Fee Fie Foe Firm

There's a new free legal website called Fee Fie Foe Firm. It's a customized Google search engine designed to give legal consumers and professionals better access to law firms and their services. It searches exclusively across law firm websites allowing you to find articles, newsletters, resumes, media releases - anything that's published on a law firm website.

The law library is currently developing a customized Google search engine for Wyoming legal research sources. We'll be announcing it soon.

Questions to Ask If You're Considering Using SaaS

Here's an addendum to my earlier post, Cloud Computing - Technology Savior or Privacy Nightmare?

These are some questions you would want to ask a potential SaaS vendor, from an article by Alan Cohen, "Cloud Computing, Is It Safe?":

1. Where is my data -- and how secure is it?
2. What happens when disaster strikes?
3. Do you provide a service level agreement?
4. Who owns the data -- and how do I get it back?
5. How much customization can I get?

Summary 2009 WY 92

Summary of Decision issued July 15, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Thomas v. State

Citation: 2009 WY 92

Docket Number: S-09-0018

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge.

Representing Appellant Thomas: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: A jury found Thomas guilty of attempted second-degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault and battery, and reckless endangerment. Thomas rammed his truck into his former girlfriend and the vehicle beside which she was standing. He then jumped out of his truck and pointed a handgun at her and a person standing nearby.
Irrelevant victim impact testimony: At trial, without objection, the victim and her physician, testified at length and in detail about the victim’s injuries, the surgeries and the necessity of future medical treatment. The nature and extent of a victim’s injuries, no less than the manner in which they were inflicted, may be probative of appellant’s intent to kill. Where a victim on the surface appears to have healed from physical injuries, evidence of those injuries may be the only way to adequately give the jury a sense of the crime that took place. Victim impact evidence is not admissible in every case. But where there has been no trial objection and where the evidence has sufficient probative value to outweigh the danger of an unfairly prejudicial effect, the Court cannot say that it was plain error for it to have been admitted.
Failure to consider the PSI: Thomas contended that the district court did not consider the PSI as required by the W.R.Cr.P. 32(a). The Court stated the Rule only requires the district court to consider the PSI. It does not require it to base the sentence upon the PSI. A review of the sentencing hearing transcript clearly revealed that the district court considered the PSI.

Conclusion: The victim impact evidence presented during the guilt phase of the trial in the case was relevant because it tended to prove an element of one of the charged crimes. The record reflects that the district court considered the PSI as required.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/m6ryqn .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 91

Summary of Decision issued July 15, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Britton v. State

Citation: 2009 WY 91

Docket Number: S-08-0179

Appeal from the District Court of Uinta County, the Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge.

Representing Appellant Britton: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Cathleen D. Parker, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Britton was convicted of involuntary manslaughter for the suffocation death of his girlfriend’s daughter. Before trial, the district court ruled that evidence of bruising on the child’s body would not be admissible. At trial, however, a medical report (Exhibit 10) that included references to bruising was admitted into evidence without objection. Britton challenged the admission of the information into evidence. Britton also challenged a provision of his written sentence ordering him to pay public defender fees. Britton contended that the provision was invalid because it was contrary to the district court’s oral ruling.
To determine whether the introduction of Exhibit 10 resulted in material prejudice, the Court reviewed the sort of unfairly prejudicial evidence that is inadmissible under W.R.E. 404(b). Exhibit 10 consisted of twenty-four pages of medical notes, within which were five references to bruises on the child’s body. Neither the prosecution nor the defense made note of the references. There was no evidence put to the jury that the bruises were the result of spanking or child abuse. There was no evidence presented to the jury that Britton spanked the child. Britton acknowledged that he wrapped the child in a blanket and that he was aware of the danger that wrapping a child’s head in a blanket could result in suffocation.
During the sentencing hearing, the district court clearly and expressly stated that Britton lacked the ability to pay the fees and that he would not be ordered to do so. The written judgment and sentence provided that he would.

Conclusion: The jury was presented with ample evidence that Britton involuntarily but recklessly caused the death of the child. The Court remanded the case to the district court to correct the written judgment to conform with the oral ruling.

Affirmed in part, remanded in part.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/lkcbw9 .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Ideas for Using Technology to Market Your Firm

If you've been wondering how and where to best make your marketing dollars work, there's a great article by Nancy Roberts Linder on today's Legal Technology at Law.com. "Where to Invest Your Marketing Technology Dollars" not only gives you marketing ideas, but provides examples of companies who provide services and concrete examples of firms already using these tech ideas. Whether you want to have a website with more impact, add podcasts or video, implement email marketing or invest time in social networking (LinkedIn, Facebook, Twitter), or all of the above, Linder provides pros and cons in a short concise article.

Summary 2009 WY 90

Summary of Decision issued July 10, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: White v. State, ex rel., WYDOT

Citation: 2009 WY 90

Docket Number: S-08-0224

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Michael K. Davis, Judge.

