Thursday, June 26, 2008

Summary 2008 WY 73

Summary of Decision issued June 26, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Johnson v. City of Laramie

Citation: 2008 WY 73

Docket Number: S-07-0093

Petition for Writ of Review from the District Court of Albany County, the Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge.

Representing Appellant: R. Michael Vang of Brown & Hiser, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: Ashley Castor, Assistant City Attorney, Laramie City Attorney’s Office.

Facts/Discussion: Johnson was arrested for driving under the influence. He filed a motion to suppress on the grounds that the breath analysis instrument was not in compliance with the Wyoming Chemical Testing Program’s rules and regulations. He argued that annually meant once every 365 days. The prosecution maintained that annually meant once per calendar year. Johnson entered a conditional guilty plea reserving the right to appeal the municipal court’s ruling on his motion to suppress.
The Court questioned the wisdom of accepting a conditional guilty plea in this instance because a conviction potentially could have been obtained using other existing evidence. The Court has stated that a trial court should only approve a conditional appeal if assured that the decision of the appellate court will dispose of the case.
A year is statutorily defined by the Wyoming legislature as “a calendar year.” Had the authors of the Wyoming Testing Program’s rules and regulations not wanted to follow the existing statutory definition, they easily could have specified that testing occur at least once every 365 days.

Holding: The Court found the term “annually” as used in the Wyoming Chemical Testing Program’s rules and regulations is unambiguous. It refers to once every calendar year.

Affirmed.

J. Golden delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/5ukhos .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Wednesday, June 25, 2008

Summary 2008 WY 72

Summary of Decision issued June 25, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Newport Int’l University v. State

Citation: 2008 WY 72

Docket Number: S-07-0234

Appeal from the District Court of Albany County, the Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge.

Representing Appellant: C.M. Aron and Galen Bruce Woelk of Aron and Hennig, LLP, Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion:
Newport International University, Inc. (NIU) appealed from a summary judgment granted in favor of the State, Department of Education and Mr. McBride (Department). The question to be answered was whether the Private School Licensing Act violated the Wyoming Constitution.
Equal Protection: In order to establish a violation of equal protection, NIU must have shown that similarly situated entities are treated differently and that the disparate treatment was not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective. The Court agreed with the district court that no classification had been created by the Act. Therefore it was unnecessary to do any further analysis. The Act regulates one specific well-defined class, private degree-granting post-secondary educational institutions. All organizations in the category must be accredited.
Improper Delegation: State constitutional vesting clauses are the primary source of limitations on delegations. It helps to insure the traditional and important separation of democratic powers by disbursing political power to the several branches. The Court adopted the analytical focus of whether the delegation violated concepts of due process and whether it was reasonable. The requirement of accreditation is a delegation of power made by the Department to the accrediting institution which does not violate the Wyoming Constitution.
Impairment of Contracts/Special Laws: The Court noted that it is well established that the contract clause of the Constitution does not restrict the power of the state to legislate in the interest of the morals, health, and safety of the public. A state has the authority to enact such laws as reasonably are deemed to be necessary. Wyoming has the authority to impose reasonable regulations in state educational institutions. To the extent the accreditation process requires a contract between NIU and the accrediting entity, the need of the state to protect citizens outweighs the contract rights of NIU.

Holding: The Court found there was no equal protection violation because different classifications are not created under the Act or the rules. The requirement that private degree granting institutions be accredited contains specific standards and allows for judicial review insuring due process protections for the institutions. The delegating of accrediting authority is reasonable and often used by state governments. The State has the authority under its police powers to regulate private educational institutions even though this may have some impact on the institution’s contracts.

Affirmed.

Dist.J. Park delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/6s4oxu .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Monday, June 23, 2008

SUmmary 2008 WY 71

Summary of Decision issued June 23, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Kunz

Citation: 2008 WY 71

Docket Number: S-07-0177

Certified question from the District Court of Goshen County, the Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge.

