Summary 2013 WY 112

Summary of Decision 27, 2013

Justice Hill delivered the opinion for the Court. Affirmed.

Case Name: SUSAN LYNN KUMMERFELD v. JOHN GARY KUMMERFELD

Docket Number: S-13-0028

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County the Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge

Representing Appellant: Mary Elizabeth Galvan of Galvan & Fritzen, Laramie, WY.

Representing Appellee: DaNece Day of Lubnau Law Office, P.C., Gillette, WY.

Date of Decision: September 27, 2013

Facts: In her appeal of the district court’s property allocation, Susan Lynn Kummerfeld (Wife) contends that the court erred when it only gave her 23% of the total assets, with the remainder going to her ex-husband John Gary Kummerfeld (Husband).

Issues: Wife states her single issue as follows: Whether the district court abused its discretion in the manner in which it divided the property between the divorcing parties by allocating 23% of the property to Wife and the remainder to Husband.

Holdings/Conclusion: Decisions regarding the division of marital property are within the trial court’s sound discretion, and we will not disturb them on appeal unless there is a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. Here, the district court properly assessed the facts and considered each of the required factors in making its determination. We hold that there is no abuse of discretion. Affirmed.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summary 2012 WY 127

Summary of Decision September 27, 2012

Justice Voigt delivered the opinion for the Court. Affirmed.

Case Name: DONNA RAY TEEPLES v. NEAL J. TEEPLES

Docket Number: S-12-0007

URL: http://www.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions.aspx

Appeal from the District Court of Sweetwater County, Honorable Nena R. James, Judge.

Representing Appellant: Richard Mathey of Mathey Law Office, Green River, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: Weston W. Reeves and Anna M. Reeves Olson of Park Street Law Office, Casper, Wyoming.

Date of Decision: September 27, 2012

Facts:  Donna Ray Teeples, the appellant, was to receive a cash payment from her
ex-husband, Neal J. Teeples, the appellee, as a result of the division of their marital assets pursuant to a divorce.  The appellant claimed that the payment, made with the funds of an S corporation owned jointly prior to the divorce, impermissibly increased her tax liability and was made with funds that were rightfully owed to her as a prior shareholder in the company. 

Issues:  Did the payment received by the appellant satisfy the terms of the Property Settlement Agreement pursuant to the parties’ divorce?

Holdings:  The appellant received a payment from the appellee pursuant to their Property Settlement Agreement following their divorce.  The appellee paid the appellant with funds from an S corporation he received in the divorce.  The appellant contended that because she had previously been a shareholder in this S corporation, the payment constituted a dividend and impermissibly increased her income tax liability.  The Court disagreed.  The appellant was taxed properly on income earned by the S corporation due to her previous stake in the company.  The distribution did not increase her tax liability.  Affirmed.

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summary 2011 WY 162

Summary of Decision December 19, 2011

[SPECIAL NOTE:  This opinion uses the "Universal Citation."  It was given an "official" citation when it is issued.  You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation.  You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered.  When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number.  The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name:  Rosendahl v. Rosendahl

Citation:  2011 WY 162

Docket Number: S-11-0046

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=464927

Appeal from the District Court of Lincoln County, The Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant):  Michael Stulken, Green River, WY.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff):  Eric F. Phillips, Rock Springs, WY.

Date of Decision:  December 19, 2011

Facts:  The parties married in 2002.  Wife (Appellee) brought children into the marriage from another relationship, and though the children lived with the parties during the marriage, Husband (Appellant) never adopted them.  The marriage did not produce any children.

Wife filed for divorce in 2009.  The court ordered Husband to reimburse Wife $45,000.00 for the mortgage debt, to be paid in monthly installments.  One-half of the orthodontia bill was to be paid by Husband, as were one-half of Wife’s attorney’s fees and costs.

