Summary 2006 WY 101

Summary of Decision issued August 14, 2006

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library for assistance.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: In the Interest of CT, Minor: CT v. State

Citation: 2006 WY 101

Docket Number: C-05-14, C-05-15

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge.

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Ken M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna Domonkos, Appellate Counsel. Argument by Mr. Koski.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Leda M. Pojman, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Pojman.

Issue: Whether the juvenile court violated Appellant’s right to due process by failing to advise him of the terms and conditions of probation. Whether the juvenile court erred by failing to consider a predispositional report prior to disposition. Whether the juvenile court erred by failing to select a statutory sanction level and by failing to impose the appropriate terms of probation for that sanction level.

Holding: The appeal challenges certain procedures and orders in a juvenile court matter. Appellant’s claim that his constitutional due process rights have been violated is reviewed de novo. He has the burden of demonstrating both that he has a protected interest and that such interest has been affected in an impermissible way. Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. A court may not enter an illegal sentence. If there was no objection below, the Court reviews alleged errors under the plain error standard.
Whether the juvenile court violated Appellant’s right to due process by failing to advise him of the terms and conditions of probation: Although the United States Supreme Court and the Wyoming Supreme Court have held that due process applies in juvenile proceedings and in probation revocation hearings, neither court has specifically delineated the extent to which such protections are applicable during the dispositional stage of the juvenile proceedings. In the instant case, the Court concluded that the juvenile court did not violate the appellant’s right to due process of the law in fashioning the probation conditions as it did. The record reflects the recommendations of the multi-disciplinary tem (MDT) and the preliminary findings of the juvenile probation officer were included in the court’s order which meets the statutory purpose of designing individualized dispositions. Appellant “signed off” on the probation conditions imposed by DFS, so he had actual knowledge of them.
Whether the juvenile court erred by failing to consider a predispositional report prior to disposition and by failing to select a statutory sanction level: The Court combined these issues because similar reasoning applied to both issues lead the Court to reversal. Wyoming’s Juvenile Justice Act contains clear mandates as to both predisposition reports and sanction levels. A predisposition study was ordered but there was no indication in the record that it was ever accomplished or that the court reviewed such a report prior to disposition. The statutory sanction level for felony property destruction is level three which provides for a maximum probationary term of twelve months. The court twice entered dispositional orders placing Appellant on probation for an indefinite period, a sanction unavailable to the court unless expressly justified in writing on the record. The Court has held that the Juvenile Justice Act does not require absolutely strict compliance but it cannot be “ignored with impunity.” The district court erred in failing to consider a predisposition report and in failing to assign a sanction level and to justify deviation from the appropriate statutory sanction level.

C.J. Voigt delivered the opinion for the Court.

Reversed and remanded.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/of47h .

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Summary 2006 WY 100

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Muller v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort

Citation: 2006 WY 100

Docket Number: 05-207

W.R.A.P. 11, Certified Questions from the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, The Honorable Mary Beck Briscoe, Judge

Representing Appellants (Plaintiffs): William R. Fix and Jenna V. Mandraccia of William R. Fix, Jackson, Wyoming

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Carter H. Wilkinson and James K. Lubing of Lubing Law Office, Jackson, Wyoming.

[The State of Wyoming was an Appellee (Intervenor but made no appearance)

Date of Decision: August 11, 2006

Facts: Appellant was outfitted with ski equipment; she was wearing ski boots and was attempting to board the Bridger Gondola at Jackson Hole Mountain Resort in order to ride to the top of the hill to begin her day of skiing. When boarding the Bridger Gondola, skiers are not wearing their skis; rather, they are stowed on exterior racks affixed to the gondola. While attempting to board the gondola, Appellant's ski boot became caught under the exterior rack on the Bridger Gondola and she was allegedly dragged several feet, the result of which were painful injuries to her leg and knee. Noting its finding on a special verdict form, following a trial with the magistrate judge presiding, a jury concluded that Appellant's injuries resulted from an inherent risk of the recreational activity in which she was taking part. It may also be discerned from the briefs and from argument that no motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment was filed in this case. It was also contemplated from the outset that the "inherent risk" in question was one for the jury to resolve. The trial was held in Jackson.

Certified Questions:

1. Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 1-1-122(a)(ii), Wyoming's Recreational Safety Act (RSA) "does not apply to a cause of action based upon the design or manufacture of sport or recreational equipment or products or safety equipment used incidental to or required by the sport or recreational opportunity." The magistrate judge interpreted this provision as a product liability provision applying to design and manufacture claims. Does the design and manufacture component of the statute apply to products and safety equipment or only sport and recreational equipment? Does this exemption exclude the operation of a ski lift by a recreational provider from the protections of the RSA?