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): Billie Ruth Edwards, Edwards & Johnson, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): No appearance.

Facts/Discussion: The question arose from an apparent conflict in statutory language governing subject matter jurisdiction of circuit courts and statutory language relating to service of process on non-resident motorists.

Answer: The circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction over a civil suit brought against a non-resident, where the prayer for recovery requests less than $7,000.00. Circuit courts’ subject matter jurisdiction over civil matters is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-9-128 and is not impacted by the method of service of process. The portion of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-6-301(c) relied upon by State Farm addresses venue and does not confer subject matter jurisdiction on a district court in a civil action where the amount in controversy does not exceed $7,000.00.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/56ljfa .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Friday, June 20, 2008

Summary 2008 WY 70

Summary of Decision issued June 20, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Edrington v. State

Citation: 2008 WY 70

Docket Number: S-07-0171

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge.

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Sylvia Lee Hackl of Cheyenne, Wyoming; Michael H. Reese of Michael Henry Reese, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Jenny L. Craig, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Edrington contested the district court’s decision to revoke his probation. Edrington was terminated from his court ordered program at TRP because of his repeated violation of the program’s rules. Appellant argued that he was incapable of following the rules and that his violations were not willful because he suffers from a mental illness. After the Court considered the evidence in the record from the probation officer, the director of the TRP program, a forensic psychologist and Appellant himself, the Court stated that the district court was not clearly erroneous when they concluded that Edrington acted willfully in violating the rules.

Holding: Edrington’s mental health diagnosis was called into doubt by his attempts to manipulate the diagnosis. Additionally, the mental illness with which he was diagnosed would not have prevented him from understanding the rules of his program or the nature and consequences of his actions. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked his probation and reinstated his full sentence.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/5k2y4c .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Thursday, June 19, 2008

Summary 2008 WY 69

Summary of Decision issued June 19, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Comet Energy Services, LLC v. Powder River Oil & Gas Ventures, LLC

Citation: 2008 WY 69

Docket Number: S-07-0063

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, the Dan R. Price II, Judge.

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Thomas F. Reese and Orintha E. Karns of Brown, Drew & Massey, LLP, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Blade M. Pickett of Welborn Sullivan Meck & Tooley, PC, Denver, Colorado.

Facts/Discussion: Comet appealed from the denial of its cross motion for summary judgment and from the award of summary judgment in favor of Powder River. The dispute was over the proper interpretation of an assignment of certain interests.
The dispute centered on the meaning of the term “leasehold estate” as used in the 1998 Assignment. The parties interpreted the term quite differently. The Court reiterated that they will construe contract language in the context within which it was written, looking to the surrounding circumstances, the subject matter, and the purpose of the agreement to ascertain the intent of the parties at the time the agreement was made. In cases requiring the interpretation of a contract, a summary judgment is appropriate only if the contract is clear and unambiguous. The meaning of terms and conditions and the intent of the parties generally are questions of fact to be resolved by the fact-finder. The parties disputed the effect, significance, and legitimacy of much of the evidence. The Court found it impossible to reasonably discern the intent of the parties by only looking within the four corners of the Assignment because the term “leasehold estate” is obscure in its meaning and because it could reasonably be interpreted to have more than one meaning.

Holding: The Court held that the district court improperly determined that summary judgment was appropriate under the facts of the case. The term “leasehold estate” as used in the 1998 assignment was ambiguous which gave rise to a genuine issue of material fact concerning the intent of the parties to the assignment.

Reversed and remanded.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/5tz8sk .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2008 WY 68

Summary of Decision issued June 19, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Winship v. Gem City Bone & Joint, PC

Citation: 2008 WY 68

Docket Number: S-07-0246

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Wade E. Waldrip, Judge.

