Summary 2006 WY 125

Summary of Decision issued September 29, 2006

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Case Name: State v. Naple

Citation: 2006 WY 125

Docket Number: 05-113

Original Proceeding: Writ of Review from the District Court of Carbon County, the Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

Representing Petitioner: Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant attorney General. Argument by Mr. Pauling.

Representing Respondent: Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender, PDP; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Ryan R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel. Argument by Ms. Domonkos.

Issue: Whether the district court abused its discretion in dismissing with prejudice the charge against respondent.

Holding: The district court dismissed with prejudice a controlled substances charge against Respondent as a sanction for the State’s failure to comply with its discovery obligations. Respondent was a passenger in a van that was stopped by a Wyoming Trooper. One passenger in the van admitted to having a small amount of marijuana. During a search of the vehicle, a one pound container of marijuana was found. Respondent stated it was her medicine and that she had a prescription for it. Respondent was charged with one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii). She pleaded not guilty and demanded discovery from the State. The State filed notice with the district court representing it had complied with its discovery obligations. None of the police reports provided to the defense by the State referenced Respondent’s statements. The defense attorney told the jury in his opening statement at trial that her statement was not referenced in any police report. The first witness at trial referred to a report written by Trooper Green which included the inculpatory statement. Respondent moved for a mistrial. The district court granted her request and dismissed, stating the State had the option of re-filing the charges. The State filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal requesting a new trial date rather than requiring the State initiate a new prosecution. Respondent filed a response specifically requesting the charge be dismissed with prejudice. In support of the motion, Respondent referred to several other cases in the local district and circuit courts where the State had failed to comply with its discovery obligations and had been warned that future violations would be punished by dismissal with prejudice.
Standard of Review: A trial court has discretion in determining the proper sanction for a party’s violation of its discovery responsibilities and its decision will be set aside only for an abuse of discretion. The State also argued that the trial court did not have the legal authority to dismiss the charge against Respondent with prejudice. This argument involves questions of law and implicates constitutional issues, so the Court reviewed it de novo.
Court’s Authority to Dismiss Criminal Charges with Prejudice: The State agreed a mistrial was warranted, but the correctness of the district court’s decision to grant a mistrial is moot because the jury has been discharged. The State failed to comply with its discovery obligations under W.R.Cr.P.16 which requires the State to provide discovery to the defense and addresses sanctions for violations. The Court focused on language which allows the court to “enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.” Rule 16 is modeled after the comparable federal rule so the Court gives great weight to federal precedent pertaining to the rule. The Court agreed with the federal precedent interpreting Rule 16 as giving trial courts discretion to dismiss charges against a defendant with prejudice, but only in extraordinary circumstances when less severe sanctions would not suffice. Wyoming precedent concerning “inherent” or “supervisory” powers does not provide a clear answer as to whether the district court properly concluded it had “inherent” authority to dismiss the case for the State’s discovery violation. Both parties referred the Court to Newman but the Court stated that it was not instructive in the instant case. The State argued that allowing the district court to dismiss criminal actions with prejudice because of the prosecutor’s discovery violations resulted in an unconstitutional intrusion by the judiciary into the executive branch’s exclusive power to prosecute cases. In Hilderbrand, on appeal, the Court held the statute which gave the district court authority to direct the prosecutor to charge someone with a crime infringed upon the executive branch’s power and discretion to make prosecutorial decisions. In the instant case, the district court did not infringe upon the prosecutor’s decision to prosecute or decline to prosecute Respondent. The court was attempting to enforce its own rules. Once a prosecutorial decision has been made, the judicial branch becomes involved. Enforcement of court rules is a responsibility of the judicial branch. The district court did not violate the separation of powers concept when it enforced its rules by dismissing the charges with prejudice.
Exercise of Discretion in Imposition of Discovery Sanctions: The Court stated they agreed with federal precedent interpreting Rule 16(d)(2), which provides three factors for the Court to consider in determining the appropriateness of a sanction: (1) the reasons the State delayed producing the requested materials, (2) the extent of prejudice to the defendant as a result of the delay and (3) the feasibility of curing the prejudice with a continuance. The prosecutor’s conduct in other cases could be relevant to a determination of whether the prosecutor’s actions were taken in bad faith. However, in order to establish the connection between the other cases and this case, there needs to be evidence about whether the same prosecuting attorneys and or the same type of violation was involved in the previous cases, whether there was an official policy to withhold, or whether the delay was simply the result of egregious and repeated sloppiness which could rise to the level of intentional withholding of evidence. Secondly, the analysis of the prejudice suffered by the defendant was not addressed with regard to whether the sanction for the violation should be a dismissal with prejudice. There was no discussion about the prejudice which would be suffered by this particular defendant if the matter was not dismissed with prejudice. Finally, the district court did not discuss whether the prejudice could be cured with a less severe sanction. The failure to consider the proper factors in determining whether a particular sanction is warranted amounts to an abuse of discretion.
The record and the district court’s order did not justify the decision to dismiss the charges with prejudice. The Court repeated that the district court has broad discretion but it must be exercised in a reasoned fashion after consideration of the appropriate factors and the court should choose the least severe sanction which it concludes will ensure the State’s compliance with its discovery responsibilities.

C.J. Voigt, dissenting opinion, joined by J. Hill: C.J. Voigt agreed with most of the majority opinion except he would have come to a different conclusion. If W.R.Cr.P. 16(d)(2) truly does give the district court broad discretion in improvising a remedy for discovery violations by the State as it deems just under the circumstances, then the circumstances of the case coupled with the matters described in paragraph 6 of the district court’s order should have sufficed. Even though the district court’s order did not directly identify and discuss the Dennison factors, the Chief Justice would have found that it sufficiently recited a reasoned decision and met the spirit of Dennison. Repeated violations by a prosecutor’s office constitute the type of extreme behavior for which nothing short of dismissal may have any effect.

Reversed and remanded.

J. Kite delivered the order for the court with C. J. Voigt dissenting, joined by J. Hill.

Link to the case: http://tinyurl.com/enkca .