2. The RSA provides that "[a]ny person who takes part in any sport or recreational opportunity assumes the inherent risks in that sport or recreational opportunity, whether those risks are known or unknown, and is legally responsible for any and all damage, injury or death to himself or other persons or property that results from the inherent risks in that sport or recreational opportunity." Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-123(a). The RSA defines inherent risks as "those dangers or conditions which are characteristic of, intrinsic to, or an integral part of any sport or recreational opportunity." Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-122(a)(i). Are inherent risks of alpine skiing limited to skiing, can an injury that occurs while boarding the ski lift be an inherent risk of alpine skiing, and can the injury in this case be such an inherent risk?

3. If not mooted by the answers to Questions 1 and 2, is the operator of a ski lift a common carrier, and if so, what standard of care is owed to those riding on a ski lift gondola?

Holdings: 1. Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-122(a)(ii) is not ambiguous and the RSA does not apply to those items listed by it, i.e., the RSA does not apply to the design or manufacture of sports equipment or products, or recreational equipment or products, or safety equipment, the use of which is incidental to the sport or recreational activity; and, "No," this statute does not exclude a ski lift operated by a recreational provider from the protections of the RSA.

2. The "inherent risks" of alpine skiing are not limited only to the act of skiing; an injury that occurs while boarding a ski lift may be an "inherent risk" of skiing; and the injury in this case may be an "inherent risk" of skiing.

3. The answers to questions one (1) and two (2) render question three (3) moot.

J. Hill delivered the opinion for the court.

Summary 2006 WY 99

Summary of Decision issued August 9, 2006

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library for assistance.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Sheaffer v. State

Citation: 2006 WY 99

Docket Number: 05-211

Appeal from the District Court of Albany County, the Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

Representing Appellant: Bill G. Hibbler, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellees: Susan C. Weidel, Senior Assistant General Counsel & Special Assistant Attorney General, University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming.

Issue: Whether the district court erred in denying inspection of the tape recording, by finding it was not a “public record” as defined by Wyoming Statute § 16-4-201. If the tape recording is a “public record” as defined by Wyoming Statute § 16-4-201, should inspection be denied for any exemption asserted pursuant to Wyoming Statute § 16-4-203. If the Court orders inspection of the tape recording, should it be redacted?

Holding: Sheaffer appeals a determination by the district court that a surreptitious recording of a University of Wyoming committee meeting was not a public record under the Wyoming Public Records Act (WPRA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-4-201 et seq.
Standard of Review: The determination of whether or not the tape is a public record required the Court to construe various provisions of the WPRA. The Court’s primary consideration was to determine the legislative intent and because statutory construction is a question of law that review is de novo.
Public record: The question the Court answered in determining whether or not the tape was public record was if it was made by the University or received by it in connection with the transaction of public business. The tape was received into the possession of the director of the University’s Auxiliary Service in connection with the investigation into Appellant’s conduct. Turning to the ordinary and obvious meaning of the word, it was apparent it was “received” by the university. Next the Court determined whether the tape was received in connection with the transaction of public business. A review of the language of WPRA supported the conclusion that the tape was a public record. The implication of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-203(d)(xi) was that records not within any of the enumerated exemptions are public records. The University contended that the content of the tape was irrelevant in that the misconduct was the act of taping itself, and therefore the contents should not be open to public inspection. The WPRA contains no language that could be construed to support that distinction.
Exemption: The Court addressed a second inquiry whether any exemption applied that would allow the record custodian to deny the public the right of inspection. Exemptions are construed narrowly. The University suggests that two exemptions apply to the tape. The first is § 16-4-203(d)(xi) which allows the record custodian to deny public inspection if the record was compiled solely for purposes of investigation. Inspection of the facts of the case indicate the tape was not compiled solely for purposes of the investigation. The second exemption urged by the University was Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-203(g). The Court found nothing in the record indicating that the University filed an application pursuant to the subsection.
Redaction: The parties also raised the issue of redaction. The Court has recognized it as an appropriate remedy when portions of an otherwise disclosable public record may be subject to an exemption. The Court determined that the tape recording is a public record under the provisions of the WPRA. To this point in the proceedings, the question of redaction is premature. If the question of redaction becomes relevant during the proceedings on remand, the district court may consider the remedy to the extent raised by any party.

J. Hill delivered the opinion for the Court.

Reversed and remanded.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/rhbkz .

