Thursday, December 23, 2010

Summary 2010 WY 170

Summary of Decision December 23, 2010

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Rodriguez v. State

Citation: 2010 WY 170

Docket Number: S-10-0003

URL: http://tinyurl.com/262635v

Appeal from the District Court of Albany County
The Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Patricia Lynn Bennett, H. Michael Bennett, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming; Michael H. Reese, Michael H. Reese, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Ms. Bennett.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Smith.

Date of Decision: December 23, 2010

Facts: Appellant challenged his conviction on a felony charge of battery of a household member, third or subsequent offense, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(f)(ii) (LexisNexis 2009).

Issues: Whether the admission of the alleged victim’s statements through the testimony of the investigator violated Appellant’s right to confront the witness against him; Whether the district court improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defense in denying Appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; Whether defense counsel was ineffective in (1) failing to object to the alleged victim’s statements introduced through the testimony of the investigating officer, and (2) by calling the alleged victim as a witness, thereby waiving Appellant’s argument that he had been denied the right to confront the witness; And whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of uncharged misconduct and prior bad acts.

Holdings: Appellant contended that the investigating police officer’s testimony about what the alleged victim told the officer was hearsay, although Defense counsel did not object to the officer’s testimony at trial. Because the prosecution presented the police officer’s testimony about the statements, but did not call the alleged victim as a witness, Appellant claimed a violation of his Sixth Amendment right. The flaw in Appellant’s argument was that the alleged victim was not unavailable as a witness. The prosecution did not call her as a witness because, as the prosecutor explained in his opening statement, she later denied that Appellant had hit her.

Appellant also contended that the district court improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defense “by forcing the defense to call the victim as a witness.” The Court found that the district court merely pointed out that the witness was available, and asked if she would be called and did not shift the burden of proof to the defense.

In his third issue, Appellant claimed that his defense counsel was ineffective because he did not object to the hearsay testimony of the police officer, and because defense counsel called the alleged victim as a witness, thereby waiving Appellant’s Confrontation Clause claim. The Court found possible reasons that defense counsel might have believed that a hearsay objection would be ultimately unsuccessful and only draw unwanted attention to the testimony. The Court has previously observed that a failure to object may not be a failure at all, but rather, a tactical decision. Moreover, the Court found that Appellant suffered no prejudice from the lack of hearsay objections. The Court found that Appellant failed to establish his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

As his final issue, Appellant claimed that the district court erred in admitting evidence of prior assaults against household members, contrary to W.R.E. 404(b). The Court found that the district court made a well-reasoned and thorough analysis of the evidence at issue, highlighting the district court’s references to Wyoming case law that has addressed prior incidents of battery or domestic violence in these sorts of cases. The Court found that it was easy to discern a legitimate basis for the district court’s ruling that the evidence was admissible. The district court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion.

The Court affirmed Appellant’s conviction.

J. Burke delivered the opinion for the court.

Tuesday, December 21, 2010

Summary 2010 WY 169

Summary of Decision December 21, 2010

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Zaloudek v. Zaloudek

Citation: 2010 WY 169

Docket Number: S-10-0068

URL: http://tinyurl.com/2f35huv

Appeal from the District Court of Uinta County, The Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): William L. Combs of Combs Law Office, L.L.C., Evanston, Wyoming

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Richard J. Mulligan of Mulligan Law Office; and Heather Noble, Jackson, Wyoming

Date of Decision: December 21, 2010

Facts: Appellant (Husband) and Appellee (Wife) divorced in 2008. As part of the divorce decree, Husband was ordered to pay a certain dollar sum to Wife to equalize assets. Husband did not make a material payment until more than a year after the divorce decree was entered. Husband herein appeals the district court’s order requiring him to pay interest on the amount he owed from the date of the rendition of the divorce decree.

Issues: Whether improper interest was added to awards to Appellee from Appellant’s IRA accounts that were not yet due during the period in which those accounts were frozen and in the control of the Court by Appellee’s Writ of Garnishment, and improperly require an immediate lump sum cash payment of the total amount? Whether the lower Court abused its discretion by improperly allowing attorney fees and costs to Appellee for claimed enforcement efforts that served to delay resolution of Decree compliance issues?

Holdings: The application of § 1-16-102 clearly requires payment from the date of rendition. A district court must expressly set a different date for payment of a judgment in order to override the application of the statute. Also, the garnishment of funds is not equivalent to a party depositing money with a court. The Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Husband to pay judgment interest from the date of rendition of the divorce decree. The Court further found the issue of attorney fees was still pending before the district court at the time of this appeal and was thus not appealable. Affirmed.

J. Golden delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2010 WY 168

Summary of Decision December 21, 2010

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Helm v. Clark

Citation: 2010 WY 168

Docket Number: S-10-0002

URL: http://tinyurl.com/2abdqds

Appeal from the District Court of Lincoln County, The Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiffs): Joseph B. Bluemel of Bluemel Law Office, Kemmerer, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Defendants): Jack D. Edwards of Edwards Law Office, P.C., Etna, Wyoming.

Date of Decision: December 21, 2010

Facts: This case involves a dispute between adjoining property owners in Lincoln County, Wyoming. Plaintiffs attempted to relocate a fence which for many years had separated their pasture from a pasture belonging to Defendant. The fence was south of the recorded property line. Defendant objected and claimed that he had acquired title to the property between the recorded boundary and the fence by adverse possession. After a bench trial, the district court quieted title to the property in Defendant. On appeal, the Plaintiffs claim the district court committed various errors in arriving at its decision.

Issues: Whether the district court’s findings of fact that Defendant had established a case for adverse possession were clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of the evidence when there was no evidence of “the definitive location, course or continuity of the fence” and “many facts material to proving adverse possession [were] absent or lacking;” the trial court specifically found Defendant “admitted the north-south fence on the east boundary of the area being adversely possessed until 1999 was a fence of convenience;” and the “evidence clearly shows the north-south fence on the east boundary of the property claimed to be adversely possessed was moved in 1999 or only eight years before this matter ensued.” Whether the district court erred by failing to rule that Defendant was estopped from arguing that the fence was a boundary fence because members of his family had admitted that the north-south fence on the east boundary of the property was a fence of convenience?

Holdings: The district court’s findings of fact that Defendant had established a case for adverse possession was consistent with prior cases, supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous. Also, the district court correctly ruled the Defendants’ admission that a north-south fence on the east boundary separating different types of land was a fence of convenience, was not relevant to the present dispute and did not have any preclusive effect in the present case.

The Plaintiffs also contested the lack of evidence about the exact location of the fence and, accordingly, the disputed property. The trial evidence did not support the district court’s simple rectangular description. The failure to provide a proper legal description did not, however, undermine the district court’s ultimate finding that Defendant proved he adversely possessed the property and was entitled to have title quieted in him.

The Court held that the district court correctly ruled Defendant had proven his claim for adverse possession of the disputed tract; however, the district court’s decision as to the size and exact location of the disputed area was clearly erroneous. The Court affirmed in part, but reversed and remanded for a determination of the exact legal description of the adversely possessed property.

Chief Justice Kite delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2010 WY 167

Summary of Decision December 21, 2010

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Fletcher v. State

Citation: 2010 WY 167

Docket Number: S-09-0258

URL: http://tinyurl.com/233h5fq

Appeal from the District Court of Park County, Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant):

Representing Appellee (Defendant):

Date of Decision: December 21, 2010

Facts: Appellant pleaded guilty to attempted manslaughter, but challenges the district court’s findings of his competence to proceed both to trial and sentencing. Appellant also disputes the court’s denial of his motion to change his plea to “not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency.”

Issues: Whether the trial court erred in its decisions that Appellant was competent to proceed to trial and to sentencing. Whether trial court erred in refusing to allow Appellant to change his plea to “not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency.”


