Friday, December 21, 2007

Summary 2007 WY 188

Summary of Decision issued December 4, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Layland v. Stevens

Citation: 2007 WY 188

Docket Number: S-07-0046

Appeal from the District court of Laramie County, the Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): Robert T. Moxley of Robert T. Moxley, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Christine Cox, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Thomas W. Rumpke, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Cox.

Issue: Whether Deputy Stevens was entitled to qualified immunity from suit for constitutional violations allegedly arising out of Mr. Layland’s arrest.

Facts/Discussion: Layland was arrested and charged with kidnapping and witness intimidation. He filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Stevens alleging various civil rights violations. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment and after a hearing the district court granted Stevens’ motion and dismissed the case.
Standard of Review:
The issue the Court found determinative was whether qualified immunity barred Layland’s claims against Stevens. The presence or absence of qualified immunity is a question of law the Court reviews de novo.
Qualified immunity shields public officials from suit on § 1983 civil rights claims when they are performing discretionary functions unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” To avoid that defense, Layland was required to show that Stevens’ arrest of him without a warrant violated his Fourth Amendment right and that the contours of that right were sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would have understood his actions violated the right. In concluding that Laylands’ rights were not violated, the district court relied on U.S. v. Little. The factors for determining whether a person has been illegally seized include: the threatening presence of several officers; the brandishing of a weapon; physical touching; aggressive language; retention of the person’s personal belongings by an officer; a request to accompany the officer to the police station; the absence of other members of the public; and whether the interaction occured in a nonpublic, small or enclosed space. The district court applied the factors and concluded that Layland failed to show that he had a clearly established right not to be arrested. On that basis they concluded Stevens was entitled to qualified immunity.
The Court used a different analysis stating that controlling precedent makes it clear that qualified immunity shielded Stevens from suit for damages if a reasonable officer could have believed Layland’s arrest was lawful in light of established law and the information Stevens possessed. Even if Stevens was mistaken in concluding that probable cause existed, he nevertheless was entitled to qualified immunity if his decision was reasonable.
Layland relied on Payton v. New York and Mickelson v. State asserting that he did not consent to the entry and that no exigent circumstances existed justifying his arrest without a warrant. The Court noted that the United States Supreme Court has not extended the rule in Payton to premises other than a private home. According to the record, Layland’s shop was neither a place of business nor his private residence. In addition, the evidence presented did not establish a lack of consent as it clearly did in Mickelson.

Holding: Under the facts presented the Court concluded as a matter of law that a reasonable officer could have concluded he had consent to enter the building to question Layland and probable cause to arrest him without a warrant.

Affirmed.

J. Kite delivered the opinion.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/2etdha .

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