Summary 2009 WY 143

Summary of Decision issued November 23, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Horse Creek Conservation District and Phase 23, LLC v. State

Citation: 2009 WY 143

Docket Number: S-08-0200

Appeal from the District Court of Goshen County, the Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge.

Representing Appellant Horse Creek: Curtis B. Buchhammer, Buchhammer & Kehl, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Ryan T. Schelhaas, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Brandi Lee Monger, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State ruling that pursuant to an agreement between Horse Creek Conservation District (HCCD) and the State, the public has a perpetual right of recreational use access to HCCD property adjacent to the Hawk Springs Reservoir.

Statutory Provisions Pertaining to Public Access: Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-2-216 through -218 provided State funding for the reconstruction of Hawk Springs Reservoir. It included a provision expressly pertaining to public access to the reservoir and adjacent lands for recreational purposes. The Court interpreted whether public access to HCCD land adjacent to the reservoir was required. On its face, the clear language of the statute requires HCCD to grant public access to all adjacent lands. HCCD and Phase 23 argue that the public access provision was ambiguous. The Court noted the term “or” follows the phrase “all adjacent lands.” Considering the entire act pertaining to the Hawk Springs Reservoir, it was obvious to the Court that the legislature appropriated a large sum of money and in order to get full public benefit in exchange for the funding, required public access for recreational purposes. By focusing on the public recreation potential and expressly identifying “hunting, fishing, and general recreation” as the purposes of the public access, the legislature clearly intended for HCCD to grant broad, as opposed to narrow or limited, public access to the area.
Contractual Provisions Pertaining to Public Access: The Court’s case law is clear that in interpreting contracts, the Court must take into account relevant statutes. The statutory agreement expressly referred to the statutes providing funding for the rehabilitation of the Hawk Springs Reservoir making the rationale for interpreting the agreement in the context of the statutes even stronger. Section 41-2-218(b)(ii)(G) required HCCD as a condition of receiving funding for the project to provide public access to all of its lands adjacent to the reservoir. The statutes had the practical effect of making HCCD lands adjacent to the reservoir “public lands” at least for recreation purposes. Thus the clear language of the agreement, when interpreted in accordance with the relevant statutes, provided that HCCD was required to grant public access to its lands adjacent to the reservoir. The Court recognized the potential for future problems resulting from the project agreement’s failure to mirror the statutory language. It therefore remanded to the district court for reformation of the project agreement language to conform more closely to the statutory language.
Legal Description: HCCD argued next that the public access provision was void because the area encumbered was not delineated by a specific legal description. The Court’s question was whether the description of the lands “adjacent” to the reservoir was sufficient to locate property encumbered by the public access interest. The plain and ordinary meaning of the words controls. The Court concluded that the plain meaning of “adjacent” was sufficiently definite to allow the encumbered property to be located. In addition, the Court noted that a basic tenet of statutory construction is that a specific statute will control over a general statute covering the same subject. In the instant case, if the Court were not to rule so, it would be undermining the legislature’s clear intent that by appropriating substantial funds for the rehabilitation of the Hawk Springs Reservoir, it required perpetual public access to all HCCD land adjacent to the reservoir.
Rule Against Perpetuities: The Rule does not apply when the interest has already vested as in the instant case. The public access interest vested upon adoption of the statutes and the project agreement.
Bona Fide Purchaser: Phase 23 claimed it should not be bound by the public access interest because the interest was not a matter of public record and it was a bona fide purchaser. The Court noted their decision in Bentley where it stated that § 34-1-120 does not apply to executory contracts because they do not fall within the applicable definition of a “conveyance” in § 34-1-120. Phase 23 simply has an equity interest in the property and will not receive a conveyance of the property from HCCD until the contract is fully performed. Because the contract was executory, there has been no conveyance of the property and § 34-1-120 provides no remedy to Phase 23.

Conclusion: The statutes providing for rehabilitation of the Hawk Springs Reservoir specifically required HCCD to grant public access to its lands adjacent to the reservoir. When the project agreement is interpreted in the context of the Statutes it unambiguously provides for public access. However, because the contractual language does not mirror the statutory language, the Court remanded for application of the equitable power of reformation to conform the contractual language to the statutes. The Court further concluded that as a matter of law, the rule against perpetuities did not apply to the public access interest because it was fully vested.
Phase 23 was also bound by the public access interest even though it was not recorded in the public record. Phase 23 is not entitled to relief under the recording statute because it had not received a conveyance of property from HCCD and it had actual notice of the public’s access interest precluding it from being a bona fide purchaser.

Affirmed and remanded.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

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