Holdings: A criminal defendant may not be tried unless he is competent, and he may not waive his right to counsel or plead guilty unless he does so “competently and intelligently.” The same standard of competency applies whether a defendant goes to trial or pleads guilty. A defendant is competent, under the standards of due process, if he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Wyo. Stat. 7-11-301 et. seq. sets forth the requirements for determining whether a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial. The statutes are designed to protect criminal defendants' due process rights. The statutory requirements pertain to all trial court proceedings, including change of plea proceedings.

During Appellant’s competency hearing, two doctors testified at length about the findings in their evaluations, each doctors reaching different conclusions. Taking both doctors’ testimonies into account, the court found Appellant competent to proceed to trial, as he had the capacity to comprehend his position, and he understood the nature and the object of the proceedings. When a district court is faced with conflicting expert reports, it does not clearly err simply by crediting one opinion over another where other record evidence exists to support the conclusion. Appellant raised his competency, yet again, on the day of sentencing and a further examination was ordered to determine Appellant’s competency to proceed to sentencing. It was concluded that Appellant did appear to have a chronic mental illness but that it did not interfere with his competency to proceed to sentencing.

Since the Appellant underwent an initial competency examination by two doctors, and an additional evaluation prior to sentencing, the district court had abundant information from which to determine his competency and to decide to utilize the information on hand rather than order additional studies. It did not abuse its discretion in finding Appellant competent to proceed to sentencing.

Appellant argues good cause existed for him to change his plea. Although experts differed as to the mental status of Appellant, the court had already credited one doctor’s evaluation over the other. Also, the record is clear that Appellant’s not guilty plea was not entered into by mistake, inadvertence, or ignorance. In fact, defense counsel considered the alternative, which was to add an accompanying plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness. Moreover, during his arraignment, Appellant acknowledged that he understood his right to plead however he wanted. Defense counsel conceded during the motion to amend plea hearing that a not guilty by reason of mental illness plea had been “considered and evaluated” prior to arraignment. There is no right to a continual succession of competency hearings in the absence of some new factor, and the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure do not place a duty on the trial judge to hold hearing after hearing in the absence of some appearance of change in the defendant’s condition since the ruling on competency was originally made. Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s motion to change his plea, as it did not consider there was good cause to do so.

The district court did not err when it found Appellant competent to proceed to trial and to sentencing. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s motion to add to his plea of not guilty, a plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness. The district court’s judgment and sentence are affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the opinion for the court.

Friday, December 17, 2010

Summary 2010 WY 166

Summary of Decision December 17, 2010

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Johnson v. State of Wyoming, ex rel., Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division

Citation: 2010 WY 166

Docket Number: S-10-0098

URL: http://tinyurl.com/2c24njt

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge

Representing Appellant (Petitioner): Kenneth DeCock of Plains Law Offices, Gillette, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Respondent): Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kelly Roseberry, Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: December 17, 2010

Facts: Appellant challenges a Medical Commission decision denying her preauthorization for shoulder surgery, after the Wyoming Workers’ Safety & Compensation Division (Division) granted her benefits for both shoulders.

Issues: Whether the Medical Commission had jurisdiction to address the issue of the compensability of the original injury after the employer and the Division agreed the injury was compensable and the Division paid benefits toward the injury.


Holdings: Each of Appellant’s claims are independent of each other, regardless of whether her case remains open with the Division. Receiving a prior award of benefits for her right shoulder did not guarantee Appellant future benefits for her left shoulder. Whenever there is an application for new benefits, the Division may require the claimant to illustrate that the injury was work-related. Contrary to Appellant’s argument that the Medical Commission lacked jurisdiction over the question of whether she sustained a work-related injury, the actual determination made by the Medical Commission was whether or not her shoulder surgery should be covered. Because Appellant did not show her left shoulder surgery was related to her employment, her claim was properly denied. The legislature did not intend the Division’s uncontested award of benefits to rise to the level of a ‘final adjudication’ necessary to apply the doctrine of issue preclusion to outstanding claims for worker’s compensation benefits.

The Medical Commission had jurisdiction to address the issue of the compensability of Appellant’s original injury.

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the opinion for the court.

Thursday, December 16, 2010

Summary 2010 WY 165

Summary of Decision December 16, 2010

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Solis v. State

Citation: 2010 WY 165

Docket Number: S-10-0092

URL: http://tinyurl.com/288wyrd

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Diane Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jessica Y. Frint, Student Director, and Meggan Hathaway, Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance Program

Date of Decision: December 16, 2010

Facts: Appellant and associate entered a retail store and selected a large quantity of clothing that was on sale, which totaled $1,011.95. Without paying for the items, they grabbed the bags and dashed towards a nearby exit door, the associate threatening a sales associate with a drawn knife. The State charged Appellant with one count of aiding and abetting aggravated robbery under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-401(c)(ii) and § 6-1-201(a) (LexisNexis 2009), and one count of felony larceny under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402(a) and (c)(i) (LexisNexis 2009). The State sought restitution in the amount of $1,968.31 for the stolen property, which was the full regular retail price of that property.

Issues: Whether the trial court’s restitution order was in error as such amount was not the actual pecuniary damage as authorized by statute?

Holdings: The State directed the Court to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-127 as a basis for upholding the restitution award. The Court agreed that § 1-1-127 would be applicable to the determination of the proper amount of restitution in the instant case. However, the Court disagreed with the State’s contention that the “full marked or listed price” of the stolen property is the equivalent of its full retail price. List price” is, in essence, what a consumer knows the price to be at the time and the amount the merchant is seeking and willing to accept as compensation for the goods. In this case, a reduced sale price of $1,011.95.

The State also contended that the district court, in accordance with § 1-1-127(a)(ii), could have properly added as much as $1,000.00 to the price of the goods in determining the civil damages. The Court found § 1-1-127(a)(ii) to be a penalty provision, specifically excluded from the definition of pecuniary damages which can be awarded as restitution. § 7-9-101(a)(iii).

The Court held the district court abused its discretion in awarding the full retail value of the stolen merchandise as restitution instead of its sales price. The restitution award was reversed and the case remanded to the district court for entry of an amended Judgment and Sentence consistent with the opinion.

J. Golden delivered the opinion for the court.

Wednesday, December 15, 2010

Summary 2010 WY 164

Summary of Decision December 15, 2010

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Egan v. Egan

Citation: 2010 WY 164

Docket Number: S-10-0065

URL: http://tinyurl.com/2bn4cy6

Appeal from the District Court of Park County, The Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Alex H. Sitz III of Meinecke & Sitz, LLC, Cody, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Kori Kae Egan, pro se.

Date of Decision: December 15, 2010

Facts: The district court allowed a significant deviation from Mother’s child support obligation.

Issues: Whether the district court abused its discretion by considering improper factors in allowing the deviation from the presumptive amount of child support; and erred in calculating Mother’s net income for purposes of calculating child support.

Holdings: The district court did not abuse its discretion by looking at Mother’s total situation, including her health condition, her family’s current finances and her practical ability to earn additional money. Also, while the district court cannot include subsequent spouses’ income in calculating the presumptive child support amount, the district court did not abuse its discretion by looking at a subsequent spouse’s contribution in considering the payor’s ability to pay in determining whether deviation is appropriate.

As to the issue of net income calculation, under the clear language of the statute, Mother was entitled to the health care coverage deduction regardless of whether Father was providing health insurance for their children or not. In contrast, given that the legislature did not include disability insurance premiums or flex plan contributions in stating the allowable deductions, it was error for the district court to deduct those amounts in calculating Mother’s net income. However, this small difference was not prejudicial and did not require reversal of the order.

Affirmed.

