court ordered him to serve three and a half to seven years imprisonment on each of the three counts, the sentences to be served concurrently. In 2010, Appellant filed a motion in district court to correct an illegal sentence. After a hearing, the district court ruled that Appellant’s sentence was not illegal, and denied the motion.

Issues: Whether the court imposed an illegal sentence where there is no authority under the law to include a consecutive sentence of probation, after the court had sentenced appellant to prison; whether the court imposed an illegal sentence where the sentence of probation, in violation of law, began three years after appellant was sentenced to incarceration; Whether the court imposed an illegal sentence where the sentence of probation was three years beyond the maximum sentence that could have been imposed by the court; Whether the court imposed an illegal sentence by sentencing appellant to restitution for crimes for which he was never tried and convicted; Whether the court, having imposed an illegal sentence, was without jurisdiction to revoke appellant’s probation where jurisdiction under the law lies solely in the board of parole after incarceration in prison.

Holdings: W.R.Cr.P. 35(a) provides that a court may correct an illegal sentence “at any time.” But while there is no time limit on motions to correct an illegal sentence, other limitations still apply. Precedent makes it clear that res judicata is one applicable limitation. The doctrine of res judicata is not limited to only those issues which were actually decided in an earlier proceeding. Issues which could have been raised in an earlier proceeding may also be foreclosed from subsequent consideration. In the present action, Appellant could have raised his first four issues in his initial appeal, and he has not suggested any good cause for failing to do so. In his fifth issue, he challenges the revocation of his probation in 2008. It may be true that he could not have raised this issue before, as his probation had not yet been revoked at the time of his initial appeal. However, his argument that the district court lacked authority to revoke his probation is founded on the assertion that the underlying sentence of probation was illegal. Because res judicata bars his claims that the underlying sentence was illegal, there is no foundation for his challenge to the subsequent revocation of his probation.

He incorrectly asserts that his sentence was longer than the maximum allowed by statute. He points out that the statute under which he was convicted, Wyo. Stat. 6-3-407(a)(i), provides for a maximum sentence of ten years. He argues that he was sentenced to three years in prison followed by ten years of probation, for a total of thirteen years. However, he completely overlooks the fact that he was convicted on four separate counts of obtaining property by false pretenses. The district court could have imposed ten years imprisonment on each count, for a total of forty years. Appellant’s thirteen year sentence was, therefore, well within the maximum allowed by statute.

Appellant also argues that the district court lacked authority to sentence him to both imprisonment and probation. Although a sentence is illegal if it places a defendant on probation and in detention at the same time for the same crime, Appellant ignores the fact that he was convicted on four separate counts. He was sentenced to imprisonment on Count III, and consecutive to that, to probation on Counts IV, V, and VI. He was not sentenced to imprisonment and probation at the same time, nor for the same crime.

He further argues that the district court violated the requirement that a sentence must be imposed within one calendar year from the date guilt is established because it ordered the probation on Counts IV, V, and VI to begin after his three years of imprisonment on Count III. In Appellant’s case, the district court did not wait more than a year to impose sentence. It imposed prison sentences on all four counts, and did so on the very same day that it found Appellant guilty. It suspended the prison sentences on Counts IV, V, and VI in favor of probation, and ordered that the probation would be consecutive to the prison sentence on Count III. That was well within the district court’s sentencing discretion, and does not alter the basic fact that Appellant’s sentences were all imposed within one year of establishing his guilt.

Next, Appellant complains that the district court ordered him to pay restitution for crimes he was not convicted of committing. Appellant was ordered to pay restitution to nine of the victims. The rule is that a court has no authority “to order restitution where there was no admission of the crimes or agreement to pay restitution as part of the plea agreement.” During Appellant’s change of plea hearing, the district court questioned him about the plea agreement: “Now, you’ve also agreed to make restitution to alleged victims [in] the charges [that] are going to be dismissed. You’re agreeable to make restitution to those people also?” Appellant unequivocally responded “Yes, sir.”

Finally, Appellant claims that his sentence was illegal, and so the district court lacked authority to revoke his probation. Because the underlying sentence was not illegal, this claim is baseless.

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the opinion for the court.

