Summary 2013 WY 151

Summary of Decision December 11, 2013

Justice Voigt delivered the opinion for the Court. Remanded for new trial.

Case Name: JOHN C. McTIERNAN, BEAR CLAW CATTLE COMPANY, and GAIL SISTRUNK v. JAMES L. JELLIS

Docket Number: S-13-0109

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Sheridan County, the Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge

Representing Appellants: Jeffrey J. Gonda and Amanda K. Roberts of Lonabaugh and Riggs, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming; and Bruce S. Asay and Gregory B. Asay of Associated Legal Group, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Gonda.

Representing Appellee: Kendal R. Hoopes of Yonkee & Toner, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming.

Date of Decision: December 11, 2013

Facts: James Jellis is a rancher in Sheridan County, Wyoming, and owns a beefalo cattle herd. Pursuant to an oral agreement with John McTiernan, Jellis kept his herd on McTiernan’s ranch near Dayton, Wyoming. A dispute arose between the parties regarding their oral agreement, culminating in a lien being asserted by McTiernan and a legal action being filed by Jellis. The jury found, inter alia, McTiernan liable for conversion of Jellis’ beefalo herd, but also found McTiernan entitled to a lien against the same pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 29-7-101 et seq. McTiernan filed a post-trial motion based on several theories, including that a new trial was warranted because of the inconsistent verdict.

Issues: The dispositive question in this matter is one that concerns whether a new trial is necessary because of an inconsistent verdict; for that reason, we restate the controlling issue as follows: Is the jury’s verdict finding McTiernan liable for conversion of a beefalo herd, while at the same time finding him entitled to a lien against the same pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 29-7-101 et seq., contrary to law?

Holdings/Decision: A lien under Chapter 7 of Title 29 is possessory and its existence dependent upon possession of the subject personal property. As a result, the jury’s finding that McTiernan was liable for conversion is inconsistent as a matter of law with its finding that McTiernan was also entitled to a personal property lien pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 29-7-101 et seq. We find the verdict is contrary to law and cannot be reconciled; therefore, we must conclude the district court abused its discretion in denying McTiernan’s motion for new trial. We remand to the district court for a new trial.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summary 2010 WY 83

Summary of Decision issued June 24, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: In re: Kite Ranch, LLC

Citation: 2010 WY 83

Docket Number: S-09-0203

Appeal from the District Court of Albany County, the Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge.

Representing Powell Family of Yakima, LLC: F. Scott Peasley of Peasley Law Office, Douglas, Wyoming.

Representing the Dunmires: M. Gregory Weisz of Pence and MacMillan, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing the Hedstroms: William H. Vines of Jones, Jones, Vine & Hunkins, Wheatland, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: The case is an appeal from a district court order determining the ownership and management rights of the members of a limited liability company (the LLC). A secondary question was presented as to whether the district court adjudicated issues that were not raised by the pleadings.

Can a party be a member of a LLC without evidence of a contribution to capital: Whether or not a member actually made the stated capital contribution is not determinative of that member’s “membership” in the LLC. Section 17-15-121(a)(i) states that a member may or may not yet have made the capital contribution attributed to him or her in the articles of organization. Section 17-15-109(a) declares that issuance of the certificate of organization is conclusive evidence that all conditions precedent required to be performed by the members have been complied with.
Under the Wyoming LLC Act, do economic and noneconomic rights of company members vest in proportion to contribution to capital or pursuant to the articles of organization: The legislature has chosen to measure the different rights of a member of a limited liability company in different ways. In the instant case, the members clearly agreed for several years to allocate profits and losses on the basis of the initial capital contributions set forth in the Articles of Organization. It is not up to the courts to tell them they were wrong in doing so. The undisputed facts in the record clearly show the existence of an oral operating agreement.
Does Wyoming law recognize a distinction between contributions to capital as initially listed in the articles of organization of a LLC and as reflected on the company’s books and records: The Court answered this question in the affirmative using the phrase: “as initially listed in the article of organization, or as the articles of organization have been amended from time to time.” At any time there may be, and likely will be, a difference between the amount of a member’s stated capital contribution and the amount of his capital or equity account.
Did the district court commit reversible error by adjudicating claims made against the unrepresented LLC: the district court’s characterization of the members’ contributions as loans or as capital contributions was not an adjudication of claims against the LLC, but was what both parties sought – a declaration of their comparative interests in the LLC.
Were issues related to dissolution of the LLC ripe for adjudication: The Court did not read the district court’s Final Order or the decision letter as having adjudicated any issues related to dissolution. Neither in the decision letter nor in the Final Order does the district court endeavor to order dissolution of the LLC or to order any particular distribution of assets.

