Summary 2006 WY 116

Summary of Decision issued September 20, 2006

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Case Name: Sanchez v. State

Citation: 2006 WY 116

Docket Number: 04-145

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Dion J. Custis, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General.

Issue: Whether the district court erred in denying Appellant’s motions for change of venue. Whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence under W.R.E. 404(b). Whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence under W.R.E. 609. Whether the district court abused its discretion in placing a time restriction on closing arguments. Whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting the expert testimony of Dr. Sirotnak. Whether there was sufficient evidence of first degree felony murder and second degree murder.

Holding: A jury found Appellant guilty of first degree felony murder and second degree murder for causing the death of a seventeen-month-old child.
Change of Venue: The Court reviews decisions on motions for a change of venue under the abuse of discretion standard. Appellant argued presumed prejudice because of the inflammatory pretrial publicity which was coupled with the connection of his case to other homicides involving the use of methamphetamines. Presumed prejudice is rarely invoked and only in extreme circumstances. The Court cited Estes, stating that because pretrial publicity in topical criminal cases is inevitable, a defendant’s rights are impacted only when the publicity dictates the community’s opinion as to guilt or innocence. In this case, the evidence of the pretrial publicity consisted of one newspaper clipping and one segment form a local news broadcast. Appellant contended actual prejudice as well. The Court utilized a two part test: the nature and extent of the publicity must be considered and the difficulty or ease in selecting a jury must be considered along with the amount of prejudice which actually appears during voir dire examination. The nature and extent of the pretrial publicity in this case was not unusual and jury selection did not prove to be difficult. Defense counsel failed to renew the motion of change of venue after voir dire, despite an invitation by the district court to do so in the event difficulties arose in seating the venire.
W.R.E. 404(b): Rulings on the admission of evidence are placed within the sound discretion of the court and an appellant must show the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion. Appellant claims error from the district court’s decision to admit evidence that he called the victim a “niglet” and used other derogatory terms while talking about African Americans. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts includes any sort of conduct that is likely to reflect adversely on the person in the eyes of the jury even though it has not been forbidden by law. In considering whether to admit evidence, a trial court must subject the proposed evidence to a certain level of analysis and must provide some details as to why it allowed the evidence to be admitted. The Court found that the State and the trial court followed the requirements of Gleason.
W.R.E. 609: Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and include determinations of the adequacy of foundation and relevancy, competency, materiality, and remoteness of the evidence. In the instant case, the trial court ruled that Appellant’s prior convictions for child abuse would be admissible if he chose to testify. The evidence of his conviction was used to impeach his credibility. An appropriate limiting instruction was given to the jury.
Time Limit on Closing Arguments: A trial court’s decision to place time restrictions on closing arguments is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Appellant claims that he was denied his right to a fair trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Sections 6 and 10 of the Wyoming Constitution because the trial court imposed a time restriction on closing arguments. The trial courts are afforded discretion in controlling their courtrooms and the proceedings therein. The Court made note of the many courts that have failed to find an abuse of discretion or a Sixth Amendment violation despite a time restriction on closing arguments. The Court reviewed the record and determined that under the circumstances, forty-five minutes for summation was not unreasonable. Defense counsel did not use all of the allotted time and did not object as to what, if anything, he was unable to cover in his summation.
Admission of Dr. Sirotnak’s Testimony: Dr. Sirotnak testified about his qualifications and experience as an associate professor of pediatrics for the University of Colorado School of Medicine and as director of the child protection team at the Denver Children’s Hospital. Defense counsel objected that the testimony was cumulative. However, Appellant did not identify any prejudicial abuse by the district court in exercising its discretion to allow the testimony so the Court found no error. Appellant challenged Dr. Sirotnak’s use of the phrase “child abuse” throughout his testimony. Because Appellant did not object at trial the evidence was reviewed by the Court using the three-prong test of the plain error standard. The Court reviewed the record and noted that the phrase was not used in its strict legal sense and so may be allowed. Appellant asserted that Dr. Sirotnak impermissibly testified regarding Appellant’s credibility. Dr. Sirotnak commented upon Appellant’s version of events as being inconsistent with the doctor’s opinion regarding cause of death. Although Dr. Sirotnak discussed the implausibility of the explanations for the injury, he did not comment directly on Appellant’s veracity or credibility. He explained his opinion that the injuries were not consistent with an accident.
Sufficiency of the Evidence: Appellant argued that it was impossible to find that he acted recklessly and at the same time, acted purposely and maliciously. He argued that the two states of mind are mutually exclusive. The Court has held that intentional conduct encompasses reckless conduct. The verdict form indicated the jury found Appellant guilty of second degree murder which requires that he acted purposely and maliciously. It follows necessarily that Appellant also acted recklessly. The two crimes were properly merged for sentencing.

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the order for the court.

Link to the case: http://tinyurl.com/ld867 .