Summary 2012 WY 155

Summary of Decision December 13, 2012


Justice Hill delivered the opinion for the Court. Affirmed.

Case Name: DONALD PAUL HUTCHINSON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Docket Number: S 12 0034

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Lincoln County, Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff/Defendant): Elisabeth M.W. Trefonas, Assistant Public Defender, Jackson, WY.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff/Defendant): Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; Theodore R. Racines, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Jeffrey Pope, Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: December 13, 2012

Facts: In October of 2010, Donald Hutchinson was charged with one count of sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree. The charges against Hutchinson alleged that he inappropriately touched a six-year-old girl’s vagina for sexual gratification while bathing her. Hutchinson was the victim’s step-grandfather at the time. The victim (HAL) reported the incident to her 14-year-old brother (TL), who then told their grandmother, who reported the information to authorities of the allegations, and an investigation followed. Eventually, the case was tried to a jury on November 7-8, 2011, and Hutchinson was found guilty. He was sentenced to two to eight years at the State penitentiary. On appeal, he contends that the victim was incompetent to testify and that the district court improperly denied his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal.

Issues: Hutchinson presents two issues:

1. Because the competency of the child witness was not properly examined and she was not competent to testify, it was clearly erroneous to allow her testimony and Hutchinson’s conviction must be reversed.

2. Because there was no evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Hutchinson had “sexual contact” with the victim, it was an abuse of discretion to deny the Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Hutchinson’s conviction must be reversed.

Holdings: The Court concluded that the trial court’s decision that the child victim was competent to testify was not clearly erroneous. Having passed the five-part test elicited by the Court during an impromptu but proper hearing, finding HAL competent to testify was squarely within the court’s sound discretion. Furthermore, after a thorough record review, and accepting the evidence as true and giving every favorable inference thereto, we find that the State presented sufficient evidence to show that Hutchinson engaged in sexual contact with HAL. Thus, the Court concluded the district court properly denied Hutchinson’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. Affirmed.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summary 2012 WY 9

Summary of Decision January 20, 2012

[SPECIAL NOTE:  This opinion uses the "Universal Citation."  It was given an "official" citation when it is issued.  You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation.  You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered.  When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number.  The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance] 

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Schaeffer v. State of Wyo.

Citation:  2012 WY 9

Docket Number: S-11-0060

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=465035

Appeal from the District Court of Sheridan County, The Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant):  Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. Olson.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. Rehurek.

Date of Decision: January 20, 2012

Facts:  The appellant was convicted of one count of aggravated assault and battery after he waved around a flare gun during an altercation at a bar. 

Issues:  1.)Whether the district court abused its discretion when it did not appoint substitute counsel; 2) Whether the district court denied the appellant his right to self-representation; 3) Whether the appellant was physically restrained excessively during the trial; 4) Whether plain error occurred when the trial court did not instruct the jury to disregard the fact that the appellant was physically restrained; 5) Whether the district court erred when it did not order a competency hearing during trial; 6) Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied the appellant’s motion for new trial as untimely; 7) Whether the district court engaged in judicial bias; 8) Whether there was sufficient evidence presented that the appellant’s flare gun was a deadly weapon; and 9) Whether plain error occurred when the State referred to allegedly incorrect and improper information at the sentencing hearing.

Holdings:  The trial court did not err when it did not allow the appellant to dismiss his attorney on the second day of trial.  The record showed that the appellant did not demonstrate that his attorney was incompetent or suffered from a conflict of interest which would justify a substitution of counsel. 

Additionally, the trial court did not violate the appellant’s right to self-representation, as the appellant never made an unequivocal request to represent himself.  The record as a whole showed that the appellant did not want to proceed pro se, and there were no facts to conclude that the appellant made “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment” of his right to counsel. 

The trial court did not require excessive physical restraints, and not instructing the jury regarding the shackles did not constitute plain error.  The appellant was charged with aggravated assault and battery and had engaged in disruptive and potentially violent behavior directed towards the court. The Court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the appellant required hand and feet shackles to ensure the safety of everyone in the courtroom.  Furthermore, based upon the record, the Court found the appellant was not uninformed of the dangers of letting the jury see his shackles.  Instead, the record suggested he intentionally chose to expose them nonetheless.  The Court observed that while it may have been better to give an instruction, neither Wyoming law nor federal law has ever required such. The appellant failed to demonstrate he suffered prejudice of a substantial right.   

