Wednesday, February 28, 2007

Summary 2007 WY 33

Summary of Decision issued February 28, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance with a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Poole v. State

Citation: 2007 WY 33

Docket Number: 05-209, 05-210

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, the Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Assistant Attorney General.

Issues: Whether the district court erred when it accepted Appellant’s guilty plea without an adequate factual basis. Whether Appellant’s guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel.

Facts/Discussion: Appellant pled guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and one count of reckless endangerment. On appeal, Appellant challenged only the validity of his guilty plea on the firearm possession charge.
Factual Basis: Rule 11(f) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure states that a trial court should not enter a judgment upon a guilty plea without ensuring that there is a factual basis for the plea so as to prevent a defendant from being misled into a waiver of substantial rights. Before accepting the guilty plea, the court must determine if the defendant’s acts fell within the conduct prohibited by law and at the time of the plea, the defendant understood his conduct was criminal. By its plain language, § 6-8-102 required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was previously convicted of a violent felony which has not been pardoned and the defendant thereafter knowingly possessed a firearm. The only mens rea requirement for a conviction is knowledge that the instrument possessed is a firearm. The State is not required to prove, nor is the court required to find, that a defendant have such knowledge. It is undisputed that the factual basis provided by Appellant and the State adequately supported the district court’s findings that Appellant knowingly possessed a firearm and that he was a convicted felon who had not been pardoned. The Court held the requirement of Rule 11(f) was satisfied and the district court did not err by accepting Appellant’s guilty plea.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: To warrant a reversal on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must demonstrate that in light of the circumstances, counsel failed to render such assistance as would have been offered by a reasonably competent attorney and that counsel’s deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case. Appellant’s argument was premised on his misunderstanding of the elements of § 6-8-102. He faulted his attorney for not knowing that he had a viable defense to the firearm charge because he believed that he had been pardoned and was therefore not a convicted felon when he possessed a firearm. The Court had already ruled that Appellant’s ignorance of his status as a convicted felon was not a defense. Therefore, counsel’s assistance was not constitutionally ineffective as claimed.

Holding: There is no requirement that a defendant have knowledge of his status as a convicted felon in order to be convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm under § 6-8-102. The conviction on the firearm charge in 05-209 was affirmed. The conviction for reckless endangering in 05-210 was summarily affirmed because Appellant did not present any argument challenging that conviction.

Affirmed.

J. Golden delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/yrc28m .

Tuesday, February 27, 2007

How-to: Windows Vista

Are you ready for the newest Microsoft system? Is it time to upgrade, or should you stick with good, old tried--and after 5+ years--mostly true?

From the few articles I've read, it can't be said that Windows Vista isn't all that bad, especially if you like playing with gadgets (widgets), Live Icons, a cool transparent interface and other graphic features. Vista offers a shiny, new look called Windows Aero, with a sidebar of gadgets and updated searching features. Vista also offers some new security features, including updated firewall protections and a User Account Control (UAC).

However, other articles and posts claim that Windows Vista is all eye candy and obnoxious functionality (one post named the UAC as Sir Obnoxious Naggy McNag). You definitely want to be sure that your computer hardware and peripherals (printers, scanners, etc.) will be up to the Vista challenge. The new Aero interface requires a higher end graphics card, Vista likes lots of memory (1 GB is best), and many companies have not yet made available drivers to make older hardware work with Vista. Another detractor from Vista's dazzle is the cost. Like Windows XP, there are various packages ranging from Home Basic upgrade ($99) to Ultimate ($399). And if you want all the cool stuff, of course, you're going to have to pay the price.

The best suggestion from these articles is to consider the state and age of your hardware and software for this decision (check out Windows Vista Upgrade Advisor). As Brian Harris in Law.com's Does the Cost Weigh Down Vista's Dazzle? states,

"[i]f you're happy with your current computer's functionality, speed and applications, then now isn't the time to move to a new operating environment. But if you have a computer that is getting long in the tooth, this may be the perfect opportunity (or excuse) to get a new machine loaded with Vista."
You can be on the cutting edge of technology, if you're really good at balancing. But sometimes it cuts too deep and becomes bleeding edge technology.

Articles & Blog Posts
Pros and cons of Windows Vista - Future Tense, Public Radio
Wait! Don't Buy Microsoft Windows Vista - PC World
Windows Vista: 15 Reasons to Switch - PC World
Does the Cost Weigh Down Vista's Dazzle? - Law.com
Can Your Law Firm Live Without Vista? - Law.com
The Most Annoying Things About Windows Vista - Yahoo! News
Don't be misled by these 10 Windows Vista myths - TechRepublic.com
Windows Vista Tip: Disable annoying "Need your permission to continue-" prompts - Lifehacker.com

Friday, February 23, 2007

Summary 2007 WY 32

Summary of Decision issued February 23, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance with a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Seymore v. State

Citation: 2007 WY 32

Docket Number: 05-179

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Marion Yoder, Senior Assistant Public Defender. Argument by Ms. Yoder.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; H. Michael Bennett, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Bennett.

Issues: Whether the jury was misinformed about the mens rea element of escape. Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct.

Facts/Discussion: The instant case is an appeal from an escape conviction. Appellant contends that the jury was improperly instructed and that the prosecutor committed misconduct during the trial. Appellant was charged with violating Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-206(a)(i). Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-18-112 provides specialized definitions of “escape from official detention” for persons housed in adult community corrections facilities.
Jury Misinformed about the Mens Rea Element of Escape: The Court reviewed their standard for the review of jury instructions. They analyze instructions as a whole and do not single out individual instructions or parts. When an appellant does not object at trial to the jury instructions, or request a certain instruction be included, the Court’s review of the issue follows the plain error standard. Appellant did not object at trial to the jury instructions that were given and did not offer any additional instructions. Appellant contended the district court failed to instruct the jury on an essential element of the crime – intent – which is a fundamental error requiring reversal. The Court stated that every crime must contain an actus reus and a mens rea. Appellant also contends that the jury should have been instructed that escape was a “specific intent” crime. The Court acknowledged the trend in law to dispense with the pattern jury instructions defining and explaining intent due to their vagueness and general failure to enlighten juries. Quoting from Mueller v. State, the Court stated the test of whether a jury has been properly instructed on the necessary elements of a crime is whether the instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances upon which the crime can be found to have been committed. The Court found no indication in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-206(a)(i) or § 7-18-112 that the legislature intended there to be a specific intent element to the crime of escape and previously, the Court has said escape is a general intent crime. The Court further stated the instructions were inadequate because even a general intent crime requires a showing that the prohibited conduct was undertaken voluntarily. As applied to the facts of the instant case, the State was required to prove that Appellant voluntarily failed to return to FCS at the required time and the jury instructions did not reflect that requirement. Without voluntary conduct, there was no mens rea. It was fundamental error requiring reversal for a trial court to fail to instruct on an essential element of the crime.
Prosecutor misconduct: Even though the Court’s determination of the first issue required reversal, they discussed the second issue to restate important legal principles and to make sure the same mistakes are not made if the matter is re-tried. Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed under a harmless error standard with reference to the entire record. Appellant identified nine alleged acts of misconduct, the cumulative effect of which allegedly denied him a fair trial. Appellant argued that it was reversible error for a prosecutor to tell a jury that it was the jury’s duty to find the defendant guilty. The Court has considered cumulative error innumerable times and has admonished prosecutors about misconduct repeatedly. After a review of the record the Court stated that the cumulative effect of the transgressions was such they were not sure Appellant was convicted on just the evidence presented. They were convinced the number and the gravity of the errors required reversal.