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Mark W. Gifford, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): C.M. Aron of Aron and Hennig, LLP, Laramie, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: The case presented the issue of whether an attorney, who distributed the proceeds of a personal injury action without paying a medical provider’s bills after his client executed, with the attorney’s knowledge, an assignment of the proceeds to the provider is liable to the medical provider for the amount of those bills.
The district court interpreted the release in its first decision letter stating that the court could not interpret it as requiring Winship to pay Jackman’s medical obligations. The district court revisited the issue in its second decision letter and focused on the law of assignments. The release clearly indicated that Jackman who was the owner of the claim intended to transfer the proceeds to Gem City for payment of his medical bills. The Court stated it made no difference whether the language authorized or directed the obligor to honor the assignment as long as it indicated that the assignor intended to transfer his right to the assignee. The Court applied the rule that they give effect to the ordinary meaning of the language of an assignment and the precedent set forth in Montgomery, the Court concluded the release effected a valid assignment.
The next question was whether additional or different wording was required to obligate an attorney to honor his client’s assignment. The Court reviewed the cases relied upon and noted that they saw no reason why the language effecting an assignment must be more definite or specifically direct the obligor to honor the assignment when the obligor is the assignor’s attorney. As long as the intention to transfer the claim or the proceeds thereof is clear, the assignment is effective.

Holding: Mr. Jackman assigned his interest in the proceeds of his personal injury action to Gem City for payment of his medical bills. As obligor, Mr. Winship was required to honor that assignment. It was irrelevant that he had not entered into a direct contract with Gem City. An obligor who has notice of an assignment and fails to honor it is responsible to the assignee.

Affirmed.

J. Kite delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/6lduqc .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Tuesday, June 17, 2008

Summary 2008 WY 67

Summary of Decision issued June 16, 2008

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Humphrey v. State

Citation: 2008 WY 67

URL: http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=451800

Docket Number: 06-249

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Donna D. Domonkos, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; David Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: June 16, 2008

Issues: Whether Appellant was denied her right to a speedy trial under W.R.Cr.P. 48, with a delay of 270 days, and under the United States Constitution, with a delay of 561 days. Whether Appellant was denied her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process when the State delayed charging her for over 26 years. Appellant was substantially prejudiced by the delay. Whether the district court committed reversible error when it admitted the victim's hearsay statements under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. The victim's state of mind was not an issue at trial and the statements did not help the trier of fact determine Appellant's state of mind. Whether the district court committed an abuse of discretion by improperly admitting hearsay evidence contrary to W.R.E. 803(6) and contrary to the completeness requirements of W.R.E. 106.

