Summary 2007 WY 1

Summary of Decision issued January 9, 2007

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Case Name: Layton v. State

Citation: 2007 WY 1

Docket Number: 05-152

Appeal from the District Court of Fremont County, the Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel. Argument by Ms. Domonkos.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric A. Johnson, Faculty Director, Jonathan Haidsiak, Student Director and Ricky D. Turner, Jr., Student Intern of the Prosecution Assistance Program. Argument by Mr. Turner.

Issue: Whether all charges should have been dismissed under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Whether the district court erroneously ordered restitution for the stolen vehicle which was recovered and the items within the vehicle which Appellant was never charged nor admitted to, stealing.

Holding: The State charged Appellant with four felonies arising out of an incident at Fremont Toyota in Lander. Appellant tried to steal a car. A Trooper attempted to apprehend Appellant but Appellant escaped, stole a Jeep and fled to Iowa where he disposed of the vehicle. Appellant appeals from the judgment and sentence entered after a jury found him guilty of five felonies. When Appellant was located, he was serving a prison sentence in an Oregon penitentiary. The State filed a detainer for the pending criminal charges. Layton requested final disposition of the Wyoming charges under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). The State accepted temporary custody of Appellant and before a preliminary hearing was held, they filed an amended information that contained eight criminal charges. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the criminal charges with prejudice claiming a violation of his speedy trial and due process rights under the IAD. The district court dismissed with prejudice Counts 1,2 and 3 of the amended information because of a violation of the 180-day speedy trial requirement of the IAD. The district court drew a distinction between the charges upon which the State’s detainer was lodged and for which Appellant was returned to Wyoming to stand trial (Counts 1,2 and 3) and those which were not the subject of that detainer (Counts 4 – 8). Relying on United States v. Sanders and Espinoza v. State, the district court ruled that the 180-day time limit imposed by IAD was inapplicable to the non-detainer charges.
Interstate Agreement on Detainers: The question whether the district court erred in its determination that the IAD does not apply to the non-detainer charges is a question of statutory construction which the Court reviews de novo.
The Court described Appellant’s claim as an argument for a generous interpretation of the 180-day rule and the dismissal provision of the IAD. The Court rejected that argument. The IAD is a congressionally sanctioned compact among forty-eight states. Wyoming’s version is contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-15-101. It is clear from the language that its speedy trial provisions apply exclusively to “untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which detainers have been lodged against the prisoner.” The Court’s review of the statute, coupled with decisions from other courts interpreting similar IAD provisions convinced them that neither the 180-day time period nor the dismissal provision applied to non-detainer same transaction offenses as Appellant claimed. In the instant case, the detainer lodged concerned the offenses charged in the original felony information and retained in the amended information. The charges upon which he was ultimately convicted were filed after Appellant requested final disposition of the initial charges and was transferred to Wyoming to stand trial. Since those Counts were not charges which formed the basis for the detainer, the district court did not err in refusing to dismiss those charges. The Court found no significance in the fact that both the new and the old charges were incorporated in the same charging document, rather than separate documents.
Restitution: Appellant did not challenge the factual basis for the restitution order in the district court and consequently, the Court reviewed his claim only for plain error. Appellant’s second argument involving the district court’s authority to make an award of restitution is a question of law which the Court reviewed de novo. Appellant’s complaint regarding the amount of restitution awarded on the Jeep turned on whether the insurance company actually sold the vehicle at salvage value. There was no clear evidence in the record that the insurance company in fact sold the Jeep for salvage value. The Court did not have evidentiary basis on which to conclude that the district court’s restitution order was erroneous as a matter of law.
The Court found no merit in Appellant’s contention that the district court exceeded its authority in ordering restitution for the personal items in the Jeep. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-103 details a trial court’s authority in ordering restitution from a criminal defendant. Appellant discussed Van Riper where the Court held the trial court lacked authority to order restitution for the value of the personal property. In the instant case, there was a direct relationship between the claimed loss and the criminal conduct. Appellant never denied taking the personal property and at sentencing never contested the restitution requested on the stolen items. The Court found the district court acted within its authority in awarding restitution for the personal items in the Jeep.

Affirmed.

J. Golden delivered the decision.

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