Chief Justice Kite delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2010 WY 163

Summary of Decision December 15, 2010

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: McMurry v. McMurry

Citation: 2010 WY 163

Docket Number: S-10-0039

URL: http://tinyurl.com/3amf7cm

Appeal from the District Court of Sublette County, The Honorable Marvin L. Tyler, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): Weston W. Reeves and Anna Reeves Olson, Park Street Law Office, Casper, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Reeves.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Kim D. Cannon and Alison Ochs of Davis & Cannon, Sheridan, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Cannon.

Date of Decision: December 15, 2010

Facts: Appellant (Husband) challenges the Decree of Divorce entered of record by the district court. There are very few facts in dispute. The principal source of controversy in this case arises because much of the marital estate was amassed through gifts from Husband’s father. The district court resolved the disputes over the division of the marital estate in an 18 page Decision Letter and a nine-page Decree of Divorce. The district court divided the marital estate into, more or less, two equal shares. In addition, the district court ordered that Husband pay to wife for her attorney’s fees and court costs.

Issues: Whether the district court’s conclusion that Husband intended to gift one-half of his overriding royalty interests to Wife is clearly erroneous. Whether the district court abused its discretion by allocating one-half of the parties’ combined estates to Wife. Whether the district court erred by awarding Wife attorney’s fees when she plainly did not need them to defend the action.

Holdings: The district court gave full recognition to the circumstance that Husband received gifts from his father. However, even if the property was Husband’s separate property, it was still within the jurisdiction of the district court to divide between husband and wife, incidental to dissolution of the marriage and the distribution of all marital assets. Although previous cases have never held that “equitable” means “equal,” likewise the Court have never held that “equal” shares are not “equitable.” Previous cases are very clear on the point contested by Husband, i.e., all property of the parties is subject to distribution. The Court held that the distribution of assets fashioned by the district court was not an abuse of discretion, and it did not shock the conscience of the Court.

The award of attorney’s fees in cases such as this is not designed to punish one party or the other, it is only designed to allow for the payment of such attorney’s fees, within the sound discretion of the district court, in those circumstances where the expenditures become “necessary” for a party because that party has no choice but to incur the expenses in defending against, or pursuing, a complaint for divorce. The district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering an award of attorney’s fees to Wife.

The Court affirmed the decree of divorce in all respects, as well as the award of attorney’s fees.

J. Hill delivered the opinion for the court.

Friday, December 10, 2010

Summary 2010 WY 162

Summary of Decision December 10, 2010

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Tucker v. State

Citation: 2010 WY 162

Docket Number: S-10-0006

URL: http://tinyurl.com/24deumm

Appeal from the District Court of Fremont County, The Honorable Marvin L. Tyler, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Diane E. Courselle, Director, UW Defender Aid Program; Kevin Ward, Student Intern. Argument by Mr. Ward.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Pojman.

Date of Decision: December 10, 2010

Facts: Appellant challenged his convictions on two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide.

A bartender stopped serving Appellant alcohol due to his level of intoxication. Approximately an hour later, Appellant asked the bartender for help starting his truck. The bartender then asked another patron, a mechanic, to help Appellant with his vehicle. The mechanic determined that the truck would not start because the clutch had not been pressed. During this time, Appellant was in the driver’s seat attempting to start the truck, the girlfriend was in the passenger seat with her head against the passenger door, and the girlfriend’s son was asleep in the backseat. After it was determined that the truck did not need a jump, Appellant got out of the truck momentarily while the mechanic got into the driver’s seat, pushed in the clutch, and started the truck. Appellant got back into the driver’s seat and the mechanic saw Appellant drive away. Approximately seven miles from town, the truck left the road, flipped over, and crashed into a tree. The girlfriend and her son were ejected from the vehicle and were found dead at the scene of the accident.

Prior to trial, the State filed a witness list designating the investigating officer as a witness. Appellant filed a motion which sought to prevent the investigating officer from testifying as an expert. The court granted the motion “in part” but also indicated that the officer could testify “in accordance with his designation.” Before the officer took the stand, another hearing was held concerning the anticipated testimony. The court stated that it would limit the officer’s testimony to the matters described in the witness designation and that it would give a curative instruction to the jury in the event that the officer’s testimony crossed into the realm of expert opinion. During the State’s examination of the officer, the prosecution asked him to describe his training in accident investigations and his experience in investigations involving ejections. The State also asked the officer to give his opinion as to where the victims were seated prior to being ejected from the vehicle. Finally, the officer was asked whether he thought the accident was influenced by alcohol impairment.

Defense counsel repeatedly objected to the State’s questions regarding the officer’s training and experience, and to the officer’s testimony regarding the position of the occupants of the vehicle, on the grounds that he was stating opinions that only an expert witness could provide. In response, the court instructed the jury several times that the investigating officer could not provide expert opinions and as to how much weight, if any, should be given to opinion testimony from a witness who is not an expert witness

Ultimately, the jury found Appellant guilty on both counts of aggravated vehicular homicide. Appellant was subsequently sentenced to 12 to 20 years for each conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively.

Issues: I – Whether the district court abused its discretion when it admitted the portion of a trooper’s testimony challenged in the motion for new trial. II – Whether there was sufficient evidence of Appellant’s guilt. III -- Whether Appellant’s consecutive sentences were illegal.

Holdings: The Court held that the district court erred in admitting the investigating officer’s opinion as to the location of the occupants of the vehicle at the time of the crash and as to whether alcohol impairment was a factor in the crash. However, in light of the remaining evidence produced by the State, the Court held these errors were harmless. The evidence was sufficient to establish that Appellant was driving the vehicle and that his intoxication was the proximate cause of the crash and the resulting deaths of the victims. Finally, the Court held that Appellant’s constitutional rights against double jeopardy and against cruel and unusual punishment were not violated by the imposition of consecutive sentences of 12 to 20 years. For these reasons, the decision of the district court was affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the opinion for the court.

A special concurrence was delivered by J. Voigt.

Specifically, to address why the State did not offer the trooper/investigating officer as an expert witness under W.R.E. 702 and offer some form of Wyoming Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction No. 6.08A (2004), which instruction tells the jury how to consider the opinion of an expert witness.

The concurrence concludes that an expert in the field of accident investigation or reconstruction, particularly one who investigated the scene immediately after the accident and who interviewed the pre-accident witnesses, may opine as to the position of the occupants in the vehicle, assuming that he or she is able to testify as to a sufficient basis for that opinion.

Summary 2010 WY 161

Summary of Decision December 10, 2010

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Wheeler v. State, ex rel., Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Comp. Div.

Citation: 2010 WY 161

Docket Number: S-10-0041

URL: http://tinyurl.com/2fo2u7r

Appeal from the District Court of Uinta County, The Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

Representing Appellant (Petitioner): Michael D. Newman, Hampton & Newman, L.C., Rock Springs, Wyoming; Donna D. Domonkos, Cheyenne, Wyoming; George Santini, Ross, Ross & Santini, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Respondent): Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kelly Roseberry, Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: December 10, 2010

Facts: Petitioner developed post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and major depressive disorder (MDD) after two of his fellow volunteer firefighters died in an explosion. He appealed from the district court’s order affirming the Office of Administrative Hearing’s (OAH) denial of worker’s compensation benefits for treatment of his PTSD and MDD.

Issues: Issue I – Whether the overwhelming weight of the evidence is that post traumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder are caused by physical changes in the human organism and meet the definition of injury in Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-102(a)(xi); Issue II – Whether the hearing examiner’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and otherwise not in accordance with the law; Issue III – Whether Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-102[(a)](xi)(J) is unconstitutional as it is vague, undefined and inapplicable to the claimant’s condition and fails to apply the constitutional provision of Article 10 Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.