Summary 2006 WY 98

Summary of Decision issued August 7, 2006

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library for assistance.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Ray v. St. Vincent Healthcare, Inc.; Johnson County, WY; Board of County Commissioners of Johnson County, WY; and the Johnson County Sheriff’s Dep’t.

Citation: 2006 WY 98

Docket Number: 05-235

Petition for Writ of Review

Representing Petitioner: R. Douglas Dumbrill and Nathan S. McLeland of Lubnau, Bailey & Dumbrill, P.C., Gillette, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. McLeland.

For Respondents Johnson County, Wyoming, The Board of County Commissioners of Johnson County, Wyoming and the Johnson County Sheriff’s Dept.: Greg L. Goddard of Goddard, Wages & Vogel, Buffalo, Wyoming.

For Respondent St. Vincent Healthcare, Inc.: No appearance.

Issue: Whether the appropriate statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims is two (2) years pursuant to W.S. § 1-3-115 or four (4) years pursuant to Sullivan v. Bailiff, and whether Appellant’s Motion to Amend Cross-Claim and Third Party Complaint Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 15 was timely filed.

Holding: St. Vincent Healthcare, Inc. sued Johnson County, Wyoming and its board of commissioners in order to recover medical expenses incurred in treating Jeremy Ray. In order to avoid a dismissal of the complaint, St. Vincent caused Ray to be joined as a defendant. Ray initially filed an answer, cross-claim, and third party complaint, but later sought to amend that filing to include a federal civil rights complaint against the Johnson County Sheriffs. The district court denied Ray’s motion and Ray sought a writ of review from the Court.
Standard of Review: A motion to amend a pleading under W.R.C.P. 15(a) “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” A district court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to amend will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Application of a statute of limitations is a question of law which the Court reviews de novo.
Based on Lafferty, the district court in the instant case determined that Ray filed his claim outside of the two-year statute of limitations and it was therefore, time barred. The issue on this writ of review is whether Lafferty remains good law. After the Court’s decision in Lafferty, the United States Supreme Court decided Wilson v. Garcia. Based on the holding in Wilson, it is clear that Lafferty is no longer valid. In Lafferty, the Court held that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-115 applied to §1983 claims. The clear rule in Wilson is that such statutes of limitations do not apply and that a state’s personal injury statute must be uniformly applied in § 1983 cases. Therefore the proper statute of limitations to apply in Wyoming state courts for § 1983 claims is the four-year limitations period contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) and not the two-year period in § 1-3-115. Because less than three years passed between the date of Ray’s injuries and his attempt to file the § 1983 claim, that claim fell within the four-year statute of limitations and was timely.
In the respondents’ brief, Johnson County and the Sheriff’s Dept. argued that the Court could affirm the district court’s denial of Ray’s motion to dismiss because Ray did not properly allege compliance with the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act and Article 16, § 7 of the Wyoming Constitution in Ray’s proposed amended complaint, cross-claim and counter-claim. However, the question was not whether the order should be affirmed or denied but whether the district court erred in applying the two-year statute of limitations in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §1-3-115. The district court did not rule on the matter so the Court did not address the issue because they did not grant the writ of review to determine that question.

C.J. Voigt delivered the opinion for the Court.

Reversed and remanded.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/he6m2 .

Summary 2006 WY 97

Summary of Decision issued August 4, 2006

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library for assistance.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Lopez v. State

Citation: 2006 WY 97

Docket Number: 05-106

Appeals from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge.

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Kenneth Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Marion Yoder, Senior Assistant Public Defender. Argument by Ms. Yoder.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Causey.

Date of Decision: August 4, 2006.

Issue: Whether sufficient evidence existed to convict Appellant of voluntary manslaughter. Whether the district court properly instructed the jury on the elements of voluntary manslaughter. Whether Appellant was subjected to vindictive prosecution and whether the habitual criminal allegation was properly proven.