Conclusion: With or without an operating agreement, a person may be a member of a limited liability company so long a his or her initial capital contribution or ownership interest is adequately identified in the articles of organization filed with the secretary of state, or as a subsequent amendment to the articles of organization so indicates. The individual economic and noneconomic rights of the members of a limited liability company vest in the various manners set forth in the Act or where appropriate, as set forth in an operating agreement. In the instant case, the members’ management rights, and the allocation of profits and losses, is in proportion to their stated capital in the unamended articles of organization. Wyoming law recognizes a distinction between contributions to capital as initially listed in the articles of organization or in the articles of organization as they may have been amended, and contributions to capital that may be reflected in a member’s capital account or equity account. In the instant case, the members clearly intended that neither Powell’s additional capital contribution of $300,000 nor Dunmires’ loans in excess of $400,000 were to affect the stated capital contributions in the unamended articles of organization. The district court neither adjudicated claims against the limited liability company, nor determined the individual claims of members or other claimants in the event of dissolution.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/24nxx2l .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance using the Universal Citation format, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2010 WY 77

Summary of Decision issued June 15, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Sanders v. Sanders

Citation: 2010 WY 77

Docket Number: S-09-0238

Appeal from the District Court of Goshen County, the Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge.

Representing Thomas Sanders: Don W. Riske and James R. Salisbury of Riske, Salisbury & Kelly, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Shirley and Daniel Sanders: John J. Maier of John Maier Law Offices, Torrington, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: Thomas Leroy Sanders (Leroy) was named as a joint tenant with right of survivorship on two Goshen County deeds. The other joint tenants, Shirley and Daniel Sanders brought a reformation action to have Leroy removed from the deeds. The dispositive issue is whether the district court’s order for reformation of the deeds was supported by sufficient evidence and in accordance with Wyoming law.
Shirley operates a farm and ranch enterprise in Goshen County and is the father of Leroy and Daniel. In 1995, Shirley’s mother decided to sell property (Parcel 1) to Shirley under an installment contract. When Shirley and his mother went to execute the documents, Shirley asked for Leroy’s name to be added to the deed with a right of survivorship to protect Parcel 1 from his wife from whom he was estranged. Also as part of his estate planning, Shirley wanted the property to pass to Leroy without going through probate. (Shirley’s attorney advised against adding Leroy as a joint tenant.) Leroy signed the mortgage but Shirley remained solely liable on the promissory note. In 1998, Parcel 2 became available for purchase. Shirley’s father had set aside money to finance the purchase. When the father died, Shirley’s mother gifted the funds to Shirley, Daniel, Leroy and Leroy’s wife to purchase the property. Shirley, Daniel and Leroy were named to Parcel 2 as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Shirley and Leroy farmed together until a dispute arose resulting in the First Case in 2002. Leroy asserted that he had a present possessory interest in Parcels 1 and 2. Leroy moved to dismiss the case shortly before trial. The district court dismissed with prejudice Leroy’s claims alleging present ownership interest in or rights to possession, use or control and any right or claim to partition. Leroy continued to assert that he had the right to a present possessory interest in the properties. In 2007, Shirley and Daniel filed a complaint seeking reformation by removing Leroy as a joint tenant. The district court denied Leroy’s motion for summary judgment ruling that its order in the First Case was binding in the current action and that res judicata prohibited Leroy from claiming any present interest in the property. After the bench trial, the district court ordered reformation of the deeds by removing Leroy as a grantee without any mention of a future interest.
In order for the remedy of reformation to be available, the evidence must establish that a mistake occurred in the drafting of the instrument, rather than in the reaching of the antecedent agreement. Shirley’s own testimony confirmed there was no drafting or “word processing” error. Mutual mistake is shown only if the instrument is intended to evidence a prior agreement and does not do so. The record clearly showed that the parties intended for Leroy to be included on the deeds as a joint tenant with right of survivorship. The evidence does not demonstrate that Shirley intended for the other aspects of his agreement with Leroy be included in the deeds. The evidence supports the existence of a separate oral agreement giving Shirley the right of sole possession during his lifetime. A joint tenancy typically allows each joint tenant full possession of the property at all times, however, the intent of the parties is paramount.