Monday, August 08, 2011

Summary 2011 WY 116

Summary of Decision August 8, 2011


[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Rathbun v. State

Citation: 2011 WY 116

Docket Number: S-10-0245

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=464133

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, Honorable Michael K. Davis, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Justin A. Daraie, Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: August 8, 2011

Facts: The appellant was convicted of attempted kidnapping and sentenced to life in prison. He appeals the denial of two pre-trial motions to dismiss, and raises two issues concerning sentencing.

Issues: Whether the appellant’s prosecution for attempted kidnapping was barred by the doctrine of double jeopardy due to his earlier guilty plea to battery. Whether the State was barred by the doctrine of res judicata from refiling the attempted kidnapping charge and seeking a second preliminary hearing after that charge was dismissed following a preliminary hearing where the circuit court judge found a lack of probable cause. Whether the district court applied the proper penalty range in imposing sentence. Whether the district court’s determination of the penalty range in imposing sentence violated the appellant’s right to trial by jury.

Holdings: No person may be placed in jeopardy more than once for the same criminal offense. Where the two offenses for which the defendant is punished or tried cannot survive the ‘same-elements’ test, the double jeopardy bar applies. The inquiry under the same-elements test is “whether each offense contains an element not contained in the other; if not, they are the ‘same offence’ and double jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive prosecution. The two offenses at issue in the present case are misdemeanor battery, in violation of Wyo. Stat. 6-2-501(b) and attempted kidnapping, a felony, in violation of Wyo. Stat. 6-1-301(a) and 6-2-201(a)(iii) and (d). Each of these statutes contains an element not contained in the other. Battery requires both the use of physical force and resultant bodily injury, neither of which element is contained in the crime of attempted kidnapping. Attempted kidnapping requires the intent to commit the crime of kidnapping, and a substantial step toward commission of that crime—which substantial step logically may or may not involve physical force or bodily injury—neither of which element is contained in the crime of battery. In cases such as this, where two crimes each contain elements not contained in the other, there is no preclusive effect, and the subsequent prosecution does not violate double jeopardy.

The doctrine of res judicata neither bars the refiling of charges nor a subsequent preliminary hearing on those charges, where there has been a dismissal of those charges based upon a failure of proof of probable cause at a preliminary hearing. Further, Wyoming law does not require the production of new or different evidence at the subsequent hearing, or that the subsequent hearing take place before the same circuit court judge or magistrate.

Kidnapping is a single crime described in Wyo. Stat. 6-2-201(a) and (b), and that subsection (c), rather than defining a lesser-included offense, describes mitigating conduct subsequent to the kidnapping that may allow for a reduced sentence. The appellant bears the burden of proving such mitigating conduct and, if competent evidence of such is produced, the question must be presented to the jury. It logically follows that, where there has not been a completed kidnapping, but instead an attempted kidnapping, the mitigating circumstances described in subsection (c) cannot occur. The potential “anomaly” in the statute that a person who completes a kidnapping but releases the victim unharmed could be subject to a lesser penalty than a person who merely attempts a kidnapping is recognized, but anomalies created by statute are not to be corrected by the court. The legislature has exclusive authority over criminal punishment and sentencing and because it would violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers, to supply what would appear to be omissions in a statute, or to correct what to be defects in a statute. The district court correctly applied the sentencing provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-201(d) after the appellant was convicted of attempted kidnapping.

A sentencing judge may not find facts that take a sentence beyond the sentencing range supported by the jury’s verdict alone. While facts in aggravation of sentence must be found by a jury, facts in mitigation of sentence may be found by the judge. If a required finding of fact exposes the defendant to a greater penalty than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict, that finding must be made by the jury. In the present action, there is one crime—kidnapping—for which the maximum sentence is as stated in Subsection (d). Where there has been a completed kidnapping, the defendant is at liberty to produce evidence to prove, in mitigation of sentence, that he or she voluntarily released the victim substantially unharmed. If that is not accomplished, the sentencing range remains as it is stated in Subsection (d). Of even more significance to the instant case is the inescapable conclusion, from the clear language of the statute, that any evidence in mitigation can only be evidence of post-kidnapping conduct, meaning that Subsection (c) does not apply to attempted kidnapping. Thus, there was no constitutional violation in the procedure by which the appellant was sentenced.