After the appellant had initially been deemed competent to proceed, the circumstances at trial were not such that would have required an additional competency evaluation.   The Court found that the trial court’s decision not to revisit the competency issue was supported by substantial evidence in the record.

The trial court did not have the authority to allow the appellant to file a motion for new trial outside the time confines of W.R.Cr.P. 33 and, therefore, it did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion as untimely. 

There was sufficient evidence presented at trial that a flare gun is a deadly weapon as used in the crime of aggravated assault and battery.   The jury was presented with substantial evidence that the appellant waved and pointed a flare gun in an extremely hostile manner, and that the flare gun was capable of causing serious bodily injury or death.   

Finally, the trial court did not exhibit judicial bias against the appellant, and the State did not provide the trial court with inappropriate or incorrect information at the sentencing hearing.

The Court Affirmed. 

J. Voigt delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2010 WY 167

Summary of Decision December 21, 2010

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Fletcher v. State

Citation: 2010 WY 167

Docket Number: S-09-0258

URL: http://tinyurl.com/233h5fq

Appeal from the District Court of Park County, Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant):

Representing Appellee (Defendant):

Date of Decision: December 21, 2010

Facts: Appellant pleaded guilty to attempted manslaughter, but challenges the district court’s findings of his competence to proceed both to trial and sentencing. Appellant also disputes the court’s denial of his motion to change his plea to “not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency.”

Issues: Whether the trial court erred in its decisions that Appellant was competent to proceed to trial and to sentencing. Whether trial court erred in refusing to allow Appellant to change his plea to “not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency.”


Holdings: A criminal defendant may not be tried unless he is competent, and he may not waive his right to counsel or plead guilty unless he does so “competently and intelligently.” The same standard of competency applies whether a defendant goes to trial or pleads guilty. A defendant is competent, under the standards of due process, if he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Wyo. Stat. 7-11-301 et. seq. sets forth the requirements for determining whether a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial. The statutes are designed to protect criminal defendants' due process rights. The statutory requirements pertain to all trial court proceedings, including change of plea proceedings.

During Appellant’s competency hearing, two doctors testified at length about the findings in their evaluations, each doctors reaching different conclusions. Taking both doctors’ testimonies into account, the court found Appellant competent to proceed to trial, as he had the capacity to comprehend his position, and he understood the nature and the object of the proceedings. When a district court is faced with conflicting expert reports, it does not clearly err simply by crediting one opinion over another where other record evidence exists to support the conclusion. Appellant raised his competency, yet again, on the day of sentencing and a further examination was ordered to determine Appellant’s competency to proceed to sentencing. It was concluded that Appellant did appear to have a chronic mental illness but that it did not interfere with his competency to proceed to sentencing.

Since the Appellant underwent an initial competency examination by two doctors, and an additional evaluation prior to sentencing, the district court had abundant information from which to determine his competency and to decide to utilize the information on hand rather than order additional studies. It did not abuse its discretion in finding Appellant competent to proceed to sentencing.

Appellant argues good cause existed for him to change his plea. Although experts differed as to the mental status of Appellant, the court had already credited one doctor’s evaluation over the other. Also, the record is clear that Appellant’s not guilty plea was not entered into by mistake, inadvertence, or ignorance. In fact, defense counsel considered the alternative, which was to add an accompanying plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness. Moreover, during his arraignment, Appellant acknowledged that he understood his right to plead however he wanted. Defense counsel conceded during the motion to amend plea hearing that a not guilty by reason of mental illness plea had been “considered and evaluated” prior to arraignment. There is no right to a continual succession of competency hearings in the absence of some new factor, and the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure do not place a duty on the trial judge to hold hearing after hearing in the absence of some appearance of change in the defendant’s condition since the ruling on competency was originally made. Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s motion to change his plea, as it did not consider there was good cause to do so.

The district court did not err when it found Appellant competent to proceed to trial and to sentencing. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s motion to add to his plea of not guilty, a plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness. The district court’s judgment and sentence are affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2010 WY 137

Summary of Decision issued October 21, 2010

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: In the Interest of DRT, A Minor, JET, v. The State of Wyoming, Department of Family Services

Citation: 2010 WY 137

Docket Number: S-10-0057

URL: http://tinyurl.com/2dn8xud

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, Honorable Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

Representing Appellant (Respondent): John M. Burman, Faculty Supervisor, and Joshua S. Toy, Student Intern, U.W. Legal Services Program, Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Petitioner): Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; Jill E. Kucera, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Sue Chatfield, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: October 21, 2010

Facts: This is an appeal from the juvenile court’s denial of the appellant’s motion to withdraw her admission of neglect of her child, and from the disposition order placing the child in the custody of the Department of Family Services.