Representing White: Bernard Q. Phelan, Phelan Law Offices, Cheyenne, Wyoming

Representing State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Theodore Racines, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: White and Kenney challenged the district court’s order dismissing their complaint pursuant to W.R.C.P. 37(b)(2) as a sanction for their failure to comply with two orders compelling discovery.
A party served with discovery requests must respond within 30 days of service unless that party objects or moves for a protective order. It was undisputed that Appellants did not respond to discovery requests within the requisite period and did not respond at all to some of the requests. It is also undisputed that Appellants never filed any objection or motion for a protective order. Despite the district court’s warnings Appellants failed to comply. In the instant case, the district court did not abuse its discretion.
Additionally, Appellants contended the Court should find per se abuse of discretion because the district court vacated the trial and stated that a new date would not be set until Appellants paid the costs imposed as a sanction. The Court has expressly held that there is no violation of art. 1, § 8 of the Wyoming Constitution when a district court orders a trial postponed until sanctions are paid.

Conclusion: Appellants were provided with ample opportunity to comply with the Court’s order prior to dismissal. Appellants implied throughout their brief that the discovery requests were unduly burdensome and overbroad. They could have objected to the requests or moved for a protective order. Failure or refusal to comply was not an alternative available under the rules.

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/ox6es9 .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 89

Summary of Decision issued July 10, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Creecy v. State

Citation: 2009 WY 89

Docket Number: S-08-0211

Appeal from the District Court of Uinta County, the Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge.

Representing Creecy: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and Kirk A. Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney general; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: A jury convicted Creecy of aggravated assault for intentionally and knowingly causing bodily injury to Chavez with a knife in a bar fight. Creecy asserted the district court erred in instructing the jury concerning the claim of self defense. The Court reviewed the instructions in the instant case and stated the instruction was from the Wyoming Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions and had been used in Harries v. State, Garcia v. State and Small v. State. The Court noted that the difficulty with Creecy’s argument was that evidence was presented from which the jury could have concluded that after Chavez pummeled him, he armed himself and attacked Chavez as he was leaving the bar. Creecy failed to establish that plain error occurred when the district court gave the instruction concerning “duty to retreat.”
ted a clear and unequivocal rule of law. Given the conflicting evidence as to who the aggressor was when Chavez was stabbed, Creecy also failed to show that giving the instruction denied him a substantial right to his material prejudice.

Affirmed.

J. Kite delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/lms37x .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 88

Summary of Decision issued July 10, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Morris v. State

Citation: 2009 WY 88

Docket Number: S-08-0177

Appeal from the District Court of Uinta County, the Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge.

Representing Morris: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and Eric M. Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney general; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: A jury convicted Morris of felony property destruction.
Sufficiency of the evidence that Morris “knowingly” destroyed property: The district court did not instruct the jury on the meaning of the term “knowingly” or how it was to be construed in the context of the remaining statutory language. Morris contended that because the State did not provide proof that he knew his act would deface the vehicle or that he had any intent at all to damage it, the conviction cannot stand. Applying the ordinary meaning of the words to the language contained in the statute, it was clear to the Court that Morris violated the statute if, with awareness, deliberateness or intention, he defaced the vehicle; it likewise was clear that he did not violate the provision if he inadvertently or involuntarily defaced the vehicle. Testimony included a statement that Morris slid across the top of the car and that the witness heard metal buckling as he slid. The Court stated that the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.
Failure to instruct jury concerning “knowingly”: The Court has previously held that the word “knowingly” is not a technical term requiring an instruction on its meaning, and due to the lack of any established rule requiring an instruction on the meaning of “knowingly”, Morris could not establish plain error.
Allowing prosecutor to define “knowingly”: During closing argument the prosecutor made a statement regarding the definition of knowingly and referred to Black’s Law Dictionary. The plain language of the statute required the State to prove that Morris, with awareness, deliberateness or intention defaced the vehicle. Evidence that Morris inadvertently defaced the vehicle would not have been sufficient to support a conviction under the statute. The Court agreed with Morris that the prosecutor misstated the law when she told the jury that all the State had to show was that he jumped on the car and that it did not have to show that he intended to damage it. Giving the words their plain meaning, the statute required proof that Morris deliberately damaged the vehicle or intended that result. Evaluating the statement within the context of the entire record, the Court concluded that Morris demonstrated he was denied a substantial right which materially prejudiced him. Had the prosecutor not told the jury that all the State had to prove was that Morris jumped on the vehicle, and that it did not have to prove that he intended to cause damage, there was a reasonable probability that the jury would have concluded from the State’s evidence that his act was inadvertent and he was not guilty of property destruction.
Restitution: Morris claimed the district court erred in ordering him to pay restitution in the amount of $1400, the estimated valued of the vehicle before the damage. The State requested restitution based upon the 2007 Kelly Blue Book value for a car of the same year, make and model in fair condition. It was not clear from the record whether the district court ordered Morris to pay that amount because defense counsel did not object to the PSI or because it concluded the fair market value was the appropriate measure of restitution. In the context of a civil action, when property is not entirely destroyed, the proper measure of damages is its value before the damage less its value after the damage.