Holding: The cumulative effect of the instructional error to the jury and the prosecutor’s misstatements was a conviction that could not be trusted because the jury was not properly instructed as to the mens rea element of the crime charged and because of the cumulative effect of several instances of prosecutorial misconduct.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

J. Golden, dissenting: The majority opinion determined that mens rea is a required element of the offense of escape as charged and therefore it was reversible error if the jury was not instructed thereon. J. Golden did not see such an element in the statute. Because he found escape as defined by § 6-5-206 to be a strict liability crime, the jury instructions correctly excluded mens rea as an element of the crime.
In addition, J. Golden reviewed the trial transcript and stated that when the prosecutor’s statements were read in the context of the entire record as the Court must, the comments were not enough in his estimation, to require reversal.

J. Hill, dissenting: J. Hill concurred with the majority that escape is a general intent crime. However, he could not agree with the majority’s decision to reverse Appellant’s conviction on the basis that the jury should have been instructed to find whether or not the failure of Appellant to return to FCS at the required time was voluntary because the issue was not raised by him. Since no argument regarding voluntariness appeared in Appellant’s brief, J. Hill would find that any claim of error on this point was waived by his failure to clearly identify the issue and support it with cogent argument and citation to pertinent authority.
J. Hill disagreed with the majority’s analysis of the prosecutorial misconduct issue. The majority’s conclusion was based in part on its determination that the jury was not properly instructed. Since that error was waived, the instructions as given to the jury became the law of the case and the evidence in the record supported the jury’s verdict.
J. Hill expressed his sympathy with and understanding of the majority’s frustration with the actions of some of the prosecutors in the state and their seeming disregard of the Court’s repeated admonitions regarding proper argument and questioning. In the instant case, he would affirm Appellant’s conviction and sentence.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/yqjq8o .

Linked case will be incomplete until Monday, Feb. 26 - thanks for your patience.

Thursday, February 22, 2007

Summary 2007 WY 31

Summary of Decision issued February 22, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance with a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: State, ex rel., Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division; and FMC Corp. v. Faulkner

Citation: 2007 WY 31

Docket Number: 06-22

Appeal from the District Court of Sweetwater County, the Honorable Nena James, Judge

Representing Appellants (Petitioner/Employer): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Steven Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Brandon W. Snyder and Thomas A. Thompson, of MacPherson, Kelly & Thompson, LLC, Rawlins, Wyoming; George Lemich of Lemich Law Center, Rock Springs, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Respondent): Michael D. Newman, Rock Springs, Wyoming.

Issues: Whether the Medical Commission erred as a matter of law in failing to allow apportionment of the employee-claimant’s impairment award between his non-work related condition and his compensable work related injury.

Facts/Discussion: The Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Division (Division) and FMC Corporation (FMC) challenge the Medical Commission’s permanent partial impairment rating awarded to Faulkner.
Standard of Review: The Court is limited to a determination of the factors specified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c). The interpretation and correct application of the provisions of the Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act are questions of law over which the Court’s review authority is plenary. The Court reviews the case as if it had come directly to the Court from the agency and do not afford any deference to the district corut’s decision.
It was undisputed that Faulkner was injured in the course of his employment and that the injury materially aggravated a pre-existing condition. Although Faulkner had prior surgery involving his lower back, at the time of the incident he was employed on a full-time basis with no medical or physical restriction impacting his employment. He had previously received worker’s compensation benefits for injuries involving his lower back but there was no indication in the record that he had received an impairment rating or a permanent disability award. The Division and FMC contended that Faulkner’s impairment rating should be reduced by the percentage of impairment attributable to his pre-existing back condition. The Division declined to reduce the impairment rating.
The instant case is one of first impression for the Court. The general consensus from other state courts that have addressed the issue is that the employer becomes liable for the entire disability resulting from a compensable accident unless statutory authority exists to the contrary (the full-responsibility rule.) States wishing to combat any perceived inequities in application of the general rule have either enacted apportionment statutes or statutorily created second injury funds.
The Division and FMC claim apportionment is proper under Wyoming law because of the language contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(g). Appellants state the statutory language requires use of the AMA Guides and that the guides provide for apportionment. The Court disagreed and stated that apportionment is not required by the AMA Guides. There was nothing in the language cited by Appellants that would lead the Court to the conclusion that apportionment was mandated by the Guides. Other provisions of the Guides make it clear that the decision to require or allow apportionment must be made by each state.
The Division and FMC claimed that even if apportionment is not expressly authorized by the statute, the Court must permit apportionment to give effect to the intent of the Act, which allows compensation solely for work-related injuries. Appellants cited Haynes v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Div. and Taylor v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div. as support. The Court distinguished the Haynes case from the instant case stating the Division specifically found that Faulkner’s back condition and impairment were aggravated by the work injury. The Court distinguished the instant case from Taylor. Faulkner had not received an impairment rating prior to the December 2000 work-related injury. There was no evidence that Faulkner was receiving a double recovery.

Holding: The Court found no error in the Division’s decision. The Wyoming legislature has not enacted a statute that requires apportionment of an impairment rating due to a pre-existing condition. The Court’s decision is consistent with the case law recognizing that material aggravation of a pre-existing condition is a compensable injury and is also in accord with the general rule disallowing apportionment in the absence of a specific statute requiring apportionment.

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/34jvgv .

Wednesday, February 21, 2007

How-to: Reduce Eye Strain at Your Computer

As I was scrolling through a few hundred blog posts, I found a great article suggesting some ways to reduce eye strain from the computer. Of course, as soon as I read the post title, my eyes began to burn furiously, prompting a good, old-fashioned, double-fisted eye rub that had me seeing stars. Okay, maybe I can be a little too psychosomatic. But that doesn't make the suggestions in The Lighting Blog's post--22 Ways to Reduce Eye Strain at Your Computer any less efficacious (I'm into big words, today).

Some of the ideas involve common sense solutions (taking breaks, stretching), or fairly well-known options having to do with ergonomics. However, the author includes some explanation on differences between monitors, lighting possibilities, and how to bring more humidity into your office.

Summary 2007 WY 30

Summary of Decision issued February 21, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance with a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Cornelius v. Powder River Energy Corp., Inc.

Citation: 2007 WY 30

Docket Number: 06-186

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, the Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): C. John Cotton of Cotton Law Offices, Gillette, Wyoming; and Kenneth E. Barker of Barker Reynolds Law Firm, LLC, Belle Fourche, South Dakota. Argument by Messrs. Cotton and Barker.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Bruce A. Salzburg of Freudenthal, Salzburg & Bonds, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Issues: Whether the district court erred in failing to determine whether the contract between Baldwin and PRECorp was written or oral. Whether the district court erred in applying the wrong standard to determine whether Baldwin was an independent contractor. Whether genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Baldwin was an independent contractor. Whether genuine issues of material fact exist as to PRECorp’s liability for its own negligence.

