Summary 2006 WY 143

Summary of Decision issued November 9, 2006

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Case Name: Becker v. Mason; and Board of County Commissioners of County of Sweetwater

Citation: 2006 WY 143

Docket Number: 05-219

Appeal from the District Court of Sweetwater County, the Honorable H. Hunter Patrick, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): Timothy W. Miller of Casper, Wyoming.

Representing Appellees (Defendants): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; and John D. Rossetti, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee Don Mason, and Richard Rideout of Law Offices of Richard Rideout, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for Appellee Board of County Commissioners. Argument by Messrs. Rossetti and Rideout.

Issue: Whether under the circumstances of this case, the appellee deputy sheriff (Don Mason) had a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the appellant’s decedent.

Holding: This was an appeal from a district court’s dismissal of a wrongful death action on the ground that the appellee deputy sheriff (Mason) did not owe the appellant’s decedent (Zachary Tyler Becker) a duty of care under the circumstances of the case. In October 2003, Towner and Brandes were at horse corrals north of Rock Springs. Towner was extremely intoxicated. A horse knocked Brandes to the ground causing injury. An ambulance and the deputy sheriff responded. Towner told Mason he had been drinking but that he wanted to follow Brandes to the hospital. Mason did not arrest Towner, or make an effort to stop him from driving. Two miles down the road, Towner veered off the right side of the road, then overcorrected, crossed the centerline and collided with a vehicle in which Becker was a passenger. Becker was killed.
Standard of Review: Both appellees filed motions to dismiss under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) alleging failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court’s standard for review is: (1) they accept the facts stated in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the appellant; (2) they sustain the dismissal only if it is certain from the face of the complaint that the appellant cannot assert any facts that would entitle him to relief; (3) they employ the same standards and examine the same materials as did the district court; and (4) such review is de novo.
Discussion: The Court focused on the specific rationale the district court followed in dismissing the amended complaint. The district court resolved the case by declaring that the deputy sheriff had no legally enforceable duty or obligation to detain or arrest Towner in reliance on McCoy v. Crook County Sheriff’s Dep’t. The Court stated they were more inclined to believe that Keehn rather than McCoy dictated the result in the instant case. While McCoy held that in the DWUI situation, the statutory authority to arrest did not create a statutory duty to arrest, it did reverse Keehn’s holding that a “peace officer’s duty to investigate a potential DWUI violation during an unrelated traffic stop is dictated by what a reasonable peace officer of ordinary prudence would do under the circumstances.” The law in Wyoming is that existing circumstances may create a duty on the part of the officer to investigate a potential DWUI. The Court stated that it was not clear from the pleadings that the appellant would have been unable to state any facts to support a negligent investigation allegation. The Court stated that Mason had a duty to do what an ordinarily prudent law enforcement officer would have done under like circumstances. Saying that the decision of whether or not to exercise one’s statutory authority by arresting a drunk driver is discretionary, and therefore cannot form the basis for a tort claim based on negligent failure to arrest, did not answer all the questions in the case, particularly by dismissal based upon failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Dissent: J. Hill concurred with the majority’s interpretation of the Court’s prior decisions in McCoy and Keehn. However, he declined to agree that the duty identified in Keehn could be imposed under the facts alleged in the instant case. The existence of a reasonable suspicion is the critical difference between Keehn and the instant case. In Keehn, the duty arose out of a police-citizen contact during a traffic stop. In the course of the stop certain facts were observed that gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the citizen was operating a motor vehicle wile driving under the influence. As alleged in this case, Towner was not operating a motor vehicle during the contact with Mason. There were no facts alleged in the Complaint that would have supported a reasonable suspicion that a DWUI had been or was going to be committed which would have justified an investigatory detention of Towner. J. Hill stated that an application of the duty to investigate a DWUI under the facts alleged would greatly expand the duty identified in Keehn. He would have affirmed the district court’s dismissal.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

C.J. Voigt delivered the opinion for the court. J. Hill filed a dissenting opinion in which J. Golden joined.

Link to the case: http://tinyurl.com/yl9t5f .