Holdings: Petitioner was not claiming that his PTSD and MDD were caused by the smoke inhalation or burn injuries he suffered in the fire. Instead, he argued that PTSD and MDD are, themselves, physical injuries and therefore compensable under the Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Act. Based upon the statutory language which clearly differentiates between mental and physical injuries, the fact that the legislature made a specific change in 1994 to exclude mental injuries that were not caused by compensable physical injuries and Wyoming case law interpreting the statute, the Court concluded that the requisite “physical injury” must be something outside of the biological changes in the brain associated with mental disorders. The record contains substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner’s conclusion that Petitioner’s PTSD and MDD were mental injuries rather than physical injuries under § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(J). The hearing examiner properly concluded that Petitioner’s mental injuries were not compensable under Wyoming law. The Court declined to determine whether Wyoming’s statute allows compensation for mental injuries caused by a compensable physical injury to another person because, even if it does, the Petitioner had already received all the benefits to which he would be entitled. And, because Wyoming case law prohibits consideration of the constitutionality of a statute in an administrative appeal, the Court declined to address that issue as well. Affirmed.

Chief Justice Kite delivered the opinion for the court.

Thursday, December 09, 2010

Summary 2010 WY 160

Summary of Decision December 9, 2010

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Hansuld v. Lariat Diesel Corp. / Lariat Diesel Corp. v. Hansuld.

Citation: 2010 WY 160

Docket Number: No. S-09-0206, S-09-0207

URL: http://tinyurl.com/2dfdq33

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge

Representing Appellants/Appellees (the Hansulds), (Plaintiff/Defendant): Larry W. Harrington of Harrington Law Firm, P.C., Casper, Wyoming

Representing Appellees/Appellants (Lariat Diesel and Mr. Piel), (Defendant/ Plaintiff): Thomas M. Hogan, Casper, Wyoming

Date of Decision: December 9, 2010

Facts: Both appeals share common facts. This is the second time these parties have been before the Court. See Hansuld v. Lariat Diesel Corp., 2003 WY 165, ¶ 13, 81 P.3d 215, 218 (Wyo. 2003) (Hansuld I). A water line crosses Appellees/Appellants’ property before reaching the Appellants/Appellees’ property. A valve on Appellees/Appellants’ property controls the flow of water to the Appellants/Appellees’ property. Appellees/Appellants turned off the Appellants/Appellees’ water, claiming that no easement existed in favor of the Appellants/Appellees’ property for the water line. The Appellants/Appellees brought the instant legal action, seeking, among other things, an injunction and a declaration that they had an implied water line easement across the Appellees/Appellants’ property. Appellees/Appellants counterclaimed seeking, among other things, declaratory relief for a precise legal description of the location and extent of its implied access easement (decided by Hansuld I). The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

Issues: I- Whether the easement for a water line across the Appellees’ property, in favor of the Appellants’ property, is necessary and beneficial. II – Whether the creation of an easement for the water line was intended by the LLC when it originally divided the property. For the second case: Whether the district court correctly ruled on summary judgment that Appellee was precluded from seeking a declaration of the exact legal description of the location of its access easement across the Appellants’ property.

Holdings: As to issue I, The burden to the Appellees’ property is simply not great enough. The Court found that putting the Appellants to the expense of laying an equivalent water line entails a disproportionate effort and expense to the finding of the existence of an easement for the water line by implication. As to issue II, the Court agreed with the Appellees that Appellants presented no evidence to adequately rebut the presumption that an easement for the water line was intended. The Court found the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to Appellant on this issue was in error.

As to the second case, the matter before the district court in Hansuld I dealt solely with whether an access easement existed by implication. This matter was distinct from where such easement might be situated. Appellees’ request for declaration of the exact legal description of the location of its access easement across the Appellants’ property was not precluded by res judicata nor the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The district court’s decision in this appeal was reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

J. Golden delivered the opinion for the court.

Wednesday, December 08, 2010

Summary 2010 WY 159

Summary of Decision December 8, 2010

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Nelson V. State

Citation: 2010 WY 159

Docket Number: S-10-0085

URL: http://tinyurl.com/2akxd4q

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, The Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Diane Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel. Argument by Ms. Kerin.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; John S. Burbridge, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Affie B. Ellis, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Ellis.

Date of Decision: December 8, 2010

Facts: An informant provided DCI with a list of individuals from whom he thought he could obtain drugs. Defendant’s name was one of those on the list. The informant contacted the Defendant and she told him that she could get him drugs.

Prior to trial, Defendant served the prosecution with a motion pursuant to W.R.E. 404(b) for disclosure of any evidence of other misconduct it intended to introduce at trial. The prosecution did not respond to the motion. Also prior to trial, Defendant asked the district court to instruct the jury concerning the entrapment defense. After the pretrial conference but before the trial, the district court advised counsel that it had concluded the entrapment defense was not relevant and it would not give the instruction.

At trial, during the prosecution’s questioning, the prosecution’s DCI witness testified that Defendant had told him at the time of her arrest that she had sold cocaine to the informant “either once or twice in July.” Defense counsel objected on the grounds that the prosecution had not given notice that it intended to introduce evidence of other misconduct. The district court overruled the objection. During cross-examination of the Defendant, the prosecution also inquired about her involvement with drugs prior to the delivery to the informant. The district court again overruled defense counsel’s objection and allowed the testimony.

After the close of the evidence, defense counsel renewed his request for an entrapment instruction. The district court declined to give the instruction, concluding the evidence presented did not support a contention that law enforcement improperly induced Defendant to act illegally. The jury found Defendant guilty of delivering cocaine. Defendant appealed, claiming error in the district court’s refusal to give an entrapment instruction and the prosecutor’s failure to give notice of intent to use W.R.E. 404(b) evidence.

Issues: Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give an entrapment instruction. Whether the prosecutor used W.R.E. 404(b) evidence without notice to defense counsel.

Holdings: The Defendant testified that she tried telling the informant no but he would not take no for an answer. The informant’s testimony about his contact with the Defendant largely corroborated her testimony. The jury, if it believed Defendant’s testimony, could reasonably have concluded that the informant’s repeated calls were sufficiently harassing to induce her to commit a crime. The question was not whether she proved she was entrapped, but whether the evidence was sufficient to require giving the instruction and let the jury decide whether it believed she was entrapped. The Court held that it was.

In the second issue, the Court concluded the prosecutor’s assertion that he did not intend to introduce evidence that the Defendant used marijuana three to four years earlier was not sufficient to overcome the 404(b) notice requirement. Previous holdings in Reay and Schreibvogel were not intended to suggest that prosecutors can avoid claims that they failed to give the required notice by simply asserting they did not intend to introduce the evidence. Furthermore, whether or not defense counsel opened the door to the testimony, the prosecution should have provided notice of the evidence in response to Ms. Nelson’s disclosure motion.

The Court’s conclusion that error occurred when the district court declined to give an entrapment instruction made it difficult to evaluate the question of whether prejudice resulted from lack of notice of the 404(b) evidence. Under the circumstances, the Court declined to consider whether the lack of notice under 404(b) led to material prejudice.

Chief Justice Kite delivered the opinion for the court.

Tuesday, December 07, 2010

Summary 2010 Wy 158

Summary of Decision December 7, 2010

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Steiger v. Happy Valley Homeowners Association

Citation: 2010 WY 158

Docket Number: S-07-0260, S-09-0081

URL: http://tinyurl.com/2dmtq96

Appeal from the District Court Laramie of County, Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

Representing Appellants (Defendants): Peter B. Steiger and Sylvia Steiger, pro se

Representing Appellee (Plaintiffs): William D. Bagley of Frontier Law Center, Cheyenne, Wyoming

Date of Decision: December 7, 2010

Facts: Appellants owned a tract of land in a subdivision governed by restrictive covenants. The Appellee filed a complaint against them alleging that they were violating the covenant prohibiting homeowners from occupying a modular or mobile home without a permanent foundation. The district court granted summary judgment for the Appellee and the Appellants appealed. The Court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case to the district court after concluding that by failing to timely respond to a request for admission, the Appellee was deemed to have admitted it lacked the authority to bring the legal action. On remand, the district court entered an order allowing the Appellees to withdraw the admission and submit a response. The district court also entered an order awarding the Appellants the costs for the appeal. The Appellants appealed both orders. The appeal from the order allowing withdrawal of the admission as an improper interlocutory appeal was dismissed. The appeal from the order awarding costs because a trial had been held in the interim and another appeal from the district court judgment seemed likely was stayed. As anticipated, the Appellants have appealed the district court’s judgment enforcing the covenant and dismissing their counterclaims.