Facts/Discussion: Cornelius sued his employer (Baldwin) and the company for which Baldwin did contract work (PRECorp) for injuries suffered when he contacted a live electrical line. The district court granted summary judgment to PRECorp on two grounds: first, as the employer of an independent contractor, PRECorp was not vicariously liable for injuries to that contractor’s employer; and second, PRECorp was not independently liable.
Standard of Review: Summary judgments are governed by W.R.C.P. 56. The Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo without giving any deference to the district court’s determinations.
Whether the Contract was Written or Oral: The Court’s review of the district court decision letter found the parties had entered into written contracts annually with an attached then-current fee schedule. The district court’s facts and conclusions were based upon that contract and the Court found no error in that regard.
Whether Baldwin was an Independent Contractor: The answer to this question was dependent upon the answer to the first question because the district court looked at cases where there was an express written contract between the parties, rather than to cases where there was not. The Court reviewed the district court decision letter and noted their reliance on Franks v. Independent Production Company, Diamond B. Servs. v. Rohde, Hille v. Pacific Power & Light Co., Jones v. Chevron and Hjelle v. Mid-State Consultants, Inc. When that law was applied to the facts of the instant case, it was clear Baldwin was an independent contractor and that summary judgment in favor of PRECorp was appropriate. PRECorp did not retain anything approaching a “controlling or pervasive role” in the work. Their role was to specify where the work was to be done and to pay for the work that was done. The flaw with Cornelius’ argument was that it directly contravenes the basic premise that an employer of an independent contractor is not liable for injuries suffered by that independent contractor’s employee.
Whether Baldwin was an Independent Contractor: The Court reviewed the entire record, and in particular the depositions in the file. The Court was convinced that there was not a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Baldwin was an independent contractor.
PRECorp’s Liability for its own Negligence: PRECorp had no affirmative duty toward Cornelius that it breached. There was no allegation that PRECorp’s premises were unsafe. PRECorp did not control the method and manner of work performed by Baldwin, and PRECorp did not voluntarily assume any safety duties. Cornelius’s injuries were caused by his own lack of care, and/or by Baldwin’s failure to provide safe equipment.

Holding: There were no genuine issues of material fact to contradict the conclusion that PRECorp was not vicariously liable for the acts of its independent contractor, Baldwin, and that PRECorp violated no separate legal duty owed by it to Cornelius.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/yqdr5x .

Friday, February 16, 2007

Summary 2007 WY 29

Case Name: Dettloff v. State

Citation: 2007 WY 29

URL: http://tinyurl.com/38gwol

Docket Number: 05-217

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Ken Koski, State Public Defender, PDP; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Tina N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: February 16, 2007

Issues: Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence found in the automobile Appellant was driving. Whether defense counsel was ineffective in representing Appellant with regard to the motion to suppress evidence. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support Appellant's convictions. Whether a jury instruction as to the term "possession" allowed Appellant to be convicted on the basis of two alternatives where there was not enough evidence to support both alternatives. Whether the trial court erred in admission of uncharged misconduct evidence.

Holdings: A defendant may challenge a search as being unconstitutional only if he can demonstrate that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property searched. The defendant must show "both an actual subjective expectation of privacy and a reasonable expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize." There are four factors that courts consider to determine whether an individual possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property searched: (1) the precautions taken in order to maintain one's privacy; (2) the likely intent of the drafters of the United States and Wyoming Constitutions; (3) the property rights a claimant possesses in the invaded area; (4) the legitimacy of the individual's possession of or presence in the property which was searched or seized. In claiming that he had standing to challenge the vehicle search, Appellant points to evidence showing the owner of the vehicle, asked Appellant's companions and Appellant to go to a storage unit and retrieve the automobile. However, he points to no evidence showing the owner gave him permission to drive the vehicle. One of the companions was also licensed to drive a motor vehicle, the three-some drove to the storage unit in Appellant's automobile and no evidence was presented as to how or why Appellant ended up driving the stored vehicle. The district court's conclusion that Appellant did not have standing to challenge the search was correct. Appellant failed to carry his burden of proving that he was legitimately present in the vehicle.

An appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the record that: 1) counsel's performance was deficient and 2) prejudice resulted. When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the paramount determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. To warrant reversal on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate that his counsel failed to render such assistance as would have been offered by a reasonably competent attorney and that counsel's deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case. The burden of proving that counsel was ineffective rests entirely on the appellant. The appellant must demonstrate the existence of a reasonable probability that, absent the deficiency in counsel's performance, the result of the proceedings would have been different. A failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats an ineffectiveness claim. An ineffectiveness claim may be disposed of solely on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice. When ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged due to counsel's failure to file a suppression motion, prejudice to a defendant can only be shown where, had the motion been made, it would have been granted, and had the evidence been suppressed, only a limited amount of evidence remained to support a conviction. In the present action, the district court correctly ruled Appellant did not have standing to challenge the vehicle search, and that conclusion applies to the constitutionality of the search under both the state and United States constitutions. Because Appellant did not have standing, he cannot show that presentation of an adequate state constitutional claim would have resulted in suppression of the evidence. Therefore, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail.

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court accepts as true the State's evidence and affords it those inferences which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from it. Conflicting evidence or inferences that can be drawn from such evidence will not be considered. The determination is whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as the jury actually did. Applying these standards, the evidence the State presented in the present action, and inferences that may be drawn from it, are reviewed to determine whether a reasonable jury could have concluded the State proved the charges against Appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. After a careful review of the record, there is no doubt the evidence the State presented met that standard. From the evidence the State presented, a reasonable inference can be made that Appellant was under the influence of methamphetamine when he was arrested and had used and possessed marijuana prior to his arrest the same day. A reasonable inference also can be made that the methamphetamine, marijuana, oxycodone and drug paraphernalia found in the pencil case in the automobile under the seat in which Appellant had been sitting was his. Additionally, a reasonable inference can be made from the quantities of methamphetamine, the paraphernalia and the amount of cash Appellant was carrying that he possessed the methamphetamine with the intent to deliver it to others. Thus, sufficient evidence was presented from which a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the offenses charged.

When a crime may be committed in alternative ways, and the jury is instructed on each alternative and returns a general verdict of guilt, the verdict must be set aside unless sufficient evidence exists to support a finding of guilt as to each alternative. However, the instruction Appellant calls into question merely defined the word possession. Pursuant to the instruction, possession could be "actual" or "constructive." Either would suffice to constitute possession. The use of the terms "actual" and "constructive" did not "have the effect of charging an alternative ground for conviction."

Where a defendant files a pretrial demand for notice of intent to introduce evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), the same shall be treated as the making of a timely objection to the introduction of such evidence. The State must then justify the evidence as proper under one of the exceptions to character evidence articulated in W.R.E. 404(b) or the general expansion of that rule and demonstrate that the evidence is relevant for the proposed purpose. Thus, a defendant is not required to object to uncharged misconduct evidence at trial if he has filed a pretrial demand for notice of intent to introduce Rule 404(b) evidence. The rationale for this rule is that rulings on uncharged misconduct evidence are too important to be made in the heat and pressure of a trial, with the jury twiddling its thumbs in the next room. In the present action, Appellant filed a demand for notice of intent to introduce Rule 404(b) evidence. The State responded with notice of its intent to introduce Rule 404(b) evidence but the notice did not identify the evidence Appellant now claims was improperly admitted under the rule. The question here is whether the challenged evidence actually was uncharged misconduct evidence falling within the confines of Rule 404(b). The problem with Appellant's claim is that the State did not present the challenged testimony as "evidence of other crimes" under Rule 404(b). Rather, the State used the testimony to raise the inference that the marijuana Appellant possessed earlier in the day was the same marijuana found in the automobile later in the day. The testimony was not evidence of uncharged misconduct and the principles governing Rule 404(b) evidence do not apply.