Conclusion: The State presented sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. The Court has previously held that the word “knowingly” is not a technical term requiring an instruction on its meaning. The prosecutor’s misstatements meant that there was a reasonable probability the jury would have concluded from the evidence that Morris’ act was inadvertent and he was not guilty of property destruction. The proper measure of restitution, when property has not been completely destroyed, is the value of the item before the damage less the value after the damage.

Reversed and remanded.

J. Hill delivered the decision.

J. Golden, concurring in part, dissenting in part: The Justice concurred in the disposition of the question regarding jury instructions. He agreed that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Morris’ conviction but disagreed with the majority opinion’s reasoning on that issue. He stated the opinion blurred the distinction between general intent and specific intent crimes. The Court has consistently ruled that criminal statutes that include the mental element “knowingly” are general intent crimes. By its plain language, § 6-3-201 is a general intent crime. The State was simply required to prove that Morris intentionally jumped on the car and not that he intended to cause damage to it. The evidence clearly supported that conclusion.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/n2xx8g .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 87

Summary of Decision issued July 7, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Cubba v. Wyoming

Citation: 2009 WY 87

Docket Number: S-08-0244

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge.

Representing Cubba: Ronald G. Pretty, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney general; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Cubba appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to correct a clerical error in his Judgment and Sentence. Cubba entered a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement for felony destruction of property and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. He contended that the Judgment and Sentence erroneously stated that his sentences were to be consecutive rather than concurrent. For Cubba to prevail, he had to have proven that the written Judgment and Sentence differed from the sentence orally imposed. The record clearly illustrated the ambiguity in the court’s oral sentence. Cubba demonstrated only that the court made two statements, one reflecting an intent to impose consecutive sentences and the other suggesting an intent to impose concurrent sentences.

Conclusion: When the record was reviewed in its entirety, Cubba had not established that the district court unambiguously imposed concurrent sentences.

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/l7fvov .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 86

Summary of Decision issued July 6, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: McCann v. City of Cody, Wyoming

Citation: 2009 WY 86

Docket Number: S-08-0134

Appeal from the District Court of Park County, the Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge.

Representing McCann: John R. Hursh of Central Wyoming Law Associates PC, Riverton, Wyoming.

Representing Cody, WY: Tracy J. Copenhaver and Scott E. Kolpitcke of Copenhaver, Kath, Kitchen & Kolpitcke, LLC, Powell, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: McCann sought review of the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the City. McCann was injured in car accident which she claimed was caused by the negligence of the City and its contractor Harris Trucking and Construction (Harris).
The rule that timely filing of a proper claim with the governmental entity is a condition precedent to suit is a judicially created rule. In Beaulieu II, the Court held that the complaint must allege compliance with the signature and certification requirements of the state constitution without which the district court does not obtain subject matter jurisdiction. The Court has repeatedly upheld the stringency of the rule over the intervening years in decisions including Gose v. City of Douglas, Coffinberry v. Board of County Commissioners, and Cantrell v. Sweetwater County School Dist. No. 2.

Conclusion: McCann did not include in her complaint an averment that she had complied with the requirements as set out in Beaulieu II (2004). It was true both with respect to the statutory and the constitutional requirements. Therefore, the district court did not acquire subject matter jurisdiction of the complaint and therefore, the Court did not acquire either.

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the decision.

J. Burke dissenting; joined by J. Kite: J. Burke dissented for three reasons: the allegations of the complaint, when reviewed in the light most favorable to McCann, sufficiently alleged the prerequisites for the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. If the complaint was not sufficient, the plaintiff should be allowed to amend the complaint. Third, if the judicially created rules for pleading a governmental claim lead to the conclusion that the complaint is legally insufficient and plaintiff is not permitted to amend, the rules should be abolished as they serve no useful purpose and create unwarranted obstacles to the determination of governmental claims on their merits. As this case indicated, a dilatory defendant benefits from failing to raise the jurisdictional challenge early in the proceedings. By contrast, the consequences of a pleading defect fall solely and harshly on the plaintiff. Plaintiffs lose their rights to have their statutorily authorized governmental claims determined on the merits simply because the complaint did not contain the jurisdiction allegation. The judicially created pleading requirements are at odds with the intended purpose of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act and the governing principles of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/kw6pcv .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 85

Summary of Decision issued July 1, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: In re: Cancellation Deed from Street, Jr.