Issues:  Husband raised five issues: 1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in the distribution of the parties’ marital assets and the allocation of the parties’ marital debts; 2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in the award of attorney fees to [Wife]; 3) Whether the trial court’s mandate that Husband is to pay for one-half of an orthodontia bill incurred for the benefit of the Wife’s children of a previous relationship is supported by the record; 4) Whether the trial court appropriately entered a final Judgment and Decree of Divorce; and 5) Whether the trial court erred by deciding [Husband’s] Motion to Amend Judgment and Decree of Divorce or, in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial on Limited Issues without a hearing.

Holdings:  The District Court was affirmed.  The district court did not abuse its discretion when it required Husband to pay $45,000.00 of the mortgage debt because the original refinance of the home was necessitated by Husband’s expenses, in part due to Husband being unemployed at the time of the refinance.  As to the home equity, it was within the district court’s discretion to award the entirety of the equity to Wife, as the home was her premarital asset.  Furthermore, the court’s mandate that Husband pay one-half of the orthodontia bill was entirely within the district court’s discretion.  Regarding attorney’s fees, the Court assumed the award was supported by the evidence.  The Court found that Husband’s W.R.C.P. 58 argument did not apply to the procedure employed by the district court in this instance, and finally, that no hearing was required on Husband’s post-judgment motion.  No sanctions apply.

J. Hill delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2010 WY 78

Summary of Decision issued June 15, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Sanning v. Sanning

Citation: 2010 WY 78

Docket Number: S-09-0202

Appeal from the District Court of Albany County, the Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge.

Representing Lee Sanning: C.M. Aron of Aron & Hennig, LLP, Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing Jamison Sanning: Devon P. O’Connell of Pence and MacMillan LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: The district court awarded a cabin to Jamison (Wife) as part of the property distribution incorporated into the parties’ divorce decree. Lee (Husband) claimed the district court abused its discretion by relying upon sentimental value to award the cabin to Wife and the court’s factual findings regarding the cabin were not supported by the trial evidence.
Wife’s grandparents owned a cabin located on state land adjacent to Priest Lake in Idaho. When grandparents were in their eighties they decided to dispose of the cabin because it had become too expensive and difficult to maintain. The Sannings purchased it for $50,000 using money from Husband’s family. When the Sannings filed for divorce they could not agree on the distribution of the marital property. Husband claimed the district court improperly awarded the cabin based upon sentimental value. He argued that Broyles v. Broyles prohibited consideration of sentimental value in awarding property. Although Broyles states that sentimental value may not typically be used to establish damages for property wrongfully converted, it does not state that sentimental value cannot be considered in awarding property in a divorce case. In Wallop v. Wallop, the Court reviewed a property distribution that included awarding the husband a ranch that had belonged to his family for many years. Similarly, in the instant case, the district court considered the statutory factors when it awarded the cabin to Wife.

Conclusion: The district court specifically stated that it was considering the statutory factors and there was nothing in the record to indicate otherwise. Under these circumstances, the award of the cabin to Wife does not shock the conscience of the Court nor appear to be so unfair and inequitable that reasonable people cannot abide it. The district court properly exercised its discretion when it awarded the cabin to Wife, on the condition that she reimburses Husband for the money gifted by his family to purchase the cabin.

Affirmed.

J. Kite delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2fdww2k .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance using the Universal Citation format, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 140

Summary of Decision Issued November 12, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Zaloudek v. Zaloudek

Citation: 2009 WY 140

Docket Number: S-09-0016

Appeal from the District Court of Unita County, Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): William L. Combs, Combs Law Office, Evanston, Wyoming

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Richard J. Mulligan, Mulligan Law Office, Jackson, Wyoming; Heather Noble, Jackson, Wyoming

Issues: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in its divorce decree ordering an equitable division of the property.