Conclusion: Leroy did not challenge the district court’s findings as to the terms of the oral agreement between his father and him and the Court concluded the findings were not clearly erroneous. In fact, the record contained evidence that when Shirley wanted to transfer other jointly held property, Leroy signed the transfer documents. This was not a proper case for reformation because the evidence did not establish that the parties made a mistake in drafting the deeds.

Reversed.

J. Kite delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/23a44o5 .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance using the Universal Citation format, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2010 WY 31

Summary of Decision issued March 22, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Singer v. New Tech Engineering L.P.

Citation: 2010 WY 31

Docket Number: S-09-0024

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable David B. Park, Judge.

Representing Appellant Singer: Mark L. Carman of Carman Law Office, PC, Billings, Montana; and Cody L. Balzer of Balzer Law Firm, PC, Loveland, Colorado.

Representing Appellee New Tech Engineering: Roger E. Shumate and James C. Worthen of Murane & Bostwick, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: After suffering debilitating injuries while working on a drilling rig owned by Caza Drilling (Caza) in northeastern Wyoming, Leonard Singer brought a negligence case against New Tech Engineering (New Tech), the company who hired safety coaches to provide “safety services” on the rig.

Employee/agent or independent contractor: The Court has stated that in regard to determining whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor, the overriding consideration is the employer’s right to control the means and manner of the work. Harrington (the safety coach) was provided no benefits from New Tech, no contract existed between the two, no deductions for federal income taxes were made and the ultimate control came from Caza. Caza controlled Harrington’s schedule, provided a truck, on-site living provisions and an occasional computer. In addition, Caza had ultimate control over the hiring and firing of safety consultants. The Court considered who had the right of control over the means and manner of the work as differentiated from control over the end product of the work to be performed. Typically, when a worker is an independent contractor, the employer is interested only in the results of the work and does not direct the details of how the work is performed. The record supported the contention that Caza and not New Tech had control over the means and manner of the work. Caza had the ultimate decision over who it selected as its safety consultants.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 429: Singer next argued that because Caza relied on New Tech to supply “safety services,” New Tech was liable to Singer. The Court noted that it discussed this Restatement section only once before and in a medical malpractice action. Research showed that § 429 is typically applied in the medical context but sometimes is applicable in other circumstances. The Court concluded that Caza relied on the coaches for safety services and only relied on New Tech to provide the names of safety coaches.
Oral contract: Singer contended that New Tech assumed affirmative safety duties when it agreed to provide safety services. The deposition testimony that Singer relied upon was testimony as to the safety coach’s duties and not New Tech’s duties. Caza retained control of its own safety program evidenced by its use of New Tech to place a safety coach. Caza never contracted orally or otherwise with New Tech to provide safety services.
Non-delegable duty: The Court agreed with the district court that the safety program was specifically a Caza program. New Tech provided no instruction, guidance, or supervision regarding safety issues on the rig. New Tech was a placement service.

Conclusion: The Court found no question of material fact regarding whether the safety coach was an employee or independent contractor – the record showed that he was an independent contractor. Also, there was no indication that Restatement § 429 imposed any liability whatsoever on New Tech. New Tech did not assume any affirmative duties regarding safety, nor is New Tech responsible for Singer’s injuries due to any “non-delegable” duty – no such duty on the part of New Tech existed.

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/yjlalnc .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 145

Summary of Decision issued December 10, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Belden v. Thorkildsen

Citation: 2008 WY 145

Docket Number: S-08-0021

Appeal from the District Court of Teton County, the Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge.

Representing Appellant Belden: Richard J. Mulligan, Mulligan Law Office and Heather Noble, Jackson, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee Thorkildsen: David G. Lewis, Jackson, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: Previously, the Court reversed a judgment in favor of Thorkildsen because the district court specifically declined to consider parol evidence of an alleged oral agreement regarding repayment of the loan at issue. Following remand, the district court once again entered judgment in favor of Thorkildsen. The district court found that Belden had failed to prove the existence of an oral agreement for repayment of the loan and also found against Belden on her claim that she was an accommodation party to the promissory note at issue. The district court rejected Belden’s attempt to introduce new evidence at the hearing following remand and entered judgment based upon evidence submitted at trial held in 2005.

Rejection of Request to Introduce Additional Evidence: After remand, Appellants indicated to the trial court that they wished to present additional evidence to support their claim that Belden had signed the promissory note as an accommodation party. The issue presented was similar to that found in Decker II. Appellants had the opportunity to present witnesses during the trial in 2005. For reasons not evidence in the record, they chose not to present the testimony in that proceeding. The Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to refuse admission of additional evidence at the hearing.