Citation: 2009 WY 85

Docket Number: S-08-0107

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge.

Representing L.B. Street: Patrick Dixon, Chapin & Dixon, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing W.C. Street: Cameron S. Walker of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: After L.B. Street became extremely ill and hospitalized, he entered into a number of transactions conveying items of personal and real property to his children. When he recovered, he claimed he had no memory of the conveyances. The prevailing question was whether L.B. Street had the requisite mental capacity to execute the documents conveying his property. The Wyoming court adheres to the general principle that mere weakness of body or mind or both, do not constitute what the law regards as mental incompetency sufficient to render a contract voidable.
Application of presumption of validity to notarized deed: The appellant contended that the district court improperly applied a presumption of validity to the inter vivos conveyance of the deed and bills of sale at issue. After a review of the record, the Court stated that nothing in the language of the district court’s holding indicated that it applied a presumption of validity when determining whether L.B. Street had the requisite mental capacity to execute the deed.
Standard for determination of capacity to execute a deed: L.B. Street claimed to have limited recollection of many of the events that occurred while he was hospitalized or during his stay at the hospice and no memory of any of the conveyances made during his illness. He argued that in Morton, the Court stated the standard included that the grantor be able to recollect the decision he formed. The Court stated that was argument was incorrect. The point of time to be considered is the time of execution of the deed.
Application of the proper burden of proof: L.B. Street raised the issue of undue influence for the first time on appeal. Because the Court did not find it to be a jurisdictional or fundamental issue, the Court did not address it.
Factual findings clearly erroneous: The record included testimony from the children, a grandchild, the nursing flow sheets, the individuals who notarized the documents and the physician expert presented by L.B. Street. The trier of fact must decide what weight is to be given to expert testimony, to determine the credibility of all witnesses, and to evaluate the testimony of each in reaching its verdict. The testimony of the physician expert upon which L.B. Street relied heavily upon fell short of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he was mentally incompetent to enter into the transactions.

Conclusion: The Court found the district court applied the proper standards when determining whether L.B. Street had the requisite mental capacity to enter into the transactions at issue. The Court did not consider the undue influence claim as it was not raised in the case below. After reviewing the record the Court stated the district court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/nycqvh .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 84

Summary of Decision issued July 1, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: McGarvey v. Key Property Management, LLC

Citation: 2009 WY 84

Docket Number: S-08-0194

Appeal from the District Court of Sweetwater County, the Honorable Nena R. James, Judge.

Representing McGarvey: Timothy Kingston, Graves, Miller & Kingston, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Key Property: Kathleen Dixon and Patrick Dixon, Chapin & Dixon, Casper, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: McGarvey filed a wrongful termination suit against her employer, claiming she was discharged from her job for reasons that violate public policy. McGarvey worked at a low-income housing facility in Rock Springs. At some point during renovations that were taking place, she organized a meeting for the residents to bring their problems to the attention of the Mayor. McGarvey received a letter noting the “unauthorized tenant meeting” which she “knew would be harmful to the company” shortly prior to her discharge. Her employers maintained there were other legitimate reasons for their decision to terminate her employment as well.
The Court noted that both parties agreed she was an at-will employee. Wyoming recognizes an exception that an employer may incur tort liability if it discharges an employee for reasons that violate public policy. McGarvey’s employers were not state or federal actors and therefore cannot be held liable under the federal constitution. Appellant noted that the free speech provision of the Wyoming constitution is worded differently and asserted it should be interpreted differently than the federal constitutional language. The facts of the Allen case match closely with the instant case. McGarvey’s speech, in which she expressed her negative opinion of her employer and potentially harmed her employer’s relationship with government officials, exceeded the limits of protected speech. The Court did not accept McGarvey’s argument that she was discharged for exercising her right of free speech.

Conclusion: The speech that McGarvey claimed was the reason for her discharge took place in a meeting held during working hours in the offices of her employers’ apartment complex. The speech was not constitutionally protected and her discharge did not violate any well-established public policy.

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/majq8p .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 83

Summary of Decision issued June 30, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Hall v. Perry

Citation: 2009 WY 83

Docket Number: S-08-0167

Appeal from the District Court of Park County, the Honorable Steven Cranfill, Judge.

Representing Hall: Matthew D. Winslow of Keegan & Winslow, PC, Cody, Wyoming.