Affirmed.

J. Kite delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2007 WY 28

[SPECIAL NOTE: These opinions use the "Universal Citation." They were given "official" citations when they were issued. You should use these citations whenever you cite these opinions, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinions that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Rollins v. Wyoming Tribune-Eagle

Citation: 2007 28

URL: http://tinyurl.com/2kqsn5

Docket Number: 06-48

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, Honorable, Peter G. Arnold Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): Mitchell E. Osborn, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Corinne E. Rutledge and James C. Kaste of Lathrop & Rutledge, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Date of Decision: February 16, 2007

Issue: Whether the Compliance Officer for the Department of Employment, the Hearing Officer at the contested case hearing, and the District Court properly determined that Appellant failed to present any evidence establishing that age actually played a role in the Appellee's decision to terminate him.

Holding: A three-stage analysis is used to prove discrimination when no direct evidence of age discrimination exists. At the first stage, the plaintiff must prove a prima facie case of discrimination. The plaintiff must show that (1) s/he is within the protected age group; (2) s/he was doing satisfactory work; (3) s/he was discharged; and (4) the position was subsequently filled by a younger person. If the plaintiff satisfies these prima facie requirements, the case enters the next stage. In this second stage, the burden of production moves to the defendant. The defendant has to present a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action. If the defendant articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, then the burden of persuasion moves back to the plaintiff. In this third stage of the discrimination analysis, the plaintiff must show that age was a determinative factor in the defendant's employment decision, or show that the defendant's explanation for its action was merely pretext. Failure to come forward with evidence of pretext will entitle the defendant to judgment. If no material facts are in dispute concerning the pretextuality of defendants' actions, summary judgment is appropriate.
In the present case, when the three stage burden-shifting analysis is applied, it can be concluded Appellee was entitled to a summary judgment on Appellant's claim of age discrimination. Although Appellant may have established a prima facie case of discrimination, Appellee provided sufficient evidence demonstrating Appellant's supervisors were having problems with his attitude, his work attendance, and disruptive behavior with co-workers. Appellant failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact to show that age was the determinative factor in his dismissal or that Appellee's employment decision was pretextual.

Although Appellant's supervisor had made questionable ageist comments in order to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext on the basis of ageist remarks, the employee must show a nexus between the discriminatory statements and the termination decision. In other words, the employee must show that age played an actual role in the termination decision and had a determinative influence on the outcome. Age-related comments referring directly to the employee who is discharged may support an inference of discrimination; however, isolated comments are typically too abstract to support a finding of age discrimination. Stray discriminatory remarks are insufficient to create a jury question because they do not establish the requisite nexus between the comment and the termination decision. When the comments are isolated and there is no showing they are related to the challenged employment action, they are insufficient to show discriminatory animus in termination decisions. In the present case, Appellant provides no details about the context or the timing of any of the ageist comments, and, significantly, none of Appellant' submissions indicate the remarks were made in connection with his discharge. In the absence of more detail as to the time and context of the comments or evidence showing that the comments were actually related to his discharge, Appellant simply has not raised a material issue of fact that age played a role in, or had a determinative influence on, Appellee's decision to terminate his employment.

Although Appellant was not required to disprove Appellee's reasons for his discharge, in order to satisfy the third stage and avoid summary judgment, he was required to show that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. The undisputed facts presented here do not demonstrate that Appellee's explanation for terminating Appellant' employment -- absenteeism, bad attitude, and refusal to follow instruction-- was not credible. In addition, even when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Appellant, it cannot be concluded that it could persuade a reasonable jury that the employer had discriminated against the employee.

A party may not overcome a motion for summary judgment by merely demonstrating some factual dispute exists. Instead, he must convince the court there is a genuine issue of material fact relating to a component of his claim that must be determined by the trier of fact. In this case, Appellant failed to identify any issues of fact material to whether age was a determinative factor in his termination. Consequently, the hearing examiner properly granted Appellee's summary judgment motion.

Affirmed.

J. Kite delivered the opinion for the court.

Thursday, February 15, 2007

Mastering e-Discovery: Advising Clients and Negotiating with Opponents

This program to be presented by the National Institute for Trial Advocacy during April in Chicago and July in New York grabbed my attention because recently I've been reading the entries at the Law.com Legal Technology column. The authors and topics are varied enough to provide good coverage on the rapidly changing area of technology - including e-discovery. My perusal revealed subjects as diverse as a discussion of the attributes of various forms of documents requested during e-discovery to Why You Must Have A Security Breach Response Plan to Rick Georges' light-hearted discussion of the tech items he "loves" this Valentine season.
You may find this is another useful tool in your e-discovery/technology arsenal.

Summary 2007 WY 27

Summary of Decision issued February 15, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance with a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Frederick v. State

Citation: 2007 WY 27

Docket Number: 05-173

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Marion Yoder, Senior Assistant Public Defender. Argument by Ms. Yoder.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Daniel M. Fetsco, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Fetsco.

Issue: Whether imposition of sentence was proper. Whether the trial court erred by ordering the defendant to pay restitution. Whether the trial court erred by entering a written judgment and sentence requiring payment of public defender fees after orally waiving those fees.

Facts/Discussion: Appellant was originally charged with one count of first-degree sexual assault. Appellant and the State agreed that he would plead guilty to a lesser charge of third-degree sexual assault and the State would recommend probation and possible deferral of the conviction. The district court rejected the agreement and entered a sentence of two to four years. Appellant challenges the district court’s rejection of the plea agreement, the order of restitution and the payment of public defender fees.
When a plea of guilty is entered as a result of a plea agreement, any promises made by the State must be fulfilled and whether a prosecutor has violated an alleged agreement is a question that is reviewed de novo. A plea agreement is a contract to which the general principles of contract law are applied. The prosecutor must stand by the terms of the agreement; and if the State is unable to carry out the terms, the correct remedy is withdrawal of the plea. The standard of review of restitution orders is confined to a search for procedural error or a clear abuse of discretion. Challenges to the factual basis of an award of restitution can be waived if the defendant enters into a plea agreement and then fails to object at sentencing. If the defendant does not object to the amount of restitution ordered by the district court, the reviewing court must review for plain error. If the defendant challenges the authority of the district court to order restitution, then review is under a de novo statutory interpretation standard because a court has only that authority to act which is conferred by the subject statute.

