Summary 2010 WY 120

Summary of Decision issued August 24, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Dorr v. Smith, Keller & Assoc.

Citation: 2010 WY 120

Docket Number: S-09-0249

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Michael K. Davis, Judge.

Representing Dorr: Greg L. Goddard of Goddard, Wages & Vogel, Buffalo, Wyoming.

Representing Smith, Keller & Assoc.: W. Perry Dray and Timothy L. Woznick of Dray, Thomson & Dyekman, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: Dorr appealed from the district court’s denial of his motion to declare Smith, Keller & Associates’ (SKA) judgment against him satisfied. He challenged the district court’s rulings that posting a supersedeas bond did not stop interest from accruing on the judgment and he was not entitled to credit against the judgment for settlements made by third parties in related actions.

Accrual of interest on judgment after posting supersedeas bond: Dorr posted a supersedeas bond to prevent SKA from executing on the judgment while the case was on appeal. He claimed that when he posted the bond, interest stopped accruing on the judgment and release of the bond to SKA satisfied the judgment. In V-1 Oil Co. v. People, the Court confirmed that posting a supersedeas bond does not constitute accomplished payment until an unqualified right to the proceeds accrues after the judgment is affirmed on appeal. If the legislature intended for the filing of a supersedeas bond to stop interest from accruing on the judgment, it would have specified that and not simply stated that interest accrues until the judgment is “paid.” If interest did not continue to accrue after a supersedeas bond was posted, the judgment creditor would not be fully compensated and the purpose of the statutory interest requirement would not be served. In Parker v. Artery, the Court ruled that payment of the entire judgment into the court absolved the defendant from further accrual of interest.
The fact that the bond should be set in an amount sufficient to cover all aspects of the judgment creditor’s damages does not mean that the judgment creditor will be limited to recovery of the amount of the bond. The purpose of a supersedeas bond is to protect nonappealing parties by maintaining the status quo during the appeal and insuring that those who have obtained the judgment under review will not be prejudiced by a stay of the judgment pending the final determination of the appeal. To hold that the release of the bond to SKA satisfied judgment would undermine the purpose of post-judgment interest and would deprive the judgment creditor of the value of the money he is owed.
Credit for third party settlements: In a separate action, SKA alleged that Dorr and his associates fraudulently conveyed property in which it had an interest to Dorr’s father and First Interstate Bank, among others. Dorr argued that the district court erred by refusing to credit the settlement amounts against SKA’s monetary judgment. A judgment debtor is entitled to credit against a judgment for a settlement that pertains to claims included in the judgment. The district court has discretion in determining whether to allow a set off. An evidentiary hearing was held on the set off matter. The district court’s decision letter noted that the arbitration award rendered against Dorr & Assoc. contained two components: $105,163.78 for unpaid compensation for 1988 and the portion of 1989 before dissolution and for violation of the dissolution provisions of the partnership agreement; and it directed Dorr & Assoc. to return the proceeds of a particular bank account, all accounts receivable existing as well as sums paid on those accounts and all computer software. Dorr asserted that SKA’s fraudulent conveyance complaints and subsequent amendments showed that it believed that its fraudulent conveyance claims were inseparable from the claims which led to the monetary award. The Court noted the documents seemed to include broad, general allegations about the arbitration award. The judgment at issue covered the monetary portion of the arbitration order awarding damages to SKA for unpaid compensation and violation of the dissolution provisions of the partnership agreement. Dorr did not direct the Court to evidence showing the fraudulent conveyance action was specifically directed at recovering for the claims covered by the monetary judgment.

Conclusion: The district court properly concluded that filing a supersedeas bond did not toll the accrual of interest on a judgment and the judgment creditor’s recovery is not limited to the bond amount. Dorr did not provide a transcript of the evidentiary hearing. Taking the district court’s factual findings as true, the Court agreed that Dorr did not satisfy his burden of proving that the settlements were related to the monetary judgment. The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to credit the Bill Dorr and First Interstate Bank settlements against SKA’s judgment.

Affirmed.

C.J. Kite delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2bxxxl4 .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance using the Universal Citation format, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2007 WY 115

Summary of Decision issued July 24, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Nickle v. Board of County Commissioners, Platte County, Wyoming

Citation: 2007 WY 115

Docket Number: 06-128

Appeal from the District Court of Platte County, the Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Frank J. Jones, Wheatland, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Eric Alden, Wheatland, Wyoming.

Issues: Whether the County has the right to recover the costs expended for abatement of a nuisance. Whether the County is entitled to recover against the supersedeas bond in the instant case for its damages incurred by the delay caused by filing of that appeal.

Facts/Discussion: Nickle challenged the district court’s order that had the effect of applying a portion of a supersedeas bond that Nickle posted in an earlier appeal, which arose out of the same circumstances as the instant appeal, so as to recompense Platte county Board of County Commissioners (the County) for damages it suffered as a result of that appeal which was dismissed for want of prosecution.
To the extent the case involves the district court’s construction of W.R.A.P. 4.02, the question of law is reviewed de novo. However, in its totality the question presented is a mixed question of law and fact. Whether the rule in question contemplates an award for the sorts of damages at issue is a question of law but the district court must also take evidence on which to base any award of damages that may be allowed by the rule. The findings are considered presumptively correct and the appellate court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record. Findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. It is appellant’s burden to bring the Court a complete record. In the absence of anything to refute them, the Court will sustain the trial court’s findings and assume the evidence presented was sufficient to support those findings.

Holding: The record in the case was woefully incomplete. From the materials forwarded, the Court could only conclude that the district court did not err as a matter of law to the extent that it applied W.R.A.P. 4.02. So far as the facts are concerned, applying the rule above, the Court presumed that a complete record would sustain the district court’s fact findings.
Nickel purports to appeal from two orders issued in 2005, as well as the order entered on April 19, 2006. He did appeal one of the earlier orders, but that appeal was dismissed. The Court did not dispositively discuss whether the earlier orders were subsumed into the 2006 order because the Court did not have a complete enough record to perform any sort of meaningful appellate review.

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2vbzq2 .