Procedural History: Appellant's legal woes began on April 11, 1980, when a grand jury indicted her for the first degree murder of her husband. The district court later granted Appellant's April 14, 1980, request for a preliminary hearing and, on May 7, 1980 it remanded the case to county [now circuit] court. Also on May 7, 1980 Appellant waived her right to a speedy preliminary hearing, and stipulated to a June 23, 1980, preliminary hearing date. The preliminary hearing failed to produce sufficient probable cause to support the murder charge, and the county court issued an order dismissing the case on July 2, 1980. The district court formally dismissed the indictment on August 22, 1980. In 1999, the Evansville Police Department reopened the investigation. That investigation led to the refiling of the first degree murder charge against Appellant on March 5, 2004. Following a preliminary hearing on May 26, 2004, Appellant was bound over to district court. The district court initially set Appellant's trial for September 27, 2004, stacked behind a number of other trials which were also set for that day. On July 8, Appellant filed a "Motion for Date Certain for Trial" wherein she requested that her trial be continued to a later date on a more reasonable schedule. On July 19, 2004, the district court moved the trial to the October 18 trial stack because of the court's crowded docket. At Appellant's arraignment on August 10, and in response to defense counsel's concerns about the trial setting, the district court vacated the October 18 trial date. During a scheduling conference held on August 25, the parties agreed to a January 3, 2005, trial date. On August 27, 2004, Appellant moved to dismiss the murder charge, arguing that her constitutional right to a speedy trial under both the United States and Wyoming Constitutions had been violated by the excessive delay in bringing her to trial. Appellant based her speedy trial claim on the lapse in time between the filing of the initial indictment in 1980 and the filing of the instant information in 2004. On September 10, 2004 Appellant filed another motion to dismiss the murder charge, this time alleging that the 24-year delay in recharging her for the 1977 murder of her husband transgressed her constitutional right to due process. Appellant contended that her right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the delay due to the death of several witnesses and the loss of potential evidence. In addition to these motions, Appellant filed numerous motions pertaining to evidentiary matters, including multiple suppression motions. The district court heard testimony and argument on Appellant's motions to dismiss on October 28, 2004, and took the matters under advisement. The district court ultimately determined that Appellant's constitutional speedy trial right had been violated and, on December 20, 2004, the court entered an order dismissing the case. In finding a speedy tr ial violation, the district court considered the entire time period between the initial April 11, 1980, indictment and the January 3, 2005, trial setting. The district court did not rule on Appellant's due process claim. The Wyoming Supreme Court subsequently granted the State's petition for review and reversed the district court's order of dismissal holding that the district court erred in considering the period of time during which no charges were pending against Appellant - August 22, 1980, to March 5, 2004 - in holding that Appellant's constitutional right to a speedy trial had been abridged. On remand, the district court, with the parties' concurrence, set Appellant's trial for March 13, 2006. Thereafter, Appellant renewed her speedy trial and due process motions to dismiss. On January 30-31, 2006, the district court, once again, heard testimony and argument on Appellant's motions to dismiss, as well as the parties' other outstanding motions. After reexamining the length of delay in the criminal proceedings and the reasons for the delay, the district court declined to find a constitutional speedy trial violation. In addition, the district court found no evidence of improper prosecutorial motive underlying the 24-year charging, as required under Fortner v. State, 843 P.2d 1139 (Wyo. 1992), and denied Appellant's due process claim. Appellant's trial commenced as scheduled on March 13, 2006 and concluded on March 24, 2006. The jury found Appellant guilty on the lesser offense of second degree murder. The district court sentenced Appellant on June 15, 2006, to a term of imprisonment of 25 to 40 years. This appeal followed.

Holdings: The record reveals Appellant expressly waived the time limitations of W.R.Cr.P. 48 when she sought, via her motion for a date certain, a continuance of the initial trial date. The record also shows that, upon remand from this Court's reversal of the district court's order of dismissal, Appellant agreed to a trial setting beyond the rule's 180-day requirement. Thus, Appellant waived the speedy trial requirements of Rule 48(b), and thus this claim, by her actions in the district court.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees every criminal defendant a speedy and public trial. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), set forth the benchmark test that applies to constitutional speedy trial claims. The Barker test requires consideration of four factors in determining whether a speedy trial violation has occurred: the length of delay; the reason for the delay; the defendant's assertion of her right; and the prejudice to the defendant. None of these factors alone are dispositive. Rather, the factors must be considered together and balanced in relation to all of the relevant circumstances of the delay in bringing the defendant to trial. The ultimate question is "whether the delay in bringing the accused to trial was unreasonable, that is, whether it substantially impaired the right of the accused to a fair trial." When a speedy trial violation is found to have occurred, the charges must be dismissed.

The law is well-settled that the speedy trial right attaches upon the filing of a criminal complaint or the arrest of the defendant, whichever occurs first. However, the speedy trial guarantee does not apply to the period of time between the dismissal of a charge and the subsequent refiling of the charge, provided the defendant is not held in continuous custody. On the basis of these principles, in the present action speedy trial clock in this case initially began on April 11, 1980, when the indictment was filed and Appellant was arrested, and continued to run until the indictment was formally dismissed by the district court on August 22, 1980. The clock resumed on March 5, 2004, when the murder charge was re-filed against Appellant. It stopped again when the district court dismissed the case on December 20, 2004. The speedy trial clock restarted on October 26, 2005, upon the filing in the district court of this Court's mandate reversing the December 20 order of dismissal, and continued to run until Appellant's trial began on March 13, 2006. The total elapsed time to trial, excluding the time when no charge was pending against Appellant, was 561 days. The length of delay in bringing Appellant to trial does warrant examination of the remaining speedy trial factors.