Improper Sentence: The district court indicated that it considered a number of factors, including undisputed evidence of bruising. A court is given broad discretion in sentencing and may consider a wide variety of factors about the defendant and his crimes. The sentence will not be overturned unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Due process requires a sentence be imposed only on accurate information. Appellant does not challenge the accuracy of the evidence, only that it was a factor in sentencing. The district court’s statements indicate the evidence was properly considered and they fell short of any indication that the district court was sentencing Appellant for first-degree sexual assault. The district court considered both the PSR and Appellant’s statements. Neither Appellant nor his counsel objected to or contradicted the evidence of the victim’s bruising. There was no evidence the initial charge prejudiced Appellant in terms of the sentence imposed. Appellant had not shown any prejudice and he was not entitled to a new sentencing hearing. Appellant also contended the sentencing procedure violated W.R.Cr.P. 32; that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object at various stages; and that the prosecutor violated the plea agreement between the parties. The Court reviewed the record which indicated there was compliance with applicable rules. Appellant failed to present any analysis of the performance of his counsel. The facts, as conceded by Appellant were more than sufficient to support the conviction. Appellant contended the prosecutor violated the agreement between the parties. The agreement was the State would not object to consideration under § 7-13-301. The State fully complied with the terms of this agreement.

Abuse of Discretion in Ordering Restitution and Public Defender Fees: The district court ordered Appellant to pay restitution to the victim and that restitution should be directed to the State or agency which assisted the victim. Appellant did not object. The Judgment and Sentence ordered restitution but did not direct restitution to the agency. Since there was no objection, the order can be reversed only if there was no authority for it or if it constituted plain error. The applicable statute is Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-102. The Court addressed the difference between the oral ruling and the written Judgment and Sentence. When a discrepancy exists the oral pronouncement prevails. The Court determined there was authority for the order of restitution from the statutes that require restitution and from § 6-2-309(j). The victim impact statement and the comments of the prosecutor, to which there were no objections, established the hospital billed for these expenses and that they would be paid by the investigating law enforcement agency. The Court has held that a victim impact statement is credible evidence upon which a court may impose a restitution amount. The Court stated it was the defendant’s obligation to object to any sentencing information he contended was inaccurate; that the defendant must challenge the accuracy of the information and has the duty to deny, dispute or disprove it. There was no objection at sentencing and no contention of plain error presented in the appeal. The Court reviewed the record to determine whether the order of restitution constituted plain error. Appellant did not articulate nor was the Court able to find any violation of an unequivocal rule of law. Appellant challenged payment of public defender fees. The oral pronouncement at sentencing was that Appellant was unable to pay. The State conceded the Judgment and Sentence must be amended to conform with the oral ruling.

Holding: It appeared to the Court that in imposing the sentence, the district court considered the facts supporting the charge and took into account appropriate particular mitigating circumstances, including letters and statements presented on behalf of Appellant. The Court would not disturb the sentence imposed by the district court.

The sentence was affirmed. The matter was remanded for the purpose of correcting the Judgment and Sentence so that it conformed to the oral ruling of the district court concerning payment of restitution and public defender fees.

District Judge Park delivered the decision.

J. Golden, dissenting: J. Golden stated the transcript for the change of plea hearing showed the parties agreed on a specific sentence as part of the plea agreement. The State acknowledged the statement presented by defense counsel corresponded with its understanding of the plea agreement. The plea agreement was not in writing but J. Golden believed the language quoted was sufficient to indicate it was an agreed sentence as contemplated by W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(1)(C). In that case, Appellant retained his right to withdraw his plea in the event the district court rejected the terms of the plea. The district court apparently misunderstood the terms and advised Appellant he would not be allowed to withdraw his plea. At sentencing when the district court rejected the sentencing terms of the plea and sentenced Appellant to a term of two to four years, neither the prosecutor nor defense objected on the basis it ran contrary to the plea. Appellant argued the lack of objection at both the change of plea hearing and the sentencing hearing equated to both prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant also claimed the district court erred in not advising him at sentencing that he could withdraw his plea as a consequence of the court’s rejection of the agreed upon sentence. J. Golden believed those claims had merit and he would have reversed and remanded with directions Appellant be allowed to withdraw his plea.
J. Golden also discussed the issue of reimbursement for a sexual assault medical examination. Since no specific loss payee was identified, the district court’s decision regarding reimbursement was premature. The district court’s order requiring Appellant to reimburse the victim for the cost of the medical examination should have been reversed.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/ypxxvf .

How-to: No Internet Connection--What Do I Do Now?

Dean at Speaking Freely recently experienced that dreaded lapse in Internet connectivity. When he was online again, he posted 5 things to do on the computer during those times of non-surfability.

Five Things to Do With A PC When You Have No Internet Connection

1. Organize bookmarks
2. Remove un-used programs
3. Clean the physical PC unit
4. Write up a blog post (or article, or letter, etc.)
5. Run maintenance programs (how long has it been since you defragged?)

Bonus
6. Organize logins and passwords




This post is dedicated to all those poor souls on the Wyoming State network who have experienced connectivity difficulties for the past few weeks.

Tuesday, February 13, 2007

Summary 2007 WY 26

Summary of Decision issued February 13, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Mendoza v. State

Citation: 2007 WY 26

Docket Number: 05-218

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, the Honorable Wade Waldrip, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Ken Koski, State Public Defender, PDP; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Assistant Attorney General.

Issue: Whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have found that Appellant knowingly stabbed the victim.

Facts/Discussion: Appellant contended that the evidence presented at his trial was not sufficient to sustain his conviction for the crime of aggravated assault and battery in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(ii).
In addressing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, the Court must determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
The crux of Appellant’s argument is that the stabbing occurred accidentally during a bar brawl and there was no evidence from which the jury could conclude that he acted “knowingly”. The Court reviewed the facts the jury could have relied upon in reaching its verdict. The Court concluded the evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant and furthermore that that conclusion did not rely on improper inferences.

Holding: After a careful examination of the evidence in the light most favorable to the State’s position, the Court concluded the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Appellant was guilty of aggravated assault and battery. It was not necessary for the jury to rely on improper inferences in reaching that conclusion.

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/yv2m79 .

Summary 2007 WY 25

Summary of Decision issued February 13, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Phillips v. State

Citation: 2007 WY 25

Docket Number: 05-240

Appeal from the District Court of Fremont County, the Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Ken Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel. Argument by Ms. Domonkos.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Mackenzie Williams, Student Intern. Argument by Mr. Williams.

Issue: Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct by referring to Appellant as a pedophile during rebuttal closing argument. Whether the district court erred in instructing the jury as to a statutory defense to a crime that was not charged.

Facts/Discussion: A jury found Appellant guilty of third-degree sexual assault and interference with a peace officer. Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment and sentence entered thereafter, on two grounds: one, that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument; and two, that the jury was improperly instructed on the law.

Prosecutor Misconduct: The prosecutor’s statement at issue was made during the State’s rebuttal closing argument, and the statement was followed by an objection, so the Court applied the harmless error standard. They considered the challenged statement in the context of the entire closing argument and in the context of the entire trial. The bases for defense counsel’s objection were that there had been no evidence admitted that Appellant was a pedophile and that the prosecutor’s statement was “simply inflammatory.” The Court concluded Appellant’s objection to the statement should have been sustained and that calling Appellant a pedophile was inflammatory which is also forbidden. However, the Court could not say that the prosecutor’s use of the word “pedophile” produced material prejudice to Appellant. With all the testimony about whether Appellant knew the victim’s real age at the time of the assault, the Court stated it was doubtful the use of this one irrelevant word affected the outcome.