Holdings: While the divorce was pending, Appellee sought permission from the district court to take some of the hay stored at the Evanston property to feed the two horses she was keeping. Appellant objected. After a hearing held by telephone, the district court denied Appellee’s request for permission to take the hay but, instead, ordered Appellant to pay for hay to be purchased from another source. Appellant filed a motion asking the district court to reconsider its ruling, claiming that the payment of money was relief that had not been sought by Appellee, and that the parties had presented no testimony or other evidence during the hearing to support the order. The district court apparently chose to deny Appellant’s motion to reconsider and, instead, issued the written order that had been prepared and submitted by Appellee. On appeal, Appellant claims that the district court’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, unsupported by the evidence, and contrary to law. The record does not support that assertion. In the motion, Appellee sought alternative forms of relief. First, she asked for permission to remove hay from the property. Alternatively, she requested payment for the costs of boarding the horses. The relief granted by the district court falls within this alternative request. Appellant had notice of this claim for relief and there was no error in the district court’s consideration of this issue.

In granting a divorce, the court shall make such disposition of the property of the parties as appears just and equitable, having regard for the respective merits of the parties and the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the party through whom the property was acquired and the burdens imposed upon the property for the benefit of either party and children. The district court has discretion to determine what weight should be given each of these individual factors, and to divide the property as appropriate to the individual circumstances of each case. The justness and fairness of a marital property division cannot be gauged with a simple comparison of the amount of property awarded to each party. Rather, the disposition should be performed with regard to the respective merits of the parties, the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the party through whom the property was acquired, and the burdens imposed upon the property for the benefit of either party.

Although one statutory factor to be considered in dividing property in a divorce is the party through whom the property was acquired, a party is not automatically entitled to all of that property. Under Wyoming law, all marital property is subject to equitable division upon divorce. In the present action, Appellant was not entitled to a larger portion of the couple’s retirement assets just because he had earned more money than Appellee.

Appellant also asserts that some of the retirement assets were acquired before the marriage, and therefore not part of the marital estate. This argument has merit, but the difficulty is that neither party provided any evidence of the value of the retirement assets at that earlier date. The record suggests that the parties were unsuccessful in obtaining this evidence, even though subpoenas were issued to the asset managers. Without evidence of the value of the retirement assets at the earlier date, the district court had no basis for excluding the pre-marital portion from division. The district court’s refusal to speculate was not unreasonable, and was not an abuse of discretion.

The divorce decree in the present action reflects that the district court considered the statutory factors. It found that “most of the assets have been acquired during the marriage and . . . that those assets have appreciated during the marriage.” The court determined that “an equitable distribution merits an equal distribution of the parties’ assets and liabilities.” It further found that “an equal division of the parties’ assets would adequately allow each party to have sufficient income with which to support his or her individual living expenses.” These findings and conclusions are sufficiently supported by the evidence of record, and are not so unfair or inequitable as to constitute an abuse of discretion.

Appellant also asserts that the district court did not follow proper procedure when it entered the divorce decree. He complains that the district court adopted the proposed divorce decree submitted by Appellee, without allowing Appellant an opportunity to approve the order as to form or to assert any objections. Appellant claims that this violated W.R.C.P. 58(a). W.R.C.P. 58(a) is the procedure used when the judge orally announces a decision and asks one of the parties, usually the prevailing party, to draft an order reflecting that decision. In the present action, the district court did not announce a decision at the end of the trial, and did not ask one of the parties to submit an order. Instead, it directed both parties to submit proposed divorce decrees. Both parties did so. In this way, the district court was reminded or made aware of the positions, arguments, and objections of both parties. Thus, there was no violation of W.R.C.P. 58(a).

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the opinion for the court.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/yavp38u .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 116

Summary of Decision issued September 22, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Painovich v. Painovich

Citation: 2009 WY 116

Docket Number: S-09-0031

Appeal from the District Court of Sweetwater County, the Honorable Jere A. Ryckman, Judge.