Issues: Whether the district court erred in allowing the Appellee to withdraw its admission and respond to the discovery request. Whether the district court’s findings were supported by the evidence. Whether the district court was prejudiced or biased against Appellants or unfairly failed to require Appellees to comply with the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.

Holdings: District courts have broad discretion to manage pretrial discovery matters. Therefore, a district court’s decision on a motion to withdraw or amend admissions under W.R.C.P. 36(b) is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. An abuse of discretion occurs when a court acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it did.

Appellants served their request for admissions on August 19, 2004. The Appellee did not serve written answers to the requests until September 24, 2004, and there is no indication the district court allowed the Appellee additional time to serve its answers. Thus, in Steiger v. Happy Valley Homeowners Association (Steiger I) 2007 WY 5, 149 P.3d 735 (2007) it was held that the Appellee admitted that it was not legally constituted and that any action the Board might have taken to authorize this suit was invalid. Without proper authorization, the Appellee lacked capacity to prosecute the suit. On remand to the district court, the Appellee filed its motion for an order allowing it to withdraw its admissions and serve responses. In its motion, the Appellee cited the provision in W.R.C.P. 36(b) allowing the court to permit withdrawal or amendment of admissions and asserted that its original responses to the eighty-eight requests for admission, which it served within a week after the thirty day time period, were late because of the volume of Appellants’ discovery requests. After considering the parties’ respective arguments, the district court granted the motion, allowing the Appellee to withdraw its admissions and serve responses.

Appellants contend the order allowing the withdrawal is contrary to the authorization in W.R.C.P. 6(b) allowing the district court to enlarge the time prescribed in other rules only when the request is made before expiration of the period prescribed or when the request is made after expiration of the time and excusable neglect is shown for the failure to act within the time prescribed. The difficulty with Appellants’ argument is that it requires a limiting of the language in Rule 36(b) expressly authorizing the district court to permit withdrawal or amendment of admissions “when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved” and “the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice” them. Allowing the Appellee to withdraw its admission and serve its response promoted presentation of the merits of the controversy. Denying the motion would have prevented presentation of the case. Allowing the withdrawal simply placed the burden back where it belonged on the Appellee to prove it was authorized to bring the enforcement action.

Appellants maintain that they relied on the admission for two and a half years and the amount of time a party relies on an admission is a key factor in showing prejudice. The amount of time a party relies on an admission may be an important factor in determining prejudice. Under the facts of this case, however, the reliance factor does not outweigh the preference for deciding a controversy on its merits. Much of the time that passed between the deemed admission and the Appellee’s request to withdraw it resulted from Appellants’ appeal to this Court from the district court’s summary judgment order, time that is not attributable to any action or inaction on the Appellee’s part. The record does not indicate any reliance left Appellants unprepared for trial. To the contrary, the record suggests Appellants were well prepared for trial and had spent untold hours preparing to defend against the Appellee’s claim. The district court could reasonably have concluded as it did that allowing withdrawal of the admission would further resolution of the controversy on the merits and not prejudice Appellants. There was no abuse of discretion in the order granting the motion.

The first finding Appellants assert is not supported by the evidence is the finding that the Appellee’s action was duly authorized by its members. However, from the evidence, the court was not left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a mistake in finding that legal action against Appellants was duly authorized by the Appellee members. Three past or current board members testified that they believed a quorum was present, and the testimony of one of those witnesses went unchallenged. Although Appellants were able to raise a doubt on cross-examination about whether ten percent of the lot owners were present, it cannot be said that doubt was sufficient to overcome the other testimony. In light of the other testimony and the fact that the district court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility, the district court’s finding was not clearly erroneous.

Appellants also contend the district court’s finding that the Appellee did not abandon the covenants by failing to uniformly enforce them was clearly erroneous. Appellants assert that they provided evidence of numerous violations by other lot owners that the Appellee allowed to go uncorrected, thereby proving the covenants were abandoned. A protective covenant is abandoned by failure to enforce it when it is violated, the violations are ignored or acquiesced to, and the violations are “so great, or so fundamental or radical as to neutralize the benefits of the restriction to the point of defeating the purpose of the covenant. In other words, the violations must be so substantial as to support a finding that the usefulness of the covenant has been destroyed, The evidence presented in this case does not support Appellants’ contention that the other violations were so substantial that the Appellee effectively had abandoned the covenants.

Appellants further contend the district court displayed bias and prejudice against them, decided every issue in favor of the Appellee and required them to comply with the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure while not requiring the Appellee to do so. Prejudice is prejudgment or the forming of an opinion without sufficient knowledge or examination; bias is a leaning of the mind or an inclination toward one person over another. Mere allegations will not suffice to show bias or prejudice; the party alleging a claim of bias or prejudice must present specific facts showing prejudgment or a leaning of the mind to the extent that the district court’s decision was based on grounds other than the evidence before it. The fair meaning of any remark made by the trial judge must be interpreted in light of the context in which it was made. A review of the entire record designated in this case, and the comments of the district court in the context in which they were made, indicate that Appellants have not shown the district court was biased or prejudiced. That is, they have not shown the district court formed an opinion about the claims without sufficient knowledge or information, or had leanings in favor of the Appellee and against them. They have not shown the district court’s findings were based on grounds other than the evidence before it. While it is clear from the record that the district court was frustrated at times with both parties, it is equally clear that the court went out of its way to allow the parties, and particularly Appellants, to present their evidence and defend fully against the claim that they violated the covenant.

Affirmed.

J. Kite delivered the opinion for the court.

J. Voigt filed a specially concurring opinion. I concur in the result reached by the majority, but I write separately because, although I agree with the majority’s treatment of the district court’s granting of the Appellee’s motion to withdraw the admission, I have a concern with something not even mentioned in the opinion. The appellants clearly violated that rule and W.R.A.P. 3.05(b) when, in filing their Designation of Records for Transmittal on Appeal, they included no portion of the trial transcript. That bears repeating more simply: there is no transcript of the trial evidence in the record. Without a trial transcript, there is nothing before us from which we can ascertain that a factual finding of the district court is or is not clearly erroneous. I would summarily affirm for that reason.

J. Hill dissented with whom J. Golden, joined. I dissent because I am convinced the majority fails to rely on the “best evidence” available to the Court, in resolving the only thorny issue in this case. From the outset, Appellants contended that the Appellee did not have the legal authority to pursue this action. As is often the case with such Appellees, it is sometimes difficult to get out “the base” when it comes time to vote. However, the Appellee only needed 10% of the lot owners in order to constitute a quorum. There were 95 lots, so rounding off (and upward) it took 10 lot owners to constitute a quorum. The best evidence of attendance was the minutes of the critical meeting and those minutes reflected that 13 “persons” were present. Appellee testified that most were couples who represented only a single lot. The president agreed that that would not amount to 10 lots, which is the absolute minimum needed to conduct such serious business. Despite “memory” testimony somewhat to the contrary, I believe Appellants were entitled to rely on the official records of the Appellee since such records existed, rather than on the vagaries of memory. I would reverse and remand this case to the district court with instructions that the complaint be dismissed.

