Summary 2011 WY 143

Summary of Decision October 14, 2011


[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Craft v. State

Citation: 2011 WY 142

Docket Number: S-11-0039

URL: http://www.blogger.com/goog_1422358376

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Gregory A. Phillips, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jeremiah I. Williamson, Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: October 14, 2011

Facts: Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to felony possession of a controlled substance in violation of Wyo. Stat. 35-7-1031(c)(i)(A). He reserved the right to appeal whether he entered a valid waiver of counsel in a prior conviction that was used to enhance the present charge to a felony. Appellant contends his waiver was not “knowing and intelligent” because he did not act with a “full awareness” of his right to counsel and did not “understand the consequences” of his waiver. Appellant additionally contends that advisements concerning possible defenses to the crime and mitigating circumstances are necessary in order to effect a knowing and intelligent waiver. He also suggests that the Saratoga municipal court was required to advise him of the potential consequence that his conviction could be used to enhance future charges against him.

Issues: Whether Appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel when he pled guilty in a municipal court proceeding so as to allow that conviction to be used to enhance a later charge to a felony pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 35-7-1031(c)(i) (2009).

Holdings: In deciding whether a defendant has entered a valid waiver of counsel, it must first be determined whether the defendant’s waiver was voluntary. If the waiver was voluntary, then it must be determined whether the defendant waived the right knowingly and intelligently

In the present action Appellant concedes that his waiver of counsel was “voluntary.” He argues, however, that his waiver was not “knowing and intelligent” because he did not act with a “full awareness” of his right to counsel and did not “understand the consequences” of his waiver. Appellant contends that advisements concerning possible defenses to the crime and mitigating circumstances are necessary in order to effect a knowing and intelligent waiver. He also suggests that the municipal court was required to advise him of the potential consequence that his conviction could be used to enhance future charges against him.

Appellant has presented no Wyoming precedent, requiring that a defendant be advised of possible defenses, mitigating circumstances, or the possibility that a conviction can be used for future sentence enhancement prior to entering a valid waiver of counsel. Rather, Wyoming authority indicates that such advisements are not required. W.R.Cr.P. 11(b) sets forth the advisements that must be given to an unrepresented defendant before acceptance of a guilty plea. W.R.Cr.P. 11 does not mention possible defenses or mitigating circumstances. Further, a defendant does not need to be advised of the possibility of future sentence enhancement prior to the entry of a valid guilty plea. A trial court’s duty to insure that a defendant understands the consequences of a guilty plea before he enters one extends only to direct consequences of such a plea.

In addition, the United States Supreme Court, in Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004) has stated that constitutional requirement is satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea.” In light of this Supreme Court precedent, and the relevant Wyoming authority, the court was persuaded by Appellant’s argument that his waiver of counsel was invalid because he was not advised of possible defenses, mitigating circumstances, or the possibility that his conviction could be used for future sentence enhancement. A defendant does not need to be given such advisements in order to effect a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel.

Appellant also claims that his waiver of counsel was inadequate. However, Appellant was advised of his right to counsel, was specifically asked whether he wished to proceed with an attorney, twice stated that he did not wish to be represented by counsel, and did not dispute the waiver of counsel until presenting a collateral challenge in this appeal. Appellant does not claim that he did not fully understand the nature of the charge against him or the range of allowable punishment for the crime prior to entering his plea. Nor does Appellant assert that he was unaware of his right to counsel. The record shows that, at the time of the municipal conviction, Appellant was an adult and possessed a high school equivalent education. Further, the record provides no indication that Appellant had any kind of language difficulties or lack of verbal comprehension.

Thus, the advisements given in the municipal court proceeding complied with the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 11, and there is no indication in the record that Appellant did not understand those advisements, including the advisement that he had a right to an attorney. Consequently, Appellant’s assertion that he did not wish to be represented by counsel must be taken at face value. The district court did not err in finding that Appellant’s waiver of counsel in the municipal proceeding was knowing and intelligent.

Affirmed.





J. Burke delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2009 WY 120

Summary of Decision issued September 29, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Cellers v. Adami

Citation: 2009 WY 120

Docket Number: S-08-0110; S-08-0111

Appeal from the District Court of Johnson County, the Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge.

Representing Nora Cellers: Greg L. Goddard of Goddard, Wages & Vogel, Buffalo, Wyoming.