Issues: Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying the appellant’s motion to withdraw her admission of neglect because (1) the juvenile court failed to advise the appellant at the initial hearing that a termination of her parental rights may be initiated upon an adjudication of neglect; (2) the juvenile court accepted the admission of neglect notwithstanding the evidence that the appellant suffered from a mental illness; and (3) the juvenile court’s acceptance of the appellant’s admission of neglect sets a dangerous precedent that will deter persons in her position from seeking assistance from governmental agencies.

Holdings: A motion to withdraw an admission in juvenile court is similar to a motion to withdraw a plea in a criminal case, and thus the standard of review is as follows: (1) a parent does not have an absolute right to withdraw an admission of neglect in a juvenile proceeding; (2) the juvenile court is vested with discretion to determine whether to grant or to deny a motion to withdraw an admission; (3) the denial of such a motion is within the sound discretion of the juvenile court where the admission was voluntary and where the procedural requirements of the applicable statutes were met at the time the admission was accepted.

In the instant case, the child was taken into temporary protective custody without a court order. Wyo. Stat. 14-3-409(a) (2009) requires that, in such case, a petition in statutory form be filed and that an informal shelter care hearing be set as soon as possible. Wyo. Stat. 14-3-409(b) (2009) also directs the court to give certain advisements at that hearing. In addition to these advisements, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-426(a) (2009) requires the juvenile court to give additional advisements at the initial hearing. The appellant does not contend that the juvenile court failed to give any of these advisements at the hearing. The appellant argues, however, that the juvenile court violated her right to the due process of law by failing to advise her, in addition, of the existence of other statutory bases for the possible termination of her parental rights.

The parent-child relationship is a constitutionally protected interest with which the State may not interfere in the absence of procedural and substantive due process. However when a proceeding is held under a particular child protection act, there is no authority for the conclusion that the failure to give notice of the existence of other statutory bases for the possible termination of her parental rights violates due process. The neglect petition was brought pursuant to the Child Protection Act found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. 14-3-401 et. seq. (2009). At a hearing, the State has the burden of proving an allegation of neglect by a preponderance of the evidence. When a child has been adjudged to be neglected under the Act, the juvenile court is obligated to ensure that reasonable efforts were made by the department of family services to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from the child’s home or to make it possible for the child to return to the child’s home. The Child Protection Act then also provides that, if a child has been placed in foster care under the Act for 15 of the most recent 22 months, the state shall file a petition to terminate parental rights. It is notice of this potential for termination of parental rights that is required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-409(b)(vi). The juvenile court is not obligated to advise the parent of the potential filing of a termination petition under a different legislative act. The hearing transcript shows that the juvenile court in this case carefully advised the appellant of her rights in these proceedings, and of the consequences that could result from an admission or a finding of neglect. That is as far as the juvenile court was required to go. Consequently, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by denying the appellant’s motion to withdraw her admission of neglect on the basis of the advisements given at the initial hearing.

A diagnosis of a recognized mental illness does not automatically render a person incompetent to enter a guilty plea. Two things are readily apparent: the juvenile court’s meticulous recitation of the appellant’s rights and the nature of the hearing, and the juvenile court’s careful investigation of the appellant’s mental capacity. Other than the appellant’s self-identified prior diagnoses, there is nothing within the transcript of that hearing that suggests any inability on her part to understand fully what was being said. It is also telling that, at the hearing upon the appellant’s motion to withdraw her admission, the appellant, now represented by counsel, presented no evidence, and almost no argument suggesting mental incapacity. Her argument consisted largely of this single sentence: “It is also troubling that she mentioned she had a bipolar disorder and it was of enough concern that a psychiatric evaluation was also ordered.” Perhaps even more telling is the fact that the evaluation had taken place prior to the hearing, with the report indicating that, although she did indeed suffer from bipolar disorder and a “mixed personality disorder,” the appellant showed no evidence of disorganized thought processes, did not suffer from ADHD, and had a “high average intellectual functioning.” In short, there is absolutely nothing in the record suggesting that the due process of law required that the appellant be allowed to withdraw her admission of neglect based upon her mental condition, because there is nothing in the record suggesting that her mental condition had any effect upon the voluntariness of that admission.