The appellant’s prosecution for attempted kidnapping was not barred by the doctrine of double jeopardy because battery is not a lesser-included offense to attempted kidnapping under the same-elements test. Neither the doctrine of res judicata nor the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars the refiling of a criminal charge and a subsequent preliminary hearing after a charge has been dismissed following a preliminary hearing where a lack of probable cause was found. The district court applied the proper punishment range in sentencing the appellant, and the district court’s determination of the appropriate punishment range did not violate the appellant’s right to trial by jury.

Affirmed.

J. Voigt delivered the opinion for the court.



Thursday, November 18, 2010

Summary 2010 WY 149

Summary of Decision November 18, 2010

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Willis v. Davis

Citation: 2010 WY 149

Docket Number: S-10-0066

URL: http://tinyurl.com/264plpa

Appeal from the District Court of Park County, Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Alex H. Sitz III of Meinecke & Sitz, Cody, Wyoming

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Matthew D. Winslow of Keegan & Winslow, , Cody, Wyoming.

Date of Decision: November 18, 2010

Facts: Appellee Father and Appellee Mother were divorced by decree awarding Father primary physical custody of the children and giving Mother liberal visitation. A year later, Father filed a motion for an order requiring Mother to show cause why she should not be held in contempt for violating provisions of the decree. Mother responded with her own motion for an order requiring Father to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for decree violations. In her motion, Mother also requested custody modification. After a hearing, the district court entered an order declining to hold either party in contempt and denying Mother’s request for custody modification. Mother did not appeal from that order. Nine days later, Mother filed a motion to modify custody. Father moved to dismiss arguing that the motion was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the district court had just heard and ruled on a request by Mother for custody modification. The district court granted the motion to dismiss.


Issues: Whether the district court erred when it applied the doctrine of res judicata to her Motion to Modify Custody.


Holdings: Four factors must exist for res judicata to apply: 1) the parties must be identical; 2) the subject matter must be identical; 3) the issues must be identical and relate to the same subject matter; and 4) the capacities of the persons must be identical in reference to both the subject matter and the issues between them. As a general rule the doctrine of res judicata applies to divorce decrees. However, Wyoming law recognizes that custody modification is sometimes necessary. Thus, a district court in this state that enters a custody order in a divorce proceeding has continuing subject matter jurisdiction to enforce or modify custody upon petition by either parent. The party seeking to modify custody bears the burden of establishing that a material change in circumstances has occurred since the entry of the previous custody determination and that the modification would be in the best interests of the children.

In the present case, in Mother’s response to Father’s supplement to motion for order to show cause, filed five months before the hearing, Mother prayed for an order requiring Father to show why he should not be held in contempt and “for a modification of custody.” The record, therefore, is clear that Mother requested custody modification, thereby placing the matter at issue. The record is also clear that the district court considered Mother’s custody modification request to be at issue during the contempt proceedings. Given Mother’s request for custody modification and the district court’s ruling on her request, there is no question the matter was raised and decided at the prior hearing. To warrant another hearing on the issue, Mother had to allege that a material change in circumstances occurred after the entry of the previous order. Mother’s later motion does not specifically make that allegation. Rather, it appears to allege a material change of circumstances since the entry of the divorce decree. Although the allegations Mother made against Father in the more recent motion were different from those she presented in her earlier motions, there is nothing in the record indicating these were new allegations that arose after the district court’s ruling. Because the record submitted to the Court does not include a hearing transcript or another statement of the evidence presented at the hearing, there is no way of knowing what allegations and evidence Mother presented against Father in support of her initial custody modification request.
Mother, as the appellant, had the burden to submit a sufficient record from which the Court could decide the issues presented. Without a transcript of the hearing or other statement of evidence, the Court will accept the district court’s finding and conclusion that the issues Mother presented in her later motion were identical to those heard at the earlier hearing and decided by the prior order.

Mother also maintains the dismissal of her custody modification motion denied her due process because she did not have an adequate opportunity in the earlier hearing to present evidence and argument supporting her request for modification of custody. Any contention that Mother was denied due process in the earlier hearing properly should have been presented to this Court by way of appeal from the earlier order. Mother did not appeal from that order.

Affirmed.

C.J. Kite delivered the opinion for the court.