Accommodation Party: Whether a person is an accommodation party to a negotiable instrument is a question of fact. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34.1-3-419 plainly requires that the accommodated and the accommodating parties be parties to the notes. Note 2 clearly had only one maker, the LLC. Belden’s signature appears as an officer of the LLC and not as an individual. Belden’s uncontradicted testimony that all four members signed separate guaranty agreements does not alter the promissory notes. Neither Belden nor Thorkildsen signed Note 2 in their individual capacities and were not “parties” to the note. Therefore, Belden cannot be an accommodation party. In light of that determination, the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether the district court’s factual finding that Belden directly benefited from the loan was clearly erroneous.

Separate Oral Contract: Belden contended that the district court erred when it concluded that no independent oral contract between her and Thorkildsen existed. The district court’s findings were amply supported by the record. The district court specifically found Belden’s credibility to be questionable. The Court’s review of the record lead it to the conclusion that the district court correctly stated that there was no evidence that Thorkildsen agreed to reimburse the LLC or Belden for amounts they paid toward Note 2.

Holding: Belden did not sign Note 2 in her individual capacity and therefore was not a party to the note. As a result, Belden cannot be an accommodation party. The district court correctly stated there was no evidence that Thorkildsen agreed to reimburse the LLC or Belden for amounts paid toward Note 2.

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/5ztae3 .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 45

Summary of Decision issued April 14, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Jenkins v. Miller

Citation: 2008 WY 45

Docket Number: S-07-0216

Appeal from the District Court of Johnson County, the Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge

Representing Appellants (Defendants): Kim D. Cannon and J. Mark Stewart of Davis & Cannon, Sheridan, Wyoming.

Representing Appellees (Plaintiffs): Dennis M. Kirven and Benjamin S. Kirven of Kirven & Kirven, PC, Buffalo, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: The Jenkins’ challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Millers and sua sponte dismissal of Jenkins’ counterclaim with respect to a private road easement. Millers had requested declaratory relief regarding an Easement Deed unilaterally recorded by Jenkins, the terms of which Millers disputed. Jenkins counterclaimed for a declaration that the same Easement Deed was valid and further that the parties were bound by an historical oral agreement for easement. The district court granted judgment in favor of Millers, concluding that Millers never accepted the Easement Deed and that there was no legally enforceable access to Millers’ lands. The court further dismissed Jenkins’ counterclaim on the grounds that Jenkins were precluded from seeking such declaratory relief as the decision to pursue an easement rested only with Millers, as potential grantees/dominant estate owners.
Grant of Millers’ Motion for Summary Judgment: Wyoming law holds that the grantees must “accept” the offered easement for the easement to be valid and binding. Millers argued that a letter and their Notice of Non-acceptance of Easement Deed were sufficient to demonstrate rejection of the Easement Deed. However, the Millers continued to use the route which had been used consistently for over twenty years. The Court stated the record could have supported a conclusion in favor of either party at that point.
The district court was also asked to determine whether Millers had any legally enforceable access, which request would encompass possibilities such as irrevocable license or an oral easement falling outside the statute of frauds. The Court noted it was one thing to say that Millers timely and appropriately rejected the Easement Deed but quite another to say that they had no legally enforceable license that they historically had accepted. The record showed that the parties had negotiated the gravel road in its current location in exchange for a grant of “permanent easement.”
Dismissal of Jenkins’ Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment: The district court dismissed sua sponte Jenkins’ counterclaim for declaratory relief. Sua sponte dismissals require adherence to a specific procedure. The district court failed to follow it. Therefore, the matter was remanded to the district court with directions to follow the procedural steps outlined in Osborn.
The Court addressed the district court’s conclusion that the right to pursue an easement rests exclusively with the petitioners, and that the Defendants were precluded from bringing a declaratory judgment action. “Landlocked” property owners cannot be forced to pursue legal remedies such as common law way of necessity or an implied easement, prior to seeking a private road pursuant to Wyoming’s private road statutes. Wyoming also recognizes the rights of property owners whose lands will be subjected to the imposition of private roads. Such property owners should have the right to determine the status of alleged or potential existing legally enforceable access through their lands even where those rights have not yet been adjudicated.

Holding: The district court erred in granting summary judgment to Millers, both in its determination that there were no issues of fact regarding Millers’ acceptance of the Easement Deed and in its conclusion that there were no issues of fact regarding Millers’ lack of legally enforceable access to their lands. The district court further erred in dismissing Jenkins’ counterclaim on the grounds that Jenkins as alleged grantors of an easement were without authority to seek a declaratory judgment as to the validity of that easement or their rights thereunder.