The question as to whether the juvenile court abuse its discretion by denying the appellant’s motion to withdraw her admission of neglect because acceptance of the admission sets a dangerous precedent that will deter persons in her position from seeking assistance from governmental agencies was not considered because it was not supported by cogent argument, because it is not supported by citation to relevant authority, because it is based upon policy considerations more properly brought before a legislative body, and because it is entirely speculative. Moreover, implementation of such a policy would render application of the Child Protection Act impossible where the neglect is made known to authorities by voluntary action of a parent. Once the appellant sought assistance, there was little choice but to take the child into protective custody. And once that occurred, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-409 required that a petition be filed and that a shelter care hearing be set, and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-426 required an initial hearing on the petition. Short of immediately returning the child to the appellant, an option the appellant did not even seek, the only appropriate procedure was to obtain an admission or denial from the appellant.

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appellant’s motion to withdraw her admission of neglect. The appellant’s waiver of counsel was voluntary, the admission was voluntary, and the juvenile court followed all appropriate procedures at the hearing. Affirmed.

J. Voigt delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2010 WY 27

Summary of Decision issued March 16, 2010

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Woyak v. State

Citation: 2010 WY 27

Docket Number: S-09-0055

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Diane Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Bruce E. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Leda M. Pojman, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: March 16, 2010

Facts: Appellant was convicted of three counts of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-303(a)(v) (2005) and two counts of sexual exploitation of children in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann § 6-4-303(b)(ii) (2009).

Issues: Whether the district court violated Appellant's constitutional rights to due process and confrontation by excluding him from a witness competency hearing in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-202 and W.R.Cr.P. 43. Whether the district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an independent competency hearing of a minor child and failing to make a finding supported by competent evidence that the child possessed a memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the occurrence as required by Wyoming law. Whether the trial court erred by submitting a verdict form that was unspecific as to the nature of the charges over the objection of Appellant.

Holdings: In the present action, the questioning of Victim 1 went well beyond simple "competency" questions . Rather, it included many questions about the substantive testimony to be given by Victim 1 and the circumstances of the crimes with which Appellant was charged. Given these attendant facts, Appellant's presence could well have been a significant aid to his attorney in formulating additional questions, as well as additional lines of questioning. Thus, it was an error of law for the district court to deny Appellant the right to be present at the competency/taint hearing under the circumstances of this case. For this reason his conviction is reversed because there is no viable basis for a determination that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Because the Court determined that reversible error occurred when the district court excluded Appellant from the competency hearing, which was deemed to be a critical stage of the trial proceedings, it did not substantively deal with the soundness of the district court's conclusion that Victim 1 was competent to testify. However it was noted that a district court is duty bound to conduct a thorough hearing once the child's competency is sufficiently called into question by either party and that it was an oversight by the parties and by the trial court in this action to have that hearing sandwiched into a 45-minute time span while the jury was at lunch. Such timing suggests two things: (1) that the parties were remiss in aiding the district court in recognizing the importance and significance of the issue and the necessity for conducting a meaningful hearing into the competency/taint matters; and (2) that the timing of the hearing did not permit adequate flexibility for a more comprehensive hearing, in light of the taint and competency flaws that became evident at (and before) the limited hearing that was conducted. The appropriate time for such a hearing would have been before jury selection, in a time slot that allowed adequate time for a complete exploration of the issues brought to the fore by the defense counsel, and in a working space that allowed for Victim 1's comfort and Appellant's right to be present . This conclusion is buttressed by Wyo. Stat. § 7-11-408 (2009). That statute allows for videotape depositions in child sexual assault/abuse cases, where circumstances warrant. The defendant is allowed to be present at such depositions and must be able to exercise the right of confrontation at those proceedings. The expectation is that additional proceedings would continue in this case upon remand, and one of the principal orders of business would be a comprehensive consideration of the question of Victim 1's competence to be a witness against Appellant, including whether or not his testimony was tainted by the many persons who talked with him about the case during the time following the incidents that brought Appellant's alleged conduct to light.

