Summary 2005 WY 160

Summary of Decision issued December 15, 2005

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Case Name: In the Matter of the Worker’s Compensation Claim of: Decker v. State, ex rel., Wyoming Medical Commission & Wyoming Worker’s Safety and Compensation Division

Citation: 2005 WY 160

Docket Number: 05-38

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, Honorable E. James Burke, Judge

Representing Appellant (Petitioner): Bill G. Hibbler, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Respondent): Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Steven R. Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kristi M. Radosevich, Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: December 15, 2005

Issues: Whether the Medical Commission order is supported by substantial evidence. Whether the Medical Commission order is contrary to law. Whether Appellant’s claim of thoracic outlet syndrome was unrelated to a compensable injury diagnosed and reported as bilateral wrist tendinitis.

Holdings: A worker’s compensation claimant has the burden of proving every essential element of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. The scope of review is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c). In appeals where both parties to a contested case submit evidence, appellate review of the evidence is limited to application of the substantial evidence test. The Court affirms the hearing examiner’s findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence. Even if sufficient evidence supports the administrative decision under the substantial evidence test, the Court applies the arbitrary-and-capricious standard as a “safety net” to catch other agency action that may have violated the Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act.

The Court found that the Medical Commission’s findings of facts failed to provide the Court with a rational basis for review. They therefore declined to address Appellant’s substantial evidence arguments. The Court has held that a hearing examiner must make findings of basic facts upon all of the material issues in the proceeding and upon which its ultimate findings of fact or conclusions are based. Unless that is done there is no rational basis for judicial review. The order does not contain an indication that the Medical Commission considered and weighed all material evidence offered by the parties. The Medical Commission decision stated concerns with inconsistent physical findings but does not specify the inconsistent physical findings which they found material. Without that specificity, the Court cannot evaluate the reasonableness of the Commission’s assertions. Because the Medical Commission’s order fails to make findings that adequately explain the rationale for the Commission’s decision, the order must be vacated.
On appeal, Appellant states that the Medical Commission recognized that the position being advanced by Appellant was that he sustained the aggravation over a substantial period of time. Because Appellant has settled on this position, the Commission’s revised order should analyze Appellant’s claim under the heightened burden of proof as required by Wyo. Ann. Stat. § 27-14-603. If Appellant’s condition is congenital, ie preexisting, then it will not be a compensable injury unless he can prove that his employment materially aggravated his condition. The claimant is required to prove by a preponderance of all the evidence that the work activities were a significant factor in the worsening of the preexisting condition.
The second compensable injury rule is not at issue in this case. Appellant was not claiming a new or different injury from his original injury. The Medical Commission must determine after weighing the evidence whether Appellant’s wrist pain presentation was anything more than a symptom of the syndrome.

The decision of the district court was reversed and remanded with directions to vacate the order denying benefits. The district court is to remand the case for supplemental findings of fact or other proceedings consistent with the opinion.

J. Golden delivered the opinion for the court.