Reversed.

D.J. Donnell delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/65sdue .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2007 WY 148

Summary of Decision issued September 18, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Schmid v. Schmid

Citation: 2007 WY 148

Docket Number: 06-268 and 06-270

Appeal from the District Court of Sweetwater County, the Honorable Jere A. Ryckman, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Clark D. Stith, Rock Springs, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): P. Richard Meyer and Robert N. Williams, of Meyer and Williams, Jackson, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Meyer.

Issues: Whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence corroborating Mike’s theory of the case. Whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to allow Mike’s counsel to cross-examine Pat concerning deposition and trial testimony that supported Mike’s theory of the case. Whether the district court violated Mike’s due process rights under article I, section 6 of the Wyoming Constitution. Whether the district court violated Mike’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Whether the district court erred by denying Mike’s pretrial motion for summary judgment and motion for directed verdict at trial, both made on the grounds of the statute of frauds and the lack of any fiduciary duty from Mike to Pat. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Mike’s motion for a new trial.

Facts/Discussion: Mike appealed the judgment entered in favor of his brother Pat.

Standard of Review: The Court reviews a trial court’s evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion. Even when a trial court errs in an evidentiary ruling, the Court will reverse only if the error was prejudicial.
The Court reviewed the record of the pretrial conference where Pat’s motion in limine was considered prior to the start of trial. The trial court ruled the evidence should be excluded explaining that each agreement has to stand on its own. On the morning before trial started, Mike followed up with a written offer of proof which was excluded as well.
It is important to note that the parties were attempting to establish the terms of their oral agreement. There was no written contract with definite and unambiguous terms. Where the language of a contract is indefinite or ambiguous, all the surrounding circumstances must be considered in order to ascertain its terms. To establish the terms of an oral agreement, a broad range of evidence may be taken into consideration. As a general proposition, all relevant evidence is admissible. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Mike was prepared to testify that the agreements he had with is brother and the two witnesses he sought to bring as evidence were identical. With that connection, the evidence is relevant. The Court concluded that to establish the terms of an oral agreement, evidence about the terms of other, identical agreements is relevant, probative, and generally admissible.
The issue of whether the evidence was unfairly prejudicial was not discussed at the pretrial stage. After trial began, Mike’s counsel renewed his request. The trial court concluded that it would be unfairly prejudicial to change its ruling and admit the evidence because opening arguments had been made, and testimony taken, based on the trial court’s earlier decision to exclude the evidence. The Court stated the relatively simple testimony seemed to present little danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or misleading the jury. Testimony from two witnesses supporting Mike’s version of the agreement would have had considerable probative value, not outweighed by other consideration.
Mike’s offers of proof were tested against the requirements of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence. The Court found they adequately informed the trial court about the nature of the proposed evidence and provided adequate information for meaningful appellate review.

The Court concluded that the trial court erred in excluding the evidence. They were also persuaded the error was prejudicial. Neither witness was a party to the suit. They were both prepared to testify contrary to their own interest that Mike owed them no bonus according to their understanding of the agreement.

In addition, the Court has indicated that a litigant is usually entitled to a remand and a new trial if he was unfairly restricted in developing and presenting his theory of the case.
Finding no legitimate basis for the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence, the Court was compelled to rule it an abuse of discretion.
Remaining Issues: The Court’s resolution of the first issue resolved most of the remaining issues except for the fifth issue asserting the district court erred in denying his pretrial motion for summary judgment and his motion for directed verdict. The Court left the claim for the trial court to consider in the context of the new trial.
The Court noted the denial of a summary judgment is not an appealable order. However, the trial court’s denial of Mike’s motion for judgment as a matter of law made at the close of trial is an appealable order. The trial court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Mike relied on the statute of frauds making the agreement void and unenforceable. The trial court rejected that argument ruling that Pat had substantially performed his part of the oral agreement. With the testimony being taken in the light most favorable to Pat, the trial court properly denied Mike’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. The trial court properly applied the substantial performance exception to the statute of frauds in this instance where the agreement was not an employment contract.

Holding: The Court held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding Mike’s evidence concerning other agreements that he asserted were identical to his oral agreement with Pat. With regard to Mike’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, the Court upheld the district court’s denial on the statute of frauds issue. The Court reversed the judgment on the evidentiary issue and remanded the case to the district court for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/yv42cc