Friday, December 03, 2010

Summary 2010 WY 157

Summary of Decision December 3, 2010

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Anderson v. State, ex rel., Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division

Citation: 2010 WY 157

Docket Number: S-10-0086

URL: http://tinyurl.com/2dcfves

Appeal from the District Court of Sweetwater County, The Honorable Nena R. James, Judge

Representing Appellant (Petitioner): Michael D. Newman, Hampton & Newman, LC, Rock Springs, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Respondent): Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kristen J. Hanna, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: December 3, 2010

Facts: Appellant challenged an order from the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) denying his claim for additional Workers’ Compensation Permanent Partial Impairment (PPI) benefits. The OAH rated his PPI using the 6th edition of the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, which was the most recent edition available in 2008 when Appellant reached maximum medical improvement. Appellant contended that his PPI should have been rated using the 5th edition of the AMA Guides, which was the most recent edition available in 2003 when he incurred his original injury.

Issues: Whether the Office of Administrative Hearings’ decision holding Appellant’s impairment should be calculated according to the 6th edition of the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law? Whether the Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division’s interpretation and application of W.S. § 27-14-405(g) result in an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority that is contrary to Article 10 Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution?

Holdings: The legislature clearly intended that the PPI be rated using the most recent edition at the time of the ascertainable loss. The 6th edition of the AMA Guides was the most recent edition when Appellant reached maximum medical improvement following his second surgery. The OAH’s determination that Appellant’s PPI was properly rated according to the 6th edition was in accordance with the law. Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the opinion for the court.

Thursday, December 02, 2010

Summary 2010 WY 156

Summary of Decision

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Camilleri v. State, ex rel., Wyoming Worker’s Safety and Compensation Division.

Citation: 2010 WY 156

Docket Number: S-09-0242

URL: http://tinyurl.com/364abop

Appeal from the District Court of Washakie County, The Honorable Robert E. Skar, Judge

Representing Appellant (Petitioner): Donna D. Domonkos, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Respondent): Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kristen J. Hanna, Senior Assistant Attorney General

Date of Decision: December 2, 2010

Facts: Appellant was employed as a licensed practical nurse, and her co-employee was the cook there. In a nutshell, Appellant claimed that her co-employee ran into her, perhaps deliberately, left-shoulder to left-shoulder, in a narrow hallway at their workplace.

Although Appellant had some predisposing bodily infirmities, she asserted the shoulder blow delivered by her co-employee was forceful enough to cause the immediate onset of pain to her left shoulder and her neck. At the hearing, Appellant’s claims were that she was entitled to temporary total disability payments during the time she was unable to work because of the continued problems she had with her left shoulder. Throughout the early months of her treatment, Appellant’s medical care providers were unable to ascertain the cause of the pain in her shoulder and most of them perceived that Appellant displayed a sense of pain that was not consistent with her claimed injury.

Appellant received benefits from the date of injury until the Division informed Appellant that it would not approve further payment of benefits. Appellant, through her appointed attorney, indicated that the matter should be assigned to the Medical Commission.

The Commission determined that Appellant was not entitled to further benefits, that she was at an ascertainable loss, that her attorney was relieved from any obligation to further represent her, and that the matter was remanded to the Workers’ Compensation Division (Division) to carry out the mandates of the Commission’s decision.

Issues: Whether the Hearing Panel’s decision denying ongoing medical treatment to Appellant and determination that she was at ascertainable loss or maximum medical improvement was supported by substantial evidence. Whether the Hearing Panel’s decision denying ongoing medical treatment to Appellant and determination that she was at ascertainable loss or maximum medical improvement was arbitrary and capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with Wyoming law.

Holdings:

Appellant’s challenge to the Commission’s decision was that its decision was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence in the record. Of great importance to that argument, was her contention that the Commission credited the testimony of all witnesses for the Division, but found that Appellant’s witnesses were pretty much across the board not credible.

The Court concluded that some of the Commission’s credibility determinations were not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, the Court found that the testimony of Appellant’s supervisor and treating physician were credible. However, after careful review, the Court held that the record contained substantial evidence to support the Commission’s decision to reject much of the testimony/evidence offered by Appellant herself, and that the decision was not contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence in the record as a whole. Thus, while the Court was greatly concerned that the Commission’s analysis of the testimonial and documentary evidence was seriously flawed, the Court concluded that the Commission’s decision should be affirmed.

J. HILL delivered the opinion of the Court

The concurrence disagreed with the majority regarding the function of the Court to reweigh the Commission’s credibility determinations. It was noted that this was a medically contested case heard by a panel of the Medical Commission. The panel members in this case included three physicians, two of whom were board certified. The Medical Commission is not obligated to accept the findings of a medical expert if, in their expertise, the Commission determines that the factual basis for the medical opinion is not credible or reliable. The findings of the Commission in this case demonstrate that it did not ignore the treating physician’s testimony. It fully considered his testimony, but found his opinion was not credible. The Commission’s findings were not clearly erroneous and were supported by substantial evidence.

J. BURKE, filed a special concurrence, with whom J. VOIGT joined.

Wednesday, December 01, 2010

Summary 2010 WY 155

Summary of Decision December 1, 2010

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Boykin v. Parkhurst

Citation: 2010 WY 155

Docket Number: S-09-0251, S-09-0252

URL: http://tinyurl.com/3a2rnsm

Appeal from the District Court of County, Honorable , Judge

Representing Appellant (Petitioner): Jason M. Tangeman and Julie M. Wickett of Nicholas & Tangeman, Laramie, Wyoming

Representing Appellee (Respondent): William L. Hiser of Brown & Hiser, , Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing Guardian ad Litem: M. Gregory Weisz of Pence and Macmillan, Laramie, Wyoming.


Date of Decision: December 1, 2010

Facts: In documents signed by Nina H. Parkhurst, she designated one of her sons (Appellee) as her attorney in fact, for purposes of managing her estate and day-to-day business matters. At that same time she also executed an Advanced Health Care Directive designating him as the individual to make health care decisions for her if she became incapacitated. Appellant, is also a son of Parkhurst. He petitioned the district court seeking the appointment of a guardian and conservator for her person and estate, alleging that she was not being properly cared for and that her estate was vulnerable because of the broad scope of the Durable Power of Attorney Appellee held. The district court appointed a Guardian ad Litem (GAL) for the limited purpose of making an inquiry into the allegations and to then file a report with the district court.

In Case No. S-09-0251, Appellee contends that the summary judgment the district court ultimately granted in favor of Appellant was erroneous because the district court’s decision to appoint a GAL decided the issue of whether a GAL was a “necessity,” and that decision was binding on the district court pursuant to the law of the case doctrine. Appellee also contends that there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to the “necessity” for a guardian/conservator and, therefore, the district court erred in awarding summary judgment in Appellant’s favor.

In Case No. S-09-0252, the GAL, who was appointed by the district court to investigate the necessity for a guardian/conservator, filed a separate appeal. In that appeal, he contended that the district court erred in finding no necessity requiring appointment of a guardian/conservator because his inquiry concluded that more accountability was necessary in order to monitor the well being of Parkhurst’s person, as well as her estate. Appellant, acting for Parkhurst, contends that the appeal must be dismissed because the GAL does not have standing to appeal the district court’s summary judgment order.

Issues: Whether the district court’s decision letter was binding upon the court pursuant to the law of the case doctrine and the court erred by granting summary judgment contrary to its earlier ruling. Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment in this matter as ample evidence existed in the record that a guardian and conservator for Nina Parkhurst is necessary thus creating a genuine issue of material fact.


Holdings: The appeal in Case No. S-09-0252 is dismissed on the basis that the GAL lacks standing to appeal in these circumstances. In this case, the GAL is not affiliated with any party to this appeal. He was appointed by the district court to produce a report designed to aid the district court in resolving the dispute between the brothers. The GAL functioned more as a witness than anything else. However, he has no interest in the outcome of this case and the mere fact that he prepared a report does not vest him with the status of a party.

