Summary 2007 WY 51

Summary of Decision issued March 23, 2007

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Case Name: Fenton v. State

Citation: 2007 WY 51

Docket Number: 05-224

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel. Argument by Ms. Domonkos.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Eric A. Johnson, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; and Geoffrey L. Gunnerson, Student Director, Prosecution Assistance Program. Argument by Mr. Gunnerson.

Facts/Discussion: Appellant entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. The “condition” preserved Appellant’s right to appeal the district court’s decision to deny his motion to suppress the evidence which supported the charge to which he pled guilty.
The State bears the burden of proof with respect to justifying warrantless searches and seizures of a dwelling house. The district court conducted a hearing and took evidence concerning the search and seizure. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, the Court does not interfere with the findings unless they are clearly erroneous. The Court noted the importance of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Court stated that Gompf and Rideout were instructive in this case because once police felt they had probable cause to search, they secured the premises and sought judicially supervised search warrants or received written consent of the home owner.
Standard of Review: The constitutionality of a particular search or seizure is a question of law the Court reviews de novo.
Appellant filed a motion to suppress where he did not contest the seizure of evidence found in plain view. Relying on Andrews v. State, the State contended that Appellant was required to assert a possessory interest in the lock box where the methamphetamine was found before he could complain of the search. The State also claimed Appellant lacked standing to complain of the constitutionality of the search. The State conceded that both Appellant and Brown (Brown lived in the home as well) objected to further search of their home but that exigent circumstances required the police to proceed with the search. The Court reviewed the record of the hearing and made special note that the length of the hearing was short and that both defense counsel and the prosecution were not well prepared for the hearing. The district court found the warrantless search was proper: because the deputies were legally on the premises having been admitted by Brown; after the deputies saw the marijuana in plain view, they had reasonable suspicion to believe Appellant was committing a drug crime or was associating with someone who was in possession of drugs; Appellant was required by terms of his probation to submit to random searches relative to the use of drugs or alcohol; both Appellant and Brown denied ownership of the locked box which was the focus of the warrantless search, so Appellant had no standing to object to the legality of the search and seizure of the box.
The Court stated their analysis was brief because there was not much to be said about the issues raised. The resolution of the case had nothing to do with the law that relates to searches and seizures conducted pursuant to the terms of a probation/parole agreement because it was not a factor in the police officer’s presence at the home, and the officers were not aware that Appellant was on probation.
The district court erred as a matter of law to the extent it relied upon the terms of the probation agreement in denying the motion to suppress. The search at issue was per se unreasonable under the governing law. The burden was on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was some exception or circumstance that demonstrated the search was not unreasonable. The State failed to meet that burden. The Andrews case was not on point and did not support a conclusion that Appellant lacked standing to challenge the search of the contents of the lock box. The Court declined to dilute the governing law as it pertains to such searches by trying to contort the circumstances to fit. The Court stated the record was clear the officers had probable cause which would have justified the issuance of a search warrant by a judicial authority.

Holding: The Court held the district court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress. The judgment and sentence of the district court was reversed, and the matter remanded to the district court for proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

J. Hill delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/33pdvp .