Representing Perry: Patrick J. Murphy and Lori L. Gorseth of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, PC, Casper, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: Hall was injured when he was thrown from a horse while participating in a deer hunt guided by Hidden Creek Outfitters (Perry). The district court ruled that the Release signed by Hall precluded his negligence action and granted summary judgment in favor of Perry. Hall argued that after he signed the Letter Agreement and provided the initial deposit, Perry was obligated to take him on the hunt. He claimed the Letter Agreement formed the entire contract and the Release was a separate agreement which required consideration apart from the fee he paid for the hunt. Hall signed the Release Agreement after arriving at the lodge prior to the hunt.
The Court stated that it follows the preexisting duty rule which means an agreement to do what one is already bound to do cannot serve as consideration to support a modification of the parties’ agreement. Perry argued that the preexisting duty rule did not apply because the Release was part of the parties’ original agreement and thus, no new or additional consideration was needed to make it enforceable. In order to accept Hall’s position that the Release was not part of the parties’ original agreement, the Court would have had to ignore the Letter Agreement’s clear reference to a separate Release and Indemnity Agreement. The Court noted the case fit into the Roussalis rationale and that no new consideration was required to make the Release enforceable.

Conclusion: The district court recognized the Release was not attached to the Letter Agreement but concluded that it was effective as an addendum because it was signed by Hall. The Court believed the Letter Agreement referred to the Release. Because the Release was an addendum to the original contract, no additional consideration was required.

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/majkat .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 82

Summary of Decision issued June 19, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Jackson v. State

Citation: 2009 WY 82

Docket Number: S-08-0048

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge.

Representing Jackson: Diane Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kristin Shaun Wilkerson, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Jackson appealed from an Order Revoking Probation and Imposing Sentence. He contended the district court erred in failing to award credit against his sentence for time he spent in jail awaiting resolution of the Petition to Revoke Probation.
Jackson asked the Court to reconsider their opinion in Halbleib where it recognized the general principle that a defendant must receive credit for all time spent in custody that is directly attributable to the underlying criminal charge. The Court held in Halbleib that as a matter of law, time spent in custody awaiting revocation proceedings can never be attributable to the underlying offense. In the instant case, the Court held that credit for time served awaiting probation revocation may be attributable to the underlying criminal charge in appropriate circumstances. Jackson was detained solely because of the accusation that he violated one or more conditions of his probation. Although some of the allegations would have been independent criminal activity if proven, he was never charged with a separate criminal offense as a result of the facts alleged in the petition to revoke his probation.

Conclusion: Under the undisputed facts of the case, the Court concluded that the 109 days that Jackson was detained pending resolution of the State’s petition to revoke probation were served as a result of the underlying criminal conviction. Jackson received only 55 days of credit of that time. The Court found he must also receive credit for the additional 54 days he was incarcerated pending resolution.

Reversed and remanded.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/n4onvy .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 81

Summary of Decision issued June 19, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Hulsy v. State

Citation: 2009 WY 81

Docket Number: S-08-0257

Appeal from the District Court of Teton County, the Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge.

Representing Hulsy: Diane Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. Morgan. Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Hulsy was convicted by a jury of felony interference with a peace officer. Hulsy was engaged in a violent verbal and physical confrontation with an employee at a bar in Jackson. He was eventually subdued and restrained by bar employees and his roommate until Teton County Sheriffs arrived. The Sheriffs had to force him to walk out of the bar. The roommate and the Sheriffs reported that as they were headed down some stairs Hulsy either kicked one of the deputies or lunged forward carrying himself and one of the Sheriffs along with him injuring the Sheriff.
In the prosecutor’s opening and closing statements, he commented that the Sheriff fell down the steps and was injured regardless of whether Hulsy kicked him or lunged forward and dragged him down the stairs with him. The Court noted that it has described the constitutional and procedural principles underlying notice and variance issues in Gonzales v. State, Vernier v. State and Capshaw v. State. It expanded on the principles in the decision in Spagner noting that a variance occurs when the evidence presented at trial proves facts different from those alleged in the information and that a variance is not fatal unless the appellant could not have anticipated from the indictment what evidence would be admitted at trial. The Court found there was sufficient evidence in the trial transcript whereby the jury could have found either version of the events credible and reasonably could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant intentionally and knowingly injured the deputy.
A careful review of the record revealed that the State did not shift its theory of prosecution, rather the State took advantage of Hulsy’s defense (that he thrashed and lunged in such a fashion as to knock the Sheriff down the stairs as opposed to kicking him) and pointed out that the net result was the same – the evidence proved the elements of the crime.

Conclusion: Under applicable constitutional and procedural standards, Hulsy was adequately advised of the charge against him and there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict which was not the product of improper alternative charging.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/np5dog .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 80

Summary of Decision issued June 18, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Velasquez v. Chamberlain

Citation: 2009 WY 80

Docket Number: S-08-0043; S-08-0044

Appeal from the District Court of Converse County, the Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge.

Representing Velasquez: Patrick Dixon of Casper, Wyoming.