In conducting an analysis for the reasons for a delay, an examination is made as to which party was responsible for the delay. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay. Delays attributable to the defendant are deducted from the equation. A review of the record in the present action, shows that, of the 561 days, delays amounting to 80 days were occasioned by neutral factors not directly attributable to Appellant or the State. Delays surrounding the preliminary hearings in both criminal actions and the continuance of the October 18 trial date in the present action, totaling 175 days, are directly attributable to Appellant, and that the 138-day delay following this Court's remand is attributable to both Appellant and the State. On the whole, that the reasons for the delay in this case weigh evenly in favor of and against each party.

There is no question Appellant asserted her constitutional right to a speedy trial. During the 1980 criminal proceedings, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial and filed a separate demand for a speedy trial. After the refiling of the criminal charge, Appellant filed two additional motions to dismiss for failure to afford her a speedy trial, as well as other pleadings in support of her speedy trial claim. Appellant's assertions of the speedy trial right, however, were intertwined with waivers of speedy preliminary hearings in both criminal actions, a request for a continuance of the trial date in the instant criminal action, continued acquiescence to the timetables set by the district court, numerous pretrial motions that required evidentiary hearings, and a request for a five-month stay in the proceedings while Appellant pursued her speedy trial complaint in the United States Supreme Court. Accordingly, this factor weighs only slightly in Appellant's favor.

The final factor considered is the degree of prejudice to Appellant caused by the delay. Prejudice is assessed in light of the interests the particular evils the speedy trial right is intended to prevent: (1) lengthy pretrial incarceration; (2) pretrial anxiety; and (3) impairment of the defense. On the prejudice prong, Appellant only argues that the delay impaired her defense of the charge. In support of this contention, Appellant points to the unavailability of certain witnesses and evidence resulting from the passage of time between the dismissal of the 1980 criminal action and the refiling of the murder charge in 2004. The obvious flaw in Appellant's argument, is that the protection of the Speedy Trial Clause has no application to the period of time in which she was neither under arrest nor formally charged for the murder of her husband. Any prejudice flowing from the loss of witnesses and evidence during the 24-year gap between the criminal prosecutions must be scrutinized under the tenets of the Due Process Clause, not the Speedy Trial Clause. Appellant does not offer any evidence or argument of prejudice resulting from the 561-day delay at issue here. Consequently, this factor weighs heavily against Appellant.

Thus, in balancing the four Barker factors, the Appellant was not denied her constitutional right to a speedy trial. Although a delay occurred in bringing Appellant to trial and Appellant asserted her right to a speedy trial, the length of the delay was not unreasonable in light of the facts in this case. Furthermore, and most importantly, Appellant has not demonstrated actual prejudice arising from the delay in the criminal proceedings. Under the circumstances, dismissal of the criminal charge against Appellant is not warranted.

Wyoming does not have a statute of limitations for the prosecution of criminal offenses. There is no question the legislature would have the authority to enact a statute of limitation, and the failure to adopt one does not appear to be oversight. Instead, it represents a conscious decision to refrain from extending grace through a statute of limitation in criminal cases. In the absence of a statute of limitations, which is the primary guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal charges, the prosecution for a criminal offense may be commenced at any time during the life of the offender unless the delay in charging denied the accused her constitutional right to due process. A pre-charging delay is not a violation of due process absent a showing of both an intentional delay by the state to gain a tactical advantage over the accused and actual prejudice resulting from the delay. The burden of proving the required two-part showing lies with the appellant.

