Summary 2010 WY 48

Summary of Decision issued April 22, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Wyo. Dept. of Employment v. Jolley, Castillo, Drennon, LTD.

Citation: 2010 WY 48

Docket Number: S-09-0175

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable David B. Park, Judge.

Representing Appellant Wyo. Dep’t of Employment: Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Matthew J. Fermelia, Senior Assistant Attorney General; William L. Weaver, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Representing Appellee Jolley, Castillo, Drennon, Ltd.: Stephenson D. Emory of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, PC, Casper, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: The Department of Employment, Unemployment Insurance Commission (Commission) appealed the district court’s reversal of the Commission’s decision which found that Jolley, Castillo, Drennon, Ltd., d/b/a Sierra Engineering (Sierra) had payroll for services performed by employees subscribing it to unemployment tax under the Wyoming Employment Security Law (WESL).
The Commission’s decision incorporated many findings of fact made by the hearing officer and set forth dozens of its own, relating to many of the consultants in order to show that they were employees and not independent contractors because they did not meet the three prongs of the independent contractor test set forth in the statutes. The Court did not address all the findings because there were at least eight consultants who were undisputedly paid wages by Sierra for services performed in Wyoming between the years 2004 through 2006. There was no evidence in the record to support finding that they were independent contractors. In litigating the issue, Sierra treated its consultants as a class of workers however the statutes state it is the employer’s burden to prove that each individual consultant meets the elements of the statute.

Conclusion: The Court found the Commission’s decision that Sierra had payroll for services paid in Wyoming during the years 2004 through 2006 was supported by substantial evidence in the record and that Sierra failed to meet its burden of proving that all of its consultants were independent contractors. An audit remains to be performed by the UI Tax Division to determine precisely which consultants were in fact “employees” under the WESL and the amount of unemployment taxes Sierra owes for those “employees.” Having found that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission’s decision, the district court was reversed, the Commission’s decision was affirmed and the case was remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2fd3ohm .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance using the Universal Citation format, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2010 WY 31

Summary of Decision issued March 22, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Singer v. New Tech Engineering L.P.

Citation: 2010 WY 31

Docket Number: S-09-0024

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable David B. Park, Judge.

Representing Appellant Singer: Mark L. Carman of Carman Law Office, PC, Billings, Montana; and Cody L. Balzer of Balzer Law Firm, PC, Loveland, Colorado.

Representing Appellee New Tech Engineering: Roger E. Shumate and James C. Worthen of Murane & Bostwick, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: After suffering debilitating injuries while working on a drilling rig owned by Caza Drilling (Caza) in northeastern Wyoming, Leonard Singer brought a negligence case against New Tech Engineering (New Tech), the company who hired safety coaches to provide “safety services” on the rig.

Employee/agent or independent contractor: The Court has stated that in regard to determining whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor, the overriding consideration is the employer’s right to control the means and manner of the work. Harrington (the safety coach) was provided no benefits from New Tech, no contract existed between the two, no deductions for federal income taxes were made and the ultimate control came from Caza. Caza controlled Harrington’s schedule, provided a truck, on-site living provisions and an occasional computer. In addition, Caza had ultimate control over the hiring and firing of safety consultants. The Court considered who had the right of control over the means and manner of the work as differentiated from control over the end product of the work to be performed. Typically, when a worker is an independent contractor, the employer is interested only in the results of the work and does not direct the details of how the work is performed. The record supported the contention that Caza and not New Tech had control over the means and manner of the work. Caza had the ultimate decision over who it selected as its safety consultants.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 429: Singer next argued that because Caza relied on New Tech to supply “safety services,” New Tech was liable to Singer. The Court noted that it discussed this Restatement section only once before and in a medical malpractice action. Research showed that § 429 is typically applied in the medical context but sometimes is applicable in other circumstances. The Court concluded that Caza relied on the coaches for safety services and only relied on New Tech to provide the names of safety coaches.
Oral contract: Singer contended that New Tech assumed affirmative safety duties when it agreed to provide safety services. The deposition testimony that Singer relied upon was testimony as to the safety coach’s duties and not New Tech’s duties. Caza retained control of its own safety program evidenced by its use of New Tech to place a safety coach. Caza never contracted orally or otherwise with New Tech to provide safety services.
Non-delegable duty: The Court agreed with the district court that the safety program was specifically a Caza program. New Tech provided no instruction, guidance, or supervision regarding safety issues on the rig. New Tech was a placement service.