Representing Chamberlain: Heather A. Jacobson of Jacobson Law Office, LLC, Douglas, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: These two consolidated appeals arise from a dispute between neighboring landowners. The Chamberlains own certain water rights. Traditionally, the water had been carried to their property through an established ditch running through property currently owned by the Velasquezes. Prior to their purchase of the property, the ditch failed and the Chamberlains replaced it with a pipeline, running on a different course from the ditch. When the Velasquezes bought the property, they claimed the Chamberlains had not received proper permission to install or maintain the pipeline and proceeded to effectively destroy the pipeline as it ran through their property. The resulting legal action included multiple claims for damages on both sides and a petition for a restraining order against the Velasquezes allowing the Chamberlains to go on their property and fix the pipeline.
The district court determined the Chamberlains legally had the unencumbered right to convey their water through the pipeline. In appeal No. S-08-0043, the Velasquezes appeal the district court’s order allowing the Chamberlains to maintain and use the pipeline as it crosses their property, as well as the district court’s refusal to grant damages to them. In appeal No. S-08-0044, the Chamberlains appeal the amount they were granted in damages, alleging the evidence supported a larger amount.
Appeal No. S-08-0043
Statutory Compliance: The Velasquezes argued that the Chamberlains violated § 41-3-114 when they changed the flow of water from the established ditch to a pipeline. The Court declined to address the argument because based upon a review of the record it was unclear whether the issue was raised in the trial below.
Validity of the Contract: The Velasquezes questioned whether Dave Lozier (previous owner of the land the Velasquez’s now own) was authorized to enter into the Agreement on behalf of Guy Lozier (brother of Dave who purchased the property from Dave when he could not meet his obligations under the contract for deed.) The district court determined that Dave had apparent authority to enter into the contract on behalf of Guy. The evidence included that there was no change in the way Dave managed the property after the purchase by Guy. The Court agreed it was reasonable for the Chamberlains to accept that Dave had authority to enter into the Agreement based on the evidence that Dave managed the property without any input from Guy. In addition, the district court found that Guy ratified the Agreement by his silence in the face of knowledge of the pipeline. The evidence supported a reasonable inference that Guy was aware of the pipeline as evidenced by a remaining scar on the ground from the excavation work. It could also be reasonably inferred that, by not objecting in any manner over a period of almost six months, Guy ratified the Agreement. The Velasquezes argue the Agreement does not constitute an easement, license or covenant running with the land. The Court stated the focus should be on the subject of the Agreement – the buried water pipeline. The pipeline replaced part of the Powell Number One Ditch which transported water to the Chamberlains’ property. Water rights encompass the right to convey water. As the Court stated in Bard Ranch, Inc.: the ditch follows the right. Consequently, the ownership interest of the Chamberlains remained unaltered regardless of who owned the property through which the pipeline runs.
Damages: Because the Court determined that the pipeline was legally in place, no trespass occurred by the Chamberlains when they repaired the pipeline. Another allegation was the use of the Vleasquezes’ feedlot by the Chamberlains. The Court agreed with the district court that the amount of damages caused by his use was not adequately proven. There was an allegation of trespass which concerned water flooding part of a pasture. According to testimony, the pasture had only been used for grazing in the past and not for hay production. The damage assessment reflected the value of a total loss of hay on pasture which bore no relation to any loss of use of the property. The request for nominal damages to deter future similar conduct was not addressed by the Court.
Appeal No. S-08-0044: An uncontradicted invoice in the amount of $11,540 for repair to the pipeline from damage caused by the Velasquezes supported the award for the full amount of the invoice.

Conclusion: The Agreement was a valid contract between neighboring landowners to alter the course and method of water flowing from the LaPrele Creek to the Chamberlain property. The Chamberlains maintained the same ownership interest in the buried water pipeline as they had in the Powell Number One Ditch. Further, the damages claimed by the Velasquezes were not supported by adequate evidence. The district court’s order was affirmed. In appeal S-08-0044, the Chamberlains introduced adequate evidence to support their claim for damages in the amount of $11,540. The award for damages was reversed and remanded.

Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.

J. Golden delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/mgx6dh .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 79

Summary of Decision issued June 17, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Royball v. State

Citation: 2009 WY 79

Docket Number: S-08-0234

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge.

Representing Appellant Royball: Diane M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling. Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Royball was charged with three counts of first degree sexual assault and one count of kidnapping. The parties subsequently entered into a plea agreement in which the State agreed to amend the information to charge two counts of third degree sexual assault in place of the first degree sexual assault counts and dismiss the remaining sexual assault and kidnapping charges. In exchange, Royball agreed to plead guilty to the amended counts of third degree sexual assault. At the change of plea hearing, the district court judge made statements concerning the plea agreement which caused Royball to terminate the hearing and file a motion for change of judge on the grounds of bias or prejudice. The circuit court denied the motion.