Improper Jury Instruction: The Court agreed with defense counsel’s objection to the instruction given to the jury because it was not directed toward the elements of the crime with which the Appellant was charged. The Court concluded that when all of the instructions were considered together, Appellant could not show that he was prejudiced. While the facts concerning consent were presented to the jury by both sides, the case did not turn on that question. The case turned upon the question of whether Appellant reasonably believed the victim was sixteen years old. A correct instruction that consent is no defense could have been and should have been given. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the Court concluded Appellant was not prejudiced by the mis-worded but fundamentally correct instruction that was given. The instruction was not so misleading that it likely confused the jury.

Holding: Neither the singular occurrence of prosecutorial misconduct in rebuttal closing argument, nor the instructional error prejudiced a material right of Appellant, and he was not denied his right to a fair trial.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/36yaso .

Summary 2007 WY 24

Summary of Decision issued February 13, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Mattern v. State

Citation: 2007 WY 24

Docket Number: 05-218

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, the Honorable Wade Waldrip, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Ken Koski, State Public Defender, PDP; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Marion Yoder, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; and Tina N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel. Argument by Ms. Yoder.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Dee Morgan, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Morgan.

Issue: Whether the State engaged in purposeful discrimination when it exercised peremptory challenges to exclude two Hispanics from the jury. Whether character evidence was improperly admitted at trial. Whether the district court properly instructed the jury as to the elements of the crime of attempted first-degree murder. Whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find Appellant guilty of attempted first-degree murder.

Facts/Discussion: A jury found Appellant guilty of attempted first-degree murder and the district court sentenced him to life in prison. The instant appeal raises questions concerning jury selection, uncharged misconduct evidence, the adequacy of the jury instructions and the sufficiency of the evidence.

Purposeful Discrimination: The Court began their analysis with a discussion of the context in which peremptory challenges occur. They discussed the “any reason or no reason” rule and then the development of the “Batson challenge.” The “Batson challenge” follows a three-step process: first the defendant must establish a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination in the State’s exercise of peremptory challenges then the State must come forward with a “neutral explanation” for the exercise of its peremptory challenge and finally, the trial judge then determines whether the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. The Court has reviewed “Batson challenges” previously in Bueno-Hernandez v. State, Espinoza v. State and Beartusk v. State. Application of the Batson analysis in the instant case convinced the Court the district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. The district court concluded the State did not purposefully discriminate against the Hispanic jurors as a group and the record supported that conclusion.

Improperly Admitted Character Evidence: Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Where there was no objection at trial, the Court reviews the evidence under the plain error standard. Appellant raised two claims under this issue involving W.R.E. 404(a) and W.R.E. 609. The Court stated Appellant failed to show how the statement violated the admonition of W. R. E. 404(a) that evidence of a character trait not be admitted to prove the Appellant acted in conformity therewith on the occasion in question. Appellant did not show how he was prejudiced by the isolated comment. During an interview after Appellant’s arrest in Arizona two months after the incident underlying the case, Appellant described the incident in detail on tape. The parties disagreed as to whether Appellant properly objected below to admission of the evidence. So the Court reviewed the record to reconstruct the status of the issue as it was presented to the district court. The Court decided Appellant’s argument was unpersuasive. Their assessment of the issue led them to agree with the State’s final conclusion. The Court made note Appellant did not preserve the issues with adequate objections below. The Court decided defense decisions must have been made for tactical reasons. The record did not show the district court committed a clear error of law or that Appellant was prejudiced by his decision to stipulate to admission of the entire statement.

Properly Instruct the Jury: The jury instructions in the case consisted mainly of pattern instructions. Appellant did not object to the instructions and proffered the instruction defining “premeditated.” Appellant failed to present a plain error analysis of the issue. The Court could have declined to consider the arguments presented because of the procedural deficiencies. However, to avoid later charges of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court made an observation about the instructions that was dispositive of Appellant’s primary complaint that even though the jury was instructed that first-degree murder required premeditation in the form of an interval of time sufficient to form the intent to kill before doing the act of killing, the jury was not instructed that Appellant must actually have deliberated. The Court rejected that argument because the instruction that was given clearly made just that point.

Sufficient Evidence: Defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the State’s case, which motion was denied. Appellant argued at trial that the State proved neither premeditation nor malice. On appeal, he argued that he did not act purposely or with premeditation. The Court evaluated the evidence of premeditation and referred to their rule for premeditation as stated in Hightower. The Court considered the evidence of the prior relationship between the victim and the Appellant. The evidence showed that the Appellant’s intense dislike for the victim predated the incident. It was not unreasonable for the jury to conclude in this case that the manner in which the gun was used, when combined with all the other evidence was sufficient. Appellant’s second sufficiency of the evidence argument was inconsistent with his position at trial. The Court noted Appellant was re-arguing the facts. The Court’s only job was to determine whether sufficient evidence was presented for reasonable jurors to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant intentionally shot the victim.

Holding: The district court did not err in denying the Appellant’s Batson challenge or in denying the Appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. The jury was properly instructed as to the elements of the crime of attempted first-degree murder, and the State produced sufficient evidence for reasonable jurors to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was guilty of that crime. Finally, no character evidence was improperly admitted.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/25ma6r .

Monday, February 12, 2007

How-to: Internet Explorer 7.0 menu

For those of you who now have Internet Explorer 7.0 (intentionally or otherwise), here is a tip to place the menu bar at the top of the window instead of under the browser controls (back/forward buttons & address).

I came across these instructions from Shauna Hensala & Betty Besson in the ITD/MIS Newsletter from the State of Wyoming MIS Support Center. I found similar instructions from Chris Hanscom on his blog, Unhandled Perception. Take your pick.

  1. Close IE.
  2. Open Notepad, copy and paste the following:

    Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00
    [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Toolbar\WebBrowser\]
    "ITBar7Position"=dword:00000001

  3. Save the file as toolbar.reg.
  4. Double click the file to merge it into the registry.
  5. Open IE. The menu bar should be at the top of the window.

Note: If the menu bar is completely missing, right click on any of the toolbars, unlock the toolbars, and check the menu bar to make it appear.

Friday, February 09, 2007

Summary 2007 WY 23

Summary of Decision issued February 9, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: C.L. v. Wyoming Department of Family Services

Citation: 2007 WY 23

Docket Number: C-06-4

Appeal from the District Court of Platte County, Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge

Representing Appellant (Respondent): Cole N. Sherard, Wheatland, Wyoming

Representing Appellee (Petitioner): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General.

Guardian Ad Litem: Eric E. Jones, Wheatland, Wyoming.

Date of Decision: February 9, 2007

Issue: Whether the district court's decision that appellant's parental rights to the minor children should be terminated was established by clear and convincing evidence.

Holdings: Termination of parental rights pursuant to § 14-2-309(a)(iii) requires the "establishment of three elements: (1) abusive treatment or neglect by the parent; (2) unsuccessful efforts to rehabilitate the family; and (3) the child's health and safety would be seriously jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the parent." Appellant does not contest the district court's findings that the first two elements of subsection (iii) were satisfied. She focuses on the third element, claiming there was insufficient evidence to support the district court's conclusion that the children's health and safety would be seriously jeopardized if they were returned to her.

Under § 14-2-309(a)(v), the Department of Family Services (DFS) was charged with proving the children had been in foster care under the State's responsibility for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months and that Appellant was unfit to have custody and control of the children. Appellant does not dispute the children have been in foster care, or otherwise under the State's responsibility, for at least fifteen of the twenty-two months preceding the hearing. However, she does take issue with the district court's finding that she was unfit to have custody and control of the children.

