Summary 2010 WY 12

Summary of Decision issued February 9, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Boyer-Gladden v. Deputy Sheriff Hill

Citation: 2010 WY 12

Docket Number: S-09-0102

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge.

Representing Appellant Boyer-Gladden: Bernie Q. Phelan, The Phelan Law Firm, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee Hill: Kay Lynn Bestol of Sundahl, Powers, Kapp & Martin, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee Glick: Nancy D. Freudenthal and Mark Stewart of Davis & Cannon, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming; Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Theodore R. Racines, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Boyer-Gladden claimed that while she was a pretrial detainee in the Laramie County Detention Facility, she was sexually assaulted by a detention deputy.

WGCA claim: The sexual assault occurred on Nov. 9, 2004. Boyer-Gladden’s claim was presented to Laramie County on June 15, 2006, well within the two-year period mandated by § 1-39-113(a). Boyer-Gladden filed her complaint in district court on Dec. 22, 2006 but the deputy was not served until Oct. 5, 2007. Consequently, the suit was not commenced within the one-year statutory period. The state law tort claims against the deputy under WGCA were time-barred.
State law tort claim (Hill): The district court initially denied the deputy’s motion for summary judgment on this claim on the ground that sexual assault was outside the deputy’s scope of duties. After the Krenning decision, the district court reconsidered and granted summary judgment finding that Boyer-Gladden consistently pled and argued that the deputy was acting within the course and scope of his duties and that the WGCA was applicable. The Court found that decision to be correct as it applied to the only state law tort claim appealed (for intentional infliction of emotional distress.) The statute of limitations governing WGCA was correctly applied. Both this case and Krenning are concerned with what was pled rather than what was done.
Federal civil rights claim (Hill): The Court concluded that the § 1983 claim against the deputy was made in his personal capacity rather than his official capacity. Therefore, the summary judgment granted to the deputy on the claim was reversed because it was based upon the district court’s conclusion that there was no evidence the deputy had violated a custom or policy of the county or the sheriff’s office. Such evidence is not required to show a personal-capacity violation of § 1983.
State law tort claims (Glick): There was no evidence in the record that the sheriff, within the scope of his own duties negligently hired or supervised the deputy, or failed to enact reasonable rules for the protection of inmates. In fact, the only evidence in regard to the accusations was that sexual contact between detention deputies and inmates violated the rules of the sheriff’s office, that the deputy had been trained under those rules, and that the sheriff had no knowledge of the deputy’s conduct until after the fact and that the sheriff immediately suspended and then terminated the deputy’s employment. Neither the sheriff nor the county was liable for the tortuous conduct of the deputy because that conduct did not occur within the deputy’s scope of duties and neither the sheriff nor the county was liable for the conduct of the sheriff even though within the scope of his duties, because his conduct was not tortuous.
Federal civil rights claim (Glick): Boyer-Gladden’s § 1983 action against the sheriff was in his official capacity. A governmental entity cannot be held liable solely on a theory of respondeat superior. A governmental entity may only be liable in quite particular circumstances. The plaintiff must demonstrate that through its deliberate conduct the municipality was the “moving force” behind the injury alleged. The sheriff was sued in his official capacity and there was no evidence that a custom or policy of the county or of the sheriff played any part in the alleged violation of Boyer-Gladden’s civil rights.

Conclusion: The Court affirmed the ruling of the district court, with the exception of the summary judgment granted on the § 1983 personal–capacity action, and the Court remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

J. Kite specially concurring, joined by J. Burke: The Justices wrote to address an issue raised by footnote 3 regarding whether failure to comply with the statute of limitations contained in § 1-39-114 deprived the court of jurisdiction. Such an analysis was unnecessary in the instant case because Boyer-Gladden’s claim was barred by her failure to file within one year of the filing of her claim as provided in § 1-39-114.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/yc9tb3o .

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