Thursday, June 17, 2010

Summary 2010 WY 77

Summary of Decision issued June 15, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Sanders v. Sanders

Citation: 2010 WY 77

Docket Number: S-09-0238

Appeal from the District Court of Goshen County, the Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge.

Representing Thomas Sanders: Don W. Riske and James R. Salisbury of Riske, Salisbury & Kelly, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Shirley and Daniel Sanders: John J. Maier of John Maier Law Offices, Torrington, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: Thomas Leroy Sanders (Leroy) was named as a joint tenant with right of survivorship on two Goshen County deeds. The other joint tenants, Shirley and Daniel Sanders brought a reformation action to have Leroy removed from the deeds. The dispositive issue is whether the district court’s order for reformation of the deeds was supported by sufficient evidence and in accordance with Wyoming law.
Shirley operates a farm and ranch enterprise in Goshen County and is the father of Leroy and Daniel. In 1995, Shirley’s mother decided to sell property (Parcel 1) to Shirley under an installment contract. When Shirley and his mother went to execute the documents, Shirley asked for Leroy’s name to be added to the deed with a right of survivorship to protect Parcel 1 from his wife from whom he was estranged. Also as part of his estate planning, Shirley wanted the property to pass to Leroy without going through probate. (Shirley’s attorney advised against adding Leroy as a joint tenant.) Leroy signed the mortgage but Shirley remained solely liable on the promissory note. In 1998, Parcel 2 became available for purchase. Shirley’s father had set aside money to finance the purchase. When the father died, Shirley’s mother gifted the funds to Shirley, Daniel, Leroy and Leroy’s wife to purchase the property. Shirley, Daniel and Leroy were named to Parcel 2 as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Shirley and Leroy farmed together until a dispute arose resulting in the First Case in 2002. Leroy asserted that he had a present possessory interest in Parcels 1 and 2. Leroy moved to dismiss the case shortly before trial. The district court dismissed with prejudice Leroy’s claims alleging present ownership interest in or rights to possession, use or control and any right or claim to partition. Leroy continued to assert that he had the right to a present possessory interest in the properties. In 2007, Shirley and Daniel filed a complaint seeking reformation by removing Leroy as a joint tenant. The district court denied Leroy’s motion for summary judgment ruling that its order in the First Case was binding in the current action and that res judicata prohibited Leroy from claiming any present interest in the property. After the bench trial, the district court ordered reformation of the deeds by removing Leroy as a grantee without any mention of a future interest.
In order for the remedy of reformation to be available, the evidence must establish that a mistake occurred in the drafting of the instrument, rather than in the reaching of the antecedent agreement. Shirley’s own testimony confirmed there was no drafting or “word processing” error. Mutual mistake is shown only if the instrument is intended to evidence a prior agreement and does not do so. The record clearly showed that the parties intended for Leroy to be included on the deeds as a joint tenant with right of survivorship. The evidence does not demonstrate that Shirley intended for the other aspects of his agreement with Leroy be included in the deeds. The evidence supports the existence of a separate oral agreement giving Shirley the right of sole possession during his lifetime. A joint tenancy typically allows each joint tenant full possession of the property at all times, however, the intent of the parties is paramount.

Conclusion: Leroy did not challenge the district court’s findings as to the terms of the oral agreement between his father and him and the Court concluded the findings were not clearly erroneous. In fact, the record contained evidence that when Shirley wanted to transfer other jointly held property, Leroy signed the transfer documents. This was not a proper case for reformation because the evidence did not establish that the parties made a mistake in drafting the deeds.

Reversed.

J. Kite delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/23a44o5 .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance using the Universal Citation format, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Wednesday, March 03, 2010

Summary 2010 WY 22

Summary of Decision issued March 3, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Cooper v. State

Citation: 2010 WY 22

Docket Number: S-09-0187

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge.

Representing Appellant Cooper: Cleo Cooper, pro se.

Representing Appellee State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Cooper appealed the district court’s denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence in which the district court clarified its intent that the sentence was to run consecutive to other sentences.
Cooper filed a direct appeal from the judgment and sentence of the conviction in case No. 16970-C which was consolidated with No. 16849-B. He did not raise the illegal-sentence issue in that appeal. It was not until July 2009 that Cooper raised the issue with the district court. Cooper failed to make any argument to show good cause as to why the issue was not brought to the attention of the district court or the Court on those prior occasions.