Conclusion: The Court found no question of material fact regarding whether the safety coach was an employee or independent contractor – the record showed that he was an independent contractor. Also, there was no indication that Restatement § 429 imposed any liability whatsoever on New Tech. New Tech did not assume any affirmative duties regarding safety, nor is New Tech responsible for Singer’s injuries due to any “non-delegable” duty – no such duty on the part of New Tech existed.

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/yjlalnc .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2007 WY 30

Summary of Decision issued February 21, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance with a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Cornelius v. Powder River Energy Corp., Inc.

Citation: 2007 WY 30

Docket Number: 06-186

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, the Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): C. John Cotton of Cotton Law Offices, Gillette, Wyoming; and Kenneth E. Barker of Barker Reynolds Law Firm, LLC, Belle Fourche, South Dakota. Argument by Messrs. Cotton and Barker.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Bruce A. Salzburg of Freudenthal, Salzburg & Bonds, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Issues: Whether the district court erred in failing to determine whether the contract between Baldwin and PRECorp was written or oral. Whether the district court erred in applying the wrong standard to determine whether Baldwin was an independent contractor. Whether genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Baldwin was an independent contractor. Whether genuine issues of material fact exist as to PRECorp’s liability for its own negligence.

Facts/Discussion: Cornelius sued his employer (Baldwin) and the company for which Baldwin did contract work (PRECorp) for injuries suffered when he contacted a live electrical line. The district court granted summary judgment to PRECorp on two grounds: first, as the employer of an independent contractor, PRECorp was not vicariously liable for injuries to that contractor’s employer; and second, PRECorp was not independently liable.
Standard of Review: Summary judgments are governed by W.R.C.P. 56. The Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo without giving any deference to the district court’s determinations.
Whether the Contract was Written or Oral: The Court’s review of the district court decision letter found the parties had entered into written contracts annually with an attached then-current fee schedule. The district court’s facts and conclusions were based upon that contract and the Court found no error in that regard.
Whether Baldwin was an Independent Contractor: The answer to this question was dependent upon the answer to the first question because the district court looked at cases where there was an express written contract between the parties, rather than to cases where there was not. The Court reviewed the district court decision letter and noted their reliance on Franks v. Independent Production Company, Diamond B. Servs. v. Rohde, Hille v. Pacific Power & Light Co., Jones v. Chevron and Hjelle v. Mid-State Consultants, Inc. When that law was applied to the facts of the instant case, it was clear Baldwin was an independent contractor and that summary judgment in favor of PRECorp was appropriate. PRECorp did not retain anything approaching a “controlling or pervasive role” in the work. Their role was to specify where the work was to be done and to pay for the work that was done. The flaw with Cornelius’ argument was that it directly contravenes the basic premise that an employer of an independent contractor is not liable for injuries suffered by that independent contractor’s employee.
Whether Baldwin was an Independent Contractor: The Court reviewed the entire record, and in particular the depositions in the file. The Court was convinced that there was not a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Baldwin was an independent contractor.
PRECorp’s Liability for its own Negligence: PRECorp had no affirmative duty toward Cornelius that it breached. There was no allegation that PRECorp’s premises were unsafe. PRECorp did not control the method and manner of work performed by Baldwin, and PRECorp did not voluntarily assume any safety duties. Cornelius’s injuries were caused by his own lack of care, and/or by Baldwin’s failure to provide safe equipment.

Holding: There were no genuine issues of material fact to contradict the conclusion that PRECorp was not vicariously liable for the acts of its independent contractor, Baldwin, and that PRECorp violated no separate legal duty owed by it to Cornelius.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/yqdr5x .