A case plan was developed that identified a number of objectives and required Appellant to fulfill certain tasks in advancement of the objectives. Appellant claims DFS failed to prove the disputed elements by clear and convincing evidence because the evidence adduced at the final hearing showed she had substantially complied with the case plan.
Although Appellant presented evidence that she had complied with several of the tasks assigned to her in the case plan, she did not complete all of the tasks and, more importantly, the evidence showed the overall objectives of the plan were not achieved.

Several of the objectives could not be measured by the sheer accomplishment of a specific task. For example, one objective required Appellant to achieve a healthy parent-child relationship with her children. She was given certain tasks in order to help her fulfill that objective, including attending individual and family therapy and completing parenting classes. These tasks were meant to provide her with tools to help her obtain the ultimate goal; however, the objective would not necessarily be accomplished by rote completion of the tasks. Instead, determination of whether the objective had been met required a qualitative measure. The therapists who testified on behalf of DFS stated that, while Appellant made an effort to complete the tasks, she did not achieve a healthy parent-child bond.

Similarly, another required Appellant to maintain a safe, stable and appropriate home. She claims she satisfied this objective by obtaining an appropriate home before the second hearing. Again, she misses the overall point. The case plan required she maintain a stable and acceptable home for the children without the presence of other family members. And yet, for part of the time she lived with her parents, in what had been determined an unacceptable environment. The determination of whether or not a home is "stable" requires a qualitative judgment. The fact that she had an appropriate home for a short period of time prior to the hearing was not sufficient to override the long history of multiple, inappropriate homes.

Because the determination of the ultimate issues in this case required a review of subjective, qualitative factors, the district court was required to gauge the credibility and sincerity of the witnesses. It was within the district court's province to weigh the evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses. The district judge actually sat in the courtroom and observed the demeanor of the witnesses; consequently, he was in the best position to make those difficult factual determinations. In accordance with the appropriate standard of review, the court will defer to the district court's evidentiary findings and conclude sufficient evidence exists to support the district court's decision to terminate Appellant's parental rights.

This is a classic case where the best interests of the children diverge from the fundamental rights of the parent. When the rights of a parent and the rights of a child are on a collision course, the rights of the parent must yield. While parents have a fundamental right to raise their children, children have a right to stability and permanency in their family relationships. Wyo. Stat. 14-2-309(a) recognizes there must be limits on the amount of time DFS will attempt to rehabilitate a parent while the children remain in foster care. The time limits recognize that the children's right to stability and permanency is superior to the parent's right to familial association.

In the case at bar, although Appellant made significant efforts to rehabilitate herself, she did not, and perhaps could not, make sufficient progress within a reasonable amount of time. At the time of the hearing, the children had been placed out of the home for nearly three years. For much of that time, Appellant did not consistently comply with DFS requirements in order to be reunified with the children. As the district court recognized, at the time of the hearing there still was no clear indication of when, if ever, Appellant would be sufficiently rehabilitated to provide the children with the stability necessary to allow reunification. The lack of a clear resolution of the case was emotionally disturbing to the children and interfered with their progress in becoming healthy and well-adjusted. Under these circumstances, it was entirely appropriate for the district court to favor the children's right to permanency and terminate Appellant's parental rights.

The district court's order terminating Appellant's parental rights pursuant to Wyo. Stat. §§ 14-2-309(a)(iii) and (v), was supported by clear and convincing evidence. The district court properly considered DFS' efforts to reunify this family and Appellant's efforts to rehabilitate herself over the entire three year period these children were in foster care, and the district court reasonably concluded the interests of the children in a safe and stable home outweighed Appellant's rights as a parent.

Affirmed.

J. Kite delivered the opinion for the court.

Justice Hill, joined by Justice Golden dissented.

The record on appeal does not contain clear and convincing evidence that mandates the termination of Appellant's parental rights to her three children. Although Appellant did not comply 100% with the directives of the district court and the supervising DFS case worker, even the district court conceded that her efforts were to a large extent successful. Examination of that transcript leaves the impression that Appellant did about as well at complying with the district court's and DFS's directives as any person could have been expected to do. The following items are undisputed in the record. (1) Appellant is at once required to maintain full-time employment, and faulted that she will not be at home enough because she works full-time or more. (2) She is faulted for losing a part-time job, although she lost that job because she left work so as not to miss a visitation that was set on a new schedule. (3) She is faulted for going to her therapist only twice a month, even though her therapist testified that in her professional judgment Appellant had progressed so far that she required only every-other-week sessions (and also, thus, to avoid over dependence on the therapist). Appellant's home is characterized as being a "threat to her children's health and safety," and Appellant is characterized as "unfit" because she did not reach her goals 100%. However, there is no evidence to support those conclusions, much less clear and convincing evidence. The only evidence to support those conclusions is the minor failings detailed in the district court's decision letter.

I would remand this case to the district court with instructions that it direct DFS to continue to provide needed services to this family, including Appellant. It may be that those efforts will never result in the ideal of complete reunification. However, these children are now 14, 13, and 10 years-of-age, and it is difficult for me to grasp how termination of Appellant's parental rights is going to improve their lot.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/27b4xx .

Wednesday, February 07, 2007

United States Statutes at Large, Volume 118, 108th Congress, 2nd

The United States Statutes at Large (Volume 118, 108th Congress, 2nd
session) is now available online from the U.S. Government Printing Office at <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/statutes/index.html>.

The United States Statutes at Large, typically referred to as the Statutes at Large, is the permanent collection of all laws and resolutions enacted during each session of Congress. Documents are available as ASCII text and Adobe Portable Document Format (PDF) files.

Every public and private law passed by Congress is published in the Statutes at Large in order of the date it was enacted into law. The laws are arranged by public law number and are cited by volume and page number. Also included in the United States Statutes at Large are concurrent resolutions, proclamations by the President, proposed and ratified amendments to the Constitution, and reorganization plans. Until 1948, treaties and international agreements approved by the Senate were also published in the Statutes at Large.

Monday, February 05, 2007

2007 Statistical Abstract of the United States


The 2007 Statistical Abstract of the United States is now available online. The abstract can be used as a "convenient volume for statistical reference, and as a guide to sources of more information both in print and on the Web". While the online format can definitely not be termed user-friendly, the content provides "an the authoritative and comprehensive summary of statistics on the social, political, and economic organization of the United States." (http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/)

If you would like the book itself, you can:


  1. of course, stop by the library and peruse our reference copy;

  2. check if the Census Bureau still has copies and get one free;

  3. or, order a copy from the Government Printing Office Bookstore for $35.00: http://bookstore.gpo.gov/collections/statistical_abstract.jsp.

Amendment to Rule 6

Please be aware, beginning March 1, 2007, a change to Rule 6(c)(2) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure will take effect.