Under the law of the case doctrine, a court's decision on an issue of law at one stage of a proceeding is binding in successive stages of the litigation. Ordinarily, the law of the case doctrine requires a trial court to adhere to its own prior rulings, the rulings of an appellate court, or another judge's rulings in the case or a closely related case. The law of the case doctrine is a discretionary rule which does not constitute a limitation on the court's power but merely "expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided.The law of the case doctrine is subject to some exceptions. One of those exceptions applies when the evidence in a subsequent trial is substantially different from that presented in the earlier proceeding. Additionally, the law of the case doctrine applies only to issues actually decided, not to issues left open. Here, it is quite unmistakable that the district court did not decide the issue of whether or not a guardian/conservator was a “necessity,” it only decided that in the interests of caution that further independent inquiry was warranted before a decision about “necessity” was finally made. The GAL’s report exposed most of the content of Appellee’s complaint to be incorrect and/or exaggerated. The district court had not decided the issue of “necessity,” it only decided that inquiry into very serious allegations of personal abuse of Mrs. Parkhurst and waste of her estate was a prudent first step. Because of these circumstances, the law of the case doctrine had no application.

The Wyoming statutes governing a durable power of attorney contemplate that a conservator may be appointed even if such an instrument is in existence. However, in the present circumstances that provision would only apply in the event of Parkhurst’s death, or other substantive facts constituting a “necessity,” as her durable power of attorney was not affected in any way by her disability or incapacity.With respect to the Advanced Health Care Directive (power of attorney), a health care decision of an agent takes precedence over that of a guardian. The determination of “necessity” in this particular case must be analyzed in light of the decisions Parkhurst made while she was not incapacitated. It is not disputed that Parkhurst now lacks the capacity to manage her own personal and financial affairs. However, during a time when her capacity to make decisions about her post-incapacity affairs was not at all in question, she made arrangements to appoint an attorney in fact for just such a contingency as that which has now arisen. She executed a Durable Power of Attorney that, in the case of her estate, appointed Appellee as her attorney in fact immediately, and in the case of her personal and health care decisions came into effect upon her incapacity to make such decisions herself.

The GAL observed that Parkhurst was living quite comfortably, was well cared for and that her estate was well managed. The issue of “necessity” found its genesis in Appellant’s allegations that Appellee was isolating Parkhurst from her friends and family, as well as pastoral attention, and that Parkhurst’s care was largely entrusted to the 16-year-old daughter of Appellee’s woman friend. He claimed a guardian was needed to ensure that those matters were monitored by a guardian and/or conservator, and that if that guardian/conservator was not him, it should be some other qualified person. Appellant also asserted that Appellee was not managing Parkhurst’s ranch in a manner that maximized income to Parkhurst. Furthermore, Appellant contended that the Durable Power of Attorney permitted Appellee to make gifts of Parkhurst’s estate, including to himself. Appellant suggested that such a power was subject to abuse, and a conservator was needed to monitor that power, as well as that Appellee was depleting Parkhurst’s resources for his own personal benefit and enrichment. Despite not uncovering any facts and circumstances that demonstrated that Appellee was not performing his responsibilities as Parkhurst’s attorney in fact, the GAL determined that a guardian/conservator was necessary so as to hold the attorney in fact accountable. The applicable Wyoming statutes impose no such requirement. The GAL also recommended that Appellee be appointed the guardian/conservator. This mechanism would require Appellee to report Parkhurst’s condition and the condition of her estate, at such intervals as the district court might require. The GAL also recommended that a healthcare professional review and evaluate Parkhurst’s current living arrangements and that a comprehensive visitation program be put in place so that Parkhurst could see a broad array of family and friends. Finally, he recommended that visitors be educated and informed about interacting with a person suffering from dementia and that the visitation program be regulated in a manner that worked toward Parkhurst’s best interests. The GAL suggested this visitation program should include Appellant and his immediate family.

The GAL reported that Parkhurst was generally in good condition, although it was also uncontested that she suffered from moderate/middle-stage dementia. The GAL concluded that Appellant exaggerated the severity of Parkhurst’s dementia, although it is to be expected that her condition will worsen in the future. As to her care, the GAL noted that Parkhurst is attended by a female adult during the day, especially on week days. Appellee visits with his mother most mornings and/or evenings and spends a significant portion of the day with her on weekends. The adult female mentioned above is assisted by her 16-year-old daughter in the morning and the evening, and the daughter is there during each night. In sum, Parkhurst has around-the-clock companionship, which the GAL considered vital. If someone is needed to stay with Parkhurst, Appellee makes appropriate arrangements. The GAL assessed Parkhurst’s living arrangements as satisfactory, but that that may change as Parkhurst’s condition progresses. The GAL noted Appellee was well aware of this possibility. The GAL recommended that a healthcare professional be brought in to further assess Parkhurst’s living circumstances. With respect to Parkhurst’s finances, the GAL noted that Appellee was well-informed about her financial picture and that he was managing that aspect of Parkhurst’s affairs well. The GAL’s only concern was that the Durable Power of Attorney permitted Appellee to make gifts to himself and, while Appellee had not done so, he could in the future.

In a decision letter filed of record, the district court credited the factual material contained in the GAL’s report, but did not credit the GAL’s conclusions and recommendations. The district court noted that the issue was the “necessity” of a guardian/conservator, as that term is used in the governing statutes. The district court found that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to the question of “necessity.” The district court concluded that Parkhurst had made arrangements for who should care for her in the event she was unable to do so. The district court then concluded that it was “not at liberty to add an accountability element to Wyoming’s durable power of attorney statutes. And, absent some showing of present necessity, it would respect Parkhurst’s wishes.”

The persuasive authorities convinces the Court that, absent some clear reason for the Court to interfere, the district court’s decision should be affirmed. Appellant has failed to come forward with anything more than speculation, conjecture, suggestions of possibilities, guesses, and perhaps even some probabilities. However, there is no convincing evidence in the record requiring that the district court’s order should be reversed. There are no genuine issues of material fact that need to be tested in the rigors of a trial. The order of the district court is affirmed.


J. Hill delivered the opinion for the court.

Tuesday, November 30, 2010

Summary of Decision November 30, 2010

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Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: King v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Fremont

Citation: 2010 WY 154

Docket Number: S-09-0227, S-09-0228

URL: http://tinyurl.com/2ue3tkh

Appeal from the District Court of Fremont County, Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiffs and Intervening Plaintiff): Jason A. Neville and Keith J. Dodson, Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, Casper, WY for Edward & Janice King; and Steven F. Freudenthal of Freudenthal, Salzburg & Bonds, Cheyenne, WY for Hanson’s North Fork Ranch.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Jodi A. Darrough, Deputy Fremont County Attorney, Lander, WY.

Date of Decision: November 30, 2010

Facts: These appeals arise from the district court’s determination of the status of a county road which fell under the jurisdiction of the Appellee. The Appellants alleged that the records concerning the existence of that road were not properly recorded or stored by Fremont County and, hence, the road had never been created as contemplated by the governing statutes. In addition, Appellants contended the road had been vacated or abandoned. As a matter of undisputed fact and law, the district court held the road had been created and further, that as a matter of law it still existed because it had not forthrightly and officially been vacated or abandoned.


Issues: Whether Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal after the entry of the partial summary judgment order. Whether the district court’s entry of summary judgment based upon its finding that the road was properly established was in error. Whether the district court erred when it dismissed the case in reliance on State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Meeker, 294 P.2d 603 (Wyo. 1956). Whether Appellants were bona fide subsequent purchasers, and thus purchased their land without the road clouding their title. Whether Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal after the entry of that order.

Holdings: W.R.C.P. 54(b) allows a district court to certify orders that adjudicate fewer than all claims upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon the express direction for the entry of judgment. No such determination was sought or granted in this case. However, Appellants were not required to appeal the partial summary judgment until the remaining issues were decided.