Motions to disqualify a judge based upon bias or prejudice are governed by W.R.Cr.P. 21.1(b). Royball asserted that the district court judge’s comments demonstrated that he had prejudged Royball’s conduct and formed the opinion that he raped the victim and should be sentenced accordingly. Royball contended the prejudgment was based on allegations contained in the probable cause affidavit filed in support of the original charges which the prosecutor had agreed to dismiss and amend. The district court judge stated that he didn’t understand how anybody could read the Affidavit of Probable Cause and believe it was appropriate to reduce two first degree rape charges to third degree sexual assault. In addition he commented that it was not his role to “second guess the DA’s office” or to “interfere with the discussions between the DA’s office and the victim.” When the judge’s comments were reviewed in the context of all of his statements during the proceedings, the Court concluded that the district court judge was not swayed and that he was able to exercise his functions impartially.

Conclusion: It could be reasonably concluded from the judge’s statements that he understood his duty was to sentence Royball only for the offenses he admitted to having committed and to which he pled guilty and on the basis of all the factors presented at the time of sentencing.

Affirmed.

J. Kite delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/mczpja .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 78

Summary of Decision issued June 15, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: In re: JD and SE

Citation: 2009 WY 78

Docket Number: S-08-0246

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

Representing Appellant (Respondents): Jakob Norman and Jamie Woolsey, Center Street Law Offices, Casper, Wyoming; Hampton Young, Jr., Law Office of Hampton M. Young, Jr., Casper, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Petitioner): Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; Jill E. Kucera, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Guardian Ad Litem: Corinne A. Burke Miller, Casper, Wyoming

Issues: Whether the State of Wyoming, Department of Family services (DFS), established by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts were made to reunify the family, and that the health and safety of the children would be jeopardized by returning them to the Mother and Father. Whether DFS established by clear and convincing evidence that Mother and Father are unfit parents. Whether DFS followed applicable rules and statutes.

Holdings: Wyo. Stat. 14-2-309 (2007) sets forth seven different bases on which parental rights may be terminated. These bases are separate and independent. Accordingly, while DFS may seek to terminate parental rights on more than one basis, it need not prove more than one. Proof of any one of those bases by clear and convincing evidence supports the termination of parental rights.

Wyo. Stat. 14-2-309(a)(i) (2007) requires proof that the parent has not communicated with the children for a period of at least one year. The record reflects that Mother often wrote to her children, and received letters and photographs in return. On this basis, the district court declined to terminate her parental rights pursuant to subsection (i). However, the termination of her parental rights must still be affirmed if there was clear and convincing proof that Mother’s rights should be terminated under another subsection of the statute.

Wyo. Stat. 14-2-309(a)(iii) (2007) requires proof that reasonable efforts have been unsuccessful in rehabilitating the family or the family has refused rehabilitative treatment. In their appeals, Mother and Father devote substantial attention to arguments that DFS did not make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the family. Father, in particular, asserts that DFS violated applicable statutory, regulatory, and policy requirements relating to rehabilitation efforts. DFS counters that its rehabilitation efforts were reasonable, though it admits that the incarceration of Mother and Father rendered such efforts more difficult. It should be noted, however, that subsection (iii) of the statute is the only subsection that lists unsuccessful rehabilitation efforts as a requirement for terminating parental rights. The remaining six subsections of § 14-2-309(a) do not require DFS to make rehabilitation efforts. Accordingly, the need not consider the parents’ arguments concerning rehabilitation efforts if there is another subsection of the statute under which their parental rights were properly terminated.

Wyo. Stat. 14-2-309(a)(iv) (2007) provides that parental rights may be terminated upon clear and convincing proof that the parent is incarcerated due to the conviction of a felony and a showing that the parent is unfit to have the custody and control of the child. It is undisputed that Mother and Father were incarcerated due to felony convictions. However, the fact of incarceration is, by itself, insufficient to establish that a person is unfit as a parent. There must still be clear and convincing evidence that Mother and Father were unfit to have custody and control of the children.

The district court must consider the parents’ fitness at the time of the hearing on the petition to terminate parental rights, because the “statute unambiguously requires a finding of present unfitness.” However, evidence of their fitness at earlier times need not be overlooked. By itself, such evidence may not be sufficient to justify the termination of parental rights. Evidence of past behavior is, however, plainly relevant in determining current parental fitness. The evidence concerning their past parenting behavior demonstrates clearly and convincingly that Mother and Father were unfit. Mother and Father had been convicted on charges that included the manufacture of methamphetamine in the presence of the children. Convictions for crimes involving harm to or endangerment of children are strongly indicative that the parents are unfit to have custody and control of their children.

The parents assert that, while incarcerated, they made efforts toward rehabilitation and improving their parenting skills. Both Mother and Father testified that they had completed parenting classes, attended drug addiction therapy sessions, and participated in other beneficial classes and programs. Mother was working toward her GED. Father was working toward an associate’s degree in carpentry. In accordance with the applicable standard of review, however, this evidence must be discounted somewhat because Mother and Father were the unsuccessful parties below. Examining the evidence in a light favorable to DFS, the prevailing party below, there is clear and convincing evidence that the parents’ efforts yielded little progress in enhancing their fitness as parents. The guardian ad litem urges that the parents were clearly and convincingly shown to be unfit. The parents’ responses to questioning, she says, indicate that they have gained no insight into parenting and have not acquired the tools to parent. The parents appear completely oblivious to the responsibilities of parenting.