Conclusion: The Court found that res judicata barred review of the issue raised by Cooper because he did not raise it in his motion for sentence reduction or in his direct appeal and he has not shown good cause to excuse those failures.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/yfvhzjo .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Friday, February 26, 2010

Summary 2010 WY 21

Summary of Decision issued February 26, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Wyo. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Wyo. Ins. Guar. Assn.

Citation: 2010 WY 21

Docket Number: S-09-0109

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable David B. Park, Judge.

Representing Appellant Wyoming Medical Center, Inc.: Stephenson D. Emery of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, PC, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee Wyoming Insurance Guaranty Association: James R. Bell of Murane & Bostwick, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: After the Wyoming Medical Center’s (WMC) insurer became insolvent, the Wyoming Insurance Guaranty Assoc. (WIGA) paid claims made against WMC. WIGA then filed a complaint against WMC claiming that it was obligated to pay the deductibles for each claim. Asserting that WIGA stood in the shoes of the insurer (PHICO), WMC argued that WIGA’s claim was barred by an earlier district court ruling that WMC was not obligated to pay the deductibles to its insolvent insurer. WIGA filed a summary judgment motion which the district court granted, ruling that WMC was obligated to pay the deductibles.

Res judicata: For res judicata to apply, the parties, the subject matter, the issues and the capacities of the persons must be identical. WMC contended that the requirement that the parties be identical was satisfied because PHICO and WIGA were in privity with each other. WMC asserted that WIGA authorized PHICO to demand payment from WMC of the deductible amounts on WIGA’s behalf. Pursuant to the plain language of § 26-31-106(a)(i), WIGA is obligated to pay “covered claims” which are those claims the insurer would have been obligated to pay but for its insolvency. The Court stated the legislature appeared to intend WIGA pay only what an insurer would have paid had it remained solvent. A solvent insurer would have been obligated to pay the claim amount less the deductible. There is wide support for construing insurance guaranty association statutes to mean that the rights and duties of such associations are limited to those explicitly set forth in the statutes. Res judicata does not apply to bar WIGA’s claim.
Set-off for attorneys’ fees: After PHICO’s insolvency, WMC paid the attorney fees at issue directly to the law firm for services it provided in defending WMC against claims covered under the policy. WMC asserted that PHICO, and therefore WIGA, would have been required to reimburse WMC for attorney fees and that a set-off against the judgment was an appropriate way to accomplish that. The Court stated that the Act reflected that the legislature drew the line between what is covered and what is not. Section 26-31-106(a)(i) makes it clear that WIGA was obligated to pay covered claims arising out of and within the coverage of an insurance policy. Section 26-31-103(a)(ii)(D) excludes supplementary payment obligations including attorney fees.

Conclusion: WIGA and PHICO were not identical and not in privity so as to make it appropriate to apply the default judgment in the breach of contract action against WIGA to bar its claim under the Insurance Guaranty Act. The definition of “covered claims” the legislature adopted expressly excludes attorney fees. The Court concluded that WIGA was not responsible for WMC’s attorney fees.

Affirmed.

J. Kite delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/y98qyyv .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Friday, November 13, 2009

Summary 2009 WY 138

Summary of Decision issued November 10, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Burke v. State, DOH

Citation: 2009 WY 138

Docket Number: S-09-0022

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Michael K. Davis, Judge.

Representing Appellant Burke: Frank J. Jones, Wheatland, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; Douglas J. Moench, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Michael T. Kahler, Assistant Attorney General, Shaun Wilkerson, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: After an audit showed that Burke had been excessively reimbursed for services provided to Medicaid recipients, the Department sought reimbursement from him. Burke filed a request for an administrative hearing, but later withdrew the request and the Department dismissed the administrative action. The Department then filed an action in district court to recover the excess payments. The district court entered summary judgment against Burke finding that he was barred from disputing the claim because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