Counts IV and V of the verdict form do pose a bit of a problem which demands closer attention in any additional proceedings. In Counts IV and V, Appellant is charged with causing each of the victims to engage in explicit sexual conduct. The instructions defined "explicit sexual conduct" thus: "'Explicit sexual conduct' means actual or simulated sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital or oral-anal, contact between persons of the same or opposite sex, bestiality, masturbation, sadistic or masochistic abuse or lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person." Notwithstanding, the instruction at issue here is no mere "definitional instruction..." the evidence could well support a finding of guilt on any one of several of the acts included within the boundaries of the definition set out above. It is impossible to tell which jurors found which act or acts to have constituted the violation of the statute. In any further proceedings more care should be taken in crafting any such instructions.

The judgment and sentence of the district court is reversed because Appellant was denied his right to be present at the competency/taint hearing. This matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

J. Hill delivered the opinion for the court.

J. Burke dissented. Appellant has not established that he had the right, constitutional or otherwise, to be present at the hearing. In addition, there is a lack of meaningful guidance for future cases. If the decision to exclude is dependent on the circumstances, this Court should provide clear guidance to trial courts for deciding when exclusion is permissible. If exclusion is never permissible, the opinion should state so unequivocally. The district judge in this case properly balanced the important factors. It was aware of the young age of the child, the serious nature of allegations against the defendant, and the risk that the child would be traumatized if confronted by the defendant. It had the opportunity to observe the child and the defendant prior to ruling on the State's request to exclude the defendant. Based upon the information provided, the district court concluded that the defendant should be excluded from the hearing. There is no error in that decision.

The district court's determination that the child victim was competent to testify should also be affirmed. A district court's determination of competency will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. In evaluating whether that decision was clearly erroneous, an appellate court may review the entire record, including the trial testimony. A review of the entire record, including the child's trial testimony, shows that the district court's competency determination was not clearly erroneous.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/yzzxr83.

Summary 2009 WY 85

Summary of Decision issued July 1, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: In re: Cancellation Deed from Street, Jr.

Citation: 2009 WY 85

Docket Number: S-08-0107

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge.

Representing L.B. Street: Patrick Dixon, Chapin & Dixon, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing W.C. Street: Cameron S. Walker of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: After L.B. Street became extremely ill and hospitalized, he entered into a number of transactions conveying items of personal and real property to his children. When he recovered, he claimed he had no memory of the conveyances. The prevailing question was whether L.B. Street had the requisite mental capacity to execute the documents conveying his property. The Wyoming court adheres to the general principle that mere weakness of body or mind or both, do not constitute what the law regards as mental incompetency sufficient to render a contract voidable.
Application of presumption of validity to notarized deed: The appellant contended that the district court improperly applied a presumption of validity to the inter vivos conveyance of the deed and bills of sale at issue. After a review of the record, the Court stated that nothing in the language of the district court’s holding indicated that it applied a presumption of validity when determining whether L.B. Street had the requisite mental capacity to execute the deed.
Standard for determination of capacity to execute a deed: L.B. Street claimed to have limited recollection of many of the events that occurred while he was hospitalized or during his stay at the hospice and no memory of any of the conveyances made during his illness. He argued that in Morton, the Court stated the standard included that the grantor be able to recollect the decision he formed. The Court stated that was argument was incorrect. The point of time to be considered is the time of execution of the deed.
Application of the proper burden of proof: L.B. Street raised the issue of undue influence for the first time on appeal. Because the Court did not find it to be a jurisdictional or fundamental issue, the Court did not address it.
Factual findings clearly erroneous: The record included testimony from the children, a grandchild, the nursing flow sheets, the individuals who notarized the documents and the physician expert presented by L.B. Street. The trier of fact must decide what weight is to be given to expert testimony, to determine the credibility of all witnesses, and to evaluate the testimony of each in reaching its verdict. The testimony of the physician expert upon which L.B. Street relied heavily upon fell short of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he was mentally incompetent to enter into the transactions.

Conclusion: The Court found the district court applied the proper standards when determining whether L.B. Street had the requisite mental capacity to enter into the transactions at issue. The Court did not consider the undue influence claim as it was not raised in the case below. After reviewing the record the Court stated the district court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/nycqvh .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 97

Summary of Decision issued August 18, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Eaton v. State

Citation: 2008 WY 97

Docket Number: 04-180 & 06-255

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable David B. Park, Judge.