A review of the record reveals that neither Mother nor Father presented testimony or other evidence indicating that they had achieved any comparable changes or improvements. What the record does contain is proof that Mother and Father were incarcerated on felony charges relating to the endangerment of the children, evidence of their past parenting failures, and indications that their parenting skills have not improved since then. Together, this evidence provided the district court with clear and convincing proof that Mother and Father were incarcerated due to the conviction of a felony and, at the time of the hearing, were unfit to have custody or control of the children. Their parental rights were properly terminated pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iv).

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the opinion for the court.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/nx2rj7 .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it is issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation to a quote the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion will need to have the reporter page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation from this, or any future opinion using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library and we will provide any needed assistance]

Cloud Computing - Technology Savior or Privacy Nightmare?

Cloud computing and the concept of SaaS (Software as a Service) are some newish techno terms you may be hearing more of in the last few years. Even if you haven't heard these terms, odds are you may be actually participating in cloud computing. If you use an online email service (for example, Google Mail (gmail) or Yahoo), you are definitely flying in the cloud.

Wikipedia defines cloud computing as "a style of computing in which dynamically scalable and often virtualized resources are provided as a service over the Internet". That reads more or less like Greek to me, so I found a better definition from Dennis Kennedy in his blog post "Nine Legal Technology Trends for 2009 - The Year of Hunkering Down".

4. Get Your head into the Cloud. You will hear even more talk about “cloud computing” and “software as a service” (SaaS) in 2009. In simplest terms, I’m referring to ways both programs and data can be hosted and managed on the Internet through a third-party provider.

Are you using Google Apps or Docs? How about Microsoft Live or Zoho? These are all third-party service providers that hold your information on the Internet (the cloud) through their servers.

As Kennedy mentions in his short description of cloud computing and SaaS, these options provide several benefits (inexpensive, not needing to invest in expensive software and hardware, as well as technology expertise). However, there are also concerns, client privacy being one of the biggies.

One of today's articles from Law.com's Legal Technology addresses some of the legal issues surrounding cloud computing. "Cloud Computing Brings New Legal Challenges" by Shari Claire Lewis begins with a timeline of sorts describing the evolution of storing data, beginning with holding and controlling all data on-site and eventually growing into the option of lessening costs by outsourcing application usage and information storage to third-party providers. Lewis then moves right into the issues of data confidentiality, noting that "[a]s with other forms of "outsourcing," businesses' duties to protect private or confidential data do not end with their transfer of the data to third-party vendors for storage or processing." Lewis also points to other concerns in how cloud computing can effect pretrial discovery, especially electronic discovery. She concludes that:

As with many issues of technology, counsel will need to understand not just the legal precedent concerning cloud servers, but also the particular facts concerning their business' use of cloud servers, the type of data that is stored in the cloud, and the location and document retention practices of the service provider.

Collection Update #5

Finally, the reporters are on the shelves! At this point, all current legal research materials are back in the library and on the shelves. Coming soon from storage will be our remaining historical materials: treatises, federal government documents, and the British collection.

Here is what we have on the shelves so far: treatises, Wyoming legislative information, reporters, current and historic state statutes, ALRs, digests, CFRs, and Federal Registers.

Free Online Seminar: BriefTools & CiteAdvisor: An Integrated Document Review System

For those of you who have Westlaw access, here's a free training opportunity from Westlaw. And if you don't have Westlaw access in your office or home, you can use the law library's free public Westlaw access!

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Sign up for this informative online seminar that will illustrate how to use West BriefTools and West CiteAdvisor to quickly and easily produce accurate and perfectly formatted legal documents.

Some tips you'll learn include:

• Assure your brief cites only good law
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• Give yourself an advantage in monitoring the status of authority that your opposition cites
• How to format legal citations within briefs, motions, decisions, opinions, and law review articles
• Selecting your jurisdiction and the formatting rules (i.e. Bluebook) you want to follow
• Building and inserting tables of authorities
  

Plus, since it's a live, interactive seminar, you'll have a chance to ask questions.

Registration is simple. Select a day and time that works best for you, then click on it to sign up:

Webinar Times
Tuesday, July 7, 2009, 10AM Central Standard Time
Thursday, July 9, 2009, 2PM Central Standard Time

If you're not available for this seminar, or if you'd prefer a one-on-one teleconference regarding your specific research needs, please call 1-800-328-0109 to speak with your dedicated attorney trainer for training.