Representing Adami: Benjamin S. Kirven and Dennis M. Kirven of Kirven & Kirven, PC, Buffalo, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: This review of a summary judgment involves the interpretation of a marital settlement agreement. The primary issue was whether in that agreement the former wife relinquished her right as the named beneficiary to the proceeds of an investment account maintained by her former husband, now deceased.

Adami relied on Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bushnell arguing that the Court should apply it to the Cellers’ marital settlement agreement and hold that Nora Cellers relinquished her expectancy interest as the beneficiary by signing that agreement which contained language that set over to Stewart Cellers the investment account as his sole and separate property. Nora Cellers relied upon Costello v. Costello and stated that Costello appeared to have softened Bushnell’s implied renunciation rule in favor of a specific disclaimer rule. The Court noted in Wadsworth that the failure to distinguish properly between present property rights in insurance policies and the expectancies of beneficiaries has created confusion in interpreting property settlement agreements incorporated in divorce decrees and made difficult the court’s task of determining to whom insurance proceeds should be paid. There the court adopted a rule that to the extent no community property rights are invaded, the named beneficiary will generally be entitled to the proceeds. The Court commented on decisions from other states and noted that one of the rules that has been adopted was that the language must be an explicit waiver or relinquishment of the beneficiary’s interest. The Court agreed with those courts that hold the language in the property settlement agreement or divorce decree must reveal a specific and explicit waiver or relinquishment of the named beneficiary’s expectancy interest.

Conclusion: The Court held that under the unambiguous language of the marital settlement agreement, the former wife did not relinquish her right as the named beneficiary to the investment account proceeds; consequently, it reversed and remanded on that issue with directions that the district court enter judgment in favor of the former wife because further proceedings would serve no useful purpose.

Reversed and remanded.

J. Golden delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/ycgkrz2 .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 19

Summary of Decision issued February 22, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: State, Dep’t of Corrections v. Watts; State, Dep’t of Corrections v. Watts

Citation: 2008 WY 19

Docket Number: S-07-0050; S-07-0095

Appeal from the District Court of Fremont County, the Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

Representing Appellants: Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, DeputyAttorny General; Misha Westby, Senior Assistant Attorney General; C. Levi Martin, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Representing Appellee: David B. Hooper and Tom A. Glassberg of Hooper Law Offices, PC, Riverton, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: Watts brought a wrongful death suit after his wife, who was a contract nurse at the Wyoming Honor Farm, was murdered by an inmate. The State moved for summary judgment claiming they were immune from suit pursuant to the WGCA.

Jurisdiction: Generally, the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not an appealable final order. The Court has recognized an exception to the general rule when a district court refused to dismiss a case on the basis of qualified immunity. The Court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal of the district court’s order denying the State’s motion for summary judgment therefore the writ of review was superfluous and was dismissed as unnecessarily granted.
Section 1-39-106: Questions of statutory interpretation are matters of law. The Act is considered a close-ended tort claims act. The Court reviewed previous cases noting that there are two groups of cases which construe the act in terms of strict or liberal construction of the WGCA. More recent cases state the principle that it is a close-ended act in which immunity is the rule and liability is the exception. The Court concluded the general rule in Wyoming is that the government is immune from liability and unless a claim falls within one of the statutory exceptions, it will be barred. The Court used their standard rules of statutory construction to determine whether the legislature intended that immunity be waived for a particular claim. The Court stated that the statute waived immunity for the State’s negligence in making the building functional. The Court reviewed cases from New Mexico and Maine. They concluded that the clear and unambiguous language of § 1-39-106 within the context of the WGCA indicated that the legislature intended to limit the waiver of immunity to negligence associated with the function of the building structure and did not intend to extend the waiver to negligence associated with operation of the penal institution within the building. Because Watts did not argue that any particular physical defect in the building resulted in his wife’s death, his claim does not fall within the parameters of § 1-39-106.

Holding: Section 1-39-106 did not waive the State’s immunity for negligence in the operation of the corrections system. Instead, it specifically limits the exception to matters associated with the physical building itself. Because Mr. Watts’ claims did not pertain to the physical condition of a building at the Wyoming Honor Farm, the State was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Case No, S-07-0050, writ of review, was dismissed. Case No. S-07-0095, appeal, was reversed and remanded to the district court.

Reversed.

J. Kite delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/yuz6fy .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]