Friday, February 02, 2007

Access to online briefs

Articles by Heidi Yelk and Angela Sanfilippo in the newsletter from the Wisconsin State Law Library provided me with a starting point for my blog today. They shared the methods of access to Wisconsin briefs both online and in their library. Wisconsin has electronic access to 15 years of state court appellate briefs and "a respectable archive" of 7th Circuit federal court briefs. That made me think about availability of briefs in Wyoming as well as where to look for access in other jurisdictions. Here in Wyoming, we rely on our indefatigable Court Clerks to help us gain access to court records as we need them. The Judiciary web page lists the Supreme Court clerk, District Court , and Circuit Court clerks for your convenience. Heidi answered my question about other jurisdictions with her link to the interactive article by Michael Whiteman called Free and Fee Based Appellate Court Briefs Online . Paul Bush's article, What Isn't Available Using CM/ECF is actually a helpful list of categories that help to further define when research will take you offline in other jurisdictions.

How-to: Blog & RSS Feed Update

It's been a year since our first "official" post introducing the Law Library Letter. Looking back on the How-to on blogs and RSS, I decided an update was in order. It's obvious that the technology gods have ignored our pleas for slower change.

The concept of blogs has not changed much from a year ago. For a short reminder, a blog (shortened from weblog or web log) is a web site in which entries are posted and displayed in reverse chronological order. While many blogs have been created as online diaries or journals, there are also now millions of blogs provided in order to bring attention to updated information or to allow groups of people to discuss topics of common interest.

What has changed are the options for subscribing to RSS feeds, whether they are for a specific web site, blog, wiki, image service (the list goes on...). RSS, as I described in the one-year old post,

"stands for Rich Site Summary or Really Simple Syndication. But unless you are a major techie, this means nothing. A more useful explanation is that through this technology, you can track a wide variety of online information, from Dilbert, to the very popular Wyoming State Law Library blog, to CNN. And you can do this without wading through relentless email messages or trying to remember to frequently check your favorite web sites. The information comes in as linked headlines accompanied by brief summaries or the first few lines of the information."

In addition to subscribing to a feed using an aggregator like Bloglines, you can now use your browser to view & track feeds. If you are using Internet Explorer 7 or Firefox 2, subscribing to RSS feeds is as simple as clicking a button in the browser. (You might be able to use more than these browsers, but I am limiting to these as two of the most popular as well as the browsers with which I have experience.)

Firefox adds an orange RSS icon to in the address bar to indicate if a site has an RSS feed associated with it. Make sure you set the feed options (Tools>Options>Feeds) for Live Bookmarks, Bloglines, Google Reader, etc. Then you can click on that icon to subscribe to whatever feed shows up in the Firefox address bar.

To learn more about the IE7 RSS subscription option, check out the Microsoft Team RSS Blog.

How-to: Personalized Homepage & Groups

Frederick Faulkner has written a great article describing how to make your browser homepage work better for you. Faulkner's Practice Web Strategies for Attorneys: Do Something More With Your Browser Homepage offers suggestions for a variety of sites that you can personalize with news, calendars, favorites, and to-do lists, to name just a few.

He specifically mentions Google, Windows Live, MyYahoo, MyMSN, and Netvibes. Then he details step-by-step how to create your own homepage on Netvibes.

I have created personalized pages on both MyYahoo and Google and appreciate the ease of use. Both offer a great many advantages for organizing information in a one-stop shop setting.

Another great service provided by Yahoo!, Google and MSN is the option to a create group page. As Yahoo! puts it, a group is "where people with a shared interest meet, get to know each other, and stay informed." Are you on a committee and need to share files or take polls? Do you want to share photos with family and friends? Again, I have been part of groups on both Yahoo! and Google and find their services to be very useful.

While you and your group members must have accounts with the service you use (yet another account to track--tiresome, at best, I know), the utility of the group page may outweigh the addition of another user ID and password to the ever-growing list of online accounts you have to manage.

Thursday, February 01, 2007

Summary 2007 WY 21

Summary of Decision issued February 1, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to the paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Wyoming Department of Revenue v. Exxon

Citation: 2007 WY 21

Docket Number: 05-220

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, Honorable Dan Spangler, Retired, Judge.

Representing Appellant (Defendant): ): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Martin L. Hardsocg, Senior Assistant Attorney General; William Russell, Assistant Attorney General.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Lawrence J. Wolfe, Patrick R. Day and Walter F. Eggers, III, of Holland & Hart, Cheyenne, Wyoming; Brent R. Kunz of Hathaway & Kunz, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Date of Decision: February 1, 2007

Issues: Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied the Department’s Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies or primary jurisdiction. Whether the district court correctly concluded that neither production taxes nor royalties are “direct costs of producing” in the proportionate profits formula set forth in § 39-14-203(b)(vi)(D) of the Wyoming Statutes.

Facts: The Department of Revenue appeals a declaratory judgment in favor of Exxon Mobil Corporation. Exxon owns and operates deep natural gas wells in Sublette County as part of its LaBarge project. Exxon and the Department agreed upon a valuation methodology that was incorporated into a judicial decree as a result of litigation. The “TSA method” was binding through August 1991 and continued in use in subsequent years. In 1997, Sublette County challenged the use of the TSA method. In 2004, the Board of Equalization determined the use of the TSA was authorized by Wyoming law. The Department then sent a letter to Exxon directing it to file amended tax returns and pay taxes according to the proportionate profits methodology for the 2003 production year. In 2004, the Department sent another letter stating it would require reporting utilizing the proportionate profits method for the 2004 production year and beyond. Within that letter, the Department specified that royalties and production taxes should be included as direct costs of producing in the proportionate profits formula.
Standard of Review: The decision to dismiss a declaratory judgment action on the basis of non-exhaustion of remedies is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. Determination of the proper treatment of royalties and production taxes under the oil and gas proportionate profits formula involves statutory interpretation and presents a question of law which the Court reviews de novo.
Discussion: Motion to Dismiss: The existence of another remedy, including an administrative appeal, does not preclude declaratory judgment relief. A district court retains discretion to withhold relief and may refuse to render a declaratory judgment where the judgment would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding. The desire to avoid usurping the role of an administrative agency is manifested in two doctrines relied upon by the Department: the exhaustion requirement and the primary jurisdiction doctrine. The Court did not find the primary jurisdiction doctrine applicable in the instant case because no genuine issues of material fact existed and no threshold determinations would have been better made by an agency with expertise.
In tax appeals, the Court has recognized the potential applicability of the exhaustion requirement because the judiciary is not the taxing authority. The Court did not find the application of Union Pacific required exhaustion in the instant case. The declination of jurisdiction in Union Pacific was not intended to be a broad refusal to entertain any future declaratory judgment action concerning a tax dispute. Rather, discretion would allow future determinations to be made on a case by case basis. Exxon challenged the Department’s authority to retroactively select a valuation methodology contrary to statutory requirements which posed a discrete and narrowly defined question of statutory construction. The Court saw those issues as appropriate subjects for declaratory relief. Dismissal was not warranted because the district court did not intrude on the agency’s fact-finding or administrative prerogative.
Proportionate Profits Formula: In RME, the Court reached the same conclusion as the district court and held that production taxes and royalties were not “direct costs of production” under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-14-203(b)(vi)(D).
Holding: The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Department’s Motion to Dismiss Exxon’s action for declaratory judgment because the district court did not intrude on the agency’s fact-finding or administrative prerogative. The Court’s holding in RME was dispositive of the Department’s challenge and further discussion of the proportionate profits formula was not necessary to resolve the instant appeal.

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the decision of the Court.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2wx725 .

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