Application of res judicata: Burke was entitled to an administrative hearing. The Department advised him that he was so entitled. Burke requested a hearing and then withdrew his request. His contention that the district court improperly applied res judicata when the Medicaid rules did not allow him to request an administrative hearing was without merit. The Department’s letters clearly informed Burke that the Department was seeking recovery of excess payments pursuant to Chapter 39 and that he had a right to request reconsideration of the decision to recover excess payments, and upon the Department’s issuance of a final decision, a contested case hearing.
Wyoming Medicaid rules: Burke claimed the Medicaid Rules were ambiguous and inconsistent because while the overpayment and excess payment provisions allow a provider to request an administrative hearing, both provisions also allow the Department to initiate a civil action to recover the payments even when the provider has requested a hearing. The problem with Burke’s argument was that there was no administrative proceeding at the time the civil lawsuit was filed. Consequently, there was no possibility of an administrative ruling in his favor and a simultaneous district court judgment in the Department’s favor.
Discovery: The issue before the district court was whether the Department was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its complaint for money damages against Burke in the amount of the excess payments. The district court determined that the order dismissing the agency action was final. The district court further determined that the doctrine of res judicata applied to bar re-litigation of the claims raised in the administrative proceeding. The discovery Burke sought to pursue was not necessary to a determination of the issues before the district court.

Conclusion: The Department’s letters clearly informed Burke that the Department was seeking recovery of excess payments pursuant to Chapter 39 and that he had a right to request reconsideration of the decision to recover excess payments, and upon the Department’s issuance of a final decision, a contested case hearing. There was no administrative proceeding at the time the civil lawsuit was filed consequently; there was no possibility of an administrative ruling in his favor and a simultaneous district court judgment in the Department’s favor. The discovery Burke sought to pursue was not necessary to a determination of the issues before the district court.

Affirmed.

J. Kite delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/ykmvj5z .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Thursday, September 03, 2009

Summary 2009 WY 108

Summary of Decision issued September 2, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Moore v. State

Citation: 2009 WY 108

Docket Number: S-08-0276

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, the Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge.

Representing Appellant Moore: Timothy D. Moore, Pro se.

Representing Appellee State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Moore was convicted of four felonies. Three of his felonies were ordered to be served concurrently with each other. Those three concurrent sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to the fourth felony sentence. Moore argued that the Order Granting Motion for Sentence Reduction made all of his sentences concurrent. He submitted that when the district court granted his motion for sentence reduction, it granted the only relief requested in the motion – that all sentences run concurrently. He claimed that the reduction in the maximum term (from 10 to 8 years) was a grant of additional relief. He also asserted that the Order Denying Sentence Modification was so confusing that he was compelled to seek clarification.

Jurisdiction: Moore’s 2005 pleadings were actually a series of letters, the first of which was a request to clarify the Order Granting Motion for Sentence Reduction. The Court found authority for Moore’s “motion” in W.R.Cr.P. 36 which allows error in the record to be corrected. The Court stated there was a lack of clarity in the Order. The Court found that the letters were a proper motion to correct clerical error and concluded that the district court had jurisdiction.

Res Judicata: The Court focused on whether Moore raised or had the opportunity to raise, the same issue presently before the Court in any previous proceeding. The district court clarified the 2004 Order Granting Motion for Sentence Reduction with its 2005 Order Denying Sentence Modification. The 2005 order clearly denied Moore’s requests for relief regarding the interpretation of the order including Moore’s argument that the prior order made all his sentences concurrent. The district court did not grant Moore any relief in its 2005 order. Moore did not appeal from the 2005 order. Thus, any claims denied by that order, were res judicata.

Conclusion: The district court did not grant Moore any relief in its July 12, 2005 order. It denied the requested relief. And it granted no affirmative relief. The district court’s September 18, 2008 order was entirely consistent with the July 12, 2005 order. The district court’s Order Clarifying July 12, 2005 Order Denying Sentence Modification was affirmed.

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/ldkv5y .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Monday, August 18, 2008

Summary 2008 WY 96

Summary of Decision issued August 15, 2008

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: R.C.R., Inc. v. Deline

Citation: 2008 WY 96

URL: http:// wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=453653

Docket Number: S-07-0029

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge

Representing Appellants (Defendants): Steven F. Freudenthal of Freudenthal Salzburg & Bonds, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellees (Plaintiffs): J. Kent Rutledge of Lathrop & Rutledge, Cheyenne, Wyoming; and Frederick B. Skillern of Montgomery Little Soran & Murray, Denver, Colorado

Date of Decision: August 15, 2008

Issues: Whether principles against splitting causes of action, of judicial estoppel, of collateral estoppel and of res judicata, as applied to the facts contained in the pleadings, evidence, findings, conclusions and rulings in the easement litigation and the private road litigation, bar the Appellees' claims. Whether the district court erroneously applied Lozier v. Blattland Investments, LLC, 2004 WY 132, 100 P.3d 380 (Wyo. 2004), without regard to the factual differences in that the Appellees do not own the property and no common source of title for the lands at issue, or the applicable rules against splitting causes of action, of judicial estoppel, of collateral estoppel and of res judicata. Whether controlling legal principles prohibit the unilateral expansion of the size of the dominant estate to be served by the easement.

