Showing posts with label Wind River Indian Reservation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Wind River Indian Reservation. Show all posts

Wednesday, March 25, 2009

Summary 2009 WY 43

Summary of Decision issued March 25, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Colyer v. State, Dep’t of Transportation

Citation: 2009 WY 43

Docket Number: S-08-0183

Appeal from the District Court of Fremont County, the Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge.

Representing Appellant Colyer: Vance Countryman, PC, Lander, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; Douglas J. Moench, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Michael T. Kahler, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Colyer’s driver’s license was suspended because he refused to submit to a chemical test of his blood alcohol content after a traffic stop. That suspension was affirmed after a contested case hearing and again after a petition for review was filed in the district court. The focal issue is whether the arrest was unlawful, which, if so, would negate the Appellant’s statutorily implied consent to chemical testing and would require reversal of the driver’s license suspension. The Court stated the dispositive issue was whether Colyer’s detention by a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) officer on the Wind River Indian Reservation rendered unlawful the otherwise lawful arrest of him by a Fremont County deputy sheriff.

Colyer relied almost exclusively on Marshall v. State ex rel. DOT and United States v. Atwell. The State relied primarily upon Pogue v. Allison and United States v. Santiago.
The hearing examiner concluded that the BIA officer’s detention was not unlawful stating that he had jurisdiction to stop the vehicle and once he determined that Colyer was not Native American had the authority to detain him until the Sheriff’s Deputy arrived to take custody. Jurisdiction for the detention of Colyer was conferred on the BIA officer by the deputy sheriffs while on route to the scene and because the BIA officer had reasonable cause to believe a crime was occurring and that it involved an immediate threat of serious bodily injury or death. The Court was not comfortable with the hearing officer’s legal analysis stating that the “peace officer” to which reference is made in § 7-2-101 on its face does not include BIA officers, the incident did not involve extraterritorial authority because neither officer left his respective territorial jurisdiction and the reasoning of Santiago did not apply.
The Court noted this was not a unique question. It reviewed cases from courts around the country noting the decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe where the United State Supreme Court detailed the history of the congressional presumption that Indian tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians on reservations and then stated that the tribes are to promptly deliver up any non-Indian offender rather than try and punish him themselves. In Duro v. Reina, the United States Supreme Court stated that tribal officers may exercise their power to detain the offender and transport him to the proper authorities. Viewing the facts of the instant case in the context above, the Court concluded that nothing occurred in the detention of Colyer to render his arrest unlawful.

Conclusion: Colyer was lawfully detained by the BIA officer pending his lawful arrest by the deputy sheriff. The State proved by a preponderance of the evidence the statutory elements required for the suspension of Colyers’ driver’s license due to his refusal to submit to a chemical test of his blood alcohol content.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/d78vk7 .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Tuesday, January 15, 2008

Summary 2008 WY 4

Summary of Decision issued January 14, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Yellowbear, Jr. v. State

Citation: 2008 WY 4

Docket Number: 06-246

Appeal from the District Court of Hot Springs County, the Honorable David B. Park, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Sylvia Lee Hackl of Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Appellant was convicted of two counts of felony murder, and two counts of being an accessory to felony murder, all based upon the physical abuse and death of his daughter. In this appeal, Appellant questions whether the State had jurisdiction to prosecute him, whether the jury was properly instructed and whether the prosecutor committed misconduct during rebuttal closing argument.
Whether the crime occurred in “Indian country” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151, thereby depriving the State of jurisdiction over the appellant:
The Court reviews subject matter jurisdiction de novo. The specific question of whether the scene of the crime was under the jurisdiction of the United States or the State of Wyoming was also reviewed de novo. The Court reviewed the post-treaty history of the Reservation as well as the federal jurisprudence that developed concerning federal and state jurisdiction in “diminished” reservations. The Court focused on the Surplus Land Act of 1905. The City of Riverton lies north of the Big Wind River on land that was ceded in that act. The Court next determined what intent the 1905 Act had as to the ceded lands by reviewing Supreme Court precedent. The Court applied the Supreme Court’s analytical construct to the 1905 Act and concluded that Congress intended a diminished reservation with the ceded lands losing their status as “Indian Country.” The Court noted that the facts in State v. Moss where the Court concluded that Congress had placed the ceded land outside the reservation and that it was no longer “Indian country” were nearly identical to those in the instant case. The Court concluded that it was the intent of Congress in passing the 1905 Act to diminish the Wind River Indian Reservation. While the City of Riverton may be located on lands that at one time were within the external boundaries of the reservation, those lands were no longer part of the reservation, and were not “Indian country.” Therefore, the State had jurisdiction in this criminal case.
Whether the district court committed reversible error by instructing the jury as to a parent’s duty to protect his or her child:
The State charged Appellant with four theories of liability under one count. The verdict form and judgment and sentence made it appear as though Appellant were charged with and convicted of four separate crimes. Appellant was afforded a preliminary hearing on only one crime, was arraigned on only one crime, and entered a plea to only one crime, leading to the conclusion that he could be convicted of only one crime. The jury separately considered and determined each theory of guilt. The Court’s review of the record indicated that there was sufficient evidence to support each of the findings of guilt. Inclusion of the parental-duty instruction was erroneous but such error was harmless given the above circumstances. Prosecutors must be aware that they cannot charge both that a defendant acted as a principal and as an accessory before the fact, as two separate crimes, in one count.
Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct during rebuttal closing argument by inserting his own credibility and beliefs, by arguing facts not in evidence, and by presenting an argument that was not properly a rebuttal argument:
The Court stated that review of the issue was not plain error because it was raised and decided by the court below. Rather, the Court was reviewing the denial of the motion for mistrial and the denial of the motion for a new trial. With specific regard to claims of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, the Court considers the alleged misconduct in the context of the entire argument, and the entire record, with the determinative factor being whether, in the absence of the error, the verdict might have been more favorable to the accused. The Court’s assessment was that it violated neither the spirit nor the letter of the ABA standards adopted as guidelines for prosecutorial argument.

Holding: The crime occurred in a location that was not part of the diminished Wind River Indian Reservation – a location no longer “Indian country” under guiding federal precedent. The State had jurisdiction to pursue the criminal charge. It was error for the district court to instruct the jury as to common law parental duties that were not encompassed within the charged crime. The error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the completed verdict form revealed juror unanimity as to Appellant’s guilt on all of the theories properly alleged under the statutes. The Judgment and Sentence should be amended to reflect the fact that only one charge was brought and that he was only convicted of one charge. The State’s rebuttal closing argument did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct in that nothing said therein was unfairly prejudicial so as to deprive the appellant of his right to a fair trial or otherwise impinge upon his substantial rights.

Affirmed, but remanded for amendment of the Judgment and Sentence.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2gtn9k .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]


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