Summary 2006 WY 40

Summary of Decision issued April 6, 2006

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Case Name: Jones v. State

Citation: 2006 WY 40

Docket Number: 04-35

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, The Honorable David B. Park, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Ryan R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel. Argument by Mr. Roden.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Dee Morgan, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Morgan.

Date of Decision: April 6, 2006

Issues: Whether W.S. § 7-18-112 is unconstitutional because it is facially vague. Whether W.S. § 7-18-112 is unconstitutional as applied in Appellant’s case. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant of escape, when the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt Appellant failed to remain within the extended limits of her confinement. Whether Appellant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments’ right to counsel was violated when she was not appointed counsel at a critical stage of the criminal proceedings, the preliminary hearing.

Holdings: Constitutionality of § 7-18-112: Appellant waived this issue by not filing a motion to dismiss nor did she in any other manner challenge the constitutionality of the statute before the district court. Appellant’s brief presented no arguments to the Court as to why they should invoke either of the available exceptions of jurisdiction or a right so fundamental in nature that the court must take cognizance of it. The Court reviewed the record and saw no reason not to hold Appellant to her waiver of the issue.
Sufficiency of the Evidence: The Court’s duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, come to the same result as the jury actually did. The Court discussed this argument in Leyo and did not address it further here. Appellant was in official detention. What remained to be determined was the exact nature of the extended limits of confinement beyond which Appellant could not go without authorization. An adult community correctional facility must manage conduct and provide twenty-four hour supervision of residents while at the same time allowing the residents to enter the community for specific purposes intended to facilitate their reintroduction into society. The elements instruction given to the jury did not contain alternative theories upon which a conviction for escape should be based. The instruction followed the statutory language and such language contained all that was essential to constitute the crime. The Court stated that her conviction would stand if the record contained sufficient evidence that Appellant escaped by failing to remain within the extended limits of her confinement, without proper authorization at any time between the dates listed on the jury instruction.
Preliminary Hearing: The alleged error of Appellant being denied the right to counsel at the preliminary hearing is subject to harmless error analysis. Appellant presented no argument that any substantial right was affected by the alleged denial of counsel at the preliminary hearing. The Court stated it was nonsensical to allege, after conviction, that prejudicial error affecting defendant’s substantial rights occurred in the preliminary hearing.

The decree of the district court was affirmed.

J. Golden delivered the opinion for the court. J. Voigt filed a dissenting opinion in which J. Burke joined.

Dissent: The alleged crimes in the case were improperly charged and the jury was improperly instructed and as a result, the Court did not know what alleged conduct, on what date, formed the basis for the conviction. The instant case is not like Huff v. State which the majority relied upon. Nor was it like Bush v. State relied upon by Appellant. Bush involved a criminal statute that could be violated in multiple ways and the instant case involves allegations of multiple violations of a single statute. The mischarged Information and the general verdict form in the instant case violated the doctrine of charging duplicity described in McInturff v. State. To determine if an indictment is duplicitous, the court must determine whether only one violation can be found in each count. The Dissent would have reversed the conviction.

Link to the case: http://tinyurl.com/mv34g .