Holdings: Wyoming has recognized the rule against splitting causes of action. In the present action, it appears that Appellant has relentlessly pursued legal, as well as perhaps some extra-legal, remedies in his campaign to frustrate the Appellees' enjoyment of their property. It is Appellant who has created, or recreated, causes of action that the Appellees, of necessity, had to pursue in self-defense. The purpose of the rule against splitting causes of action is "to promote fairness to the parties by protecting defendants against fragmented, harassing, vexatious, and costly litigation, and the possibility of conflicting outcomes." While Appellant is nominally the "defendant" in this litigation (as he has been in the past as well), it is Appellant's conduct/misconduct that has necessitated all of the legal proceedings. Although Appellant did not develop this issue in much detail or with much clarity, it is evident from the record that the Appellees' lawsuit was prompted by harassment from Appellant. The Appellees' action was not barred by the rule against splitting causes of action.

Judicial estoppel is applied to foreclose a party from maintaining inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings. The doctrine is applied sparingly and not in a highly technical manner that prevents litigation on the merits. Judicial estoppel is sometimes referred to as a doctrine which estops a party to play fast and loose with the courts or to trifle with judicial proceedings. It is an expression of the maxim that one cannot blow hot and cold in the same breath. A party will just not be allowed to maintain inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings. Judicial estoppel requires that where a man is successful in the position taken in the first proceeding, then that position rises to the dignity of conclusiveness. Appellant's claim of judicial estoppel is based upon his contention that the Appellees should be estopped from claiming that the easement benefits Rainbow Canyon, Inc., lands because they did not seek to have Rainbow Canyon, Inc., added as a party to earlier private road litigation. The present litigation does not, however, seek to adjudicate the right of Rainbow Canyon, Inc., or any of its owners to use the easement. Rather, this litigation concerns the Appellees' use of the easement. Thus, judicial estoppel does not apply to the circumstances presented here.

Collateral estoppel bars re-litigation of previously litigated issues (as contrasted with "claims"), as well as issues which could have been but which were not raised in the prior litigation. These factors are used in the analysis of collateral estoppel: (1) Whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with the issue presented in the present action; (2) whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the merits; (3) whether the party against whom the collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. The prior litigation in question dealt only with the location of the easement and not its scope and hence collateral estoppel did not bar the Appellees from pursuing this litigation. Moreover, it was Appellant's conduct in attempting to unilaterally limit the Appellees' use of the easement and otherwise interfere with their property rights that necessitated this litigation. The only one of those four factors that is met here is that the parties are the same. The issues are not identical, there was a determination on the merits but both the issues and the claims are entirely different here, and the Appellees did not have an opportunity to litigate the issues now before us because they had not yet come to light. The Appellees' action was not barred by the principles that constitute collateral estoppel.

Res judicata bars the re-litigation of previously litigated claims or causes of action, as well as claims that could or should have been raised in the prior litigation. These factors are applied to the analysis of res judicata: (1) Identity in parties; (2) identity in subject matter; (3) the issues are the same and relate to the subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons are identical in reference to both the subject matter and the issues between them. The resolution of the collateral estoppel contentions applies equally to res judicata. Res judicata did not bar this litigation, which was prompted almost exclusively by Appellant's improper interference with the Appellees' property rights.

Appellant contends that the interpretation the district court placed on Lozier v. Blattland, changes the law dramatically because its "implicit" holding requires a new evidentiary hearing in all cases to determine the intention of the parties, even where the matter has been previously and fully litigated. Appellant postulates that such a construction will substantially chill the free transferability of any real property which is a subservient estate to any easement since the scope and burden of that easement would be subject to re-interpretation and re-evaluation at any time a dominant estate holder requested. It suffices to note that Appellant grossly exaggerates the doom that the district court's application of that case, in these circumstances, spells for owners of servient estates. To allay any lingering concerns, the district court's decision in this case is not viewed as altering/expanding/contracting the essence of the holding in Lozier in any way.