In the present action, Appellant has not carried her burden on either prong. An independent review of the record reveals no evidence indicating bad faith or improper motive on the part of the State. Additionally, the court was not convinced that Appellant was substantially prejudiced by the delay given the facts of this case. Both improper motive and actual prejudice must be shown in order to establish a due process violation. Even if it were to be concluded that some prejudice resulted from the delay because evidence was unavailable, Appellant has not presented any evidence that the prosecutors delayed refiling the charges in order to gain a tactical advantage or due to some other improper motive. By itself, the fact 24 years elapsed between the dismissal of the original criminal case and the filing of the new murder charge does not establish a due process violation. Appellant's claim is rejected.

At trial, the victim's sister testified about a conversation she had with him the night before he was killed. She testified that, during this conversation, he was extremely upset and angry about some bank problems and Appellant's possible involvement in those problems. Such testimony was admissible under the hearsay exception provided by W.R.E. 803(3) for a declarant's then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health). This exception is available when a nonparty's state of mind is significant. In many criminal trials, the state of mind of the alleged victim is important. What the victim said is often admissible to show his purpose, knowledge or mental state. In the present action, the victim's statement that he was angry with Appellant about the problems at the bank and, if he learned that she was responsible for the missing money and checks, he intended to kick her out of the house and keep the children with him showed his then-existing state of mind and emotion. His state of mind was relevant because testimony from bank employees and others indicated Appellant knew he was upset about the missing money and believed she was responsible, and her knowledge of his state of mind may have affected her actions later that night. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony concerning the statements the victim made on the night before he was killed.

A review of the issue as to whether financial records were hearsay and admitted improperly hearsay evidence is inhibited by the global scope of Appellant's argument. Appellant muddles categories of documents together, failing to present any cogent argument regarding specific challenges to individual documents. Because of the overreaching nature of Appellant's argument, there is no basis in Appellant's argument for overturning the district court's determination of admissibility. Appellant's argument that the challenged documents should not have been admitted seems to revolve, in part, around her speculation that further documents existed that had not been discovered. Other aspects of her argument concern documents that were destroyed over time after the homicide and were no longer available at the time of trial. Appellant complains that the speculative and unavailable documents could have changed the entire context of the admitted documents. Appellant's challenge mistakes admissibility with credibility. Appellant has not provided any legal principle that would bar admissibility of standard business records based on the unavailability of related documents, particularly those whose very existence is purely a matter of conjecture. Without question, the complete records, unmarred by torn pages and missing segments, would have been more useful to the trial court than those records actually admitted. However, such discrepancies go to the weight rather than to the admissibility of the evidence. So long as the available records satisfied all of the safeguards set out in Rule 803(6), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting them into evidence. Additionally, Appellant has not argued, within the context of the facts of this case, that admission of the challenged records prejudiced her, even under a harmless error standard. Under the circumstances, there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant if the error had never occurred.

There is no reversible error in light of the applicable rules of law. The judgment and sentence of the district court is affirmed.

J. Golden delivered the opinion for the court.

Friday, June 13, 2008

Updated Library Webpage

For those of you who are choosing to avoid our indecisive Wyoming weather this weekend, and instead are conscientiously completing your legal research, here is an update on the fancy new toy I placed on the library homepage this week.

Being a Google fan, I decided to play with one of their tech options and created a Google gadget that would provide quick links to popular legal resources as well as search our library catalog. This gadget can be added to your iGoogle homepage if you use one. (Click on the "Add Stuff" link on the right side of the page, close to the top. Search for "Wyoming" and our gadget will show up in that results list.) I also was able to embed it on our library site. Hopefully you can see it in action now. If not, you now know why I'm sending out this email. I have had reports that the gadget is not showing up and instead there is a big blank space where our links to Wyoming and federal resources used to be. This being an unsatisfactory situation, I am sending you a very quick, though temporary, fix.

If you're seeing a big blank spot on our homepage (http://library.courts.state.wy.us), hit the F5 key, or hit CTRL+F5. This will refresh your web browser and hopefully the gadget and it's important links will appear.