Representing Appellant Steven Painovich: James M. Peterson and John M. Kuker of Romsa & Kuker, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee Jacqueline Painovich: John A. Zebre of Zebre Law Offices, PC, Rock Springs, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: In 2006, Jacqueline filed for divorce from Steven. Subsequently, Steven answered the complaint and retained counsel. Following a hearing to dispose of the marital property, in which Steven failed to appear, the district court entered judgment in favor of Jacqueline.
The Court has repeatedly stated that it is the appellant’s burden to bring a complete record to the Court for review. When the appellant fails to do so, the Court must accept the district court’s findings as being based upon sufficient evidence. Steven failed to appeal the denial of the motion for relief from judgment as required by the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure. Consequently, the latter claims and arguments were not properly before the Court and could not be considered.

Conclusion: After reviewing the record on appeal, the Court could not find that the district court abused its discretion in denying Steven’s motion to vacate filed pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60. Steven failed to provide a record on appeal adequate for the Court to properly evaluate the district court’s exercise of discretion. In addition, many of the arguments in the appeal were related to the denial of a second motion that was not appealed.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/ns9ssb .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2007 WY 67

Summary of Decision issued April 26, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Moss v. Moss

Citation: 2007 WY 67

Docket Number: 06-23

Appeal from the District Court of Teton County, the Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): Kenneth S. Cohen of Cohen Law Office, PC, Jackson, Wyoming

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Lea Kuvinka of Kuvinka & Kuvinka, PC, Jackson, Wyoming.

Issues: Whether the district court abused its discretion in dividing the marital property by awarding both of the major appreciating assets, the business and the house, to the husband and awarding to the wife an equalizing payment for less than that proposed by the husband and parceled out over a period of eight years rather than in an immediate lump sum as proposed by the husband, dispossessing the wife and the parties’ two children from the marital residence effectively denying her the ability to purchase substitute housing and thereby rendering the property division unfair and inequitable. The district court ordered the husband to pay child support at a rate less than the presumptive child support amount, without providing any justification for that deviation, and the court failed to impute a higher income to the husband based on the testimony of the husband’s valuation expert, who testified that the parties’ business was paying the husband substantially less than the market value for his services which the expert calculated at $75,000 per year.

Facts/Discussion: Wife sought review of the district court’s divorce decree.
Standard of Review: The division of marital property is within the sound discretion of the district court and the Court will not find an abuse of discretion unless the property distribution shocks the conscience or appears so unfair that reasonable people could not abide it. Decisions concerning child support are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard as well.
Property Division: Wife alleged the property division rested on a material factual mistake rendering it inequitable. She stated that by recognizing a debt of $470,000 both against the business and the residence the district court erroneously subtracted twice from the marital assets what was essentially one debt. The Court stated it seemed clear from the record that Husband was awarded marital property on the basis of a mistake of fact resulting in Husband actually receiving assets of greater value than Wife to a degree not intended by the court or the statute. Wife also complained about the lump sum equalization payment. Having reviewed the record, the Court found the district court’s approach to the method by which Husband was required to make the equalizing payment neither shocked the conscience not was it unfair and inequitable.
Child Support: The district court failed to identify the statutory presumptive child support nor did they make basic findings of fact that would allow for the calculation of child support. The order was therefore reversed.

Holding: Wife demonstrated the distribution of marital property was based upon a factual mistake which constituted an abuse of discretion. The child support order was not supported by adequate findings. Consequently, the Court reversed and remanded the divorce decree to the district court for further consideration. The Court emphasized the ultimate distribution is for the district court to resolve within its sound discretion utilizing accurate information concerning the value of the total marital estate.

Reversed and remanded.

J. Kite delivered the decision.

J. Golden, concurring in part and dissenting in part: J. Golden agreed the divorce decree should be reversed and remanded for reconsideration of child support, but not concerning the property distribution. He felt that the finding of the district court would be within its discretion if it were supported by pertinent facts and circumstances. J. Golden felt that under the circumstances, the district court did not act arbitrarily or capriciously.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/23bq8q .