Appellant also contends that the district court's order amounts to allowing the Appellees to unilaterally expand the size of the dominant estate. Appellant has made no claim that the "burden" on the easement had been expanded and the facts establish that the Appellees used the easement at issue only a few times a year. The district court did not err in taking evidence about the circumstances which surrounded the creation and use of the easement and none of its findings of fact is clearly erroneous. Indeed, the district court took a very sensible and rational approach to resolving this festering conflict. The uses the Appellees make of the easement are reasonable in every respect, given the language used in the written conveyance. Those uses are much the same as the uses made prior owners. The district court did not err by going outside the four corners of the easement to ascertain its "extent" or "scope," and its conclusions are wholly consistent with governing law.

There is no merit in any of Appellant's contentions. Therefore, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the opinion for the court.

Wednesday, April 16, 2008

Summary 2008 WY 46

Summary of Decision issued April 16, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Tilden

Citation: 2008 WY 46

Docket Number: S-07-0208

Appeal from the District Court of Park County, the Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Andrea L. Richard and Erika M. Nash of the Richard Law Firm, PC, Jackson, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Jessica Rutzick of Jessica Rutzick Attorney at Law, PC, Jackson, Wyoming and John R. Vincent of Vincent Law Office, Riverton, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: Stewart Title appealed the district court’s award of statutory attorney’s fees and interest to Tilden. This is the third trip to the Court for the instant case.
Whether the filing deadline of W.R.C.P. 54(d)(2) applied:
The unambiguous language of W.R.C.P. 54(d)(2) does not place a 14-day filing deadline upon application for fees in a case where the cause of action is for attorney’s fees. There was no reason to require the filing of a motion for attorney’s fees because the only reason any additional filing was required was that a partial summary judgment had been granted resolving the fact that statutory attorney’s fees were due but not establishing the amount.
Whether doctrine of res judicata bars award:
The district court found that the arbitrator denied the attorney’s fee claim on the grounds that he had no authority to decide it. The language and intent of the Interim Order was clear. The arbitrator did not address and decide Tilden’s claim for statutory attorneys’ fees therefore, the issue was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
Whether contingent fees can be included:
In its brief, Stewart Title did not mention the existence or effect of contingent fees. The Court noted that attorney’s fees must be proven to be reasonable. Whether or not attorney’s fees are fixed or contingent is one factor a district court is to consider in determining the reasonableness under the federal “lodestar” test adopted by the Court. The district court listed and considered the required lodestar factors.
Whether amounts billed in violation of Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(g) can be included:
Stewart Title contended that one of Tilden’s lawyers violated the rule by hiring and charging Tilden for the services of a certain paralegal. The Court summarily affirmed the district court’s rejection of Stewart Title’s objection to inclusion in the attorney’s fees award of amounts paid to the paralegal.
Whether prejudgment interest can be included:
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-15-124(c) does not clearly indicate whether prejudgment interest is available only upon the underlying claim or loss that the insurer refused to pay or also upon the attorney’s fees incurred both in vindicating that claim and in pursuing the attorney’s fees claim under the statute. The Court noted again that the arbitrator declined to decide the attorney’s fees issue because he concluded that he lacked the jurisdiction to make such a determination under applicable arbitration rules and that there was no prevailing party statute for him to apply. Attorney’s fees owed at any given time could have been readily computed and if Stewart Title had asked for the amount, they could have cut off the accrual of fees and interest. An insured, wronged by the dilatory tactics of an insurer cannot be made whole if he or she loses more in attorney’s fees and interest that he or she obtains in an underlying damage award.

Holding: The filing deadline of W.R.C.P. 54(d)(2) did not apply to an application for fees under Wyoming Statutes. The present action was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata because it was not raised, and could not be raised, in the arbitration. The district court did not err by including in the final judgment attorney’s fees that might have been contingent or attorney’s fees paid to a certain paralegal or prejudgment interest on the fees awarded in the judgment.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/6mzkeg .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

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