Representing Appellant: Kenneth M. Koski, Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; Marion Yoder, Senior Assistant Public Defender; Ryan R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee: Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling; David L. Delicath; and Melissa Swearingen, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Eaton sought review of his conviction for the crime of first degree murder, three counts of felony murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery and first degree sexual assault, and the sentence of death which was imposed on June 3, 2004.
The Court divided the opinion into three parts. Part I dealt with those asserted errors that occurred in the guilt/innocence phase of the trial that would require reversal of Eaton’s convictions. Part II dealt with whether or not there were errors in the sentencing phase of the trial that would require reversal of the sentence of death. Part III dealt with the issues raised in Eaton’s appeal of the district court’s denial of his motion for a new trial.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction-------------------------------------------------------------------------------¶ 1

Issues--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------¶ 2

Facts and Proceedings-------------------------------------------------------------¶¶ 3-10

Discussion--------------------------------------------------------------------------¶¶ 11-12

PART I. Guilt/Innocence Phase

A. Was Eaton Incompetent During Trial and the Proceedings in this Court

(i) Competency as a medical/mental issue.---------------------------¶¶ 13-23

(ii) Competency as suggested by events at trial.---------------------¶¶ 24-30

B. Voir Dire as Predisposing Jury to Find Eaton Guilty----------------------¶¶ 31-32

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel--------------------------------------------¶¶ 33-37

(i) Did the theory-of-the-case defense chosen by defense

counsel meet the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and

Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases

(February 2003).----------------------------------------------------------¶¶ 38-47

(ii) No challenge to DNA.------------------------------------------------¶¶ 48-50

(iii) Failure to know the applicable law.--------------------------------¶¶ 51-54

(iv) Concession of guilt without Eaton’s consent.-------------------¶¶ 55-61

(v) Defense counsel’s election to allow the trial to proceed

when Eaton was not competent to stand trial constitutes

ineffective assistance of counsel.--------------------------------------------¶ 62

(vi) Waiver of venue.----------------------------------------------------¶¶ 63-65

(vii) Failure to object to instructions.----------------------------------¶¶ 66-73

(viii) The foregoing arguments, in combination,

demonstrate that Eaton was abandoned by defense counsel.-----¶¶ 74-76

D. Hostility/Prejudice/Bias Toward Eaton at Guilt/Innocence

Phase; Additional Remand--------------------------------------------------¶¶ 77-79

(i) Guilt/innocence phase prejudice/bias/hostility.------------------¶¶ 80-81

(ii) Need for additional remand.---------------------------------------------¶ 82

E. Juror Misconduct--------------------------------------------------------------¶¶ 83-91

F. Admission of Evidence--------------------------------------------------------------¶ 92

(i) Testimony of Joe Dax.-----------------------------------------------¶¶ 93-96

(ii) Dr. Thorpen in the jury box.---------------------------------------¶¶ 97-98

(iii) Mary Follette.-------------------------------------------------------¶¶ 99-100

G. Record Incomplete---------------------------------------------------------¶¶101-102

H. Prosecutorial Misconduct-------------------------------------------------¶¶ 103-104

I. Cumulative Error--------------------------------------------------------------------¶ 105

CONCLUSION-------------------------------------------------------------------------¶ 106

PART II: Sentencing Phase---------------------------------------------------------¶ 107

A. Voir Dire----------------------------------------------------------------------¶¶ 108-114

B. Application of the 2003 Statute to this Case---------------------------¶¶ 115-125

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel------------------------------------------------¶ 126

(i) 2003 statute---------------------------------------------------------------¶ 127

(ii) Whether Trial Counsel Provided Ineffective

Assistance in the Investigation and Presentation in

the Sentencing Phase of Mitigating Evidence---------------------¶ 128-185¶

(iii) Instructions-------------------------------------------------------¶¶ 186-188

(iv) Sentencing form inadequate------------------------------------------¶ 189

D. Hostility of Judge-----------------------------------------------------------------¶ 190

E. Prosecutorial Misconduct----------------------------------------------------------¶ 191

(i) In closing argument----------------------------------------------¶¶ 192-200

(ii) During examination of witnesses------------------------------¶¶ 201-205

(iii) Destruction of evidence-----------------------------------------------¶ 206