Be assured that I will be solving this inconsistent bug as soon as I can.

Thursday, June 12, 2008

Summary 2008 WY 66

Summary of Decision issued June 12, 2008

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Brumbaugh v. Mikelson Land Co.

Citation: 2008 WY 66

Docket Number: S-07-0218

Appeal from the District Court of Park County, the Steven R. Cranfill, Judge.

Representing Appellants (Plaintiffs): S. Joseph Darrah of Darrah, Darrah & Brown, PC, Powell, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Thomas P. Keegan of Keegan & Winslow, PC, Cody, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: The Brumbaughs filed a declaratory and injunctive relief action against MLC seeking to enforce the rights they claimed pursuant to the Skytel Country Estates restrictive covenants and plat. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of MLC holding the Brumbaughs were not entitled to any of their requests for relief. After the Brumbaughs predecessor in interest purchased two Skytel lots, Skytel partially vacated the plat, amended the restrictive covenants and sold the remaining property to Mikelson Land Company (MLC) which incorporated it into a larger subdivision.
Partial Vacation of Plat and Amendment to Restrictive Covenants of the Skytel Country Estates Subdivision:
Under the plain language of the amendment to the declaration of covenants, the vacation of the plat and § 34-12-108, the owners of Lots 77, 81 and 82 in the Skytel Country Estates subdivision continued to enjoy the rights and be bound by the obligations contained in the relevant subdivision documents. The amendment to the covenants and the vacation of the plat did not change those rights.
Brumbaughs’ Rights Concerning the Skytel Country Estates Subdivision:
The district court considered the language of paragraph 6 of the covenants and declared that the covenant reserved the right to such easements only to the title owner which was MLC. The Court stated that the district court’s interpretation was mistaken. When the entire declaration iwa considered, the rights conveyed were to inure to the benefit of Skytel lot owners. Therefore the Brumbaughs have a right to easements for utilities and access. The declaration does not define the location or scope of the easements. On remand the district court will have the responsibility of determining the location and scope. The Brumbaughs also claimed they were entitled to use all roads which have been developed in the original Skytel Country Estates. The Court concluded as a matter of law they were entitled to access to their lot across lands formerly within the Skytel Country Estates subdivision. They were not limited to the roads shown on the plat. On remand the district court will need to determine the status of the Heidi Drive access or whether other reasonably convenient or necessary access exists or may be developed. The express language of the covenants does not create an obligation for the developer to provide water nor does it convey a right to tap into any water system. The Brumbaugh’s interpretation of the language of the covenants would create a new right to connect to the Cody’s Country subdivision water system which the Court ruled they were not entitled to. The Court ruled that the property formerly included in the common area of the Skytel Country Estates subdivision was not burdened by the requirements that central livestock facilities be placed upon it.
MLC’s Rights in the Skytel Country Estates Subdivision:
Prior to the vacation of the plat, the owner of two-thirds of the land area in the Skytel Country Estates subdivision had the authority to modify the covenants. MLC is not an owner of land in the subdivision therefore it does not have the right to modify the Skytel Country Estates subdivision covenants. The Court stated the appointment of an architectural committee was invalid at the time the complaint was filed.

Holding: The Skytel Country Estates subdivision documents grant the Brumbaughs easements for power, sewer and access across lands originally in the Skytel Country Estate subdivision and the district court erred by ruling as a matter of law that they did not have those rights. Because the location and scope of the easements were not set out in the written documents, they are floating easements and the district court will have to consider the relevant facts to determine a reasonable and convenient location and scope for those easements.
The district court properly concluded that the covenants did not grant the Brumbaughs the right to connect to the water system developed by MLC or to central livestock facilities located in the common area of the original Skytel Country Estates subdivision.
MLC did not have the authority to modify the Skytel Country Estates subdivision covenants and the appointment of MLC as architectural committee was not valid.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, remanded.

J. Kite delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/69tofy .

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