The statutes in effect when the road was created are found in Wyoming Compiled Statutes 1910, §§ 2513-2531. Section 2523 requires that a survey and record of the road “be filed in the office of the county clerk.” The Appellants contend that this step was not perfected, although the documentation required to be assembled by the governing statutes was in the possession of Fremont County at the time this action arose, as well as at all times in the interim between 1913 and the present day. However, it is not disputed that the grantor/grantee index did not provide those examining property titles any information about the road. Further, unless a title examiner inquired of a county clerk employee about the existence and actual location of the records pertaining to county roads, then whether or not a particular parcel of land was burdened by a county road would not be evident. It is this flaw that is the mainstay of the Appellants’ contentions herein and on that basis, it is contended that the road should be declared not to have ever come into existence.

It is not the physical location of these records that create the ultimate issue in this case but whether or not they were made of record for purposes of providing constructive notice. The district court relied in significant part on the case of Lakewood v. Mavromatis, 817 P.2d 90 (Colo. 1991) in deciding to grant a partial summary judgment in favor of the Commission with respect to the validity, ab initio, of the road. Although that case differs from the present case on the facts because a road was never built on the tract of land in question, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that placing the road petition and incorporated plat in the road book in the office of the county clerk was adequate to dedicate the tract as a public highway, but it did not provide constructive notice to bona fide subsequent purchasers of the governmental entity’s interest in the disputed parcel of land. Based on that case, the district court concluded that the remaining issues would be required to be tried; to wit: (1) whether or not Appellants had actual notice of the road and (2) whether or not they are bona fide subsequent purchasers of the property they now own that may be subject to the Commission’s interest in the road. The district court concluded that the Wyoming Legislature also intended to require the recording of the road petition in compliance with the Wyoming Recording Act. However, failure to do so did not void the established road, especially with regard to the parties in the initial road proceedings because they had actual notice of the road. The district court indicated that this case was complicated because it was unclear if the road was ever established on the ground. Moreover, while there was evidence that at least a faint “track” of the road could be found on the ground for most of its distance, it had been fenced over in places, it had been washed out in places, it was blocked by vegetation in places, a wellhead was in its course, and a building had been placed along its course so that it disappeared into, and then re-emerged on the other end of, the building.
However, based on the totality of the circumstances, the district court will be affirmed in its decision that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the road had been created in the first instance.

The Appellee Commission subsequently filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that once a county road has been created, it can only be extinguished through formal vacation proceedings. Prior to a trial, the district court reconsidered its previous ruling in light of the case State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Meeker, 294 P.2d 603 (Wyo. 1956). The failure to record an instrument which is not required to be recorded does not affect or vitiate the instrument as to anyone, and it is valid not only between the parties thereto, but also to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers. Until 1953 Wyoming had no statute which required the transfer of title by eminent domain to be recorded in the ordinary and regular books of record kept for the transfer of property by conveyances. Based on that case, the wording of the statutes in place in 1913, the fact that the road had never been “formally vacated,” and the circumstance that the County Road Book gave constructive notice of the road had inquiry been made of the county clerk, the district court held that the motion to dismiss should be granted.

The heart of the controversy in this case lies in the tension between Wyoming’s long-standing “unrecorded conveyance” statute and those statutes that deal with the creation of county roads. The records of the road in question were maintained in the manner mandated by these statutes. Eventually, the “recorded” documents with respect to county roads were moved to the county planning office and later to the county roads/transportation department. However, at all times the records were available to the public had inquiry been made about them to the county clerk or to other county departments. Moreover, county roads, cannot be vacated except by official action of the county commissioners of a county. Appellants participated in an effort to vacate the road, but that was unsuccessful. Wyo. Stat. 24-3-201 et seq. authorize a county to remedy a problem such as the one that has arisen in the present action. However, these statutes do not mandate action on the part of counties and are not determinative of the issues raised herein. The existing statutes, as well as the cases interpreting them over the years, track closely with common law principles that have long played a key role in issues such as this. Two of the most important of those are: “Once a road, always a road;” and, where a road is created by a statutory procedure such as that in play here, such a road cannot be abandoned, vacated, or disestablished without there being clear action on the part of the governmental entity that created the road to vacate, abandon, or disestablish it. For these reasons, the district court was correct that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the road had been created. In addition, the road has not been vacated, abandoned, or disestablished by Fremont County and, therefore, it is still a county road as a matter of law.

The district court’s partial summary judgment order is affirmed. The district court’s order dismissing the further claims of Appellants is also affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the opinion for the court.

J. Burke files an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which J. Voigt joins. I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority’s decision affirming the dismissal of the Appellants’ claims in reliance on State Highway Comm’n v. Meeker, 75 Wyo. 210, 294 P.2d 603 (Wyo. 1956). Mr. Meeker challenged the county’s ownership of a highway right-of-way across his property on the basis that there was “no instrument of record in the office of the county clerk showing the highway.” The right-of-way had been acquired through eminent domain, however, and the Court found “no statute which required the transfer of title by eminent domain to be recorded” in the public record. The Court said that “failure to record an instrument which is not required to be recorded does not affect or vitiate the instrument as to anyone, and it is valid not only between the parties thereto, but also to subsequent purchasers.” “Hence,” the Court wrote, “it is quite clear that the title the State acquired under the condemnation proceedings in 1950 is valid and good against any subsequent purchaser of the same property.” However, Meeker detours from a long line of Wyoming cases emphasizing that county road easements must be placed on the public record. These cases establish that the Wyoming Legislature and the Court have consistently, with the exception of Meeker, said that county roads must be placed on the public record.

This policy extends not to county roads only, but to all real property conveyances. “Public policy requires that subsequent purchasers be able to rely on the title shown in public records.” Applying Meeker to the case at hand, however, means that the Appellants cannot rely on their title as shown in the Fremont County Clerk’s property records. That seriously undermines “the purpose of our recording statutes, which entitle one to rely on public records and determine whether or not a certain property is subject to liens, prior encumbrances or other outstanding claims.

The Court in Meeker indicated that the proceedings of the Board of County Commissioners gave Mr. Meeker constructive notice of the Commissioners’ decision to acquire the highway right-of-way. As stated in a droll but persuasive argument offered by Appellants in the present action, if the ruling in Meeker is controlling in this case, then every conveyance of land would have to be accompanied by a review of all proceedings of the county commissioners back to 1890.

Because of its anomalous nature and impracticable result, the decision in Meeker should be limited to its peculiar facts. By the time of trial in the Meeker case, “construction of the highway was commenced and substantially completed. That is not true of the road in the present action. In addition, Mr. Meeker “was in possession of the land in question as lessee during all of the time the eminent domain proceedings were taking place and must have had notice thereof.” Appellants were not in possession of the land in question in 1913 when the County Commissioners undertook to establish the road.

More significantly, Meeker is distinguishable on legal grounds. That decision rested on the Court’s finding “no statute which required the transfer of title by eminent domain to be recorded” in the public record. In the current case, there is at least one statute requiring the road easement to be recorded. In 1919, the Wyoming Legislature enacted a statute requiring Boards of County Commissioners, within their respective counties determine what if any such roads now or heretofore travelled but not heretofore officially established and recorded, are necessary or important for the public use as permanent roads, and to cause such roads to be recorded, or if need be laid out, established and recorded, and all roads recorded as aforesaid, shall be highways. No other roads shall be highways unless and until lawfully established as such by official authority. The County Commissioners of Fremont County undertook to establish the road in question, but failed to record it. This statute imposed upon them the duty of rectifying that failure. Notably, this statute makes no distinction between roads acquired by eminent domain and those acquired by other means. Because this statute required the easement in question to be recorded, the ruling in Meeker is not controlling here.

Accordingly, the district court’s decision to dismiss the claims raised by the Appellants should be reversed and remanded to the district court with instructions to proceed to trial on the question of whether the Appellants are bona fide subsequent purchasers for value who took title to their properties without notice of the road easement.

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