F. Allowing Dr. Ash to Testify------------------------------------------------¶¶ 207-210

G. Instructions Improper-----------------------------------------------------¶¶ 211-213

H. Record Incomplete---------------------------------------------------------------¶ 214

(i) Instructions conference/other discussions---------------------¶¶ 215-216

(ii) Remand hearing too limited-------------------------------------------¶ 217

I. Error in Admission of Too Much Evidence About 1998 Conviction--------¶ 218

Conclusion-------------------------------------------------------------------------------¶ 219

Part III: Motion for New Trial-------------------------------------------------------¶ 220

Discussion-----------------------------------------------------------------------¶¶ 221-227

Conclusion------------------------------------------------------------------------¶¶ 228-230

Holding: The Court examined the briefs of the parties and the record on appeal and held that no error occurred during the guilt/innocence phase of Eaton’s trial that would require reversal of his seven convictions. Therefore, the judgment was affirmed in all respects. The Court found no reversible error in the penalty phase and affirmed the death sentence. A constitutional death penalty sentencing scheme must ensure the availability of meaningful judicial review as a final safeguard that improves the reliability of the sentencing process. Throughout the opinion the Court applied the final safeguard as provided in § 6-2-103(c) (d) and (e). The Court was satisfied that the evidence supported the jury’s findings with respect to aggravating and mitigating circumstance. It was the Court’s determination that the sentence of death was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor.
The Court affirmed the judgment and sentence of the district court, as well as its order denying Eaton’s motion for a new trial. The case was remanded to the district court for the purpose of vacating the suspension of the sentence of death and setting a specific date for the execution of that sentence.

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/5j69ta.

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 75

Summary of Decision issued July 1, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Haynes v. State

Citation: 2008 WY 75

Docket Number: S-07-0263

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, the Michael N. Deegan, Judge.

Representing Appellant: Diane Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee: Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling. Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: A jury convicted Haynes on two counts of first degree sexual assault. He appealed claiming the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for sexually assaulting a “physically helpless” victim; the prosecutor committed misconduct by misinforming the jury concerning the effect of its verdict and by using victim impact evidence to inflame the jury’s passion; and the district court erred in refusing to address the issue of his mental competency before sentencing.
Sufficiency of the Evidence: The Court’s task was to determine whether evidence was presented from which the jury could have found that each element of first degree sexual assault was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury heard testimony from which it could have concluded that the victim was asleep and therefore physically helpless when the assault occurred. The jury also heard testimony from which it could have concluded that the victim woke during the sexual assault. The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.
Prosecutorial Misconduct: The Court agreed with the district court that the prosecutor’s question of the forensic psychologist regarding whether the State could detain Haynes if he were found not guilty by reason of mental illness was highly improper. The prosecutor’s question raised the specter that a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental deficiency would result in Haynes’ release, a matter that was not within the province of the jury and had the potential to distract the jury from its fact-finding responsibility. The Court continued with their review considering whether a reasonable probability existed that the jury would have returned a verdict of not guilty or not guilty by reason of mental illness if the prosecution had not asked the improper question. After the Court reviewed the record, they stated that a reasonable possibility did not exist that the jury would have returned a verdict of not guilty or not guilty by reason of mental illness. The Court strongly cautioned Wyoming prosecutors from questions and arguments that inform or misinform the jury concerning the consequences of its verdict.
The State waved a photo of the victim in front of the jury during closing argument. The record reflects that the statement made and the photo shown occurred during closing argument. The law is clear that victim impact evidence is inappropriate during the guilt phase of a criminal prosecution. The Court referred to their non-exhaustive list of factors (from Trujillo) for evaluating whether material prejudice resulted. The comment was isolated in the instant case and there was nothing in the record to suggest the prosecutor made the remark or used the photo to divert the jury’s attention.
Mental Incompetence: A sex offender risk assessment was made of Haynes. Within the report was a statement that indicated that Haynes functioned at the level of a six or seven year old child. The record reflects that the district court compared the statements contained in the risk assessment with the earlier testimony presented on the competency issue and found that no new evidence was presented.

Holding: The State presented evidence from which a jury could reasonably concluded the victim in this case was asleep and therefore, “physically helpless” as required under the first degree sexual assault statute. Haynes was not materially prejudiced by the prosecutor’s improper comments during witness questioning and closing argument. The district court appropriately considered the issue of Haynes’ mental competence throughout the proceedings, including sentencing.

Affirmed.

J. Kite delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/6ancql .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]