Holding: Appellant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and of being a habitual criminal. He was sentenced to a term of 10 to 15 years with credit for all time served. This was a retrial after reversal of Appellant’s original conviction.
Sufficiency of the Evidence: When the Court considers a claim of the sufficiency of the evidence, they review the evidence with the assumption that the evidence of the prevailing party is true, they disregard the evidence favoring the unsuccessful party and give the prevailing party the benefit of every favorable inference that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. Appellant was tried for the crime of voluntary manslaughter, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-105(a)(i). The Court stated that the issue turned upon which of the witnesses the jury decided were the most believable. The Court reviewed the record of the case including the testimony from William Chapin as well as the testimony of the three expert witnesses. They concluded that there was evidence from which the jury could find each of the elements of voluntary manslaughter and that they did so in light of the lesser included offense instruction.
Adequacy of the Instructions: Appellant contended that the instructions did not fully comprehend the nuances of the crime. The standard of review generally applicable to jury instructions is that they should inform jurors concerning the applicable law so that they can apply that law to their findings with respect to the material facts; they should be written with the particular facts and legal theories of the case in mind; and the test of whether a jury has been properly instructed on the necessary elements of the crime is whether the instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime can be found to have been committed. Appellant made no objection to the instructions given. The Court reviewed Appellant’s argument and the cases cited and determined the cases were not pertinent to the case. The Court therefore concluded that Appellant failed to demonstrate plain error with respect to the instructions given to the jury.
Habitual Criminal – Vindictive Prosecution: A defendant has the burden of proof and must establish either (1) actual vindictiveness or (2) a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness which will give rise to a presumption of vindictiveness. Thereafter, the burden shifts to the prosecution to justify its decision with legitimate, articulable, objective reasons. If the defendant does not meet his burden of proof, however, the district court need not reach the government justification issue. Following a detailed consideration of the circumstances presented by this case, the district court determined that the State had met its burden. The Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err as a matter of law in not disallowing the amendment to the information.
Habitual Criminal – Sufficiency of the Evidence: The admission or exclusion of evidence is in the discretion of the district court and the defendant bears the burden of establishing that the district court abused its discretion. Appellant’s arguments as to the level of authenticity of the documents applied only to the weight to be given those documents, a matter to be argued to the jury. The Court concluded that the district court did not err in admitting the evidence of Appellant’s prior convictions and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding of guilt.

J. Hill delivered the opinion for the court.

Affirmed.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/p6hnm .

Summary 2006 WY 96

Summary of Decision issued August 4, 2006

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library for assistance.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Foote, Jr. v. Simek, as owner of Mountain Meadow Ranch

Citation: 2006 WY 96

Docket Number: 05-203

Appeal from the District Court of Park County, the Honorable H. Hunter Patrick, Judge.

Representing Appellant: Laurence W. Stinson of Bonner Stinson, P.C., Powell, Wyoming; and Matthew D. Winslow of Winslow Law Firm, P.C., Cody, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Stinson.

Representing Appellee: Andrea L. Richard of The Richard Law Firm, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming.

Issue: Whether genuine issues of material fact exist on the “breach of duty” and “causation” elements of the employee’s cause of action.

Holding: The district court granted summary judgment to the owner of a ranch where an employee was injured while replacing a gasket on a pivot irrigation system. It concluded that the ranch’s owner did not breach his duty to provide the employee a reasonably safe workplace or to warn the employee of unsafe work conditions, and that the employee’s decision to replace the gasket by himself was an intervening cause of the employee’s injuries.
Standard of review: The standard of review in summary judgment in negligence actions is subject to a more exacting scrutiny because the actions are factually dependent. The Court employs the same standards and examines the same materials as the district court. They examine the record de novo, in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and affording that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the record.
A good portion of the parties’ appellate argument focuses on the district courts reliance on Mellor where the employee was injured while helping his employer and another individual move a heavy cabinet. Appellant claims that the Court’s analysis in Mellor was based on the doctrines of assumption of risk and contributory negligence. The Court agrees that to the extent Mellor relied upon those doctrines, its reasoning did not survive the adoption of comparative fault. Furthermore, the issues in the instant case should have been presented to the jury under the latter construct. Unlike Mellor, the Court could not conclude, as a matter of law, that the owner did not breach his duty to the employee.
“Breach of duty”: The Court found that genuine issues of material fact existed that precluded granting the owner summary judgment on the basis of breach of duty. Whether the owner breached his duty to provide the employee a reasonably safe workplace or to warn the employee of unsafe work conditions in the instant case is inextricably intertwined with the circumstances surrounding the employee’s decision to replace the gasket by himself. The Court stated that it was apparent from both hearing transcripts that in granting the owner summary judgment, the district court adopted the owner’s characterization of the facts. However, that was not the only reasonable inference that could be drawn from the evidence presented, therefore summary judgment was inappropriate. Any doubt in that regard must, according to the Court’s standard of review, be resolved in favor of the employee.
“Causation”: These same issues of fact preclude granting the owner summary judgment on the causation element as well. Reasonable minds could disagree as to the effect of the evidence and each party emphasized the same facts in arguing the causation issue as they did in the breach of duty issue. The Court therefore reversed and remanded the district court grant of summary judgment.

C.J. Voigt delivered the opinion for the Court.

Reversed and remanded.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/lavvx .